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Contemporary India has a troubled history of sporadic blood-letting in gruesome 
episodes of mass violence which targets men, women and sometimes children 
because of their religious identity. The Indian Constitution unequivocally guarantees 
equal legal rights, equal protection and security to religious minorities.  However, 
the Indian State’s record of actually upholding the assurances in the secular 
democratic Constitution has been mixed.  This study tries to map, understand and 
evaluate how effectively the State in free India has secured justice for victims of mass 
communal violence. It does so by relying primarily on the State’s own records 
relating to four major episodes of mass communal violence, using the powerful 
democratic instrument of the Right to Information Act 2005. In this way, it tries to 
hold up the mirror to governments, public authorities and institutions, to human 
rights workers and to survivors themselves.  
 
Since Independence, India has seen scores of group attacks on people targeted 
because of their religious identity1. Such violence is described in South Asia as 
communal violence. While there is insufficient rigorous research on numbers of 
people killed in religious massacres, one estimate suggests that 25,628 lives have 
been lost (including 1005 in police firings)2.  The media has regularly reported on this 
violence, citizens’ groups have documented grave abuses and State complicity in 
violence, and government-appointed commissions of inquiry have gathered 
extensive evidence on it from victims, perpetrators and officials. Despite this, it has 
been remarkably difficult to hold perpetrators and State authorities accountable for 




                                                        
1 A.A. Engineer, Communal Riots after Independence: A Comprehensive Account (Delhi: Shipra, 
2004). 
2 B. Rajeshwari, Communal Riots in India: A Chronology (1947-2003) (Delhi: Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, 2004).  
Many of those who are engaged with this study have experience of working directly 
with survivors of mass communal violence, and learning from the narratives and 
experience of victim survivors. There is also a fairly large body of information -  
reports of judicial commissions,  investigations by civil rights groups, academic 
research and journalism - available on episodes of mass communal violence. All of 
these suggest a recurring pattern of structural injustice and impunity leading up to, 
during and in the aftermath of such mass violence. These lay out the broad 
hypothesis of this study, which we tried to test against the State’s own records.  
 
The study does not investigate the build-up and prevention of episodes of mass 
communal violence. It focusses on the access of victims to protection, justice and 
reparation after communal violence.  In summary our hypothesis is that the Indian 
State has failed, in very large measure, to prosecute perpetrators, to account for its 
own failures, to compensate victims, and to tell citizens about what it did or did not 
do. We seek in this study to verify this hypothesis, by excavating the State’s own 
records.  
 
There are many related questions which this forensic examination of public records 
connected with the conduct of various State institutions during and after major 
episodes of mass communal violence seeks answers to. What leads to this recurring 
failure to secure justice in successive religious massacres?   What is the nature of the 
State’s failure, the extent and contours of this failure, the areas where it recurs and 
the areas where it is unique to or particularly pronounced after certain episodes of 
mass communal violence. Citizen human rights groups, victim groups and 
researchers have documented many episodes of mass violence. However, we believe 
that in anatomizing the State’s response to mass violence, the extraction of official 
records from the conventional determined secrecy of public institutions, and their 
careful scrutiny and analysis would perhaps add another dimension both to the 
chronicling of and efforts to prevent the recurrence of such violence.  
 
International law lays down that States owe victims of gross human rights violations 
reparation3, and reparation includes (1) access to justice in the form of criminal 
                                                        
3 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
prosecution, (2) access to truth, and (3) material and non-material restitution.  The 
Indian State has failed victims of mass violence on all these counts.  We felt that the 
State’s failure to make its own performance public was tied to its multiple failures to 
make reparations. 
 
In this spirit, we thought it important to examine the official record, to analyse what 
it reveals about how the Indian State responded to episodes of mass violence.  We 
look in particular at (a) the State’s efforts to prosecute people responsible for mass 
violence, (b) the State’s attempts to hold complicit or remiss public officials 
accountable and (c) the State’s measures to compensate victims of mass violence.   
 
All governments tend to work in a culture of secrecy. This tendency to withhold 
official information from public inspection is aggravated when the State is itself 
subject to intense scrutiny for the performance of its duties. Arguably the most 
significant administrative reform in India since Independence to deepen democracy 
has been the passage of a very progressive and strong Right to Information law in 
2005. This has legally created duties of public officials at every level to share most 
official information and documents with any citizen who seeks these, and in fact to 
actively place in the public domain a lot of information even when it is not 
specifically sought.  This law has spurred an enormous amount of civic action, 
mainly to interrogate the financial probity of official actions. This current study seeks 
to extend this scrutiny consciously to official actions to protect the life and property 
of citizens in major episodes of targeted mass communal violence. Unlike the largest 
volume of right to information activism which has enquired into public corruption, 
this seeks to place the spotlight for public examination on public action to secure 
protection and justice for all citizens regardless of their religious identity. It 
interrogates all institutions of justice – the civil magistracy, the police, and the courts. 
It strives to examine, in the final analysis, the success of the executive and judicial 
arms of governments to uphold the pledges of the secular democratic Constitution of 
India.        
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Humanitarian Law: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 21 March 
2006, A/RES/60/147, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4721cb942.html  
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This study investigates the State’s record in the aftermath of what we describe as 
‘mass communal violence’.   Below, we lay out the scope and method of our inquiry.  
In Section A, we discuss what we mean by communal violence and mass violence.  In 
Section B, we describe the sources of information upon which we relied, and discuss 
our focus on the information contained in official records.  In Section C, we explain 
how and why we chose the four episodes of mass communal violence that this study 
looks at.   In Section D, we explain the three dimensions of the State’s performance 
that we examined.   
 
A. Defining mass communal violence 
 
1. Communal violence 
 
This study looks at violence where the victims are targeted because they were known 
or are presumed to belong to a particular religious community.  Such violence which 
targets people specifically because of their religious identity is commonly referred to 
as ‘communal violence’5 in India, and in the course of the study, we frequently refer 
to it as such.     
 
2. Defining mass violence 
 
Mass violence has proved difficult to define precisely.  We use the term to describe 
an instance or episode where a large number of people are violently attacked and are 
killed, injured, displaced from their homes, or suffer financial loss as a result of 
attacks on their homes, possessions and businesses, or are reduced to living in fear.  
Many victims of mass violence suffer multiple types of harm. Mass violence 
                                                        
4 Researched and written by Surabhi Chopra 
5 For a discussion of the term “communalism” in the Indian context, see A. Vanaik, The Furies of 
Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity and Secularization (London: Verso, 1997) 33-34.   
encompasses massacres – the violent killing of large numbers of people – but 
includes violence other than murder as well.  Having said that, the episodes of mass 
violence covered in this study are massacres, in that in each of these, significant 
numbers of people were killed.  We do not look specifically at genocidal violence, 
where the avowed motive of organisers and participants is the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, the targeted group6.  We look at violence where people were 
targetted because of their religious persuasion, which includes but is not restricted to 
genocidal violence.   In this sense, this is a study of ‘mass communal violence’. 
 
3. The question of numbers 
 
When studying mass violence, questions about numbers are the elephant in the 
room.  Does mass violence imply a certain number of fatalities amongst the targeted 
group?  Is the number of perpetrators important?  Coster, for instance, argues that 
mass killing by a single killer is not massacre7.  Mass violence, as we use it, implies a 
large number of victims relative to the local context, who suffer various types of 
harm individually and simultaneously; it also implies a significant number of direct 
perpetrators.  However, rather than pinning down a minimum amount of harm, we 
have relied on a more commonsense idea of scale when identifying episodes as mass 
violence.  The episodes we examine, including mass violence in Gujarat in 2002, 
Bhagalpur in 1989, Delhi in 1984, and Nellie in 1983, will not challenge any 
reasonable reader’s understanding of mass violence8.  
 
Rather than focusing entirely on the number of fatalities, we identified two features 
of mass violence that we considered most salient.  The first is that violence unfolds 
within readily identifiable spatial and temporal limits. Violence is inflicted within a 
                                                        
6 Article 2, UN General Assembly, Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, A/RES/260, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f0873.html [accessed 8 
January 2012].  
7 W. Coster in M. Levene, “Introduction,” in The Massacre in History, eds. M. Levene, and P. Roberts 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 6. 
8 Other episodes we considered looking at, such as the violence in Marad in 2002, involved fewer 
deaths, but considerable displacement and property damage.  A mention of the body count may not 
shock the reader, but when we considered the impact of this episode in the round and in its context, we 
felt it should be treated as mass violence, and the State’s reaction to it should be evaluated in this light. 
relatively concentrated span of time, and within a limited, though not defined, 
geographical area.  The second is what Levene identifies as a ‘critical ingredient of 
massacre’: 
The relationship at the point of delivery between those killing and those 
being killed.  A massacre is when a group of…people lacking in self defence, 
at least at that moment, are killed – usually by another group…who have the 
physical means, the power, with which to undertake the killing without 
physical danger to themselves9.   
 
We have examined four episodes of mass violence where, by and large, victims were 
outnumbered, unarmed, and lacked the wherewithal to escape violence.   
   
We were influenced by the definition of Crimes against Humanity in Article 7 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which provides that crimes against 
humanity may be committed either as part of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack 
against a civilian population.  Thus, while identity based violence on a large scale 
clearly falls into the category of mass violence, relatively smaller scale attacks also 
fall into this category where the violence is planned, directed, primarily one-sided, 
and where the State fails to step in and make serious attempts to control violence.   
 
We have generally avoided describing such violence as a ‘riot’.  While in its original 
meaning, a riot describes violent public disorder involving a group or crowd, to the 
Indian ear, the words ‘communal riot’ tends to suggest a more or less spontaneous, 
and a more or less equally matched, clash between two groups. This term erases the 
role of the State in enabling such violence to occur, and the role of political groups in 
inciting the violence and manufacturing tension between religious communities. It is 
for this reason that we believe that the term ‘communal riot’ does not accurately 
describe the character of mass communal violence which we investigate in this 
study.  
 
                                                        
9 M. Levene, “Introduction,” in The Massacre in History, eds. M. Levene, and P. Roberts (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 1999), 5. 
4. What we do not do 
 
This study does not focus on the State’s actions in the build-up to mass communal 
violence, but on its occurrence and aftermath.  We also do not examine why or how 
these episodes of mass violence took place.  This exclusion was the necessary 
outcome of the principal methodology of this study – of excavating and examining 
official records. State records – except possibly intelligence reports which are 
exempted from Right to Information disclosure – will not typically capture the slow 
build-up to violence, the creation and cultivation of hatred between religious 
communities, the processes of ghettoisation and structural discrimination that 
accompany it.  Similarly, the mechanics of the actual violence, its planning and 
preparation also belong to the informal, rather than formal, public sphere. We 
restrict ourselves instead to State actions which can be assessed directly from 
officially mandated public records.       
 
Examining the State’s record through the State’s records 
 
5. Why do official records matter? 
 
As discussed earlier, this study tries to understand and evaluate the State’s 
performance in providing victims of mass violence access to justice by relying 
primarily on the State’s own records.    
 
The massacres we look at in this study represent a serious failure by the State to 
perform one of its most basic duties – protecting all citizens, regardless of their 
religious or other identities, from physical (and psychological) harm.  Therefore, we 
would argue that the State’s response to such failure, what it did or did not do in 
response to mass violence, is important information in itself, and that citizens should 
be able to examine. This information reveals the extent to which, after failing in its 
basic duty to protect citizens from violence, the State failed to perform its other core 
duty – punishing perpetrators of violence; and extending reparations and assistance 
to victim survivors to rebuild their lives with restored social relations and credible 
assurance of non-recurrence.   
 
Beyond the basic facts that official records reveal, we hypothesized that sifting 
through records on different episodes of violence could help to identify specific 
points of weakness in government systems, laws, rules, processes and institutions.  
That the State fails is clear. We began this study hoping that the State’s records 
would help to better understand the nature and specific details of the State’s failure.  
 
In the aftermath of violence against minorities, individuals and groups have 
documented the State’s failures and the victims’ suffering, and these efforts have 
been invaluable in efforts to hold the State accountable.  These reports also make an 
important contribution to the historical record, and towards ensuring that a religious 
massacre is not erased from public memory and history. However, we felt strongly 
that the historical record is partial unless it includes official records.  And by official 
records, we mean not the public statements of press officers or elected officials, 
which generally aim to protect individuals holding high political office, and mollify 
or undermine critics.  We mean, instead, the multiple, often intersecting records 
generated by public authorities tasked with responding to violence and responding 
to victims of violence.    
 
Records generated by State agencies are an important part of the historical record in 
their own right. They can also serve to correct public perception, where the 
government’s public statements are at odds with what its agencies and officials 
actually did on the ground.  Thus, these records can reveal failures that governments 
may try to conceal through polished public statements. 
 
Where an official record resorts to euphemism, and aims to obscure, it conceals 
factual information but telegraphs the public authority’s efforts to hide its failures.  
When witness statements by scores of victims have several paragraphs in common, 
as after the Nelle massacre, this hints at a coordinated effort to conceal what actually 
happened to each individual. Whether documents produced for external 
consumption are easy to fathom or opaque, easily available or elusive, tells us 
something about the extent to which a public body wants to ease the survivor’s 
recovery.   When official records never leave the confines of State institutions, when 
they are withheld from victims and the public at large, they testify to practical 
recourse being withheld from victims, as well as the lack of a principled accounting 
for why mass violence occurs.  
 
6. A note on the State 
 
So far, and in the chapters that follow, we refer frequently to ‘the State’ - the ‘State’s’ 
actions, failures, accountability or lack thereof.  We use ‘the State’ as formulaic 
shorthand for the spectrum of official entities that are engaged in some way during 
and after mass violence.  Through the report we will attempt to refer specifically to 
the different governments, Central and state, and within them the particular public 
authority or public official or institution seized of the issue under discussion. The 
State in our description in the pages of this report includes within itself institutions 
and authorities like the executive magistracy, police, prosecution, judges and courts. 
More fundamentally, however, while we use the convenient shorthand of referring 
to the State, we recognize that this describes what Abrams refers to as ‘an ensemble 
of institutionalized political power’10, comprising different entities with varied 
responsibilities, powers, agendas, priorities, institutional cultures and influence, 
which often compete and conflict with one another.  
 
7. Sources of information 
 
a) Generated by the State 
We draw primarily upon material generated by State processes, administrative, 
judicial, and legislative, and by State-appointed Commissions of Inquiry.  This 
includes, inter alia, administrative records, reports by Commissions of Inquiry and 
Action Taken Reports tabled by state governments on the findings of some of these 
Commissions, court judgments, materials placed before trial and appeal courts, 
reports by national and State commissions on human rights, minorities, and women, 
and Parliamentary and legislative assembly debates.   
                                                        
10 P. Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no.1 
(1988): 58-89, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.1988.tb00004.x. 
Some of this material, such as Supreme Court and High Court judgments, is already 
in the public domain.  We sought other information under the Right to Information 
Act 2005 (‘Right to Information Act’).  Some material is ostensibly in the public 
domain, so applying for it under the Right to Information Act seemed moot, but has, 
in fact, been extremely difficult to access. Parliamentary and state legislative 
assembly debates in particular fall into this category of material where we faced 
practical logistical difficulties. While publicly available in theory, Parliamentary 
debates are available online only from 2004 onwards; older debates are available in 
the Parliament library, but gaining access to the library is cumbersome.  Assembly 
debates for Assam, Delhi, Bihar and Gujarat are not available online.  The national 
Parliament library does not have a comprehensive collection of State Assembly 
debates.   
It follows from our reliance on official material that the depth of our research on each 
massacre depended upon how much material Central and state Governments 
created on it, how much of this material various public authorities retained over 
time, and how much material public authorities actually disclosed to us.   Chapter 2 
discusses in more depth our experience of trying to extract information on mass 
violence using the Right to Information Act, the problems we faced and the strategies 
we used. More generally, we believe that understanding the State’s role during mass 
violence and its response to victims of such violence depends upon reportage and 
commentary by independent observers, but also on access to uncensored archival 
evidence that scholars can evaluate.  An important question this research forced us to 
confront was whether, in India, such access exists.  While not completely negative, 
our experience was sobering.  
b) Generated by non-State actors 
We have also drawn upon civil society reports and academic work on the massacres 
studied, and to a lesser extent, journalistic accounts.  This material is referenced, and 
we use it to interrogate any marked differences between official record and the 
findings of civil society reports, as well as to fill in detail that the official record 
leaves out.  Relatively recent violence, such as in Gujarat in 2002, unfolded before 
television cameras, and has been covered and debated in the media ever since.  A 
large number of citizen’s groups visited Gujarat in the immediate aftermath of 
violence in 2002, and documented what they saw.  Older massacres, in Nellie in 1983 
and in Bhagalpur in 1989, are not documented anywhere near so comprehensively 
by journalists, human rights groups and academics. The 1984 anti-Sikh violence in 
Delhi in the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s assassination is the exception – its 
particular context and location meant that there was more media and civil society 
coverage at the time, and in the years that followed.   
 
8. What about the victims? 
 
We have not done field research amongst survivors of mass violence in 1983, 1984, 
1989 and 2002.  Team members have visited massacre sites and interacted with 
survivors, and families of victims in Nellie and Delhi during the course of the study, 
but not in their capacity as researchers. However, the impressions they formed 
during these visits have inevitably influenced them, and how they approached the 
material gathered during the study.  Similarly, we have spoken at length with 
lawyers and activists advocating for victims of these massacres, but not formally 
interviewed them. Where we refer to a fact or opinion we learned from them, we 
identify this explicitly.   
 
In Gujarat, the Centre for Equity Studies has worked with survivors of mass violence 
in Gujarat for several years, through a programme called Nyayagraha.  Since 
Nyayagraha is intensely engaged in Gujarat in excavating records under Right to 
Information as part of efforts to secure justice for the victim survivors, we could not 
artificially separate the seeking of official records from our on-going engagement 
with victim perspectives and narratives.  In this sense, the Gujarat chapter stands on 
a slightly different footing from the rest of the study.   We have tried, as far as 
possible, to identify and reference information about events or individuals that 
comes exclusively from Nyayagraha’s work.  The first-hand experience of 
Nyayagraha lawyers and community justice workers in Gujarat shaped our 
understanding of the aftermath of massacre, particularly in Gujarat, and shaped the 
Right to Information questions we asked.   
 
The central focus of this particular study was on official records, and not on victim 
narratives.  That said, there are limits to what we can learn from official records, 
limits to how acutely we read the records and very clear limits to how far we 
understand the gap between what is recorded and what actually plays out when a 
victim of violence interacts with the police, or the local health centre, the courts, or 
the district headquarters where he or she applies for compensation. While sensible to 
these limits, we felt strongly that analyzing the official account without analyzing the 
survivor’s lived experience was a worthwhile endeavour. Much of the existing 
commentary and analysis of these four episodes of mass violence, but also mass 
violence in India more generally, focuses on survivors in the immediate aftermath of 
violence. Some academic analyses rely heavily on media coverage of religious 
violence11.  However, we did not find much material that scrutinized the State’s own 
records in any depth.  We believe that this is a significant gap, and this study is a 
small attempt to bridge this.  The Centre for Equity Studies hopes to build upon this 
study in the future, combining what the official record reveals with field research 
and victim support services amongst survivors of mass violence. 
  
B. Which episodes of mass violence? 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study looks at four massacres since 1980.  There have been 
many episodes of religious mass violence since Independence, and we debated how 
to choose which episodes to study.  This is not a choice that lends itself easily to a 
traditional social science method such as random sampling.  It is difficult to get 
reliable information about mass violence.  State records are not public (and, given the 
subject matter, need to be carefully interrogated).  Official statistics, to the extent they 
exist, are unreliable. Varshney points out, for example, that government statistics on 
communal violence seem to be inconsistent12.  State governments often provide data 
on communal ‘incidents’, not communal ‘riots’ or ‘violence’, but do not use a 
standard definition of that term.  So for example, a large ‘riot’ might contain forty 
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‘incidents’ according to official statistics, but be regarded as a single episode by the 
media or by those affected13.  In addition, different State governments appear to 
adopt different definitions of a communal incident, and Varshney notes that some 
States seem to adopt a narrow definition, while others include a wider range of 
situations within the ambit of that term.   
 
There are very few academic accounts that survey a large number of episodes of 
mass violence. Most accounts focus on violence in a particular region, or violence 
between or against particular communities14. One of the few attempts to 
comprehensively document communal violence involving Hindus and Muslims 
since 1947 relied on English language newspapers for its information, and limits 
itself to documenting deaths, properties destroyed, and locations of violence15.  
Moreover, as the authors acknowledge, this information is refracted through the 
errors and biases of the reporters who originally covered these events.  So, it is 
difficult to come by a comprehensive account of a range of episodes of mass violence.  
Media reports can be unreliable, not least because identity-based violence is typically 
described as a ‘riot’, which can refer to a clash between different groups, but is also 
used to describe targeted attacks by one group on another, and where the targeted 
groups sustains the vast majority of personal and material harm.  For our purposes, 
we could not securely rely upon material that potentially conflated these two types 
of violence.    
 
Were a reliable catalogue of mass violence available, we suspect that an objective 
criterion for choosing which episodes to study would still have eluded us.  We 
would have been reluctant to sift by body count, since we chose to focus on whether 
violence was systematic as much as on whether it was widespread.  While deaths 
and property damage could be used as a proxy for whether violence was systematic 
and targeted, this would involve subjective judgments.  In light of this, we chose to 
be unabashedly subjective about which episodes of mass violence we have looked at.  
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Since we are focusing on the State’s response to mass violence, and we are relying 
heavily on the State’s own records, we feel strongly that these subjective choices do 
not prevent us from fairly evaluating the State’s performance and identifying 
systemic points of weakness. 
 
In our choices, we tried to make sure we included episodes of mass violence that 
took place in different parts of India, at different times after 1980, under different 
political regimes. Accessing official records before 1980 would have been very 
difficult.  The authors of this study have varying degrees of connection to the four 
episodes we finally chose to focus on (after extended and passionate debate).  Two 
team members have worked intensively for many years with survivors of the 2002 
violence in Gujarat. One member of the research team has visited and interacted with 
survivors of violence in Nellie before this study began.  One member of the team has 
interacted with survivors of the violence against Sikhs in Delhi in 1984.  In 
Bhagalpur, none of us had any previous work experience or personal connections, 
but one member had documented a case study there of a survivor’s long fight for 
justice.  
 
Beyond this subjective engagement, we explain our rationale for choosing each of the 
four episodes of mass violence we chose finally to examine as part of this study.  
 
1. Nellie 1983 
 
The Nellie massacre in February 1983 needs to be understood in the context of 
violence across Assam in 1983, and the anti-immigrant agitation from 1979 to 1984.  It 
was by far the biggest violent episode during the agitation, and one of the most 
extreme and gruesome instances of communal violence in India since 
Independence16.  Official estimates say that 1800 people were killed during the Nellie 
violence, in the course of one morning; unofficial estimates put the number of deaths 
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at 3300.  The scale of destruction made this a compelling episode to study.  Complete 
and formal immunity for perpetrators also made it a necessary choice.  In 1985, as a 
result of the Assam Accord, the State Government dropped cases against those 
charged with violent crimes during the Assam agitation, including those charged 
with offences in relation to the Nellie massacre.  This was in effect, a complete 
amnesty, and may in part be why Nellie seems, to an extent, a forgotten episode of 
mass violence17 despite its scale.  Victims of the Nellie massacre have received, over 
the years, far less compensation than victims of, for example, the 1984 anti-Sikh 
violence.  
 
2. Delhi 1984   
 
On October 31, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards shot and killed her.  
In the three days following her assassination, Sikhs were attacked across Delhi; 3000 
people were killed, and large numbers of Sikh homes and businesses destroyed. 
These attacks were not limited to Delhi.  However, the toll on people and property 
was highest in Delhi, the national capital which (unlike, say, Nellie in Assam) was 
well served with police forces and communications infrastructure, hosted the Army’s 
headquarters, as well as the head offices of major newspapers. The scale of the 1984 
violence, which targeted poorer Sikhs with the greatest virulence, but unusually, did 
not spare middle-class and rich Sikh neighbourhoods, make it important to study.  
The fact that such extreme violence unspooled in a city where the means to control it 
undoubtedly existed pointed to a substantial degree of State support for the 
attackers.  In the years that followed, many survivors testified before several 
commissions and committees of inquiry, but relatively few trials against perpetrators 
were litigated.  Political functionaries from the Congress known to have participated 
in the violence have enjoyed substantial protection – Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish 
Tytler, for example, were nominated as candidates in Delhi in the most recent 
Parliamentary elections before public protest forced them to withdraw.  The official 
record on the 1984 anti-Sikh violence was likely to offer a perspective on how 
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government machinery allows a high level of impunity for those involved in mass 
crimes.  
 
3. Bhagalpur 1989  
 
In 1989, Hindu right-wing political groups were organizing “shilanyas processions” 
across North India, which involved carrying consecrated bricks to build a Ram 
temple in Ayodhya, where a mosque built by the Mughal emperor, Babar stood, 
allegedly at the site of Rama’s birthplace. In Bhagalpur, Bihar, violence broke out 
during one such procession on 24 October 1989, and spread to villages surrounding 
the town.  The violence lasted for several weeks.  Over a thousand people were 
killed, most of them Muslim.  The district administration in Bhagalpur was on notice 
that tensions were running high, and had the opportunity to prepare for violence.  It 
failed to do so, and once violence spread to rural Bhagalpur, it became much harder 
to control.  We felt the Bhagalpur mass violence was important to study because of 
its scale and the active role the police allegedly played in allowing violence.  As with 
the Nellie massacre, there is very little academic research and documentation on the 
Bhagalpur violence. In light of this, we felt studying the State records were 
particularly relevant.  
 
4. Gujarat 2002 
 
We decided to examine the State’s response to the post-Godhra violence in Gujarat 
2002 because of the scale of violence, but also because of the high degree of concert 
between government forces and non-State Hindu right-wing groups.  As we 
discussed earlier, any episode of identity-based mass violence strongly implies that 
the State tolerated or supported violence.  Even so, the degree of State support in 
Gujarat was striking. The Gujarat police openly sided with violent mobs, the 
government provided no relief for victims of violence, and obstructed non-State 
efforts to provide relief.  We felt it important to study the response of a government 
that was openly hostile to the community targeted by violence.  At the same time, 
civil society and the media were very vocal about the government’s role in mass 
violence, as were the Supreme Court and the National Human Rights Commission in 
the months and years that followed.  In light of this, we thought it likely that the 
Gujarat government would have been compelled to collate a significant amount of 
information on the 2002 mass violence, which we thought important to pull into the 
public domain.   
 
C. What dimensions of accountability for mass violence? 
 
Our research looks at what steps the State took towards holding individuals and 
institutions accountable for mass violence, and we look in particular at (1) access to 
criminal justice for victims of violence, (2) whether public officials implicated in 
violence were held accountable, and (3) access to compensation and rehabilitation for 
survivors of violence.    
 
We have discussed our sources of information earlier, and mentioned that we 
deployed the Right to Information Act to apply for official records on the massacres 
we studied, as very few of these records are publicly available.  We drafted a 
common set of applications on each dimension of accountability, and sent them to 
the relevant public authorities for each of the four episodes of mass violence.  Below, 
we describe the overarching concern that guided our questions on each dimension of 
accountability that we examined.  In Chapter 2, we outline the applications we filed 
on each of these dimensions.   
1. Access to criminal justice 
 
Past experience suggests that the majority of complaints registered after religious 
massacres do not journey very far within the criminal justice system.  For example, 
after the anti-Sikh massacre in 1984, a large number of cases were closed on the 
ground that there was not enough evidence to prosecute the accused.  The cases that 
made their way through the system (and are still being fought) involved prominent 
political functionaries18.  After the Gujarat massacre in 2002 and the anti-Christian 
violence in Kandhamal in 2008, however, Indian civil society has made a concerted 
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push to pursue cases that involve ‘ordinary perpetrators’ or less extreme violence.  In 
Gujarat, for example, many victims are trying to secure justice from the lower and 
higher reaches of the State’s machinery, supported by NGOs such as Citizens for 
Justice, Jan Vikas, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, and Aman Biradari 
which has undertaken the Nyayagraha campaign.   
We know that the criminal justice system consistently fails victims of communal 
violence – the vast majority of cases are not brought to trial and a small fraction of 
acquittals are appealed.  However, we need to understand the anatomy of this 
failure.  What are the points at which the system fails?  Do we see failure of a scale 
and type that suggests systematic subversion by the police and prosecution?  Do 
these failures suggest that there are gaps in the law, or that the police lack the 
capacity to build a case against perpetrators, or that the authorities are motivated by 
bias?   These are the questions that guided our RTI applications. 
2. Accountability of public officials 
 
In the aftermath of mass atrocities, one of the State’s standard responses has been to 
appoint a judicial Commission of Inquiry, usually headed by a sitting or retired 
senior judge of the High court or the Supreme Court. These commissions can be 
appointed by Central or state legislatures and by Central or state executives.  While 
each commission we considered had its own mandate, all of them were asked to 
evaluate the government’s performance. This includes identifying negligent and 
culpable lapses by government officials, and in many cases, recommending 
administrative discipline or criminal prosecution against them.  Central and state 
governments are obliged to present reports by commissions of inquiry to the relevant 
Central or state legislature within six months of receiving a report, along with a 
memorandum of action taken in response to the report19. Despite this legal 
requirement, we found that the reports of most of these commissions are not publicly 
available. In fact, we found it difficult to obtain copies of many of these commissions, 
and finally had to resort to Right to Information applications to the Home Ministry 
and various state governments, but even these yielded the reports after considerable 
legal wrangling. It is not surprising therefore that there is little public knowledge 
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about what they recommended and even less about what followed from their 
recommendations.   
For many victims of mass violence, testifying before a commission is the closest they 
get to their day in court, because their complaints are either not recorded or 
incorrectly recorded, and their cases ‘closed’ before they are submitted for trial 
because the police claim that they are unable to gather sufficient evidence for this.  
We felt it important to enquire, in general, about the extent to which governments 
had acted on recommendations by commissions.  However, we felt it particularly 
important to check whether governments had taken action against errant officials.   
Restricting our inquiry to officials identified as remiss, negligent or complicit by 
official commissions of inquiry has some obvious limitations. Commissions of 
inquiry are appointed by the government of the day, and are likely to reflect views 
that suit the administration.  Despite this, we restricted ourselves to officials against 
whom commissions recommended action, because Central and state governments 
are legally obliged to respond to these recommendations.  The State’s legal obligation 
served as a gateway to asking about progress on commissions of inquiry.  
3. Compensation and rehabilitation 
 
Victims of mass violence lose family members, suffer physical injuries, and lose their 
homes, possessions, shops and businesses.  Past experience shows that hundreds, 
and sometimes thousands of families, have been displaced by extreme violence and 
have lived in relief camps, often for several months. As a result, people’s earnings 
suffer sharply in the short term, and it can take many years to recover from the loss 
of livelihood.    
 
India does not have national norms that apply to episodes of mass violence.  Most 
States have Relief Codes, of pre-independence pedigree, which set guidelines for 
how the State Government should respond to natural disasters, such as floods or 
famine.  Many Relief Codes also apply, or can apply, to widespread loss and damage 
caused by other forces.  However, most state governments do not apply Relief Codes 
to large-scale communal violence, and the ones that do are not necessarily consistent 
about when the Code applies.  The details of compensation given after the four 
massacres we examined, but also after other mass atrocities, are not widely available.    
 
In light of this, we wanted to establish what compensation and rehabilitation 
packages were given to victims of these four massacres, and what norms, if any, they 
pointed towards.  Did the state government announce compensation, and if so, 
when?  What types of loss do these packages cover?  Are the compensation amounts 
token payments, do they follow tort principles – restoring the person to his pre-loss 
financial situation?  Do they cover financial loss alone or include pain and suffering 
as well?  How do they compare to one another, if they can usefully be compared 
across time?   
 
D. Summing up 
 
In the next chapter, we discuss our experience using the Right to Information Act to 
extract information on mass violence.  In Chapters 3 to 6, we discuss these three 
dimensions of accountability in the aftermath of Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984, Bhagalpur 
1989 and Gujarat 2002.  In chapter 7, we draw together our findings on access to 
criminal justice across these four episodes of mass violence, and try to place them in 
the larger context of what Indian criminal procedure provides and fails to provide.   
Chapter 8 consolidates what we have learned about whether government officials 
were held appropriately accountable for failures or complicity in response to mass 
violence.  It also discusses gaps in Indian law that weaken efforts to ensure such 
accountability.   In Chapter 9, we summarise our findings from the official record on 
compensation and rehabilitation after mass violence.  We consider international 
guidelines and national benchmarks, and directions for reform in the future.  Finally, 
in Chapter 10 we present our concluding thoughts.  




In the last chapter, we described our endeavour as examining the State’s record on 
mass violence through the State’s records.  To pursue this, we sought official records 
on (1) criminal justice in the aftermath of mass violence, (2) steps to hold public 
officials accountable for such violence and (3) relief and rehabilitation for victims of 
mass violence.   
 
Some of the records we sought were easily accessible to the public, such as Supreme 
Court judgments.  Others were formally in the public domain, but practically 
difficult to access, such as legislative assembly proceedings.  Some records were 
supposed to be available, but have never been released to the public, such as “action 
taken” reports by governments in response to commissions of inquiry.  Other 
records, by their nature, are not routinely made public, such as chargesheets in a 
criminal case.  To extract official records that fell in to the last two categories, we 
used the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the RTI Act). 
 
We use the word “extract” advisedly.  Accessing information generated by State 
processes was not a matter simply of applying for and receiving official records.   It 
was fairly laborious and protracted, our applications met frequently with silence or 
rejection.  Without the legal right to information, of course, we could not have 
accessed whatever information we eventually secured.  The RTI Act was 
undoubtedly the anchor of our inquiry into the State’s record on responding to mass 
violence.  At the same time, through the applications we made, our inquiry tested the 
potential and limits of the Act in revealing information about serious violations of 
human rights.   
 
Below, we describe briefly the right and procedure the RTI Act puts in place.  We 
then outline the specific applications we made under the categories of criminal 
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justice, accountability of public officials and relief and rehabilitation for victims of 
violence.  We go on to discuss the process we used and problems we faced in using 
the Act.  Finally, we assess our experience in the round.   
 
 
B. The RTI Act: Context and mechanics 
 
When the RTI Act was passed in 2005, it upended the default position on disclosure 
of government records.  Before 2005, the colonial-era Official Secrets Act, 1923 
regulated access to official documents and, in effect, protected them from public 
disclosure.  So the default status of all official information was that it was “secret”, 
unless specifically disclosed.  The RTI Act, which emerged out of a long, grass-roots 
struggle for transparency, declared that citizens could access all official records as a 
matter of right, unless those records fell within certain excepted categories of 
information.   
 
These categories are laid out in Section 8 of the Act, which we reproduce below: 
 
“(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty 
and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of 
the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence; 
(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any 
court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of 
court; 
(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of 
Parliament or the State Legislature; 
(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual 
property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a 
third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public 
interest warrants the disclosure of such information; 
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the 
competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the 
disclosure of such information; 
(f) information received in confidence from foreign Government; 
(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical 
safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in 
confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; 
(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or 
apprehension or prosecution of offenders; 
(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, 
Secretaries and other officers: 
Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the 
material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public 
after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over; 
Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions 
specified in this section shall not be disclosed; 
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which 
has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause 
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public 
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate 
authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies 
the disclosure of such information; 
Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a 
State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. 
 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 nor any of the 
exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority 
may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
harm to the protected interests. 
 
(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any 
information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, 
occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is 
made under secton 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under 
that section: 
Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said 
period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central 
Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this 
Act.” 
 
Information that is over 20 years old is, rightly, subject to a more liberal disclosure 
regime.  It can only be withheld under the first three categories above – disclosure 
would threaten India’s sovereignty or national interest, disclosure would cause a 
breach of privilege of Parliament or a State legislature, or disclosure has been 
forbidden by a court of law or may amount to contempt of court.  For our purposes, 
this meant that information was more freely disclosable for three of the episodes of 
mass violence we were studying - Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984 and Bhagalpur 1989.   
 
The Act defines “information”21 broadly, capturing electronic and paper records 
generated by a broad range of processes and public authorities.  It also defines 
“public authority”22 broadly, covering not just the executive, legislature and 
judiciary, but also bodies that are substantially funded by the public exchequer. 
 Thus, the ambit of the Act is generous, leaving, in theory, narrow pockets of 
information that are shielded from disclosure.   
 
The Act places a strong obligation on public authorities to disclose information of 
their own accord, listing types and classes of information that have to be made 
public23.  It also allows individuals to apply for information from a public authority, 
without having to justify why they want it24.  An individual can also apply to inspect 
official records.  When a public authority receives an application, it is obliged to 
respond to the application within a month, either disclosing the information 
requested or refusing to disclose it and making clear which excepted category the 
information falls into25.  If the public authority does not hold the particular 
information requested, it is supposed to transfer the application to the public 
authority that does, and inform the applicant of the transfer.  If a public authority 
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fails to respond within a month, its silence is deemed to be a refusal.   
 
An applicant whose request for information is refused can appeal against the 
refusal26.  His or her first appeal would be decided within the public authority – the 
first appeal authority is a senior office-holder within that body.  If the first appeal 
authority upholds the initial refusal, the applicant can file a second appeal with the 
information commission, an independent tribunal whose decision is binding upon 
the public authority implicated in the appeal. Each state has a state information 
commission.  Second appeals against refusals by public authorities in the Central 
government and the government of Delhi lie with the Central Information 
Commission.  An information commission can order disclosure of information.  It 
can go beyond that, however, and impose individual penalties on officials who have 
withheld information in ways that are obstructive or malicious, or deliberately given 
incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information27.  While a 
very small proportion of the penalties imposable under the RTI Act are actually 
imposed by commissions, the prospect of a penalty arguably makes public officials 
respond to applications far more than they otherwise might28. 
 
The Act emerged out of a right to information movement in the 1990s that included 
groups working on access to socio-economic rights for the rural poor, 
environmentalists, and human rights campaigners29.  Public discussion has focused 
primarily on the Act as a tool against official corruption and inefficiency.   However, 
aside from its general applicability to the issues that concerned us, the Act also has 
specific provisions on information about human rights and civil liberties of 
                                                        
26  The procedure for first and second appeals is laid out in Section 19, The Right to 
Information Act of 2005. 
27 Section 20, The Right to Information Act of 2005. 
28 RTI Assessment and Analysis Group, and National Campaign for People’s Right to 
Information, “Revised Executive Summary”, Safeguarding the Right to Information: Report of the 
People’s RTI Assessment 2008 (“RaaG & NCPRI study 2008”).  October 2009, p. 48 [Extracted in 
Resource Pack for Regional Workshop “Towards More Open and Transparent Governance in 
South Asia”, New Delhi, 27-29 April 2010].  
29 S. Singh, “The Genesis and Evolution of the Right to Information Regime in India.” 
 Background Paper for Regional Workshop. Towards More Open and Transparent Governance in 
South Asia.  New Delhi, April 27-29, 2010.  p.7-8.   
individuals.  When an applicant applies for information relating to someone’s life 
and liberty, a public authority is obliged to disclose it within 48 hours, rather than 
the usual 30 days30.  In addition, the Act obliges even public authorities that are 
otherwise exempt from its ambit to disclose information about human rights abuses. 
 Central and State governments can exclude security and intelligence agencies from 
the RTI regime, but these agencies have to respond to applications for information 
concerning human rights31.   
 
C. Our applications 
 
Armed with this expansive right to information under Indian law, we sought 
information on the three issues discussed in Chapter 1: access to criminal justice, 
accountability of public officials and relief and rehabilitation for victims of mass 
violence.  We drafted a common set of applications on each dimension of 
accountability, and sent them to the relevant public authorities for each of the four 
episodes of mass violence32.     
 
Below, we outline what applications we filed on each issue, and why.   
1. Access to criminal justice 
We applied for information and records from the first point of contact that a victim 
would have with the criminal justice system – the local police station, through to the 
point where the accused is convicted or acquitted, and finally to decisions on appeals 
against acquittals by the courts.  We outline the questions below:   
i. Complaints and FIRs:  
We asked district police headquarters how many complaints police stations in 
                                                        
30 Proviso to Section 7 Right to Information Act of 2005  
31 Provisos to Section 24(1) and Section 24(4), Right to Information Act of 2005.  The 
information commission in any State has to approve the disclosure of such information, and it 
has to be disclosed within 45 days rather than the usual time limit of 30 days.     
32 We also applied for this information in relation to mass violence in Kandhamal, Orissa in 
2008 and Marad, Kerala in 2002 and 2003.  Although these episodes are not a part of this 
study, we draw upon our experience of applying for information on them in this chapter.  
the district received from people who suffered or witnessed violence.   We also 
asked how many FIRS, or first information reports, the police recorded.  We 
wanted to gauge how many complaints were actually reduced to FIRs – the point 
at which they officially enter the system.   We asked for copies of all the 
complaints and FIRs, so that we could analyse whether the offence had been 
accurately recorded, whether there was delay in registering the FIR (between the 
complaint and the FIR, and the actual incident and the FIR).  We also wanted to 
assess the quality of the FIR – did it record details clearly, were multiple 
incidents put in one FIR, were names of accused recorded clearly?  
ii. Sexual violence:   
We asked for the same information about complaints and FIRs on sexual 
violence.  Given that sexual violence is silenced and under-reported, we chose to 
file a specific application for information on it.   We wanted to get a sense of what 
types of acts were treated as ‘sexual violence’ by the public authorities, and by 
the same token, what legal provisions they were using to describe this violence. 
 In addition, we wanted to see how many sexual violence cases were reported, 
and juxtapose this against estimates of sexual violence from civil society reports. 
  
iii. Arrest:   
We asked for information on how many people were arrested, disaggregated by 
religion and by caste.  We wanted to get a sense of the nature of arrests.  Were 
they prompt?  Were they discriminatory, disproportionately targeting a 
particular community? 
  
iv. Remand in police custody:   
After arresting an alleged criminal, the police should press for detention in police 
custody or in jail and oppose bail, particularly where there is a risk the accused 
person is likely to commit further crimes, intimidate witnesses, or abscond.  We 
wanted to see if remand was granted more frequently in cases where the offence 
alleged was more serious, and also wanted to check if the records suggested that 
applications or grants of remand in detention seemed biased against a 
particularly community or group.  
v. Judicial bail:   
We hoped to cross-reference the information on remand in detention against 
information on remand on bail, when the court conditionally or unconditionally 
allows the accused his freedom.  It is the prosecution’s job to oppose bail where 
they feel it is not warranted – almost always the case where serious violence is 
concerned.  We asked for information on how often the prosecution opposed 
bail applications by the defence. 
vi. Summary closure:   
We asked for information on the number of cases that were closed before going 
to trial, and whether the police complied with legal procedure on summary 
closure.  We wanted to gauge whether the number of cases closed summarily 
seemed proportionate.   Further, did we observe any links between the quality of 
the FIR in a case, and whether it was summarily closed?  Finally, we wanted to 
see if the complainant was given notice that the police were applying for 
summary closure, as is required by law, so he or she could challenge this 
decision.  
  
vii. & viii. Trials – JMFC and Sessions Court:   
Cases that are not summarily closed go to trial, the less serious ones before a 
judicial magistrate ‘of the first class’ (‘JMFC’) and the more serious ones before a 
court of sessions.  We applied for information on JMFC and Sessions trials, 
asking for the copies of charge-sheets in cases tried.  A charge sheet is the official 
document that records the details of the charge against an individual.  It is 
distinct from the First Information Report, which describes a crime that has been 
committed.  The charge sheet usually refers to one or more FIRs, and charges an 
individual or organization for (some or all of) the crimes specified in those 
FIR(s).  Once the charge sheet has been submitted to a court of law, prosecution 
against the accused begins.   
ix. Charge sheet  
We wanted to see the quality of the charge-sheet – were the correct offences 
charged, on the face of the information available through the records?  In how 
many cases were there applications to amend the charge-sheet, or to re-
investigate, or to add witnesses or add accused persons? We felt this information 
would indicate whether the prosecution tried to ensure the charge-sheet, often 
hastily put together in the first instance, was comprehensive.  Since the charge-
sheet is one of the founding documents of a criminal trial, whether such 
attempts were made by the prosecution could indicate the quality of the 
prosecution’s engagement with a case. 
  
x. Acquittals / convictions:  
We wanted to know the results of cases after each episode of mass violence, and 
asked for information on how many trials ended in acquittal and how many in 
convictions. 
  
xi. Acquittals / appeals:   
If the accused is acquitted at the end of trial, the prosecution decides whether to 
appeal the acquittal.  We asked for information on how many acquittals were 
followed by appeals.  We also asked for records on the prosecution’s decision 
about whether or not to appeal.  These records would help to assess whether the 
prosecution was doing its job and challenging acquittals that could, legally, be 
challenged.  Was it making this decision in a rigorous way?  
 
 
3.  Accountability of public officials 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, we sought information about action by Central and State 
governments against public officials identified as complicit in mass violence by 
Commissions of Inquiry.  We applied for copies of commission of inquiry reports, as 
well as the information described below.   
  
1. Officials identified by commissions of inquiry: 
a) Officials against whom action was recommended:  
We asked the Central and State Governments about whether they took steps 
to discipline, under administrative rules, or prosecute, under criminal law, 
officials who were identified by commissions of inquiry as having failed to 
perform their duties, or having been grossly negligent, or having been 
complicit in violence, and against whom the commission specifically 
recommended action.  We asked for records on such action, and if the 
government took no action, we also asked for records relevant to the decision 
not to inquire, discipline or prosecute.  We wanted to see the extent to which 
governments had followed these recommendations. 
b) Officials who were identified as remiss:  
We also filed an application requesting the same information for officials who 
were identified as remiss by a Commissions of Inquiry, but against whom the 
commission did not actually recommend action. We did this because it 
became clear from reading several inquiry reports that Commissions often 
chose to ‘name and shame’ officials in the body of their report, they did not 
go as far as recommending disciplinary steps against them.  Many 
Commissions opted for general, fairly emollient recommendations, 
suggesting that governments ‘promote communal harmony’.  We wanted to 
gauge whether the administration chose to act on analysis where officials 
were singled out for incompetence or actual complicity even by the usually 
blunt instrument of judicial Commissions of Inquiry. 
2. Officials for whom permission to prosecute was requested:  
Under Indian criminal law, a government official cannot be prosecuted unless the 
Central or State Government which employs that official grants permission, or a 
sanction, to prosecute. We asked the Home and Personnel Ministries centrally, and 
Home and personnel departments in States about whether they had received 
applications for permission to prosecute any officials in relation to these four 
episodes of mass violence.  We asked for copies of these applications, and, in each 
instance, copies of the government’s response. 
 
D. Relief and rehabilitation 
 
We filed RTI applications seeking information about different points at which the 
government might give relief and compensation, starting from the immediate 
aftermath of the massacre.   We describe these applications below. 
1. Displacement:  
We asked the Home Department of each State Government for estimates of families 
forced to migrate or displaced from their homes as a result of the episode of violence, 
and details, where possible, of where they migrated from and to.  Indian public 
authorities tend not to recognize internal displacement as a result of violence, on the 
ground that movement within India is free, so people forced to leave their homes are 
migrants rather than internally displaced persons. Nevertheless, we are of the view 
that district authorities or State intelligence agencies are likely to have at least rough 
estimates of displaced people.  We filed this application as a first step to see how 
governments track this information, and what they do with it.  For example, does the 
district from where people flee coordinate with the receiving district to ensure 
people’s safety?  
2. Relief camps:  
We asked the Home Department, district magistrate and relief commissioner in each 
State Government about government and non-government relief camps set up for 
people fleeing attacks.  We asked about when camps were set up, when they were 
shut down, how many people they housed while open, what services they included 
and whether the government provided them with security cover.  We also asked, in 
the event that no camps were set up, for records documenting why the 
administration decided they were not needed.  
  
As far as government camps were concerned, we wanted to gauge how quickly the 
district administration set them up, how accessible and safe they were and whether 
they provided basic services for people calibrated against how long people were in 
camps.  So, for example, did people have access to medical help if they were ill or 
injured?  If families could not return to their homes for many weeks, did the camps 
have access to schools for children? 
  
With regard to camps set up privately, we wanted to know how many camps there 
were to gauge how fully or partially the government responded to people rendered 
homeless, and the extent to which NGOs stepped in.  We also wanted to get a sense 
of how closely the local administration tracked, coordinated and contributed to 
private relief efforts, and whether these camps had security cover. 
3. Rates of compensation:  
We asked State Governments for information on the compensation packages they 
issued, if any, in the aftermath of these episodes of mass violence.  We asked for 
details that included, inter alia, the date when compensation was announced, what 
types of loss were covered, and what people had to do to prove eligibility.  In 
addition to the basic information about whether and what sort of compensation the 
government announced, we also wanted to see how soon after the massacre it was 
declared, whether the instructions and eligibility requirements were user-friendly, 
whether the packages covered long term rehabilitation or not, and whether there 
were multiple compensation packages for the same episode.  
4. Comparative rates of compensation:   
We also asked State Governments for information on compensation packages issued 
since 1980 after natural or manmade disasters.  We wanted these to compare relief 
and compensation measures issued by the same government over a period of time, 
and in response to different catalysts.  Were rates of compensation and types of loss 
covered fairly consistent, allowing for inflation?  Were compensation packages more 
or less generous in response to ‘apolitical’ catalysts, such as cyclones or earthquakes? 
 Is there an emerging national standard on compensation after natural or manmade 
disasters?   
5. Compensation for sexual violence:  
 We asked specifically for information on compensation for victims of sexual 
violence.  We disaggregated sexual violence for particular attention because it tends 
to remain hidden  - individuals and families are less likely to report it, governments 
are less likely to be alert to its costs.  Reaching victims of sexual violence takes special 
measures.  We wanted to see if any district or state administration had explicitly 
tried to reach victims of sexual violence, and if so, was there something we could 
learn from these steps for wider application? 
6. Rebuilding religious structures:  
We asked State Governments whether the State had a policy on rebuilding religious 
structured damaged during mass violence.  We also asked whether the State 
Government had information on what religious structures were damaged during the 
particular episode we were studying, and whether the government had rebuilt it or 
given any funds, wholly or partially, to rebuild it.  Experience shows that places of 
worship are destroyed during attacks targeting people based on professed or 
perceived faith.  This destruction of public symbols of faith leaves targeted 
communities feeling extremely insecure, and is, of course, a violation of the 
Constitutional right to freedom of religion33.  Repairing damaged places of worship 
can be an important step towards restoring a sense of security.  
7. Compensation by the Central Government:   
We asked the Home Ministry in the Central Government about compensation 
                                                        
33 Article 25, Constitution of India. 
measures.  We filed an application asking about any compensation measures by the 
Central Government in response to a natural or manmade calamity since 1980.  As 
when we asked this question of State Governments, we wanted to get a measure of 
comparative compensation packages.  We filed a second application asking whether 
the Central government had announced compensation for the specific episodes of 
mass violence we were studying, and asked for comprehensive information on any 
such measures.  We needed this information to assess the full amount of 
compensation from the State that victims of mass violence received.  We also wanted 
to see how soon after a massacre the Centre stepped in with compensation, and if 
there was any obvious trigger for this response.  
8. The Prime Minister’s Relief Fund:  
The Prime Minister’s relief fund is a fund comprising contributions by private 
individuals, administered by the Prime Minister’s Office.  The Fund is not bound to 
respond to any particular incident. We asked whether the Prime Minister’s relief 
fund had ever given funds towards compensating or rehabilitating victims of 
communal violence since 1980.  If it had, we asked for a list of incidents whose 
victims received these discretionary funds.  We asked this question in order to get a 
full measure of compensation that victims received from any government source.  
 
B. Process and problems 
 
On deciding what information to ask for and why, we had to pin down how to apply 
for it.  The Act lays down a simple procedure, and each State has rules on format and 
fees.  However, in actual fact, drafting applications for information that is complex 
and not current presented challenges.   
 
1. Drafting applications 
 
For each application, we tried to strike a balance between being specific and being 
comprehensive.  Some preliminary “test” applications had taught us that we had to 
draft requests for information quite tightly.  Applications that require discretionary 
choices on the part of the public authority tend not to fare well.  Similarly, 
applications that are not drafted to cover all the potential records that contain a piece 
of information can be easily refused on technicalities by officials inclined to be 
recalcitrant - a particular concern with applications asking for older information that 
would require more effort to retrieve.  For example, a request for information on 
relief camps after mass violence might yield no information if there were no 
government relief camps, and we would have to specify that we wanted information 
on government and non-government camps.  At the same time, we had to be careful 
not to turn our applications into a fishing expedition, which the public authority can 
justifiably reject. There are several information commission decisions that make clear 
multiple discrete inquiries cannot be sandwiched into one application34. 
 
2. Directing applications 
 
Deciding where to send each application also took some amount of effort.  To make 
an effective RTI application, the applicant needs to know which public authority 
holds the information she wants.  Public authorities are supposed to disclose the 
types or classes of information they hold.  However, it was not clear what district 
level officials or State level departments held the information we sought.  Often, it 
was not clear who the decision-maker was for a process or what guidelines, manuals 
or instructions regulated that process.  For example, it was not clear whether relief 
for people displaced by violence was administered by the same authority in the State 
Government that delivered relief during natural disasters.  As another example, it 
was not clear whether the prosecution, the Home Department or the Law 
Department had formal say over whether an appeal should be filed in a criminal 
trial.  Different states have different conventions, but even so, we were surprised that 
conversations with police, prosecution and defence lawyers did not entirely clarify 
decision-making around appeals.  
 
So, before applying for information we had to research how the processes that 
generated the information unfolded by speaking to current and retired government 
                                                        
34 See for example, Hakam Singh v. NDMC, GNCT Delhi Navyug School Education Society, CIC 
Decision No. CIC/SG/A/2010/003570/11335; Adjunct Appeal No.CIC/SG/A/2010/003570, 
18 March 2011 
officials.  We also had to make preliminary applications that formed the basis for 
subsequent, more detailed applications.  For example, we applied for information on 
notifications and guidelines on compensation, and used this knowledge to apply for 
information specific to the massacres we were examining.  Some of the processes we 
researched are occasional, and it is understandable that knowledge about them is not 
proactively disclosed – information about the army’s role during mass violence, for 
example.  Other processes that we had to “unpack” were routine, such as the chain 
of decision making involved in appealing an acquittal.  Informal information seeking 
helped us to formally apply for information.  However, this takes time, and would 
prove very difficult for people who could not informally access the sort of 
professionals – civil servants, lawyers, police functionaries, judges – whom we 
consulted.   
 
We applied to multiple authorities for information on issues where they held 
overlapping responsibility rather than only applying to one authority.  We felt this 
was preferable to depending upon only one public authority to transfer an 
application promptly and appropriately, and would allow us to compare responses 
where we received information from different authorities on the same question. As 
we discuss below, this strategy met with mixed success. 
 
We learned that departments formed after the events on which information is sought 
did not have information that pre-dates its establishment, even if those departments 
were responsible for the subject of the RTI application in question.  For example, the 
South East police district in Delhi informed us that some records on violence in 1984 
were with the South district, because at the time the South East district was a part of 
the South district.  The Riot Cell in Delhi, formed in the 1990s, only had information 
on a sub-set of criminal cases relating to the 1984 massacre - it had records on cases 
that were re-opened after the Cell was set up.  Similarly, applications about violence 
in Nellie, Assam in 1983 were repeatedly transferred between two districts because 
Nellie is today part of a district that was carved out of a larger one after 1983.   
 
So, it is not clear in advance whether the date of the information determines which 
public authority holds it, or the subject of the information.  We have discovered 
whether a particular public authority has information only when we have applied 
for it.  Thus, the applicant needs to research in advance when a public authority was 
set up, in addition to researching how information is generated.   
 
C. Procedural hurdles 
 
1. Lack of basic information for applications 
The Act requires that public authorities communicate clearly how to apply for 
information.  While most public authority websites had an RTI section, many did not 
give basic information such as the name and designation of the public information 
officer.  Lacking even this information, we had to call public authorities before we 
could send our application.  When faced with this, we sent applications to the head 
of the relevant department and asked that they be transferred to the right person. 
This usually worked, but meant that any response from the department was 
considerably delayed.    
2. Fees 
Another hurdle when applying for information was cumbersome requirements for 
paying application fees. Under the RTI Act, State governments can make their own 
rules - which meant that fee rules were not just cumbersome; they were cumbersome 
in different ways in different States.  In Delhi, RTI application fees have to be paid 
through an Indian Postal Order.  In Mumbai, fees had to be paid through a court fee 
ticket.  Orissa required that the applicant attach a copy of photo identification along 
with the application.  In Gujarat, an application could be made only on judicial 
stamp papers worth Rs. 20 each.  In Kerala, a PIO informed us that fees could be paid 
only though judicial stamp paper bought in Kerala.  The Kerala RTI fee rules don’t 
specify that judicial stamp paper should be bought in Kerala, and we attached a copy 
of the rules to any applications we sent to Kerala. 
 
Different states also had varied rules on paying the fee for copies of records.  Kerala, 
again, was the most difficult - the fee could only be paid through a demand draft 
from specific banks, but addresses for these banks were not easily available.  
Maharashtra and Orissa required fees for filing first appeals - this seems contrary to 
the RTI Act, which specifies that fees have to paid for filing an application and for 
copies of records, but does not require a fee for filing an appeal.   
 
While we were well placed to comply with fee formats of different sorts, an applicant 
outside the urban middle class is unlikely to have easy access to State rules, or be 
able to comply easily with those rules.   
3. Lack of suo motu disclosure 
The Act emphasises that public authorities should pre-empt the need for RTI 
applications by disclosing information on their own initiative.  Almost none of the 
information we sought was already accessible, including information ostensibly in 
the public domain such as commissions of inquiry reports and state assembly 




In Delhi and Gujarat, where some of us worked, we asked in several applications to 
inspect information held by a public authority35.  The RTI Act allows applicants to 
apply for inspection of records.  Inspecting records is useful when the applicant does 
not know what information a public authority holds on a particular subject, or when 
it is likely that a public authority will be reluctant to disclose the information sought. 
 We were allowed to inspect documents whenever we requested inspection.  In 
Delhi, when we inspected documents, we were asked why we wanted the 
information at issue, and whether we were doing research. Officials were curious 
rather than confrontational, and the inspections provided an opportunity to speak to 
officials about what information they had and how the public authority maintained 
information more openly than would have been possible in writing.  On three 
occasions, police officials, spontaneously but off the record, spoke to us of their 
memories of policing during the 1984 massacre.  
 
However, we found that actually getting the records we shortlisted during 
inspection was cumbersome.  We had to make repeated appointments to do so.  At 
the National Commission for Minorities, we were told that we had to come back on 
                                                        
35 We did not apply for inspection in Assam, Bihar, Orissa or Kerala as we did not have the 
funds to travel frequently and at short notice.   
another day and submit a list of records we wanted - the person receiving the list 
had left for the day - and then gave up after several attempts to set up an 
appointment to go in as the records were interesting but not central to our enquiry. 
 
In Gujarat, one occasion when we inspected documents was more hostile than our 
experiences in Delhi.  The District Magistrate’s office in Ahmedabad city asked us to 
inspect files relating to our application for information on relief camps set up after 
mass violence in 2002.  Our first visit to the DM’s office began with the District 
Magistrate expressing his displeasure and saying he was not obliged to respond to 
such detailed applications.  He informed us verbally that the Gujarat government did 
not open any relief camps36.  We responded that he was obliged to write and tell us 
whatever his response was. To which he replied that he would not do so, and we 
could appeal and do whatever else we wanted.  This seemed to be a performance for 
the benefit of his subordinates, who actually made a real effort to accommodate us.   
 
D. Informal strategies  
 
Over several months, as we applied and appealed for information, it became clear 
that speaking to public information officers on the phone and in person, helped our 
applications.  Supplementary contact, inquiring into the fate of our applications, did 
not mean the application succeeded.  But it helped to nudge applications that had 
been neglected and elicit a response - even if that response was a refusal.  In a few 
instances, the Public Information Officer (PIO) was confused by the application and 
responded after discussing it with us.  In other instances, meeting PIOs gave us the 
opportunity to ask questions about how they maintained records, and draft fresh 
applications couched in terms that would be easier for the public authority to 
process.  We saw the effect of informal contact most clearly in Gujarat, where 
Nyayagraha volunteers working with mass violence survivors had applied to police 
stations on several occasions for information on criminal cases.  Our RTI applications 
in districts where Nyayagraha colleagues had contacts with police stations elicited 
                                                        
36 From collector statement on all camps provided on inspection at collectors office, on 31st 
March 2010. 
 
far more comprehensive responses than other applications we filed.  This could be in 
part because records relating to the 2002 mass violence are still “live” - in use and 
readily available.  However, our RTI applications to the Orissa government on mass 
violence in Kandhamal in 2008 were almost all refused, and these more recent 




We filed 824 applications.  We got some information – though rarely all the 
information requested - as a first response to 255 applications, or 31% of the total.  
324 - or 40% of the total - were transferred to other public authorities.  245 of these - 
29% of the total - were met with silence - or deemed refusals.    We got reasoned 
refusals in a few applications, as a follow up to deemed refusals.   
 
We filed 515 first appeals against deemed and reasoned refusals.   Given the time 
frame of the study, we chose to file very few second appeals, as there are long delays 
before second appeal hearings.  Two of the five “second appeals” we filed have been 
successful.  
  
1. Reasoned refusals  
 
We received only a few reasoned refusals to our requests for information.  Below, we 
discuss the grounds on which public authorities denied our requests, and how we 
responded.   
a) Twenty-year rule:  
The RTI Act provides that information that is over 20 years old is subject to only 
three of the seven permissible reasons for withholding information - so it is more 
readily “disclosable” than information created within the last 20 years.  The plain 
words of Section 8(3) of the Act make this clear.   
 
Four public authorities understood the 20-year rule as the opposite of what the Act 
intends.  They responded to requests for information on mass violence in 1984 and 
1983 by saying that it could not be disclosed at all because it was over 20 years old. 
 Scanning CIC decisions reveals that several public authorities have understood the 
20-year rule in this way, and the CIC has corrected them and explained what Section 
8(3) lays down37.   At a first appeal hearing In Delhi’s South-East police district 
headquarters, it seemed to us that the PIO had genuinely misunderstood the 20 year 
rule, rather than misinterpreting it instrumentally.  But his misunderstanding was 
upheld, as the first appeal officer refused to consider the CIC decisions on this point 
and reiterated that 20-year old information need not be disclosed.   
 
b) Right to privacy:   
Seven applications for information on complaints and FIRs were refused on the 
ground that they violated the right to privacy of the individuals - complainants and 
accused - named in the FIR.  Section 8(1)(j) of the Act provides for a balancing act 
between transparency and privacy. It allows information to be withheld if disclosure 
would prejudice a third party’s right to privacy, and allows a third party to be 
notified and to appeal disclosure where information that affects them is going to be 
disclosed.  As it happened, the information requested in these seven applications 
was over 20 years old, so we pointed out that the privacy exception did not apply in 
these cases at all.  However, it is noteworthy that the public authorities seemed not 
even to consider the balance they are supposed to strike - they used Section 8(1)(j) as 
a ground for outright refusal to disclose information.   
 
c) Matters under investigation:  
In two refusals, public authorities relied on Section 8(1)(h), which exempts 
information from disclosure if making it public would “impede the process of 
investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders”.  This provision does not 
exempt all information on cases that are being investigated or prosecuted from 
disclosure.  The Delhi High Court emphasised this in Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information 
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CIC/AT/A/2006/20 and Shri S.R. Pershad v. Directorate General of Supplies & Disposals 37/ICPB/2006. 
Commissioner38, where it held that the public authority must justify how investigation 
would be hampered by sharing the information requested.  The High Court stated: 
 
“It is apparent that the mere existence of an investigation process cannot be a 
ground for refusal of the information; the authority withholding information 
must show satisfactory reasons as to why the release of such information 
would hamper the investigation process.  Such reasons should be germane, 
and the opinion of the process being hampered should be reasonable and 
based on some material. Sans this consideration, Section 8(1)(h) and other 
such provisions would become the haven for dodging demands for 
information.”39 
 
The High Court’s judgment corroborates the general principle that exceptions to the 
right to information must be interpreted narrowly, and implies that a PIO should 
have justified why disclosure of records would impede the process of prosecution.   
    
These judgments arguably apply with even stronger force in the context of 
protracted trials, such as those following the 1984 violence, where cases may not 
have been formally closed, but is not being actively investigated.  However, in the 
two refusals we got citing ongoing investigation and prosecution, Section 8(1)(h) was 
treated as exempting information from disclosure wholesale.    
 
d)  Security and intelligence agencies:   
 
The RTI Act allows Central and State Governments to place public authorities 
dealing with intelligence and security outside the compass of the Act, although 
agencies exempted in this way are still obliged to disclose information on allegations 
of corruption and human rights violations committed in the course of their work.   
 
The Gujarat Home Department was the only public authority that resorted to this 
provision.  Two applications asking about action taken against public servants 
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39 Bhatt J. states at paragraph 13 of the judgment 
allegedly involved in the 2002 mass violence were refused on the ground that the 
Criminal Investigation Department, dealing with their cases, fell outside the ambit of 
the RTI Act.  We appealed this refusal on the ground that the information we sought 
clearly related to allegations of human rights abuses by the officials in question, and 
had to be disclosed even by agencies notified as outside the ambit of the Act.    
 
Once again, the public authorities relying on this provision used it as a ground for 
blanket refusal, rather than applying the proviso to exemption, which requires that 
information about human rights allegations be made public.  It is worth noting, 
however, that we expected more responses, particularly to applications asking about 
recent mass violence, which said that agencies dealing with the information were 
outside the ambit of the Act.  Some of the information we applied for would almost 
certainly have been with intelligence and security agencies, in addition to other 
public authorities.  We were encouraged that most of the reasoned refusals sent to us 
argued that particular information was exempt, rather than arguing that particular 
public authorities in their entirety were exempt from the demands of the RTI Act.   
 
2. Deemed refusals  
 
29% of responses to applications were refusals we did not receive.  Public authorities 
failed entirely to respond to our applications within their deadline under the Act, a 
failure that the Act treats as a refusal.  We filed appeals against these deemed 




In addition to deemed refusals, we also dealt with our applications being transferred, 
often repeatedly.  In Assam, two districts kept transferring applications for 
information about the Nellie massacre between themselves.  Often, public authorities 
that almost certainly would have had the information requested transferred it to the 
district administration where the episode of mass violence we were asking about had 
taken place.  For example, Home Departments in Assam and Bihar transferred 
applications for information about disciplinary action against officials to district 
authorities in Nellie and Bhagalpur.  The Army HQ transferred our application for 
information on when the army was called out to assist civil authorities during 
episodes of mass violence to the army units nearest where the violence took place. 
 This, in particular, was completely unnecessary.  There have been only a few 
occasions when the army has been summoned to contain mass violence, and these 
occasions have been serious.  It is simply not credible that the army HQ in New 
Delhi would not have at least basic records on these instances.   
 
In Gujarat, district administrations in Ahmedabad and Baroda, transferred our 
applications to several police stations within these districts.  In Ahmedabad City, this 
meant a transfer to 37 police stations.  In other districts, our applications were 
transferred to certain police stations, without any confirmation that these were the 
only police stations affected 
 
Some public authorities seemed to transfer applications to avoid answering them, 
and stall the applicant.  The Ministry of Home Affairs has 64 PIOs dealing with 
different areas.  We sent applications to the PIO who seemed best suited to our 
query, but found that our applications were transferred to every other PIO within the 
Ministry.  These PIOs in turn transferred the applications - also within the Ministry - 
until it became difficult to keep track of where the application was and where and 
when to file a first appeal.  The S-E police district in Delhi sent an application 
requesting information on appeals filed in criminal cases to every other police 
district in Delhi, although we asked for information from that particular district. 
  Public authorities that are large, and have many sub-branches, can effectively 
stonewall an application by transferring it in several different directions.  The 
applicant finds himself in the position of corresponding with multiple PIOs and 
facing significant delays because each recipient treats the application as a fresh 
request.   
 
4. “We don’t have it” 
 
While deemed refusals and transfers stall and delay applications, the hardest 
response to deal with is a complete denial that the public authority has a piece of 
information, even when its remit strongly suggests that it should have that 
information.  We discussed earlier the example of Army HQ in Delhi denying, not 
very credibly, that they had information on occasions when the army had been asked 
by Central or State Governments to help control religious riots.  Another improbable 
denial was from the Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Home 
Affairs (“DoPT”) at the Centre, which said it did not have information on 
disciplinary action against Central civil service employees in connection with 
episodes of mass violence.  The DoPT also denied having information on 
applications for sanction to prosecute any Central civil service employee.    
 
It is inconceivable that these public authorities would not have records on matters 
that fall within their core functions.   But this complete denial - rather than reasoned 
refusal - effectively forces the applicant to apply for inspection of what are 
potentially a large number of records.   Another strategy we considered when faced 
with a dubious denial of this sort, is to lobby legislators to ask for the information in 
a session of the State Assembly or Parliament.   We were not able to pursue this 
strategy within the time-frame of this study, but hope to do so in the longer term.   
 
5. “We should have it but don’t”  
 
In many instances, a claim by a public authority that it did not hold the information 
we demanded was credible, but surprising.  The failure of public authorities to hold 
certain types of information indicated serious lapses in record management.  More 
fundamentally, it suggested a failure to recognize the importance of records related 
to mass violence. 
 
We mentioned earlier our discovery that neither the police, nor the prosecution, the 
law department or the home department in Delhi kept records on appeals filed after 
acquittals in cases relating to the 1984 massacre.  The Ministry of Home Affairs 
seemed not to have copies of reports by commissions of inquiry on some of the worst 
episodes of mass violence since 1947.   Neither did the Parliament library.  Even if 
some of the commissions in question were set up by State governments, surely these 
records should make their way to the Centre.   
 
Applications to national and state commissions on human rights, women, and 
minorities for any complaints, investigations, correspondence or other records 
related to the episodes of mass violence we examined yielded almost no responses.   
National and state human rights commissions, as well as national and state 
commissions charged with protecting rights of particular constituencies can 
investigate complaints from the public and initiate their own enquiries.  None of the 
Commissions, State or National, had information on mass atrocities that occurred 
before they were established, even where official processes around those atrocities – 
criminal trials, commissions of enquiry or delivering compensation – were still 
playing out after they were established.   
 
The National Minorities Commission allowed us to inspect its records on the 2002 
mass violence in Gujarat and 2008 mass violence in Kandhamal, Orissa.   However, 
we received no responses from minorities’ commissions in different States.  The 
national women’s commission and state women’s commissions also did not respond 
to our applications.  This failure to respond is particularly notable in relation to mass 
violence in Gujarat, where civil society groups documented widespread sexual 
violence against Muslim women.   
 
Our experience with these bodies, meant to be quasi-independent watchdogs, was 
very disappointing.  We would have expected them, at a minimum, to respond to 
queries about serious violence against groups they are supposed to protect, even if 
they did not have the information requested.     
 
National and state commissions do not seem to serve as a repository of information 
on atrocities that affect the rights of groups they are charged with protecting, though 
as publicly funded institutions they should perform this function for episodes of 
mass violence.   The National Human Rights Commission and the National 
Minorities Commission clearly responded to complaints and took the initiative to 
investigate in the immediate aftermath of mass violence.  However, they do not seem 
to monitor access to justice for victims of mass violence in the longer term in any 
systematic way.  This mirrors media and public attention to mass atrocities – 
concentrated on crises but not on longer-term consequences.   
 
While it is in the nature of the media to highlight current rather than past crises, 
national commissions are supposed to hold government machinery accountable and 
respond to serious grievances.  Surely this should include having current 
information on criminal justice and compensation following mass violence, as well as 
scrutinising current commissions of inquiry, such as those under way in Gujarat and 
Orissa.  Their own records suggest that they do not fulfill these roles for victims of 
mass violence.    
 
6. Destroyed and missing information 
 
In Nellie, we learned that basic information on criminal proceedings, including FIRs, 
could not be found.  It was not clear when these records had been destroyed.   In 
Delhi, complaints by victims in several police stations had been destroyed.  When a 
public authority said records are destroyed, we asked for the Order under which that 
destruction had been authorized.   We found, in general, that public authorities do 
not disclose the protocol or rules according to which they manage and destroy 
records.   
 
For older episodes of mass violence, it was not surprising that records had been 
destroyed.  Many official records are routinely destroyed according to internal 
timetables. However, this has serious implications for the individual affected by 
mass violence and also more generally, for society.  If an individual wanted to 
reopen civil or criminal legal proceedings, destruction of records makes this nearly 
impossible.  Destroying records of mass atrocities also means that if in the future 
there were State or citizen driven acknowledgement of the atrocity – a public 
memorial, a museum, an archive, a class taught in school or university - crucial 
information would have been lost.   
 
While the RTI Act obligates public authorities to maintain and disclose information, 
it does not lay down classes of information that cannot be destroyed, or types of 
records that need to be maintained permanently.  It is, of course, difficult to draw a 
circle around what records should be preserved, but it is important - to allow 
practical recourse and to aid historical memory - to do so.   At a minimum, records 
before a commission of inquiry looking into mass violence should not be destroyed, 
and should, to the fullest extent possible, be publicly available.    
 
7. Technical refusals 
 
The police headquarters in one zone of Mumbai refused our applications on the 
ground that the information we sought was not maintained in the format we had 
asked for it, and a considerable amount of resources would be spent on providing it 
in that format. While a public authority is well within its rights under the Act to 
refuse to provide information in a particular format if that would use 
disproportionate resources, this is not a ground for refusing entirely to disclose 
information.  The public authority is still obliged to disclose the information in the 
manner in which it exists, or allow the applicant to inspect the records available.  We 
appealed this refusal, but the First Appeal Authority upheld the PIO’s refusal.   
 
F. Factors that affected access: 
 
1. The Issue 
 
On the whole, public authorities were willing to disclose information related to 
criminal proceedings.  We discovered, however, that the relevant public authorities 
simply did not maintain and preserve in any organised way records on information 
we sought, such as bail applications and appeals.   
 
Information on disciplinary proceedings against public officials proved most difficult 
to access.  We were expecting reasoned refusals on this issue.  Instead, State and 
Central governments failed to reply to our applications, transferred our applications, 
and denied they had these records.  Applications seeking information about 
disciplinary proceedings against officials raise legitimate concerns about the balance 
between one person’s right to information and another person’s right to privacy. 
 Our experience was that public authorities do not even attempt this balancing 
exercise - they simply deflect the applications. Even where we asked for the number 
of disciplinary proceedings or applications for permission to prosecute officials, we 
did not receive a response.   
 
Information on relief and rehabilitation was more readily disclosed.  However, the 
quality of the information available was patchy, and we found public authorities did 
not maintain detailed records on relief and rehabilitation.  This might, in part, be 
because different States have different institutions, systems and standards on relief 
and rehabilitation.  The poor quality of information on this issue points to the need 




Large amounts of information on the older massacres in Nellie and Delhi had been 
destroyed.  The barriers to access were that information had been lost, destroyed, or 
was going to be difficult to locate, so information officers were reluctant to make the 
effort.  We did not encounter, on the whole, unwillingness to disclose the 
information as a matter of principle.   By contrast, information related to a very 
recent massacre, in Kandhamal, Orissa, proved very difficult to access - almost all 
our RTI applications met with refusal.  As a result, we were forced to exclude this 
episode of mass violence from the study.  The blanket refusal to disclose information 
on mass violence in Kandhamal suggested active reluctance by district and State 
authorities. We received the most responses, and the fullest responses to RTI 
applications on mass violence in Gujarat, which took place almost a decade ago.   
 
3. State government   
 
We encountered what we believe is likely to be a deliberate, blanket refusal to 
disclose information on the Kandhamal massacre from public authorities in Orissa. 
 RTI rules in Kerala were the most cumbersome, and created procedural barriers to 
applying for information.   With the exception of Orissa and Kerala, we did not 
encounter great variations in responsiveness between the other State governments to 
which we addressed applications, which were the governments of Assam, Delhi, 
Bihar and Gujarat.  
 
4. Public authority 
 
While responsiveness did not vary greatly by State, it did vary by the type of public 
authority we approached for information.  District level authorities, including offices 
of the district collector and superintendent of police, tended to respond to 
applications, even if these responses were late and even if they refused us 
information.  Police authorities, similarly, acknowledged and responded in some 
way to our applications.  District and police public authorities were also more 
responsive on the phone, and understood and responded to applications for 
inspection of records.  While police and district public authorities often responded 
with incorrect information or refused information, they seemed seasoned in 
responding to RTI inquiries from the public, most likely because these public 
authorities regularly interact with members of the public. 
 
By contrast, we found that applications directed to the army, Central and State 
commissions, and courts tended to be ignored.  The National Commission for 
Minorities did not respond to repeated applications for inspection of records.  The 
RTI contact number on the Army Headquarters website was answered by an 
individual who insisted that we explain our reason for applying for information 
before we could get details of public information officers to whom applications are to 
be addressed.  These public authorities seemed uninformed about the RTI Act, and 
ill-equipped to fulfill their obligations.     Our experience suggests the need for more 
nuanced research on differences between classes or categories of public authorities in 
how many RTI applications they receive, and how responsive they are to these 
applications.  Are some branches of the State, such as the armed forces, or certain 
types of public authorities substantially untouched by the RTI Act?  
 
While the army, commissions and courts lacked competence in dealing with RTI 
applications, some other public authorities seemed competent, but evasive.  The 
Home Ministry responded to most of our RTI applications by “transferring” each 
application to every single PIO within the Home Ministry, who further transferred 
them back to some of their colleagues.   As the applicants who encountered this 
repeatedly, we believe that this was deliberate evasion rather than simple 
incompetence.  The Department of Personnel and Training, similarly, claimed it did 
not have information on disciplinary proceedings against central civil service 
employees.  Such denial is different from a reasoned refusal under the RTI Act, 




An unpredictable but relevant factor in exercising the right to information is the 
capacity of the pubic information officers.  We made over 700 applications across 6 
states. We spoke on phone or in person to PIOs dealing with about 10% of these 
applications.  Obviously, individual capacity varied.  However, we found overall 
that while most PIOs understood they had a basic disclosure obligation, they did not 
understand the nuances of the grounds for refusal under section 8 of the RTI Act. 
 Public authorities also seemed unaware of or unwilling to conduct the balancing 
exercise required by many grounds for refusal, applying these grounds, instead, in 
the most expansive way possible.  We encountered offices in Delhi that did not have 
copies of the RTI Act in Hindi, which would have assisted PIOs handling our 
applications.  On a few occasions, we took with us copies of the Act in Hindi and 
found that it helped the conversation.  PIOs are the frontline RTI officials whom a 
citizen encounters, and particularly in offices that deal with members of the public 
frequently, they need better training.   
 
It is early in the life of the RTI Act and PIOs have to implement disclosure 
obligations fundamentally at odds with the “official secrets” regime that preceded 
the Act.  However, we would caution against taking comfort from this fact in 
thinking about capacity.   Our experience, in the admittedly small number of cases 
where we met or spoke to the PIO directly, was that once public authorities have 
internal precedents based on a restrictive reading of the RTI Act, even where such 
precedents go against the clear words of the Act and even where Information 
Commissions have clarified that a particular reading is too restrictive, the internal 
precedent tends to prevail.     
 
6. Civil society pressure 
 
A less direct, but nevertheless significant factor affecting access to information was 
civil society scrutiny and advocacy following an episode of mass violence.  We 
suggest that the paucity of information on the Nellie massacre is not just because it 
happened many years ago, but also because it happened at a time when the media 
was not as diverse, ubiquitous or outspoken as it is today.  More information on 
mass violence in 1984 in Delhi is available than on mass violence in Nellie and 
Bhagalpur in the 1980s.  This is due in large part to the continued civil society 
activism on behalf of survivors of the 1984 violence, which led to commissions of 
inquiry, legal proceedings and debates in the legislature.  There is far more public 
information on mass violence in Gujarat than on more recent mass violence in 
Kandhamal, Orissa.   We believe that this difference, too, reflects greater media and 
civil society scrutiny of developments in Gujarat after 2002 as compared to 
Kandhamal in 2008.  We do not want to minimise or undervalue advocacy by 
survivors and their supporters after the relatively “neglected” massacres.  However, 
some episodes of mass violence have been followed by more sustained advocacy and 
scrutiny at different levels - local, regional and national.   We argue that this greater 
scrutiny results in State authorities creating and maintaining more records than they 
otherwise might.   
 
G. Summing up 
 
 
We began this chapter by saying that our inquiry tested the potential and limits of 
the Act in revealing information about serious violations of human rights.   
 
As a law, the RTI Act is a strong tool for extracting information related to mass 
violence in particular, and abuses of civil and political rights in general.  It has 
provisions that place a weightier obligation on the State to disclose information 
related to allegations of human rights abuses as compared to other types of 
information. 
   
Using the Act - putting its strong provisions into practice - was challenging.  We 
began with a “wish list” of information we wanted to have about the State’s response 
to mass violence, and then analysed what information was likely to be captured in 
official records.  We designed our applications to cover as much of this information 
as possible.  Ultimately, we extracted only a fraction of the information we asked for. 
  A lot of the information we sought had been destroyed, and a lot of information we 
sought was denied to us, and some of what we sought was actually disclosed.  In 
evaluating the performance of public authorities through our experience, it would be 
disingenuous not to acknowledge that the RTI applications we filed were complex, 
and very likely placed a greater burden on public authorities than many other 
applications that they receive. We asked for a lot of information that is old, and we 
asked for a relatively high level of detail.  While the RTI process challenged us, our 
applications in turn challenged the State. Despite a general tilt towards using the 
grounds for refusal in a blunt rather than nuanced way, many public authorities 
disclosed the information we requested.   
        
Our experience leads us to think that the RTI Act has great potential to deepen State 
accountability for grave human rights abuses.   Despite the frustrations involved in 
securing information on the State’s response to mass violence, we believe that the 
Act should be used aggressively in this way. It is, obviously, very important to use 
the RTI Act in securing justice for victims of recent episodes of mass violence.  It is 
equally important to extract the information that survives on older episodes of mass 
violence, as a matter of historical record, as testimony to the experience of victims, 
and as a way to understand the State’s failures.   
 
In the chapters that follow, we analyse the information we secured on mass violence 
















In this chapter, we discuss the massacre of Bengali Muslims in Nellie, in rural Assam 
in 1983.  The Nellie massacre was probably the most gruesome communal slaughter 
since Independence. Its virulence stunned the nation and laid the stage for a series of 
such large-scale massacres in the next two decades, including in the streets of Delhi 
in 1984, in Bhagalpur in 1989, in Mumbai in 1992-93 and across many districts of 
Gujarat in 2002.  The Nellie bloodbath in the early winter months of 1983 took place 
during very fraught Assembly elections that year. It was not the only violent episode 
during the election, but it was by far the worst – official estimates put the death toll 
at 1800, but unofficial estimates put it at 3000.  Below, we begin by briefly situating 
the massacre in the context of the 6-year anti-foreigner agitation in Assam.  We then 
discuss access to criminal justice for survivors of the massacre, as well as relief and 
rehabilitation and action taken against errant officials.  Through our discussion, we 
also try to analyse some of the reasons that the Nellie massacre has garnered far less 
attention than it should over the years.   
 
B. The context 
 
1. The Assam agitation 
 
From 1979 to 1985, there was a widespread agitation against the presence of 
‘foreigners’, mainly real and alleged immigrants from East Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
in Assam41.  The anti-foreigner movement aimed to detect illegal immigrants from 
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East Pakistan and Bangladesh; to delete their names from the electoral rolls; and to 
deport them from Assam. Growing tensions around an increase in Bengali 
immigrants crystallised in February 1978, when the death of Hiralal Patwari, a 
Member of Parliament, necessitated a by-election to the Lok Sabha in the Mangaldoi 
constituency, which had a large number of settlers from East Bengal.    
 
While holding the by-election, it was discovered that the number of voters in this 
constituency had increased significantly since the last election.  This discovery 
became the flashpoint for tensions over the steady increase in Bengali immigrants in 
Assam over the past several decades and particularly during the Bangladeshi war of 
Independence in 197742.  Soon after, the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) 
demanded that the election be postponed and foreign nationals be deleted from the 
electoral rolls.  The AASU and the Assam Gana Sangam Parishad (AGSP), a coalition 
of a few regional political and cultural organisations, demanded that the Central 
Government identify, disenfranchise and deport foreign nationals.  They called for a 
boycott of the elections, which found substantial support in large parts of Assam, 
and marked the beginning of the six-year long movement, popularly known as the 
anti- foreigners movement.   
 
The movement destabilised the Assam government, and the years since 1979 saw 
sustained protest, including sit-ins, picketing, strikes and civil disobedience.   The 
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42 Estimates from census data argue that the population of Assam grew at the rate of 36% between 
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Political Demography of Assam's Anti-Immigrant Movement," Population and Development Review, 
Vol. 9, No. 2 (1983), 283, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/197305 quoted in Baruah, S. 
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1187.  However, as Baruah points out, it is very difficult to make reasonable estimates of how much 
population grew or how many immigrants entered Assam in the years before the Assam agitation. The 
only set of relevant census data that are likely to provide a direct estimate is the data on birthplace, but 
it is unlikely that immigrants of dubious legal status would provide accurate information on this. The 
language data are not helpful because of the tendency of Bengali Muslim immigrants to declare 
Assamese as their mother tongue. Most census-based estimates therefore are based on calculating the 
difference between the assumed natural rate of population growth and the actual rate of growth. This 
approach, apart from the methodological problems of arriving at an accurate natural rate of population 
growth of Assam, obviously does not allow for differentiation between immigrants from the rest of 
India and from foreign countries. Furthermore, since there was no census in Assam in 1981 because of 
the political turmoil, even such crude estimates are not possible for the period 1971 to 1981 when, 
according to partisans of the Assam movement, large-scale immigration took place. 
movement disrupted Parliamentary elections in 1980, and Assembly elections in 
1983.  The Centre suspended the elected state government and imposed President’s 
Rule in Assam in December 1979 for a year, in June 1981 for several months, and 
again in March 1982 for a year, as elected governments fell on a number of occasions 
.   Large numbers of people, including government employees, refused to recognise 
the State Government, on the ground that it was illegitimate since it had been elected 
on the basis of invalid electoral roles that included illegal aliens. A report by the 
Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) noted that November 1979 nearly 700,000 
people in Guwahati and an estimated two million people in the state as a whole 
courted arrest.  The entire government machinery was party to what the PUCL 
termed ‘satyagraha’43.  One journalist reports that the Postmaster General personally 
delivered mail to senior officials, because the postal employees refused to work in 
large numbers44.   Academic accounts and contemporary reportage tells us that the 
government became increasingly repressive in 1981 and 1982, and brought in Central 
paramilitary forces because the State police forces were considered unreliable.   
  
The movement directly threatened East Bengali immigrants, who had migrated to 
Assam steadily over nearly two centuries.  Regardless of when Bengali settlers had 
actually moved to Assam, they were viewed as aliens - Bangladeshi foreigners.  
Violent attacks against Bengali settlers rose after 197945.    
 
Despite the continuing violence and popular protest, the Centre resolved to hold 
State assembly elections in February 1983.  It also decided to use unrevised electoral 
rolls from 1979, which had triggered the anti-immigrant movement in the first place, 
most likely because the ruling Congress party believed it was likely to win elections 
in Assam.  This was a direct challenge to the leaders of the movement, who called for 
a boycott.   
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Leading up to the elections, Assam also experienced the worst ethnic violence in 
India since Independence.    Potential candidates were picketed and pressured to sit 
out elections until the electoral rolls were revised.  Owners of printing presses in 
Assam refused to print the electoral rolls for the election.  
 
The State government-appointed Commission of Inquiry on Assam Disturbances 
(Tewary Commission) reported that between January to April 1983 in Assam46: 2072 
people were killed in group clashes, and 235 were killed in police firing; 14 
government employees were killed; 2,25,951 people were rendered homeless, while 
2,48,292 took shelter in relief camps; 22,436 homes were burnt and 445 government 
buildings were burnt; there were 1031 ‘incidents’ relating to bridges and culverts; 
there were 22 incidents of burning railway property and 85 incidents of tampering 
with railway tracks. Every district in Assam except Cachar and North Cachar Hills 
faced unrest, in a bewildering over-heated cauldron of enmeshed ethnic and 
religious hatred.  In Nellie, Lalung tribals killed Bengali Muslims; in Kokrajhar Boro 
Kacharis fought Bengali Hindus and Muslims; in Goreswar and Khairabari 
Saraniand Boro Kacharis fought Bengali Hindus; in Gohpur Boros fought Assamese 
Hindus; in Dhemaji and Jonai Mishing tribals fought Bengali Hindus and Muslims; 
in Samaguri Muslims killed Hindus; in Dhaila and Thekrabariagain Muslims killed 
Hindus; in Chaowlkhowa Chapori Assamese Hindus and Muslims together killed 
Bengali Muslims47.    
 
The potential for serious violence was so high that the election was staggered over 
three days to allow for the security forces to move from one polling station to the 
next.  The Centre had to bring polling personnel from outside Assam, since State 
government employees had passed a resolution boycotting elections.  Ballot papers 
were printed in Delhi and flown in to Assam.  While the Centre posted security 
personnel in the State – one account says that over 270 companies of paramilitary 
forces were deployed48 – Baruah notes that they concentrated almost entirely on 
protecting polling stations. 
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2. The Nellie Massacre  
 
One area where the administration ignored potential violence was in Nellie and its 
surrounding villages.  Nellie and other Muslim immigrant villages are situated north 
of National Highway 37, around 35 kilometres from Morigaon, the district 
headquarters and 12 kilometres from Jagiroad town.  The Muslim majority villages 
are surrounded by Tiwa (also known as Lalung) villages, as well as by other tribal 
and ethnic Assamese villages.  People from these surrounding villages participated 
in the massacre in Nellie.   
 
On the morning of 18 February 1983, thousands of people surrounded the Nellie area 
and attacked Bengali Muslim residents. The attack began at about 8:00 AM and 
continued till around 3:30 PM49.  The attackers were armed with machetes and other 
weapons. They systematically set fire to people’s huts.  As residents fled their 
burning homes, they were hacked to death.  Fourteen villages were attacked.  Roads 
to the Nellie area were blocked and the Muslim villages surrounded, so people could 
not go to Jagiroad police station while violence was unfolding.  Unofficial estimates 
say that the massacre orphaned 371 children and left over 2000 people dead50.  
 
After the elections, in July 1983, the Assam government appointed the Commission 
of Inquiry on Assam Disturbances (‘Tewary Commission’) to, inter alia, examine the 
circumstances leading to disturbances in Assam between January and April 1983.  
When examining the Nellie massacre, the Commission’s report revealed that local 
officials had enough warning of likely violence to take preventive action, that the 
massacre was the result of shocking and culpable neglect.   
 
Polling took place in the Nellie area on 14 February 1983.  Three days before the 
massacre, on 15 February, the Officer in charge of Nagaon police station sent a 
wireless message to the Commandant, 5th Assam Police Battalion who was 
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supervising law and order in Morigaon, and also sent copies to the Sub-divisional 
Police Officer, Morigaon and the Officer in Charge, Jagiroad police station.  It read: 
 
‘INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT LAST NIGHT ABOUT ONE 
THOUSAND ASSAMESE PEOPLE OF SURROUNDING VILLAGES OF 
NELLIE ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPONS ASSEMBLED AT NELLIE BY 
BEATING OF DRUM (.)  MINORITY PEOPLE ARE IN PANIC AND 
APPREHENDING ATTACK AT ANY MOMENT (.) SUBMISSION FOR 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO MAINTAIN PEACE.’51 
 
Some residents of Nellie approached the Officer in Charge, at Nagaon and asked that 
he send the message – Nagaon police station itself did not have jurisdiction over 
Nellie.  However the Officer in Charge, Nagaon did not inform the Superintendent of 
Police at Nagaon, and claimed that he could not do this because he ‘couldn’t apply 
his mind’52.   
 
None of the three addressees of the wireless message admitted to having received 
the message.  The Officer in Charge, Law & Order for Morigaon, MNA Kabir, told 
the Tewary Commission that his wife received the message and that he did not see it.  
Likewise, Pramode Chetia, the sub-divisional police officer (SDPO), told the 
Commission that the message was placed on his table rather than handed to him, 
and he, too, did not see it.  Bhadra Kenta Chetia, Officer in Charge, Jagiroad police 
station, was also similarly remiss – he told the Commission that the message was in 
the ‘put-up basket’, but he did not see it.    
 
A group of Hindu individuals in the Nellie area had complained to the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police (SP) on 15 February, saying they feared an attack by 
Muslims in the area. The District authorities shared this information with KPS Gill, 
the Inspector General Police (IGP) at the time, who advised the Officer in Charge, 
Jagiroad Police station to patrol the area and form peace committees.53  There is, 
thus, a strong contrast between how the police in Morigaon responded to Assamese 
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Hindu residents expressing fears about being attacked, and Bengali Muslim 
residents who expressed the same, ultimately well founded, fear.   
 
The Superintendent of Police’s report after the election said that the Officer in 
Charge, Jagiroad had received the wireless message on 16 February, as well as 
applications from Assamese Hindus fearing violence from Muslims.  ‘So on 17/2/83, 
S.I. B.K. Chatia, S.I. Dhiren Gogoi along with 3rd Bn. CRPF visited the area and 
convened a meeting of leading persons of both the communities and they were 
advised to arrange day and night patrolling on their own localities’54. 
 
Residents of Borbori village, where 585 people were murdered, said that before the 
massacre, the Officer in Charge of Jagiroad Police Station visited the area with the 
CRPF and assured them they would be safe, but turned down their requests to post 
an armed police picket in the area55.    
 
The Officer in Charge of Jagiroad police station, Bhadra Kanta Chetia, heard about 
the violence unfolding around Nellie at 10:54 AM on the 18th from the commander of 
a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalion, but did not personally go to Nellie.  
He sent two platoons of CRPF along with a sub-inspector and an assistant sub-
inspector. The Officer in Charge, followed later, but said that the Nellie area was 
difficult to access and further, that he began rescuing drowning people from a river 
en route to the villages, and making medical arrangements for survivors56. The 
SDPO, Pramode Chetia, heard about the violence from a Member of Legislative 
Assembly (MLA) at 12:30 PM on the 18th.  He also did not go immediately to the site 
of the massacre, but sent a message to Jagiroad telling the Officer in Charge to go to 
the spot57.   
 
National and international journalists were in Assam during the mass violence in 
Nellie.  Some even witnessed it, and reported their eyewitness accounts of people 
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being surrounded and hacked to death.  However, in the years that followed, the 
Nellie massacre received little media or academic attention58, and the district 
administration’s lapses are largely forgotten.  In the months that followed the 
massacre, the dominant account of the massacre amongst the Tiwa or Lalung tribe 
seemed to be that it was retaliatory violence. In a memorandum to the Prime 
Minister dated June 1983, the Lalung Darbar, representing the tribe, documented 
violence against Lalungs in the Nellie area in the days leading up to the massacre, 
allegedly by Bengali Muslim perpetrators59.  The memorandum described the Nellie 
massacre as ‘a group clash in…the same sub-division for which several hundreds of 
people had lose their lives [sic]…The exact numbers of victims are not yet 
known…the figures published in various newspapers and magazines of the world 
cannot be accepted as correct…The activities state above [attacks on Lalungs] were 
carried out by immigrant Bangladeshis and these activities of immigrants created 
panic in…Nowgong district and Lalung tribal community were first victim of loot 
and arson perpetrated by the immigrants and during which hundreds of Lalung 
popel [sic] lost their lives.’60 
 
In the years that followed the massacre, Kimura argues that the majority Assamese 
account of the massacre gained acceptance, while the Tiwa/Lalung and Bengali 
Muslim accounts have little traction61.  The explanation for the massacre propagated 
by agitation leaders was that the Tiwas in the Nellie area lost their land over time to 
Bengali Muslim settlers, which led to tension and eventually, violence. The Tiwa 
narrative is different, focusing on alleged abduction of Tiwa girls by Muslims, 
suggesting cultural friction between the two communities.  It also reveals a sense of 
betrayal by the leaders of the agitation, who some Tiwas claim led the attack on 
Nellie, but then let responsibility for it fall on the Tiwas who participated in it.  
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Muslims in the Nellie area point to a more proximate cause for the massacre – they 
describe it as revenge for their participation in the election.  One observer noted that 
only 109 votes were cast at the Nellie Government School polling booth that day62.  
Mohmmad Hussain, an independent, won the Morigaon Assembly seat by getting 
714 of 1514 votes cast, of which 223 were rejected.  The constituency had 78,012 
voters, so less than 1% actually voted.   
 
None of these accounts, not even the Bengali Muslim account, lays blame on the 
State for failing to prevent the massacre, suggesting that the lack of information 
about this episode of mass violence largely allowed the authorities to escape the 
criticism and consequences that should have followed.   
 
3. The Assam Accord 
 
The 1983 Assembly election brought a new Congress (I) government in Assam 
headed by Hiteshwar Saikia. The extremely high Muslim death toll strained ties 
amongst groups in the Assam movement, and several Assamese Muslim leaders 
broke away63.  A more fragmented movement signed an accord with the Central 
Government in 1985.   
 
The Assam movement ended in 1985 with an accord signed between the Indian 
government and the leaders of the movement on 15 August 1985.  State Assembly 
elections were held in Assam in December 1985, which brought the Asam Gona 
Parishad – the leaders of the agitation – to power. The accord also tried to address 
concerns about illegal immigration into India, deciding that, those who entered India 
before 1966 were to be made citizens, those who entered between 1966 and 1971 were 
to be disenfranchised temporarily, and more recent arrivals were to be deported64.   
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The accord also incorporated an agreement to withdraw disciplinary proceedings 
against ‘employees’ (presumably government employees, though the accord does 
not say this explicitly), and review criminal cases connected to the agitation.   
 
The relevant extracts of the accord are as follows: 
 
14. The Central and State Government have agreed to: 
 
(a) Review with sympathy and withdraw cases of disciplinary action against 
employees in the context of the agitation and ensure that there is no 
victimization; 
 
(b) Frame a scheme for ex-gratia payment to next-of-kin of those who [were] 
killed in the course of the agitation;… 
 
(d) Undertake review of detention cases, if any, as well as cases against 
persons charged with criminal offences in connection with the agitation, 
except those charged with commission of heinous offences; 
 
(e) Consider withdrawal of the prohibitory orders / notifications in force, if 
any. [emphasis added]65 
 
Provision 14(a) of the Assam accord mentions reviewing disciplinary action against 
government employees, but in practice appears to make withdrawing such action 
compulsory and universal.  The accord also requires the Centre and the Assam 
government to prevent ‘victimization’ of employees facing disciplinary cases, but 
does not specify what victimization might mean.  Provision 14(d) does not specify 
what ‘detention cases’ means.  Further, the accord requires governments to review 
all cases except ‘heinous’ ones, but does not explain what crimes this covers. In 
practice, what the accord was interpreted to mandate was a full amnesty to all 
persons charged with crimes, even of murder and rape, during the mass communal 
violence.      
 
The Ministry of Home Affairs was the ‘nodal Ministry’ for the implementation of the 
accord and the Government of Assam has a department dedicated to it as well.    
 
                                                        
65 Text of Assam Accord, according to Part II (A), Assam Gazette 23 June 1999, 7. Available at 
http://aasc.nic.in/Acts%20and%20Rules%20%28GOA%29/Implementation%20of%20Assam%20Acc
ord%20Deptt/Assam%20Accord.pdf, accessed on 17 July 2010. 
After the Assam accord, the Assam government worked on revising the electoral 
rolls.  Baruah notes, ‘The procedures followed were controversial. Critics claimed 
that a large number of names of legal citizens were removed from the electoral 
rolls.’66  There were elections in Assam in 1985, and the Assom Gana Parishad (AGP) 
won after a campaign where they tried to reposition themselves, using “Minorities 
are not Foreigners, AGP for all, all for AGP” as a major campaign slogan.67    
 
It is likely that Bengali Muslims who were not disenfranchised did not have the 
political wherewithal to protest the sweeping amnesty granted to those accused of 
crimes during the agitation, as well as to government officials with disciplinary cases 
against them.   After the accord was signed, the State Government withdrew criminal 
cases against all the people charged with crimes in connection with the Nellie 
massacre, and more generally, withdrew cases connected to election violence across 
Assam68.   
 
C. Access to Criminal justice  
 
1. Complaints and FIRs 
 
Six hunded and sixty eight First Information reports or FIRs were registered in 
relation to the violence in Nellie.  However, the Morigaon district administration has 
only been able to locate 525 FIRs, which they disclosed to us, and said that the 
remaining 143 FIRs had most likely been damaged over time due to ‘lack of proper 
storage’69.  
 
The Tewary Commission noted soon after the Nellie massacre that it was difficult to 
accurately count crimes committed in Assam in the first quarter of 1983 because 
some police stations treated “various cases resulting in complaints as separate 
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incidents” while others “clubbed together the like incidents which took place in a 
given area” and counted them as one incident, i.e. created what has since come to be 
called an omnibus FIR70.  
The FIRs we extracted related to the Nellie massacre, however, are not omnibus FIRs 
as much as highly vague FIRs.  We examined 240 FIRs where the complainant’s 
account was almost identical across all the FIRs.  The basic text of the handwritten 
FIRs was as follows: 
“I have the honour to report you that on 18/2/83 at 8am, Friday, a good 
number of miscreant equipped with guns, daos, lathis, arows attacked our 
villagers and following things were destroyed and burnt our houses and 
looted all the properties.[sic]”  25% included the following line: “I can identify 
some of them who were involved in this crime and even if they appear in 
front of me I can identify them.”  However, these tend to be FIRs from the 
same village, and it is unlikely that the line reflects the actual ability of 
particular complainants to identify perpetrators.   The FIRs record names of 
family members killed, and some record the names of people injured.  Almost 
all of them record details of property destroyed and most of these have a 
monetary estimate next to this.  The police are not complainants in any of 
these FIRs, though the pro forma statement in each makes it impossible to say 
whether the complainant is a direct victim of violence, a family member of 
someone killed or a witness. The police clearly did not seek, or ignored, or 
actively suppressed individual accounts, and the resulting individual crimes.  
That said, complainants had accused specific people in 139 out of 241, or 58% 
of FIRs.  The remaining 42% said the perpetrators were ‘unknown’ or a mob 
of “14/15000 people”. 
The FIRs were recorded over the two months following the massacre.  In 1983, the 
officers recording these complaints could not have known that the Assam accord 
would result in a sweeping amnesty.  So, these FIRs would have been the foundation 
for criminal proceedings, and at least 4 of every 10 FIRs would simply not have 
allowed for robust investigation, because there would have been no names of the 
accused on the record.     
2. Arrests 
The SP, Morigaon informed us that 1668 people were arrested in the wake of the 
Nellie massacre.  However, we have not learned religious affiliations of people 
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arrested.  We requested arrest registers, but we were informed that these records no 
longer exist.   
3. Summary closure and Charge-sheets 
 
We learned that charges were filed in 299 cases, and the remaining 389 cases – or 56% 
of cases – were summarily closed even before the virtual amnesty that followed from 
the Assam Accord.  After the Assam Accord was signed in 1985, the Government of 
Assam petitioned to withdraw cases under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1973, in all the trial courts that had live cases, citing lack of evidence in all of 
these.  The courts accepted the applications, and agreed to the discharge of all the 
accused.   
 
Therefore even before the blanket, informal amnesty in the Assam accord, 56% cases 
were closed for ‘lack of evidence’.  That is telling in itself.  We examined copies of 100 
charge sheets from Nagaon district, and these are fairly detailed – certainly, detailed 
enough to ground proceedings, had the State been willing.    
  
Once the Assam accord was signed, the Assam government withdrew cases that 
were not summarily closed already.  Not only the police and prosecution, but the 
courts as well mechanically accepted a political mandate to close all cases, and failed 
to apply a judicial mind to the facts of each case, before deciding whether or not it 
deserved to be closed.  
 
The Assam accord explicitly denied immunity to those accused of “heinous” crimes.  
Had the courts functioned independently, they would, at a minimum, have queried 
the withdrawal of cases related to the Nellie massacre. 
D. Accountability of public officials  
The Tewary Commission was asked to assess measures that State authorities took to 
anticipate, prevent and deal with election related disturbances and recommend 
measures to prevent similar violence in the future.  It is important to note that the 
Commission’s mandate included looking into the Nellie massacre, but extended 
beyond that, and its analysis and recommendations need to be evaluated in that 
light.  
1. District administration 
The Tewary Commission was critical of the three government functionaries who had 
failed to read the wireless message warning of armed people gearing up to attack the 
Nellie area.   They were: 
  
• MNA Kabir, Commandant, 5th Armed Police Batallion was posted as Officer 
in charge law and order for Morigaon in February 1983.   
• Pramode Chetia, SDPO, Morigaon in February 1983.   
• Bhadra Kenta Chetia, O.C., Jagiroad police station, Morigaon in February 
1983 
The Commission said they had (1) failed to take steps to prevent the communal 
violence in Nellie, Assam on 18 February 1983, despite prior knowledge that violence 
was apprehended and (2) failed to respond to violence while it was unfolding. 
The Commission states: “Had these three officers been careful about their dak 
[letters], they would have come to know of it [the planned attack] on 15th February 
itself and if their knowledge would have been converted into obvious actions, there 
would, perhaps, have been some effective preventive action at Nellie.”71    The 
Commission also concluded, “In so far as Nellie is concerned, even the plea of lack of 
previous information cannot be taken,” given the exchange with the IGP, law and 
Order, and the Officer in Charge’s visit to Borbori village the day before the 
massacre72. 
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While officials in Jagiroad police station and Morigaon did not take steps to avert 
violence, they also failed to rush to the Nellie area once they heard it was under 
attack. The Tewary Commission also notes that, while police and security forces 
were stretched thin, on 18 February, Jagiroad police station had a platoon of the 
CRPF available for urgent action, implying that they were not quite as short-staffed 
as they made out. The Officer in Charge, Jagiroad, Mr. Chetia, received two messages 
about the Nellie violence a little before 11 AM, and sent the CRPF troops to the area 
instead of going there himself. The SDPO also did not go from Morigaon to Nellie as 
soon as he heard about the massacre, and the Commission criticizes this: “it is a 
matter of serious concern that…[the]…SDPO preferred to…send a message…to OC 
Jagiroad  instead of taking some more positive …action himself”73. 
 
The Commission found Mr. Bhadra Kanta Chetia’s claims that he was diverted 
because he was rescuing drowning people unreliable.  The Commission found that 
“had Shri Bhadra Kanta Chetia, Officer in Charge, Jagiroad police station been 
conscious of his duties, even if preventive action could not be taken before 18 
February in spite of previous information about possible clashes, prompt action 
could certainly have been taken on 18.2.83 to contain the trouble.” The Commission 
also said,  
For any incidents, the plea of inadequacy of force can very easily be taken…It 
is the easiest way to attempt to shift the responsibility by saying that more 
force was demanded but was not made available.  In the case of the Nellie 
incident, what is established is that the force that was available with the OiC 
of the Jagiroad police station on the 17th and then on the 18th of February 
1983 was not utilized effectively and immediately on receiving the 
information.74      
 
Appendix E of the Tewary Commission Report on the violence in Assam from 
January to April 1983 gives a list of dismissed / suspended police personnel.  It tells 
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us that Mr. B.K. Chetia, the Officer in Charge, Jagiroad was suspended and the 
government ordered departmental proceedings against him for negligence and 
dereliction of duty75.  Mr. Promode Chetia, the SDPO, Morigaon who also failed to 
read the message about impending violence, was suspended ten days after the 
massacre for negligence and dereliction of duty.  A few months later, in October 
1983, Mr. Chetia was reinstated76, but the Tewary Commission does not state why he 
was reinstated.  The list of dismissed and suspended police personnel does not 
include M.N.A. Kabir, the A.P.S. Commandant, 5th Armed Battalian, and we infer 
from this omission that Mr Kabir did not face disciplinary proceedings.  This 
leniency is striking, since the district administration’s records indicate that the DIG 
in charge of law and order for Nagaon district posted Mr. Kabir in Morigaon sub-
division specifically in response to increasing violence in Morigaon77.  Mr. Kabir 
claimed that his wife did not receive the wireless message about Nellie being under 
siege, and that because clerical staff was on strike, the dak delivery system had not 
worked as it should have78. However the ASI, Morigaon deposed before the 
commission that the dak runner had delivered the message to Mr. Kabir’s wife, she 
had read the message, kept it with her and instructed the runner to sign for it79.   Mr. 
Kabir was the rank of an SP, and it is possible his relative seniority sheltered him 
from the inquiries that his junior colleagues, who were not of the ‘officer class’ faced, 
even though he was, on the face of the record, unconscionably negligent.   
 
The Commission also heard allegations that Ghana Kanta Dutta, Officer in Charge, 
Amsoi police outpost himself led a mob of attackers and opened fire on people.  He 
denied the allegations, said he wasn’t in the area and presented copies of the general 
diary to prove this.  The Assam government suspended him, and ordered 
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departmental proceeding against him for negligence and dereliction of duty in 
connection with the Nellie incident80.  
 
We do not know the ultimate result of the proceedings against the Officers in Charge 
of Jagiroad and Amsoi, though it seems that the Officer in Charge, Jagiroad faced 
disciplinary proceedings that his seniors evaded.  However, we were struck by the 
fact that the Tewary Commission was quite mild in its findings, despite its careful 
fact-checking.  It euphemistically rued the fact that the three errant public officials 
were not ‘more careful’ with their dak.  Surely the more reasonable response is that it 
is simply not credible that all three addressees of a wireless message failed to read it, 
even accounting for how troubled the district was at the time.  In fact, as the 
Commission itself noted, all three individuals should have been alert to the 
possibility of violence even without receiving the message in light of the ample 
warning from events preceding the Nellie massacre. The far graver charge against 
the Officer in Charge, Amsoi that he actually participated in the violence also led to a 
mild administrative enquiry, rather than any criminal proceedings.    
 
The SP’s report on violence from January to March 1983 lists incidents of violence by 
and against various communities across Morigaon in February 1983, including some 
in the area under Jagiroad police station81.  On several of these occasions, the SP 
reports that the police rushed to the spot and averted large scale fatalities.  The Nellie 
massacre is a stark outlier.  
 
The Commission found that senior district officials, including the District Magistrate 
and the Superintendent of Police, had acted responsibly on February, 18 1983.  The 
Commission reports that the Deputy Commissioner and the D.I.G received messages 
about the massacre at Morigaon around midnight on the night of the 18th, and 
rushed to Nellie82.  The Superintendent of Police heard about the massacre at 2:50 
PM, and also rushed to Nellie.  Considering that the violence began at 8 AM that 
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morning, the information itself reached very late, despite wireless communication 
being available. The Commission however took their versions on face value. It is 
worth noting also that senior district officials, when deposing before the 
Commission, seemed at pains to exonerate their colleagues from blame, and put the 
enormous failures around Nellie down to strained resources and reduced 
communication as a result of the unrest.   
 
Deposing before the Tewary Commission, set up to enquire into the political violence 
in Assam from January to March 1983, the Deputy Commissioner of Nagaon district 
said that the police were given firm instructions to quell communal violence on  
February 12th, and the district authorities decided not to divert any police officers 
from that subdivision, and that that they called in the army on February 16th to help 
maintain law and order83.    
 
The SP, in his report, described four incidents of violence in the Jagiroad P.S. area on 
11, 12, and 13 February 1983.  He described all four incidents as attacks by Muslims 
and Bengali Hindus on Assamese villages, and reported that the police chased away 
the mobs on all four occasions.  On one occasion he reported that 27 houses were 
burnt and five people killed, but otherwise reported no casualties. This clearly 
indicates that the Jagiroad PS police were expecting violence, and were capable of 
mobs of ‘2/3 thousand’, so the SP should have queried more closely why they were 
passive when they knew crowds were building around Muslim villages in Nellie. 
 
The Assam government did not respond to our specific query on sanction under 
Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which is required to prosecute 
officials in relation to the Nellie massacre.  However, since we know that the State 
withdrew all criminal proceedings related to election violence after the Assam 
Accord, we can assume that sanction to prosecute was not granted even if there was 
an application for it. We cannot confirm that any such application was even made.   
2. The State, the Centre and the Election Commission  
 
                                                        
83 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Assam Disturbances (“Tewary Comission”), 262, para. 
13.19. 
The Tewary Commission does not delve into the responsibility of the State 
Government or the Central Government vis-à-vis the Nellie massacre, or election 
violence more generally.  Two facts strongly suggest that the State Government had 
little commitment to finding out how or why violence unfolded and who should be 
held responsible.  The first, discussed earlier, is the de facto amnesty to perpetrators 
after the Assam Accord.  The second is the fact that the State Government never 
released the report by the Tewary Commission, the only official inquiry into the 
extreme election violence that Assam experienced in 198384. The Tewary 
Commission’s report was never formally released, and until we secured a copy 
through an Right to Information application, we only had access to a faint, 
photocopied extract informally circulated by journalists and rights activists.  
        
While the Commission’s fact finding seems thorough and reasonably even-handed, it 
is also fairly mild in tone and its censure of government officials. For example, its 
findings about official responsibility were not reflected in its recommendations, 
which were extremely general, speaking for instance about the need to build 
religious amity in Assam, or the need to tackle illegal immigration.  It is possible that 
the Congress government after the 1983 elections did not release the report because 
the leaders of the Assam agitation had denounced the Commission as a sham85 and 
set up a rival, unofficial commission.  The unofficial commission was chaired by TU 
Mehta, a retired High Court Chief Justice and mirrored the mandate of the Tewary 
Commission. The unofficial Mehta Commission was sympathetic to the Assam 
agitation, and criticized the decision to hold elections.  In 1985, when the Asom Gana 
Parishad came to power, the State Government had even less incentive than the 
previous dispensation to make the Tewary Commission public.   
 
Commentators over the years have criticized the Central Government’s push for 
Assembly elections in Assam in 1983. In a pamphlet of the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting of the Government of India after the elections, the decision was 
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described as necessary to avert a Constitutional crisis, because Assam was under 
President’s Rule which could only be imposed for a year at time, and had to end in 
March 1983.  However, clearly, the Centre and State had done nowhere near enough 
to prepare for elections.  When talks between the Centre and the agitation leaders 
broke down in January 1983, the agitation leaders were arrested and elections 
announced.  The Election Commission, in its turn, fell in line with the Central 
Government’s argument that elections had to be held at very short notice instead of 
reaching an independent assessment on whether free and fair elections were viable 
at that time.   
 
E. Relief and rehabilitation 
 
The Revenue and Disaster Management Department of the Government of Assam 
(where our Right to Information application landed after a convoluted journey) 
informed us that in February 1983, relief and rehabilitation was governed by the 
Assam Relief manual and ‘relevant circulars’, and disclosed copies of the Relief 
Manual and instructions and guidelines on relief86.  They also informed us that the 
Relief Manual is applicable in situations of communal violence87.  We learned that 
they did not have any guidelines or instructions for repairing religious structures 
damaged by human-made or natural disasters88.   
While the Assam Government gave copies of generally applicable guidelines, the 
Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Nagaon informed us that they could not trace 
any of the more detailed information we requested on relief measures after the Nellie 
massacre89.   
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So while we know what relief norms prevailed at the time, which we discuss below, 
we do not have records from which to piece together information about how many 
government or non-government relief camps were set up, when they were set up, 
how many people they sheltered, what facilities they offered and when they were 
dismantled.   
1. Displacement and relief camps 
 
The Tewary Commission mentions relief measures in Morigaon district but does not 
describe them in detail.  Unofficial sources also mention a relief camp for victims of 
the Nellie massacre90 that was guarded by troops from the Central Reserve Police 
Force91.  A Government of India pamphlet by the Directorate of Advertising the 
Visual Publicity of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India 
claimed in April 1983 that relief was being provided in 197 camps with a population 
of 2,38,688 by the Government of Assam92.  It also claimed that ‘at one time’ 3,10,000 
‘refugees’ were living in 250 camps, and that relief assistance included food and milk 
for children and expectant mothers93.  It also said that about 68,000 ‘refugees have… 
moved back to their villages. Almost all the refugees who went to Arunachal 
Pradesh have returned to Assam.  Efforts are also being made to persuade the 
refugees who went to West Bengal to return to Assam’94.  These figures are for the 
entire State, rather than specific to the Nellie massacre, but they suggest basic relief 
provisioning by the State Government with some Central assistance. 
The Morigaon district administration’s report tells us that, in Morigaon, “minority 
pockets in remote areas were leaving their villages out of fear but it not possible to 
provide CRPF Pickets or to cover those areas by mobile patrolling because most of 
the bridges were burnt and roads damaged by agitationists” and describes diverting 
police from other camps, noting that “as a result of large scale disturbances may 
relief camps had to be started and all those camps needed protection.  So four more 
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coys [companies] of the CRPF were inducted in Nagaon Dist.”95   A report by the SP 
also mentions that survivors of the massacre were housed in the government school 
in Nellie on the night of the 18th96.  District records show that one section of the 10th 
CRPF was deployed in Nellie after the elections97.  
2. General relief norms 
 
 
The Assam Relief Manual98 dated June 1976 and still in use today, focuses primarily 
on relief following floods. It was meant to be an ‘integrated plan for relief 
administration’, to ensure ‘speed, coordination and efficient control’.  It has a chapter 
addressing ‘Relief on Account of other national calamities or other causes’99, which 
includes drought and famine, storms and cyclones, earthquakes, landslides, 
epidemics, major accidents in factories, mines and transport, accidents in melas and 
festivals, serious fires, ‘acute economic distress’ and ‘distress of people on account of 
grave situation arising out of international border dispute but not amounting to war’.  
The last category possibly reflects the fact that the Relief Manual was compiled soon 
after Bangladesh independence, and the large flows of refugees who came into West 
Bengal and Assam from Bangladesh a few years previously.  
The Manual does not address steps specific to displacement caused by internal 
violence within Assam. It also does not lay down detailed guidelines for relief 
unrelated to floods, stating that variations in magnitude of loss mean ‘no hard and 
fast rules / regulations can be framed nor any prior preparations can be made for the 
grant of relief to the people in distress…relief operation will be organised by the DC 
[District Commissioner] as soon as emergency situation arise [sic] and steps will be 
taken to give relief to the deserving cases. The instructions…for the floods will be 
followed as far as applicable in these cases’100.  Thus, while we have learned from the 
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Revenue and Disaster Management Department that the Manual applied to 
communal violence, in fact, there is little guidance in the Manual.   
The DC is charged with supervising ‘relief centres’, and instructed with making 
special provisions for the ‘infirm, destitute, orphans, children, expectant / nursing 
mothers’101.  He or she is also empowered to set up relief works and distribute relief 
in the form of agricultural inputs, soft loans, and house repair grants102.  The District 
Health Officer is charged with organising emergency medical relief teams at the 
district headquarters, and rushing them to sites where they are needed and open 
camp dispensaries if existing health facilities are not enough103.    
The Manual instructs the Superintendent of Police to collect intelligence on crime in 
the aftermath of a calamity, assist in relief and rescue and transferring people to 
relief camps, help people to re-establish contact with their families, prevent and 
investigate crime104. 
While we know what general standards applied to the Nellie aftermath, we have no 
information on whether these standards were followed.  The Tewary Commission 
report says that the DC and SP provided medical relief, shelter and ‘other necessary 
measures’105.   
3. Specific norms   
 
The Manual instructs the District Collector to begin relief works without waiting for 
instructions from the State Government106.  The Manual grants the DC full powers to 
distribute gratuitous relief, as well as rehabilitation grants for, inter alia, construction 
or repairing houses at the rate of Rs. 300 per family for completely damaged houses 
and Rs. 100 per family for partially damaged houses107.  However, for survivors of 
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the Nellie massacre, these norms were displaced the rehabilitation package 
announced by the Government of Assam, which consisted of: 
• Rs. 5000 cash to each bereaved family for each person killed. 
• Rs. 5000 towards reconstruction of houses destroyed. 
• Relief assistance on the same scale as in the relief camps up to three months 
after people returned to their homes, ‘till the harvesting of the next crop.’ 
• Distribution of free seed at the rate of 10 kgs. per bigha, subject to a 
maximum of 20 kgs for two bighas for every agriculturalist family for sowing 
summer paddy. 
• Assistance to replace lost bullocks at the rate of two bullocks per family 
subsidy subject to a maximum of Rs. 1500. 
• Subsidy of Rs. 500 per family for lost milch cattle. 
• For small traders and businessmen, it has been decided to give business loan 
of Rs. 2500 per family together with a loan, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1000 
in an urban area, and Rs. 200 in rural areas for the repair and reconstruction 
of shops damaged in the disturbances and for maintenance relief for a period 
of one month. 
It is important to note that the rehabilitation package is not restricted to victims of 
the Nellie massacre – all victims of ethnic violence between January and April 1983 
were entitled to this relief.  The rehabilitation package focuses primarily on economic 
rehabilitation at a subsistence level. It does not provide for compensation for injuries 
and disability, however serious.   
 
Based on the information disclosed to us by the Centre and the State government, we 
do not believe these rates of compensation were increased in the years following 
1983.  By contrast, in later chapters, we will see how the Central Government 
enhanced compensation in recent years to survivors of the 1984 mass violence in 
Delhi and the 1989 mass violence in Bhagalpur. 
 
A majority of the FIRs we examined recorded loss of property, tracking numbers of 
livestock and amount of grain lost, for example.  Most of these FIRs had a number for 
compensation on them, based on property and lives lost.  Given the scant detail on 
actual crimes committed in these FIRs, we are of the view that they were filled in as a 
formality to disburse compensation rather than investigate offences.  This suggests 
that in the months following the Nellie massacre, the Morigaon administration took 
steps to distribute compensation, although we cannot judge how comprehensive or 
efficient they were.  Scanning the losses in the FIRs also makes clear how poor most 
survivors of the massacre were – movable and immovable property losses were 
estimated at over Rs. 10,000 in only a handful of cases.  Many recorded items such as 
a single hen or duck, or a single brass container in addition to thatched huts.   
 
F. Access to information  
 
 
None of the information we sought on the Nellie massacre was in the public domain, 
on access to criminal justice, on whether officials identified as remiss were held 
accountable, and on compensation and rehabilitation.  Right to Information 
applications on this episode of mass violence proved very challenging.  In 1983, 
Nellie was a part of Morigaon district, and it has since become a part of Nagaon 
district.  So our Right to Information applications were repeatedly transferred 
between the two districts. 
 
Very little information survived on the questions we asked in our Right to 
Information applications.  We got copies of the few legal papers that survived, and 
learned that Nagaon district officials had spent time in the record room of the local 
trial court locating them.  After several applications ricocheted back and forth 
between the two districts, we called the public information officer in the district 
headquarters who said he had tried to locate the information we asked for, but was 
at a loss.   
 
Strangely, the Home Department of the Assam Government gave us a copy of the 
Tewary Commission report, which was never released when it was written. It is still 
not officially placed in the public domain. We got an original copy of the report, and 
can only speculate that after 27 years, officials had either forgotten that it was never 
officially placed before the Assembly, or were taking an admirably purposive 
approach to their Right to Information obligations in this one instance.    
 
G. Summing up 
 
 
The Nellie massacre testifies to the role an active media and civil society can play, 
more than the three episodes of mass violence we discuss in the chapters that follow.  
Despite the large death toll in Nellie, the State’s actions in this area did not come 
under sustained scrutiny beyond the immediate aftermath of the massacre.  
Perpetrators did not face criminal trials.  Only one, fairly junior police person faced 
disciplinary measures.  Survivors received minimal compensation.  In the absence of 
sustained media, activist and academic scrutiny, the State’s actions and account 
becomes difficult to challenge.  Even this account, partial as it is, has remained out of 
public view and is in danger of being lost as records are destroyed over time, except 
for the records which we now have been able to access.





In this chapter we discuss the massacre of Sikhs that took place in Delhi after the 
assassination of the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, by her two Sikh 
bodyguards on 31st October 1984.  The background to this assassination is situated in 
the measures taken by Mrs. Gandhi’s government in attempting to tackle the militant 
separatist movement in Punjab. These included the ordering of the army to storm 
into the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, the Golden Temple at Amritsar, Punjab, in an 
anti-insurgency operation five months earlier, destroying portions of the sacred 
structure, and killing scores of innocent pilgrims, as ‘collateral damage’. We look at 
the spread of the violence in Delhi and analyse the measures taken by the 
Government to bring the criminals to book, to ensure accountability of officials and 
to compensate and rehabilitate the survivors of the violence.  
 
The violence started on the 31st of October and continued till 7th of November 1984. 
Even though the violence took place in varying degrees of intensity across the 
country, especially in Kanpur, Bokaro and Chas, for the purpose of this study we are 
examining the events and the subsequent government response that took place in 
Delhi.  
 
B. Background and context 
 
Around 9.20 a.m. on 31st October 1984, two Sikh security guards fired upon Prime 
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi at 1, Safdarjung Road, her official residence.  This 
information spread, and thousands of people started gathering at the All India 
Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), where the Prime Minister had been taken.  By 
that afternoon the newspapers announced that Mrs. Gandhi had succumbed to her 
injuries. 
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Between 2 and 3 p.m. in the afternoon, sporadic incidents started taking place 
around AIIMS, situated in South Delhi. Initially these were confined to shouting of 
slogans against the Sikhs, calling them traitors, pulling out Sikh passengers from 
buses and manhandling them and chanting angry slogans such as ‘Khoon ka Badla 
Khoon Se,’ or ‘Blood for Blood’. When the then President of India, Giani Zail Singh, 
himself a Sikh, arrived at AIIMS around 5:20 p.m., 15 to 20 people stoned his car.  
Placing blame on the entire Sikh community, mobs assaulted Sikhs, pulled them out 
of cars and off buses, and burned their turbans, but no assailant killed a Sikh. Many 
people reported that their neighbourhoods were peaceful on October 31, 1984.  
According to the first documentations of the violence by civil society groups, the 
huge crowd of mourners that had gathered at AIIMS included many Sikh people, 
and it was only after a group of around 20 persons started shouting slogans against 
Sikhs and began the first attacks on Sikhs on the road, that the crowd started getting 
restless. Till this time there was no sign of any aggression towards the Sikhs in and 
around AIIMS.   
 
Some of the first instances of violence on 31st October 1984 were reported from the 
residential areas adjoining AIIMS i.e. Green Park, Defence Colony, Safdarjung, Lodhi 
Colony, Sarojini Nagar. Also it was observed that most instances of violence on 31st 
October were limited to looting, arson and hurting Sikhs travelling in public 
vehicles. It appears that on the night of 31st October this ‘anger’ and ‘outrage’ that the 
general public felt at the assassination of the Prime Minister was actively stoked, 
channelized and given a systematic form. What started off as mob anger targeted at 
the Sikh community was organised into a massacre. This is evident from the scale 
and manner of targeted violence that took place in entire Delhi including the 
outskirts from 1st November to 3rd November and spill over instances up to almost 
7th November 1984.   
 
Different mobs in various parts of the city followed the same pattern. The mob 
mostly consisted of outsiders, with some persons from the locality. In a number of 
instances this mob was led/directed by the local politician (usually belonging to the 
Congress Party). The houses and shops belonging to Sikhs or inhabited by Sikhs 
were identified. The mob usually had access to the voters list and therefore was 
easily able to identify Sikh homes. The male Sikh residents, irrespective of age, were 
pulled out, beaten up mercilessly and then burnt alive, sometimes with a burning 
rubber tyre thrown around their neck. Simultaneously the houses and shops were 
looted and then burnt. In some instances, the task of beating the Sikh residents was 
of the first mob and the second mob that followed would then burn the injured 
bodies of the Sikhs so that no evidence is left. Almost all witnesses had reported that 
the mobs were carrying a white powder of some sort which was used to throw on 
the burning bodies of the Sikhs.  
 
Officially, 2733 Sikhs were reported to have been killed in Delhi alone during the 
anti-Sikh massacre. Unofficial estimates place this figure close to 4000 persons. There 
is no exact estimate of the total number of persons displaced, injured and affected by 
the riots, loss of income and means of livelihood.   In the years that followed the 
massacre, the Central and Delhi governments set up various commissions and 
committees of inquiry, but did little to pursue perpetrators seriously. 
 
1. Marwah commission 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the violence, faced with the failure to hold organisers 
accountable, two leading civil rights organisations People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
(PUCL) and People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) filed a writ petition in the 
Delhi High Court, calling for an appointment of a commission of inquiry led by the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The court dismissed the writ petition on the 
grounds that an independent inquiry had already been instituted by the Delhi Police, 
with Ved Marwah, then Assistant Commissioner of Police nominated to head the 
investigation on 25 November 1984. 
 
However, the Marwah report was enjoined from publication by a Delhi High Court 
order, after a suit to stay publication of the report was filed by two senior police 
officials, who were both allegedly indicted in the report for their negligence and 
possible positive involvement in the riots. Both Sewa Dass, the Delhi Commissioner 
of Police (East), and Chander Prakash, Delhi Commissioner of Police (South), were 
from areas in Delhi which had the highest Sikh casualties.  
 
On being asked to speak about the Marwah Report, Retired Chief Justice Rajit S. 
Narula later testified that he learned that certain police officers had told Ved 
Marwah about being ordered by senior officers to cover up or participate in the 
massacres, these statements being recorded during the personal examination of those 
officers. These comments however were not included in the personal statements 
submitted by those officers, but were a part of Marwah's personal notes109.  
 
In the interim stay order issued by the Delhi High Court, Justice Chawla praised the 
performance of the officers during the Sikh massacres, stating that "the plaintiffs 
along with their officers and with their limited resources worked day and night to 
control the riots with great devotion to their duty. In fact the riots were controlled in 
the said two Districts (South and East) in a very short span of two to three days. 
However, the journalists and some other social organizations freely criticised the 
police alleging their administrative failure in not controlling the riots110.” The 
injunction was not appealed by the Delhi administration, and the while the official 
written statements were handed over to the subsequent Mishra Commission, 
Marwah's crucial handwritten notes were destroyed, allegedly on instructions from 
higher authorities.  
 
2. Mishra Commission 
 
In the six months following the massacres, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi  
refused to instate an official commission of inquiry, claiming that he was "protecting 
the Sikhs" and that to do so would "raise issues that were already dead".111 He played 
down the violence as a 'natural reaction', saying, in a speech given on the 19th of 
November, 1984, '...when a mighty tree falls, it is only natural that the earth around it 
does shake a little.’ Finally in April 1985, giving in to public pressures, the Mishra 
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Commission was appointed under Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act. Its 
mandate increased the purview of investigations beyond the violence in Delhi, and 
was stated as being to "inquire into the allegations in regard to the incidents of 
organized violence which took place in Delhi and also the disturbances which took 
place in Bokaro Tehsil, Chas Tehsil and at Kanpur and to recommend measures 
which may be adopted for prevention of recurrence of such incidents.”    
 
The operations of the Commission were mired in controversy, with most of the year 
of 1985 passing before investigations began. To add to the controversy a member of 
the Indian Police Service, D.R. Meena, was appointed to lead the commission’s 
investigating agency despite allegations about police complicity in the episodes. 
Civil rights groups PUCL and PUDR applied under terms of the Commissions to be 
part of the inquiry, but the same were rejected. Instead the Citizen's Justice Group 
(CJC), formed in June 1985 to represent Sikh victims was recognised as the official 
body of the victims.   
 
Proceedings of the Commission were held 'in camera' or behind closed doors, 
ostensibly because of 'tainted' news and the sensitivity of the inquiry. This shielded 
the inquiry from scrutiny and accountability, and the press too was directed to not 
publish any stories on the proceedings of the Commission. The victims' 
representative body CJC demand for copies of the affidavits received by the 
Commission was denied on the grounds of the fear of threats to national security, 
stating 'the rising wave of terrorism and such other anti-national and violent 
activities of anti-social elements'112.  
 
Witnesses were only examined in January 1986, more than fifteen months after the 
massacre.  Further evidence pointing to a bias toward the official side was that while 
the Commission permitted cross-examination of victims, representatives of the 
victims were not allowed to cross-examine any government, police or army officials 
which had been summoned113.  
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The Mishra Commission report submitted its report to the Indian Government in 
August 1986 and it was placed before Parliament in February 1987.  The Delhi 
Administration explained the massacres as a justified reaction to the “misbehaviour 
and anti national character of the local Sikh youths”, stating that Sikh groups has 
instigated the mobs by publicly celebrating Mrs. Gandhi's death114.  
 
The simplistic (and biased) stance of the administration was accepted by the 
Commission in its entirety, and despite evidence to the contrary which pointed to the 
involvement of Congress workers and the handing out of kerosene for the burning 
and access to voters lists to identify Sikh household, the final report’s conclusion was 
that the rioting was spontaneous, stating that the "the gloom that had spread and 
affected Congressmen in particular115" and "the short span of time that intervened 
would not have permitted any scope for any organisation (of riots) to be done." 
Senior police officials and politicians were wholly exonerated, and the strongest 
charge leveled against subordinate officials was that of indifference116.  
 
The finding on the second part of the mandate, which was to ‘recommend measures 
to prevent the recurrence of such incidents,’ largely comprised of recommendations 
consisting of measures to inculcate patriotism and communal harmony amongst the 
youth and warned of the 'evils of television'.  
 
Other than the weak recommendations, the procedure followed by Justice Mishra 
had also come under criticism, prompting the Citizens Justice Committee, to 
officially withdraw from the proceedings. 
 
3. Committees following the Mishra Commission 
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In accordance with the recommendations of the Mishra Commission, the 
government appointed three further Committees on 23 February 1987. The Kapoor-
Mittal Committee was appointed to inquire into the conduct of the Delhi police, and 
consisted of Justice Dilip Kapoor, a retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and 
Kusum Lata Mittal, a retired Secretary to the Government of India. The Jain Banerjee 
Committee, consisting of Justice M.L.Jain, a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court 
and Shri E.N. Renision, a retired I.P.S. officer (later on replaced by Shri A.K.Banerji, a 
retired I.P.S. officer) was constituted to examine cases relating to riots in Delhi. The 
Ahuja Committee, led by R. K. Ahuja, a Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
was directed to conduct an inquiry to find out the total number of Sikhs killed in 
Delhi during the riots and to make appropriate recommendations regarding ex-
gratia payments and other reliefs to their family members.  
 
The R.K. Ahuja Committee reached a figure of 2733 as the total number of Sikhs 
killed in Delhi, and recommended measures for compensation. It did not, however, 
investigate the numbers of Sikhs killed in Kanpur, Bokaro or any other place in 
India. 
 
The Kapoor-Mittal Committee analysed each district and each police station falling 
under it to determine the role played by the police personnel available in the police 
station, and put a lot of emphasis on information gleaned from affidavits of victims 
and eyewitnesses. It submitted two reports as there was a difference of opinion on 
the mandate between two members of Committee, and the government accepted 
only the report submitted by Kusum Lal Mittal, on the grounds that the Kapoor 
report was more in the nature of sociological analysis. Taking action on the basis of 
the report, the government indicted 72 police officers but insufficient action was been 
taken against the police personnel named, on the grounds of expiry of periods of 
limitation and retirement. Of the 72 indicted, one person's pension was reduced, two 
were censured and one was warned.       
 
The Jain-Banerjee Committee examined whether there were cases of omission to 
register or properly investigate offences committed in Delhi during the period of 
riots between 31 October and 7 November 1984.  Set up to examine whether there 
were cases of omission to register or properly investigate offences committed during 
the episodes of mass communal violence in Delhi, and where necessary to 
recommend registration of cases and monitor investigation thereof, it recommended 
cases to be registered against a Congress leader and Member of Parliament, Sajjan 
Kumar and others. The functioning of the Committee was challenged in the Delhi 
High Court by Sajjan Kumar, Brahmanand Gupta and others, and the court passed a 
stay order in December 1987, which was not challenged by the Delhi Government. 
The High Court quashed the appointment of the committee in August 1989, as it 
found that the vesting of powers in the committee was contrary to the provisions of 
the Delhi Police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Delhi government 
then appointed the Poti-Rosha Committee on 23 March 1990 consisting of P. 
Subramaniam Poti, a retired Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court as the chairman 
and P. A. Rosha, retired officer of the Indian Police Service as the member. Its 
mandate was much the same as the Jain-Banerjee Committee. It recommended cases 
to be registered against Sajjan Kumar and others, however the Committee did not 
seek an extension after its term of six months were over, and consequently did not 
finalise a report.  
 
The Jain-Aggarwal Committee was then constituted as a final follow-up to the Poti-
Rosha Committee and had Justice MD Jain, a retired judge of the Delhi High Court, 
and A. P. Aggarwal a retired IPS officer. It started functioning in December 1990 and 
took into consideration 669 affidavits filed before the Justice Mishra Committee and 
also received 415 fresh affidavits from affected persons and their family members 
and looked into 403 FIRs recorded by the Delhi Police in respect of the riot cases. It 
completed its full term and submitted a detailed report in August 1993, in which 
recommendations were made to the Delhi Government for reopening of cases or 
filing of fresh cases. It was the most comprehensive report till date on the cases that 
had been registered after the massacre, and made detailed observations on the 
casual, perfunctory and faulty manner in which the police had handled criminal 
cases. It found that many subsequent acquittals of the accused occurred due to a 
novel method adopted by the police – the use of vague, “omnibus-type” FIRs, which 
covering many, often unrelated incidents, rather than distinct or separate FIRs for 
each incident. Amongst the other gross irregularities committed by the police was 
the format prepared by the police for aggrieved persons for submitting complaints 
did not even contain a column to record names of victims and offenders. Many 
written reports of incidents lodged by victims were not acted upon, and the charge 
sheets, when they were made were couched in general terms and did not refer to 
specific incidents.  
 
The Government of Delhi, then led by the Bharitya Janata Party under Madan Lal 
Khurana, set up the Narula Committee in December 1993, and it submitted its report 
in January 1994. It was led by the retired Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana 
High Court, and it reviewed the findings of the previous committees. The report 
recommended filing of criminal cases against prominent Congress leaders, Sajjan 
Kumar, Jagdish Tytler and HKL Bhagat. 
 
4. Nanavati Commission 
 
On May 10, 2000 with the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance heading the central 
government, yet another commission of inquiry led by Justice G.T. Nanavati was 
appointed. Its mandate was, yet again, “to inquire into the causes and course of the 
criminal violence and riots targeting members of the Sikh community which took 
place in the National Capital Territory of Delhi and other parts of the country on 31st 
October, 1984 and thereafter, and to examine the sequence of events leading to and 
all the facts relating to the violence and riots; whether the heinous crimes could have 
been averted and whether there were lapses or dereliction of duties on part of 
authorities or individuals responsible; to inquire into the adequacy of  the 
administrative measures taken to prevent and to deal with the said violence and 
riots; to recommend measures which may be adopted to meet the ends of the justice, 
and to consider other measures which may be found relevant”. 
 
As part of its functioning, the Commission solicited new affidavits and received the 
ones filed before the Mishra Committee, however key records relating to the 
deployment of the Army were not handed over, on the excuse that these were 
missing.    
 
It submitted its report to the Government on 9 February 2005, and was tabled in 
Parliament 8 August 2005. The report recommended cases to be filed, compensation 
to be enhanced and action to be taken against officials. Even though this report did 
not ascribe to the assumption of the Mishra Commission that the violence was not 
organised, the language used in the report made no definite statements and therefore 
left loopholes that the Government could take advantage of. For example in 
recommending a case to be registered against Jagdish Tytler, the report has said that 
'very probably' there was a case against him which the government used as an 
excuse for not taking any action against Jagdish Tytler.  
 
As part of its findings it further reported that “…substantial increase in the anti-
social population also appears to be one of the causes for the large scale looting and 
killing that  took place  during the riots.”117 It further found that, “What started as a 
spontaneous reaction became an organised effort. Large masses of people, supplying 
with weapons and flammable materials, There is absolutely no evidence suggesting 
that Shri Rajiv Gandhi or any other high ranking Congress(I) leader had suggested or 
organized attacks on Sikhs.  Whatever acts were done, were done  by the local 
Congress(I) leaders and workers, and they appear to have done so for their personal 
political reasons”118.    
  
 
We filed 164 applications under the Right to Information Act to access information 
regarding various aspects of the 1984 anti Sikh violence in Delhi.  As this chapter 
unfolds, the role of the police and the administration in blatantly refusing to control 
the violence will be clear. Further the steady reluctance of the State to take action as 
mandated by law in response to a massacre of such scale will also be evident.  
 
  
C. Access to criminal justice 
 
Through RTI application, we managed to secure copies of most FIRs filed in relation 
to the 1984 massacre from police districts across Delhi, and we draw heavily from 
these in our discussion below.  In accessing information on criminal proceedings 
through the Right to Information Act, the major hurdle proved to be what was 
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described as the routine destruction of records. Due to this we were unable to access 
copies of complaints, court records including copies of charge-sheets, closure reports 
and judgments.   
 
4. Complaints and FIRs  
 
When the Misra Commission of Inquiry was set up and during the course of its 
investigation, in response to an interrogatory, the Delhi administration replied that 
the police had filed a total of 228 FIRs. At the outset, it is pertinent to state here that 
presently Delhi is divided into 12 districts for the purpose of law and order. We 
received copies of FIRs from all districts except for South East and East district. Since 
the records have been destroyed as a matter of ‘routine’, copies of complaints have 
not been maintained and therefore were not provided to us. We were informed that a 
total of 458 First Information Reports (FIRs) were filed overall, and we were given 
copies of 425 FIRs. The remaining information is now based on the 418 FIRs that 
were analysed and information from commission reports.  
 
We analysed 418 FIRs and learned the following: 
• Of 418 FIRs, 281 FIRs were lodged in the year 1984, i.e. 67% if the total 
sample, either immediately after the act of violence occurred or after peace 
was restored in the city. 
•  141 FIRs, (almost a 1/3 of the analysed sample) were filed in subsequent 
years  i.e. 1985, 1987, 1991, 1993, usually after an intervention like 
recommendations by a Commission or a Committee.  
• There are 42 FIRs i.e. 10% of the 418, where we know that previous FIRs had 
been lodged and either the case had been closed or the filing of a specific FIR 
had been refused by the police.  
• In 334 FIRs we found that appropriate sections were used i.e. in 79% FIRs, as 
per the offence made out in the text of the FIR. In 67 FIRs i.e. 16%, even where 
an offence of rioting, murder, looting was made out on the facts recorded by 
the police, the appropriate section was not applied.  
• In 147 FIRs it has been recorded in the text of the FIR that the victim/witness 
knows/can recognise the accused person and how the complainant 
recognises the accused person/s.  
• 13% of FIRs were very unclear, in that important information such as date, 
time, duration, accused and victims are written down. Amongst these, 26 i.e. 
6% were found to be what we describe in this study to be omnibus FIRs.  84% 
of the omnibus FIRs featured a police complainant. So, there is a 
correspondence between police complainants and weak FIRs. 
• Of the 128 FIRs (30% of the total FIRs) in which the police is the complainant, 
119 i.e. 92% were filed within 48 hours of the violence taking place. Of these 
39 cases were closed summarily and in 41 cases the accused was acquitted. 22 
of these FIRs were considered to be omnibus. 
• Only 5 FIRs recorded the crime of rape, even though it is a widely and 
credibly believed  that a number of instances of sexual violence took place in 
Delhi. 
 
The anti riot cell got 255 new FIRs registered in and around the years 1987, 1991, 
1993, following recommendations by commissions and committees of inquiry. Of 
these, 48%, or 123 cases were closed as the accused persons were untraceable or the 
FIR was cancelled or the proceedings were abated. The anti riot cell would monitor 
the investigation of the case but the actual investigation and follow up was carried 
out by the respective police station as per the jurisdiction of the incident of violence.  
 
The Misra Commission has stated on the basis of the records placed before it that 
FIRs were not received if they implicated police officials or any person in authority 
and that the informants were forced to delete the names of such persons from their 
complaints. If reports were made orally then they were not recorded verbatim. 
Several instances have been noted by the Commission where combined FIRs have 
been lodged with regard to several separate incidents, which in this study we 
describe as omnibus FIRs. In summary, legally sound FIRs had mostly not been 
recorded, and these vitiated possibilities of effective investigation and prosecution 
later.  
 
The Jain Aggarwal Committee has explained at length the ‘novel’ pattern of 
registration/non registration of cases with regard to commission of cognizable 
offences.  Instead of registering a separate/distinct FIR with regard to each and every 
cognizable offence reported at the police station, a general, vague and omnibus type 
of FIR was recorded at the concerned police station on the basis of a vague report 
couched in general terms and signed by some police official, say SHO/SI/ASI. This 
was to the effect that during the police official’s visit to a particular locality falling 
within the jurisdiction of his police station he noticed that the law and order 
situation was worsening and that violent, armed mobs were attacking the business 
establishments/residential houses of the Sikhs and were indulging in loot and arson 
of their property and were even committing murders of Sikhs in the locality. FIRs 
were registered on such vague reports, and any further information was recorded 
under Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.  
 
The Jain Aggarwal Committee also observed that the police had devised a format for 
receiving complaints. This format contained various columns including the names 
and addresses of the complainants, the damage to the person, the kind and 
description of the looted/burnt property and the quantum of loss suffered by them. 
There was no column or space for recording facts about incidents of murders, the 
names of the deceased persons and the names of the culprits if these were known. 
This illegal procedure caused incalculable harm to the aggrieved persons, as crucial 
facts that would form the basis of any investigation were not recorded.   
 
An FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence but it is nevertheless of immense 
importance as it furnishes in writing the earliest information regarding the 
occurrence and can be used for to corroborate or contradict its maker under section 
157 or 145 of the Evidence Act. Any subsequent or further statement of a witness will 
fall under section 161 if the investigation in the case has begun and will be 
inadmissible in court except for the purpose of contradicting the witness when 
examined in court. The large numbers of weak, incomplete FIRs were almost 
certainly a major factor in the high rate of acquittal in cases that went to trial.  
  
Arrests:  
Table 1.2: Religious break of arrests carried out in relation to the Anti Sikh massacre 
in Delhi 1984 
District 






South West 223 179 0 44 
New Delhi 56 27 0 1 
North 353 326 0 27 
Outer 151 146 0 5 
South  44 32 0 12 
West 273 172 9 48 
North West 115 96 0 19 
Central 403 377 7 19 
East 618 
Break up not 
given     
North East 375 267 0 108 
South East 123 61 8 54 
 
 
It is pertinent to mention here that apart from other crimes, large scale looting was 
also carried out during this massacre. The police, instead of lodging cases against 
such persons and arresting them, asked them to place all the looted material on the 
streets. It obviously became completely impossible to then identify who had looted 
what property and the victims were asked to identify their belongings and take them 
back in whatever condition they were available. This was done in complete defiance 
of the established criminal law of the land, and was obviously designed to secure 




5. Remand and bail 
 
We received no information on judicial custody and remand, mainly because 
information in this form is not maintained by the police or the courts. On the aspect 
of bail, the Justice Ranganath Misra Commission states, ‘The police released most of 
the accused persons on bail at its level and those who were challenged to the court in 
custody have been released by the Court. There has been obviously no effective 
opposition in the matter of grant of bail nor has the order of release on bail been 
challenged in judicial proceedings in higher courts.’   
 
6. Summary Closures 
 
All the aspects in the conducting of a criminal trial are linked to each other. 
Therefore where appropriate arrests are not carried out, FIRs do not contain details 
of accused or the offence and investigations are perfunctory and shoddy the obvious 
consequence is the closure of the case. 37% of the cases from the 418 FIRs analysed 
resulted in summary closure and the ground recorded for closure is that the accused 
person/s were untraceable. The anti riot cell got 255 new FIRs registered in and 
around the years 1987, 1991, 1993. Of these 123 which means 49.8 % cases are 
recorded as closed on ground of the accused being untraceable or the FIR was 
cancelled or the proceedings were abated. 
 
7. Charge-sheets  
 
The Delhi police did not disclose charge-sheets filed in criminal cases pertaining to 
the massacre, telling us that the police in Delhi do not maintain this record.  Our RTI 
applications were transferred to the courts and the public prosecutor, and we learned 
that these charge-sheets had been destroyed as a matter of routine.   Thus, basic 
criminal records relating to one of the most serious episodes of communal violence 
in India no longer exist.   
 
While we were unable to trace the progress of FIRs to the stage of charging offences, 
and gauage how different cases progressed, there is documentation in the public 
domain to suggest that the prosecution were less than robust and diligent in 
pursuing it case to conviction. 
 
One report describes the quality of charge sheets as follows: 
 
‘In the charge-sheets filed in court, there was often no correlation between the 
specific charges and the people listed as Prosecution Witnesses. The prosecution also 
failed to follow the Criminal Procedure Code (Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) 
requirements in Sections 212 and 218 to frame distinct charges for each event. Crimes 
relating to the witnesses often were not included. In the charge-sheet filed with FIR 
No. 351/84 of PS Nangloi, for example, no mention was made of the murders of the 
husbands of two of the Prosecution Witnesses. Although the prosecution did not 
produce the witnesses in court, alleging that they were untraceable, the Jain-
Aggarwal Committee located them in Delhi and found that the police had fabricated 
their statements, omitting the deaths of their husbands. The charge-sheets also 
omitted key eye-witnesses. In the case against Rajinder Prasad alias Raj Bania, the 
charge-sheet did not include the names of the petitioner’s four daughters all of 
whom had witnessed the murder of their father. Thus, the prosecution and police 
ensured the acquittal of the defense through reliance on faulty charge-sheets.” 
 
It is apparent from the above that as a logical conclusion of the token investigation 
that was carried out, weak charge-sheets made sure that even if the witnesses were 
ready to depose before the court either their names were struck off or they were not 




8. Trials, Acquittals and Appeals 
 
From the FIRs that we analysed, we found that 30% of the cases that proceeded to 
trial ended in acquittals. We do not have complete information on whether all of 
them were appealed or not but we do know that in July 2010 there were 44 appeals 
from acquittals and convictions pending in the Delhi High Court and 2 special leave 
petitions pending in the Supreme Court of India.  
 
The Jain Aggarwal Committee gave some of the following reasons why in their 
opinion the riot related cases were resulting in acquittals and the manner in which 
the trials were being conducted: 
 
• Faulty investigation: The Committee observed that the Investigating Officers 
examined only the complainant, widow or son or father of the deceased as 
the case may be under section 161. The statements recorded were short and 
sketchy and concluded that the maker of the statement was not able to 
identify anyone from amongst the culprits/mob. 
 
• No correlation between cases: Since a number of incidents of mob violence 
took place on a particular day in a particular locality at about the same time 
during 31st October to 4th November 1984, the police should have correlated 
the various instances to find corroborative evidence. But nothing of this kind 
was done and a solitary witness to a crime even in cases where charge-sheets 
were filed was in most cases the complainant. Even the family members or 
neighbours were not examined or arrayed in the list of witnesses and even if 
the complainant had witnessed other instances of violence, no attempt was 
made to utilize this information.  We noticed this trend while analyzing the 
FIRs. For example in a particular locality there was an FIR lodged at around 1 
am for looting, rioting etc and the case was later closed as accused 
untraceable, but in the same police station the subsequent FIR filed around 3 
am referred to persons being arrested for violating the curfew orders, near 
the same locality as above, but no correlation was chosen to be made by the 
police.  
 
• No attempts to trace accused persons: No attempts were made to trace 
accused persons and effect recovery of weapons or stolen goods from them. 
Infact the police had resorted to making public announcements and asking 
people to deposit stolen goods on the roads so that they could be collected 
and given back to their owners where ever traceable. This is not an acceptable 
form of recovery of stolen goods as per the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 
and such recoveries have no evidentiary value.  
 
• Joint trial: The logical fallout of an omnibus FIR which is general in nature 
but to which a number of complaints and/or statements are attached is a joint 
chargesheet for numerous offences. The general principle in the Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 is that for each distinct offence of which a person is 
accused, the accused will face a separate charge and a separate trial. The 
Committee was shocked to observe that in a large number of charge-sheets 
filed in court several accused persons numbering even 100 and more were 
arraigned to stand trial together even though allegations against a number of 
them were distinct and were not linked to each other. This utter confusion 
resulted in the acquittal of a number of persons. 
 
• Non examination of prosecution witnesses: Another shocking trend observed 
by the Committee was that even though a number of complainants were cited 
as prosecution witnesses, they were not examined on the pretext of their not 
being traceable. In a number of cases these witnesses were eye witnesses and 
would have probably changed the course of the trial. It is also mentioned that 
in a number of cases, these very complainants were traced by the Committee 
for verifying the details of the affidavits filed by them.     
 
 
Vrinda Grover, Advocate of the Supreme Court, conducted an analysis of 137 
representative judgments on the November 1984 massacres, with 120 from the trial 
courts, seven from the High Court, and four from the Supreme Court. These cases 
resulted in only eight convictions for murder, with two of those overturned by the 
High Court. Grave lapses in police investigations, delays in filing cases, the failure to 
identify and investigate prosecution witnesses, the deliberate mis-recording of 
witness statements, and the failure to comply with legal procedures precluded 
effective prosecutions. For example, in State v. Kanak Singh the police translated the 
English FIR into Hindi and considered that to be their investigation119.  
 
Sajjan Kumar, an influential Congress leader from Sultanpuri in the Outer district of 
Delhi is alleged to have instigated and led the rioting mobs in his district and other 
areas resulting in murders, looting, arson and theft being committed. 
Recommendations against Sajjan Kumar were made by the Jain Banerjee Committee, 
the Jain Aggarwal Committee and the GT Nanavati Commission.  At least 7 FIRs 
referred to Sajjan Kumar as an accused person, but the cases were closed as accused 
untraceable. This issue was specifically raised by the Nanavati Commission in its 
recommendations while referring to FIR nos 250/84, 307/94 and 347/91 of PS 
Sultanpuri, FIR nos 325/93, 329/93 and 178/84 of PS Mangolpuri and FIR no 416/94 
of PS Delhi Cantt. 
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In response, the Government in the ATR on this recommendation has specifically 
mentioned that in 5 FIRs the witnesses/complainants resiled from their statements 
and therefore Sajjan Kumar’s name did not find mention in the charge sheet or the 
case was closed due to accused being untraceable. We do not know if the 
complainants were given notice before closure of the cases or whether any attempts 
by the investigating agency or the judge were made to assess why the witnesses had 
changed their statements.  
 
Currently, the CBI is prosecuting Sajjan Kumar, Brahmanand Gupta and others in a 
trial going on in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, Delhi. It is 
pertinent to mention here that even in May 2010 Sajjan Kumar could not be produced 
in court by the CBI and only after the Metropolitan Magistrate threatened to 
summon the Director of the CBI in person and considerable media attention to this 
case was given that the accused person appeared in the lower court after securing 
bail from the Delhi High Court.  Even though the trial has recently begun and the 
prosecution is leading evidence already this case has reached the Supreme Court on 
the issue of bail and on the issue of framing of charges.  The fact that an extremely 
high profile prosecution of Sajjan Kumar an active Congress leader and a Member of 
Parliament is still going on and is at the stage of evidence is a telling fact.  Sajjan 
Kumar is only one of several Congress politicians who was identified by victims and 
witnesses as involved in violence, and like Kumar, his counterparts have escaped 
criminal liability.  As late as May 2010 the closure report filed by the CBI in a 
prosecution against Jagdish Tytler was accepted by the Court mainly on the grounds 
of too much time having elapsed clearly indicating that an alleged offender may not 
even face trial because the prosecution is doing the job of the defence.  
 
While inspecting the available trial court records of the cases in Delhi we came across 
the file of State v Rajbeer Singh which is a window on the attitude of the investigating 
agency, the prosecution and the judiciary while conducting cases flowing from the 
1984 massacre.  The trial started on 26.07.1994 and was completed on 26.11.1994 i.e. 
in a span of 4 months120.  
                                                        
120 State v Rajbeer, FIR No. 559/92, PS Punjabi Bagh, u/s 147,148,149 IPC based on the affidavits of 
Joginder Bajwa and Inderjeet Singh, charges framed u/s 147/395/436 and 295 IPC r/w 149 IPC. SC 
No. 21/94.  
 
The dateline of this case with the proceedings in brief is as follows121: 
• 09.08.1994: Charges framed. Prosecution Evidence on 20.09.1994 and 
22.09.1994 
• 20.09.1994: Prosecution Witness (PW) Jaswant Singh has expired while other 
2 PWs remain unserved. 22.09.1994 for remaining prosecution evidence 
(RPE) 
• 11.10.1994: PW Joginder Singh Bajwa has sent application stating that he is 
apprehending danger to his life at the hands of the accused persons. The 
Judge while deciding this application was of the opinion that since the exact 
nature of the danger has not been pleaded in the application, the same is 
based on the whims of the witness and non bailable warrants (NBW) were 
issued against the witness. Following this date 6 different dates were put up 
in the case for the appearance of the said witness who did not place an 
appearance in the court. 
After repeated hearings where the main prosecution witness did not appear, 
the accused was acquitted on 26 November 1994.  The case file records said: 
“26.11.1994: No PW is present. NBW sent against PW Joginder Singh 
Bajwa who is material and main witness in this case has been sent 
back with request that NBW against him cannot be executed for want 
of time. It appears that investigating agency is not interested in 
producing this witness to court. This witness also does not appear to 
be interested in appearing before the court as he did not turn up when 
summoned and he was not available as per the request stated to be 
served/ executed against him for production in court on 29.10.1994. 
The prosecution was given last opportunity. Thereafter, this witness 
was not produced on 17.11.1994. NBW was stated to be unexecuted 
against him and returned with report that he is not available at the 
given address at Kapurthala. Today also, NBW has been returned 
unexecuted with remarks as mentioned above. Thus it appears that 
neither PW Joginder Singh Bajwa nor the prosecution is interested in 
                                                        
121 Accessed on inspection of court records carried out in the record room of the Patiala House court in 
Delhi.  Records on file with Centre for Equity Studies. 
producing him as a witness. Even the IO is not present today though 
he was directed to appear in person on the last date of hearing. 
Assistant Public Prosecutor (APP) requests for one more adjournment 
which is declined. Therefore PE is ordered to be closed. On perusal of 
evidence no incriminating circumstance has appeared in the evidence 
of the prosecution to be put to the accused in his statement u/s 313 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to seek explanation from him. 
Therefore requirement to record his statement u/s 313 Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 is dispensed with and the accused is acquitted 
for lack of evidence, for the reasons mentioned in my judgment 
recorded separately.”     
 
Clearly, the Court chose to be a silent spectator to the lackadaisical approach 
displayed by the Police and the Prosecution and paid no heed to the need for witness 
protection. The records nowhere displayed any attempt by the Judge to warn the 
accused persons about the consequences of intimidating the prosecution witnesses 
let alone assuring the witness of any protection. Further, inspite of the fact that the 
witness was not residing in Delhi a short period of time was given to serve the 
witness and finally the IO was not held to account for not appearing in the case in 
person.  
 
The Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court dealt with some cases coming out of 
the 1984 violence.  In one judgment, discussed later in this chapter, the High Court 
judged compensation given to a widow to be inadequate.  In another,  Bhagat Singh v 
State122, the  High Court took into consideration the context of the massacre and 
especially the fact that the Misra Commission, the Kusum Lata Mittal Committee and 
the Jain Aggarwal Committee had severely criticised the role of the police and the 
administration during and after the massacre.  In this case the relevance of 
conviction on the basis of a supplementary chargesheet was challenged when in the 
main chargesheet the accused were acquitted. The High Court was of the opinion 
that Section 173(8) clearly stipulates that nothing contained in Section 173 of the 
Code shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after 
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report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and therefore the 
conviction on a the basis of a supplementary chargesheet is not bad in law.  
 
The Supreme Court’s record with cases related to mass violence in 1984 is very 
mixed.  In Kishori v State123, an appeal against conviction and sentence, the apex court 
seemed to treat the context of violence – the fact that it was mass communal violence 
– as a mitigating factor in favour of the defendant.  The Supreme Court through JJs 
GT Nanavati and Rajender Babu upheld the conviction of the accused but altered the 
death sentence awarded to the accused to one of life imprisonment. The court 
reasoned that, inter alia, the defendants had been swept away by mob frenzy, and 
participants in mobs lose “one's self and the normal standard or sense of judgment 
and reality”.  Further where the argument of a hardened criminal is being made by 
the State for the purpose of sentencing, the Supreme Court has observed that even 
though at the stage of trial the accused was convicted of 7 murders, the High Court 
upheld the conviction in 3 cases and only 2 were appealed before the Supreme Court, 
therefore the accused cannot be termed as a hardened criminal. In any case, the 
Supreme Court said, all the cases refer to one string of events and not various 
different crimes committed by the accused.   One of the judges in this case, Justice GT 
Nanavati a year after this judgement was heading the last Commission of Inquiry 
looking into the anti-Sikh massacre of 1984.  This rationale of the Supreme Court was 
also followed in Manohar Lal@ Munna and Anr v State of NCT of Delhi124, a case with 
similar facts, where the court opined, “What the appellants have done were no doubt 
acts of the most gruesome nature. But we bear in mind that they were on a rampage, 
and they ran berserk unguided by sense or reason and triggered only by a demented 
psyche. They had no special or personal animosity towards anyone of the deceased 
individually. The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had blind folded 
those youths and unfortunately there was no leadership to bridle the mob frenzy 
unleashed with all cruelty125.” 
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D. Accountability of Officials 
 
 
In the previous section, we discussed how the police failed  victims in the immediate 
aftermath of violence, by refusing to even record the first information given to them 
in detail and then by conducting substandard investigations. In this section we will 
examine the kind of action, if any, that was taken against erring officials of the 
government who were accused of dereliction of duty and/or active connivance 
during the massacre in Delhi.      
   
In the various civil society reports126 and government reports127 the role of the police 
and other administrative officials during and after the massacre has consistently 
been under criticism. The authors of such reports after examining numerous 
affidavits of victims and eyewitnesses and interviewing them are of the view that in 
a number of instances the police was instigating the violence and in other places it 
was a silent spectator to the massacre unfolding.  
 
As discussed earlier, the Kusum Lata Mittal report dealt with the role of the Delhi 
police in detail, singling out all the police personnel responsible for dereliction of 
duty or accused of having actively indulged in the violence. This report based its 
recommendations on affidavits of the victims and eyewitnesses, police records like 
duty registers, wireless log books and movement registers and affidavits of the 
police and on behalf of the Delhi administration. Wherever the Committee found 
that a police official had done a commendable job the report recommended positive 
measures be taken.  
 
Action was recommended by Ms. Kusum Lata Mittal against 22 SHOs128while in 
1984 the then Union Territory of Delhi was divided into 63 police stations129 therefore 
                                                        
126 People’s Union of Democratic Rights and People’s Union of Civil Liberties, Who are the Guilty? 
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report and Justice GT Nanavati Commission report 
128 Station House Officer, overall in-charge of a police station  
a clear 33% high ranking officials were recommended  for suitable departmental 
action. Also, the committee gave recommendations against 3 Assistant 
Commissioners of Police and 3 Deputy Commissioners of Police who where incharge 
of 3 out 5 districts functioning at that stage in Delhi.  The Jain Aggarwal committee 
report also made recommendations against police officials apart from making 
recommendations on the criminal cases being pursued by the State. The table below 
indicates the sum total130 of different types of action taken or reasons for not taking 
action against police officials recommended by both Kusum Lata Mittal report and 
the Jain Aggarwal committee report. 
 
 
Sr. No Action Taken131/Reason for no Number 
                                                                                                                                                              
129 Justice Ranganath Misra Commission report, 8 
130 This information has been consolidated on the basis of information received through RTI 
applications and the GT Nanavati Commission report. 
131 As per the Delhi Police Act, 1978, Section 21 Powers of punishment  
(1) Subject to the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution and the rules, the Commissioner of 
Police, Additional Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional Deputy 
Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police Training College or of the Police Training School or 
any other officer of equivalent rank, may award to any police officer of subordinate rank any of the 
following punishments, namely:-- 
(a) dismissal; 
(b) removal from service; 
(c) reduction in rank; 
(d) forfeiture of approved service; 
(e) reduction in pay; 
(f) withholding of increment; and 
(g) fine not exceeding one month's pay. 
(2) Subject to the rule-- 
(a) any police officer specified in sub-section (1) may award the punishment of censure to any police 
officer of subordinate rank; 
(b) the Assistant Commissioner of Police may award the punishment of censure to police officers of, or 
below, the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police; 
(c) any police officer of, and above, the rank of Inspector may award punishment drill not exceeding 
fifteen days or fatigue duty or any other punitive duty to constables. 
action 
.    
 
1 Departmental Action 47 
2 Retirement/expired 42 
3 Censure 5 
4 Exonerated 32 
5 Reduction of pension 1 
6 Pending action 4 
7 Enquiry quashed 1 
8 Warning 1 
9 Criminal Cases 25 
  Total 158 
 
 
Recommendations given against 12 specific police officials by the GT Nanavati 
Commission of Inquiry were responded to by the Delhi Government in its 
memorandum of action taken.   Of the 12 officials, 7 officials had retired and no 
action could be taken against them. 5 disciplinary proceedings were initiated which 
resulted in 2 exonerations and 3 cases were dropped due to lack of evidence. The GT 
Nanavati Commission of Inquiry observed that, ‘....police personnel remained 
passive and did not provide protection to the people.’.  The government responded 
to this general observation with its own generality: ‘The Government has noted all 
such general observations for taking appropriate remedial action and to advise Delhi 
Police (and State Governments) to ensure that the police personnel perform their 
duties properly in such situations in future.’ The Nanavati Commission report even 
as late as 2005 found that the explanations given by the Lt. Governor P.G. Gavai and 
                                                                                                                                                              
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall affect any police officer's liability for prosecution 
and punishment for any offence committed by him. 
(4) The Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, 
Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police Training College or of the Police 
Training School, Assistant Commissioner of Police, or any other police officer of equivalent rank may 
suspend any police officer of subordinate rank who is reasonably suspected to be guilty of misconduct, 
pending an investigation or enquiry into such misconduct. 
(5) An Inspector of Police may suspend any police officer below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, 
who is reasonably suspected to be guilty of misconduct, pending an investigation or enquiry into such 
misconduct. 
 
the Commissioner of Police S.C. Tandon respectively in November 1984 were found 
to be unsatisfactory and that they both ‘cannot escape the responsibility for their 
failure’ but in response the government said that both the persons had been replaced 
and that, according to the government, was sufficient action132.  
 
The then Commissioner of Police SC Tandon has maintained in his testimony that 
accurate information about the scale of violence was not being relayed to him by his 
subordinates and therefore he was not in a position to react.  However,  wireless 
records referred to by the Kusum Lata Mittal report disproved this, as do other 
sources, such as an affidavit by journalist Rahul Kuldeep Bedi which clearly 
establishes that the information was at all times reaching the police control room.  
Despite hard proof that the police commissioner was grossly negligent, and despite 
findings by one committee and one commission to this effect, the Delhi Government 
took no action against him.  Negligible amount of action has been taken against the 
police officials in a position of command clearly setting an example of this being 
acceptable behaviour and setting a trend which continues to be seen in other 
instances of mass violence.  
   




According to civil society reports atleast 50,000 persons were displaced by the 1984 
mass violence133.  In 2006, the Central Government acknowledged in a notification 
that around 22,000 families had migrated to Punjab from other riot affected states 
(not limited to Delhi only) and that they were still living in Punjab.  Such families 
were to be paid a rehabilitation grant @ Rs. 2 lakh per family and other riot affected 
families who had moved to other states would also similarly be paid a rehabilitation 
grant of Rs. 2 lakh per family.  
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133 PUCL-PUDR, ibid. 
2. Relief Camps 
 
As per the RK Ahuja report134 12 relief camps had been set up. It is not clear if this 
was the total number of relief camps set up or if these are only the government 
camps that are being referred to.   From accounts of survivors before two 
commissions of inquiry, i.e. Ranganath Misra and GT Nanavati, on 3rd November 
1984 a number of the survivors were taken to relief camps by the army.  There is also 
reference to a number of camps that were set up within gurudwaras.  Civil society 
accounts refer to relief camps being in existence even a year after the violence135. The 
PUCL-PUDR report ‘Who are the Guilty?’ which was written soon after the massacre 
refers to an official figure of 10 relief camps and an unofficial figure of 18 camps 
more within Delhi and on its outskirts136. 
 
After announcing a rehabilitation scheme on November 6th 1984, the government also 
announced the closure of relief camps137. It is only after the Delhi High Court138 
granted a stay that the camps were extended till November 16th, even then it is 
reported that the Government had stopped the water supply to the camps from 
November 13th itself139. At that stage with meagre compensation the victims of 
violence were forced to return to their houses which had either been looted or 
completely burnt.    
 
3. Monetary compensation 
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The Central Government appointed a Relief Commissioner140 with effect from 4th 
November 1984141 even though the violence had begun from the afternoon of 31st 
October itself142. The 1984 notification did not lay down in detail the procedures for 
applying for compensation in any of the categories stated above. The Ahuja 
Committee report states that, ‘Since the conditions remained disturbed for some time 
and also in order to ensure early settlement of claims, most claims were decided on 
the basis of one or two local witnesses and sometime on the statement of the claimant 
alone. This was done because of the fact that many of the victims could not either file 
a FIR or because the FIRs were allegedly not registered by the police. Therefore, 
initially, death certificates / FIRs were not considered essential while considering the 
claims. Approximately 1700 claims were settled by March, 1985 and a total of 
approximately Rs.1.7 crores was paid to the next of kin. The scrutiny for the claims 
after July-August, 1985 was made more rigorous and death certificates, FIRs and a 
copy of the ration card were required as part of documentary evidence.’  
 
In response to the massacre, the Government of India announced compensation 
packages at 5 different occasions beginning in 1984 and ending in 2006. These are 
discussed below.  
 
The first compensation package announced by the Government of India on 6 
November 1984 provided for a paltry compensation of Rs.10,000 to the next of kin 
for each death in the family, compensation of Rs.2000 for injury, grant of Rs.10000 
for total destruction of the house, and for substantial and minor damage, Rs.5000 
and Rs.1000 respectively.   
 
In the subsequent year, the Government of India enhanced the compensation for 
death from Rs.10,000 to Rs.20,000. However the distribution of compensation was 
extremely delayed and many victims had received nothing up until 1998. The 
relief scheme increased the amount allotted for total destruction to 10,000 and 
                                                        
140 Central Government order No.F.8/1/84-SI of 5th November 1984  
141 RK Ahuja Committee report accessed on www.carnage84.com  
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maintained Rs.5000 for substantial destruction143.  
 
The Ahuja report recorded that 1700 claims had been settled by the Relief 
Commissioner's Office by March 1985, however for claims after that date, death 
certificates, FIRs and a copy of the ration card was required, a measure which 
precluded many families of the victims who had been either unable to get FIRs 
registered or received death certificates144.  
 
The year after, in 1987, an ex-gratia assistance to victims for loss or damage to 
commercial premises or assets was announced, which was to be given at a rate of 
50% of the estimated loss, up to a maximum of Rs. 50,000 and would cover both 
insured and uninsured property. In case of insured property, the amount 
received by the victim by way of insurance claims would be set off and in case it 
exceeded the maximum limit, then no assistance would be provided. An FIR was 
essential for the claim to be entertained.  
 
In 1990, compensation for (total) destruction of house was enhanced to Rs. 20,000, 
which was to be paid retrospectively.   
 
The Nanavati Commission Report recommended employment for one family 
member and compensation on a uniform basis.   Both these recommendations 
were accepted by the Government in its 'Action Taken Repot (ATR), which 
established two committees to inquire into the adequacy and uniformity of 
compensation through several Indian states and additional employment 
opportunities for survivors. The reports of the two committees were submitted 
on October 29, 2005, and the same recommended an additional total 
compensation of Rs.10,000,000145.   
 
This led to the government announcing the most significant increase in 
compensation in 2006, a total increase of Rs.7,500,000. This increased the 
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compensation in case of death, by providing for the payment of ex gratia amount 
of Rs. 3.5 lakhs, which was to be over and above anything that had already been 
paid to the family of the victim. As per the directions, all death cases in trains 
were to be paid the ex-gratia amount after due verification. Ex gratia for 
damaged residential properties was to be paid at 10 times the original amount 
paid after adjusting the amount already paid. Ex gratia for damaged uninsured 
commercial/industrial properties were to be paid at the rate of ten times the 
original amount paid, after adjusting the amount already paid. This circular also 
provided for preference and age relaxation in employment opportunities for the 
children/family members of persons who died in the riots and asked the 
concerned governments to launch special recruitment drives. Necessary pension 
benefits for affected persons who had to leave their jobs due to the riots and have 
now reached the age of superannuation were also provided.  
 
Pension benefits to widows and old aged parents of those who were killed in the 
riots at the rate of Rs.2500 per month were also announced. Wives of disabled 
persons (who had over 70% disability) and persons who have been missing since, 
were also held to be eligible for the pension. However, the notification was not 
clear on whether these benefits were to be extended retroactively or from date. 
 
Interestingly, this is also the only notification that provides for a procedure to be 
followed, the kind of personnel to be used for disbursement of the compensation 
amounts and lastly a clear cut schedule and time line for dealing with all claims. 
While it is not known if all the claims have been settled or not, there have instances 
where the victims have had to approach the High Courts of their States for payment 
of claims under the 2006 notification.  
 
 
4. Relief for Widows and Children 
 
The Misra Commission had recommended that the socio-economic programmes for 
rehabilitation of the riot affected widows, especially in the matter of employment, 
should be continued.  
 
In addition to the monetary help, the Delhi Administration also allotted DDA flats at 
reserve prices to the widows. The flats were allotted on payment of an initial 
instalment of Rs.1,000/-. A total of 942 flats were allotted to the widows against this 
scheme. But in 1989 the government demanded Rs. 42,000 for the price of one flat in 
Tilak Vihar, a widows’ colony with 1600 families146. It was also decided that any 
widow who got married would get Rs.5,000/- and a daughter of the widow who got 
married would be given Rs.3,000/- after proper verification. Efforts were also made 
to provide training to the widows to enable them to stand on their own feet. In 1986 
an attempt was made to find out the number of widows or their wards who would 
require employment. The Lt. Governor vide letter U.O. No.86/LG/86/914-30 dated 
07.03.1986 asked various Government Departments and agencies of Delhi 
Administration to identify posts for the employment of these widows along with age 
relaxation and relaxation in qualifications vide U.O. No.313/LG/86/932 dated 
29.05.1986.  
 
Even though the Ahuja Committee recommended that in addition to other benefits, 
suitable Government employment should be offered to the eligible widows or one 
member from each family in relaxation of rules pertaining to age, educational 
qualifications and work experience and that old age pension of Rs.500/- per widow 
should be granted in such cases where the widow is of more than 55 years of aged 
and no employment has been given to the widow or one of her sons and a stipend of 
Rs.50/- and Rs.100/- per child be given to the children of those killed in riots, while 
studying in school and college respectively, it is not clear if these measures were 
implemented.  
 
5. Compensation for damage/destruction of Commercial Property 
 
The Misra Commission recommended that reasonable compensation as may be 
decided by the State should be paid for commercial premises which have sustained 
losses due to violence and liberal compensation be paid where victims had a small 
business with the caveat that a victim who has received compensation in the form of 
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private insurance will not be covered147.  The Commission also recommended 
indirectly that the Government should tie up with major banks and ensure that soft 
loans are made available to the victims of the violence148.   
 
The Dhillon Committee recommended that business establishments, which had 
insurance cover, but whose insurance claims were not settled by insurance 
companies on the technical ground that riot is not covered under the insurance, 
should be paid compensation under the directions of the Government.  This 
Committee recommended that since all insurance companies were nationalized, they 
be directed to pay the claims.  However, the Government did not accept this 
recommendation and as a result insurance claims were rejected by the insurance 
companies throughout the country.        
 
The Central Government also propounded a scheme called 'Central Interest Subsidy 
Scheme (Revised)' for November, 1984 Riot Affected Borrowers (hereinafter called 
'the Scheme'). The Scheme came into force from 1st September, 1993.  The Reserve 
Bank of India issued directions to all the banks that all the borrowers who were 
affected by the November, 1984 riots would be eligible for relief if any loan was 
outstanding during the period of November, 1984 till March, 1992 in terms of the 
said Scheme. The Scheme provides that interest of only 1% per annum was to be 
charged and the balance interest amount due to the banks would be reimbursed by 
the Government of India to the banks as interest subsidy through RBI149.  
 
The Nanavati Commission strongly recommended that all affected persons 
throughout the country should be compensation uniformly, at an early date and one 
member of the family who has lost all their earning male members and don’t have 
the necessary means to provide for themselves should be provided employment. The 
Commission also observed that in cases where the victims have managed to 
approach the concerned High Courts they have managed to get compensation upto 
Rs. 3.5 lakhs for death of a family member. In light of this observation the 
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Commission recommended that the Government ensure that there is complete 
uniformity of payment and that the standards set by the High Court should be taken 
into consideration while making such payments.  
 
It can be safely said that the last compensation notification dated 16th January 2006 is 
a result of suggestions made by the Nanavati Commission and subsequent 
discussion in the Parliament, which in turn were influenced by civil society activism.   
 
6. Judicial Intervention 
 
In a number of instances the victims had to knock the doors of the Delhi High Court 
to be able to claim their compensation. In Bhajan Kaur v Delhi150 the petitioner  
approached the Delhi High Court seeking enhancement of compensation paid for the 
death of her husband during the 1984 massacre. The Delhi High Court, relying on 
previous decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, concluded that the 
judicial trend is to award substantial compensation for illegal extinction or 
deprivation of life and liberty as a result of abuses by State agents.  It held that the 
principles for grant of compensation or financial aid to the families of the victims 
whose lives are taken away due to State failure to prevent mass violence should be 
the same151.  The judgment in this case formed the basis on which enhanced 
compensation was recommended by the Nanavati Commission and then paid by the 
government.   
 
In Sardar Paramjeet Singh v Delhi152 the Delhi High Court intervened in a case where a 
survivor of the anti-Sikh massacre in Delhi had moved to Punjab in 1986 and had 
then returned to Delhi in 2000. In 2006 the GOI had announced enhanced 
compensation packages for the victims of the massacre and the Petitioner being in 
Delhi applied for the compensation in Delhi but was refused on the grounds that 
since he had moved to Punjab, he could not apply for benefits in another State. The 
High Court directed the Delhi government to pay the enhanced compensation to the 
Petitioner after carrying out the necessary verification within a specified time limit 
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and then claim that amount from the concerned government department instead of 
making the Petitioner run from pillar to post.     
 
Overall, it is amply clear that it took the Central government 22 years to reach a 
consensus on the amount of compensation and the categories of loss that it needs to 
compensate.  It is also clear that all the claims have still not been settled and that 
victims still have to knock the doors of the High Court to get what is due to them 
even after almost 26 years.  
 
7. Religious Structures 
 
The Justice Ranganath Misra Commission report notes that the Delhi Development 
Authority (DDA) had repaired 131153 Gurudwaras located in different parts of the 
city which had been damaged due to the massacre.  The Delhi Administration had 
reported in response to an inquiry by the Mishra Commission that a total of 180 
Gurudwaras had been damaged during the massacre and 11 educational institutions 
also run by Sikhs across the city had been damaged.  
 
F. Summing up 
 
27 years after the 1984 massacre, high profile criminal trials are still pending or have 
recently been closed, housing allotment is still being carried out, enhanced monetary 
compensation was paid as late as 2005 and cases are still pending with the Delhi 
government, none of the police officials who were in charge and could have 
prevented large scale violence from taking place by doing their duty have been 
prosecuted.  
 
It would not be incorrect to say that the State started responding only when there 
was external pressure either of the media, human rights groups and activists, or of 
the organised and influential Sikh community. Left to its own devices, the State was 
more than satisfied in ensuring that criminal cases are not registered or are closed 
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due to a farcical investigation, token amounts paid as compensation for the loss of 
life and livelihood and the junior most people being held accountable for the 
complete failure of the law and order machinery. 
 




In 1986, the locks of the Babri Masjid were opened in Ayodhya.  In the years that 
followed, right-wing Hindu political parties and organisations campaigned across 
India to build a temple on the same site where the mosque stood.  In Bhagalpur, 
Bihar, over 1000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in 1989 during violence that 
followed a shilanyas procession carrying ‘consecrated’ bricks to Ayodhya for 
constructing the temple. This chapter examines the official record on mass violence 
in Bhagalpur, Bihar in 1989.  We will briefly describe the violence.  We then discuss 
access to criminal justice, whether and how public officials were held accountable, 
and compensation and rehabilitation for the victims.  
B. Context 
 
In the late eighties, the town of Bhagalpur had a history of well-established, 
politically affiliated criminal gangs155, high rates of crime, and a history of religious 
riots156.   Even against this background, the mass violence in 1989 was anomalous 
and fierce.  Unlike previous riots, the riots in 1989 continued intermittently for 
almost 6 weeks.   Violence broke out on 24 October 1989, and lasted until early 
December 1989157, spreading to15 out of 21 blocks in Bhagalpur district, and 
extracting a heavy toll of death and injury.   
 
Official estimates say that 982 people were murdered, including 29 people from 
outside Bhagalpur district158.   Unofficial estimates put the number of dead at about 
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1100159.  Some months after the violence, the bodies of only 414 people had been 
recovered.  Those who were missing were believed to have been drowned in the 
Ganga or killed and buried in paddy fields.  Estimates of people seriously injured 
vary between 259160 to 524161.  84 children were completely orphaned, with no family 
surviving to look after them.  Over 11,500 houses were damaged in 195 villages, out 
of which about 4000 were completely destroyed.  Thousands of people were 
displaced from their homes and took shelter in relief camps.  A senior official 
estimated that 48,000 people ‘were affected in various ways’162.  The Bhagalpur riots 
were also unusual because violence spread from Bhagalpur town to villages in 
Bhagalpur district – official reports speak of mobs comprising hundreds, sometimes 
thousands of attackers, targeting villages.  As we describe later, some of the worst 
massacres during the 1989 violence were in rural areas. 
 
What led to the violence?  The months leading up to mass violence in Bhagalpur saw 
friction between some Hindus and Muslims in the area, centred around public 
religious celebrations163. Despite violence in other parts of Bihar that year, as the Ram 
Janmbhoomi- BabriMasjid dispute simmered, the State Government did not stop the 
shilanyas processions164.   On 24 October, 1989 in Bhagalpur, the shilanyas 
procession went to Tartarpur chowk, a Muslim locality off its licensed route, where 
people tried to stop the procession.  A verbal scuffle led to violence, and members of 
the procession alleged that they were attacked with bombs thrown from a Muslim 
school in the area.   The Superintendent of Police (‘SP’) ordered the police to open 
fire, and was attacked, and allegedly bombed, by a Muslim group in Tartarpur 
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160 “Report of the Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the communal disturbances at Bhagalpur, 
1989,” R.C.P. Sinha and Shamsul Hasan.  
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Chowk.  The Commission of Enquiry165 reviewing evidence on the outbreak of 
violence concluded that the alleged bomb were likely to have been firecrackers, and 
while most processionists were not violent, a critical minority were armed and 
shouting anti-Musim slogans as they went through Tartarpur chowk. 
 
After this, violence spread through Bhagalpur town, fuelled by rumours that 
Muslims had killed students in the local university.  Muslim homes and businesses 
were attacked in different parts of Bhagalpur town, including Parwatti, 
Ashanandpur, and Sujaganj Bazaar, where ‘a number of BJP people ably assisted by 
a band of criminals’ attacked Muslims and looted Muslim homes and shops while 
the police watched166. 
 
Violence spread to the villages surrounding Bhagalpur.  Official reports on the 
violence describe attacks by mobs of hundreds, and occasionally thousands, of 
people. While there were some attacks by Muslim mobs on Hindu people and 
property, the majority of victims were Muslim.    
 
Thirty one Muslims were killed in Bhatoria village on 25 October167.   Many Muslim 
families fled to the neighbouring village of Bhadki Bhatoria. The DIG ordered police 
to protect them, but shortly after he left, a mob of 2000 Hindus attacked.  The police 
fired at the attackers, but when they killed one person, the police panicked and fled.  
This emboldened the attackers, who pulled down every Muslim home in the village.  
The Bhagalpur Commission of Inquiry speculated that the police feared reprisal 
since the person killed when they fired was a Yadav, a powerful community in the 
area.   
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On October 27, 1989, about 4000 attackers surrounded the homes of about 25 Muslim 
families in Lugain village168.  Eyewitnesses said the attackers were led by an ASI of 
police, Ram Chandra Singh, and the attack lasted 9 hours.  One hundred and eighty 
Muslims were murdered and thrown into wells.  When the attackers discovered that 
they could not disguise the stench of decomposing bodies by covering them with 
mud, they removed the bodies, buried them in three paddy fields and planted 
vegetables over them.  The ASI of Jagdishpur PS, the BDO and the SI were involved 
in burying the bodies.  Twnty five days later, the Special ADM, AK Singh, 
discovered the mass graves – the trees in the village were full of vultures, which 
alerted him to the hidden bodies.  The ASI was arrested, but later released on bail.   
 
Muslims in Tamauni village fended off a mob on October 25, then asked Kajrail 
police station, which was a quarter mile away, for protection.  On October 26, the 
village was attacked again, and while many people fled, many were killed while 
running away.  The attackers looted homes and carried away livestock owned by 
Muslim families.  The police did not intervene. Some days later, attackers 
intimidated two Muslim ministers of State who were trying to locate bodies of the 
dead into leaving the village169.   
 
In Fatehpur Chowk village170, Muslims sought police protection on 29 October when 
they were attacked, but the police did little to stop the attackers who killed people 
and looted homes, even though the police station was 200 yards away.  The police 
allegedly told Muslim residents who sought help to contact the army instead.  In 
Adani Nagar, similarly, the police watched a mob loot and kill, and did nothing to 
help adults and children running to safety171.  In Chara Baragaon, four Muslims led 
the police into the village to recover their looted property from the homes of 3 other 
residents on 26 October 1989.  The DIG left them in the protection of police officials, 
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led by an ASI.  The four Muslims were lynched and killed while the police stood by.  
No action was taken against the ASI and the constables on duty172.   
 
One the worst massacres was in Chanderi village, where 108 Muslims were killed on 
October 27, 1989173.  Attackers surrounded the Muslim hamlet in Chanderi, looting 
and burning homes.  At about 10:00 pm, the army arrived, and promised Muslims 
safe passage the next day, after assurances from the BDO and the Officer in Charge 
of Sabour PS that they would watch over the village.  The next morning, the 
attackers, including the mukhiya and the sarpanch of the village, returned to the area 
and asked Muslims residents to go with them to another village.  They led 125 
Muslims to a pond close by, and attacked them.  Sixty people were killed.  One 
woman, Mallika Begum, survived by jumping into the pond, although two of the 
attackers chopped her right foot off with a sword. Hours later, the army commander, 
Major Virk, found her and took her to safety. Mallika Begum later testified before the 
Patna High Court that police officers were present during the massacre.   
 
The police repeatedly failed to protect lives in Bhagalpur and its surrounding 
villages.  The district administration as a whole did not prepare to avert violence 
despite advance warnings that Bhagalpur was tense, and failed to react swiftly once 
violence broke out. However, in the aftermath of violence, a few senior district 
officials reported candidly and in detail about how the district administration had 
failed to control violence, particularly against Muslims. We obtained through Right 
to Information applications reports by the then Commissioner of Bhagalpur 
(‘Commissioner’s report’) and the Special Additional District Magistrate, Law & 
Order, Bhagalpur (‘Report of Special ADM, Law & Order’)174. These have provided 
important facts as well as analysis.  The Bihar Government also gave us a copy of the 
report (‘Inquiry report’) of the Bhagalpur Riot Inquiry Commission 1989 (‘Bhagalpur 
Commission’) in response to an RTI application.  
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The Commission was constituted in 1989, while sporadic violence still continued, 
and finished its inquiry in 1995 rather than in the 3 months initially stipulated when 
it was set up.  The Commission of Inquiry did not have a smooth tenure.   It was set 
up as a single-member commission, but the sole member, a retired judge of the Patna 
High Court, JN Prasad, was perceived as biased, and protests against his 
appointment led to two other members being appointed.   Ultimately, the 
Chairperson submitted a dissenting report, which was very much at odds with the 
majority report175.  Despite that, the majority report, which was accepted by the Bihar 
Assembly, was detailed and relatively forthright, and we have drawn heavily upon it 
for information.  It is worth noting that none of these documents are in the public 
domain, even 20 years after mass violence in Bhagalpur, and we needed to appeal 
against an initial refusal to disclose them. 
 
C. Access to criminal justice 
 
In addition to the official reports and inquiry report mentioned earlier, the Bihar 
Government disclosed FIRs from 3 police stations related to the 1989 mass violence 
in Bhagalpur.  However, it failed to disclose any of the other information we 
requested on criminal investigation or proceedings.  Since the government failed to 
respond, rather than giving a reasoned refusal, it is not clear if these records no 
longer exist, or if they are being withheld.    
 
Below, we discuss access to criminal justice in the aftermath of the Bhagalpur mass 
violence based on the records available to us, with the caveat that this is a partial 
picture, focusing primarily on the months immediately following mass violence.  
Information on the fate of trials and appeals in the years that followed is drawn from 
media reports. 
 
1. Complaints and FIRs 
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The Bihar government did not disclose copies of complaints to us, so we cannot 
assess how accurately complaints were reflected in FIRs recorded by the police.  
However, other official reports as well as the Inquiry Commission documented 
serious problems, as well as bias, in the way FIRs were recorded.  By government 
officials’ own reckoning, the police delayed filing FIRs, and failed entirely to file FIRs 
in many serious cases.   The ADM, Law & Order estimated that 982 people were 
murdered during mass violence.  However, the list of FIRs appended to the Inquiry 
report shows that the police registered only 595 FIRs in the months following 
violence, which seem to cover only 354 of the officially reported 982 deaths.   What of 
the other people killed?  Were these people whose bodies were not recovered?   One 
account speculates that many of the deaths that were never recorded as crimes were 
the result of police firing176, which, as we will discuss below, appears to have been 
biased against Muslims.  
 
Delays and failures to register FIRs disproportionately targeted Muslim victims and 
complainants. Further, when FIRs were registered, the police often drafted them 
poorly, obscuring or omitting important details, thereby weakening any criminal 
investigation that might follow. 
 
The very first FIR that was lodged in relation to the Bhagalpur riots featured the 
police as complainants, against Muslim accused, in relation to violence in Tatarpur 
Chowk on 24 October 1989.  Although the Officer-in-charge of Kotwali Police Station 
had seen Muslim shops being attacked in Shujaganj Market and seen killings and 
looting in Parwatti Chowk, the police did not lodge an FIR on the violence in 
Shujaganj or Parwatti Chowk177.  The Bhagalpur Commissioner remarked that ‘it 
would have been worth investigating…whether…office bearers of Hindu 
community organizations…’ were involved as participants or organizers178.  
Similarly, though Amarpur was the site of serious mass killings, only 2 FIRs had 
been lodged in relation to that violence even as late as the early 1990s. 
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The Commissioner of Bhagalpur noted that major incidents like the Lagain massacre 
in Jagdishpur went undetected for almost a month179 and the FIR relatead to the 
massacre was registered 41 days after it took place180.  Mass killings in areas in or 
close to Bhagalpur town, including Parbatti, and Sahibganj in Kotwali were also 
ignored for about a fortnight. The report also notes delays in filing FIRs – ‘a major 
incident of disappearance of 22 Muslims from Sahibganj goes completely unnoticed.  
The FIR is registered with the police after 45 days’181. 
 
The ADM, Law & Order reported that in the aftermath of the riots, police officers 
were sent to various refugee camps and instructed to record FIRs, but the 
administration heard that ‘the names of the attackers are not being truthfully 
recorded. The literate among the refugees and some members of…voluntary 
organizations were now involved in writing the FIR and handing it over to the 
police…Even then it took nearly three months for al the FIRs to be registered’.182 
 
When the recalcitrant police filed FIRs, these were of dubious quality.  Official 
reports strongly indicate that this was deliberate rather than simply a lack of 
capacity.  The Commissioner of Bhagalpur noted that FIRs in cases of looting by 
Hindus were ‘drafted most cryptically often not indicating who is the affected person 
and who are the accused183.  As an example, when the police discovered the bodies 
of 6 Muslim adults and 4 children in a well very near Kotwali police station, the 
resulting FIR did not mention that the people killed were Muslim184.  In another, 
very serious omission, the police only recorded that 4 Muslims were killed when a 
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mob of 2000 Hindu rioters attacked the Muslim neighbourhood in Bhatoria village, 
when witnesses indicated that 31 Muslims had been murdered185. 
 
On 24th October, a group comprising hundreds who broke away from the Ramshila 
procession attacked a business called the National Watch Company.  ASI Brij Kishore 
deposed that armed members of the home guard joined the looters.  However, in the 
FIR he lodged, Brij Kishore did not identify anyone by name. When the Inquiry 
Commission probed this, and tried to compare the FIR to notes in the police station 
diary, the police refused to give them the original station diary recording the day’s 
events, and gave instead a photocopied record that seemed to be ‘adjusted’186.  
 
Even though the police attempted to disguise their failure to record FIRs properly, 
the Commission noted several instances where FIRs left out important details or 
were grossly delayed, and found that these delays and omissions were the result of 
bias.  One example was the FIR related to killings and looting in Bhagalpur town’s 
Parwatti area.  Witnesses before the Commission said that KC Dubey, the Officer-in-
charge of Kotwali Police Station, watched but didn’t intervene in the violence.  The 
district administration later suggested that the FIR filed about the Parwatti violence 
was fabricated by the Muslim complainants so they could claim compensation187.  
The Commission did not believe them, noting that the FIR had resulted in a charge-
sheet (PS Cse 808/89), and said that ‘in a riot…an FIR cannot be defeated merely 
because it is lodged after considerable delay. Particularly when the 
authorities…were deeply committed against the informant and were not prepared to 
accept such FIRs.  KC Dubey having admitted that he saw the loot and arson in 
Sujaganj…and…in Parwati should himself have lodged the …We totally disbelieve 
and reject the denial of KC Dubey…it is the duty of the State to defend the FIR if it is 
belated…explanation should be offered…it was the duty of the prosecution to explain the 
delay and it was for the defence to take advantage of the delay.  Here the process was reversed 
[emphasis added]’188.  
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The Commission noted on multiple occasions that FIRs seemed to have been 
doctored, or there were discrepancies between the FIR and other official documents.  
For example, the Commission recorded how the Officer-in-charge, Kotwali filed an 
FIR on the Tatarpur Chowk violence mentioning a large number of Muslims whom 
the SP knew, however the SP who was the target of violence identified only two 
people named in the FIR in his evidence189.  The Commission also noted that the 
police had not conducted a forensic exam of the bombs hurled at the SP, and the 
alleged bombs were most likely to have been firecrackers190.   
 
We secured through RTI applications copies of FIRs lodged in Kotwali, Nathnagar 
and Jagdishpur police stations.  These are only a fraction of the FIRs filed after mass 
violence in 1989, but gave us a window onto the quality of FIRs registered.   
 
Across the three police stations, the majority of complaints registered came in very 
soon after the incidents at issue.  In Kotwali, 28% of FIRs indicated that the 
complainant had reported the crimes alleged on the day of the incident itself.  50% 
indicated that the victim had complained within a week and 85% indicated that the 
victim had complained within a month of the incident. In Jagdishpur, 60% of FIRs 
indicated that the complainant had reported the incident at issue on the day it 
occurred. In Nathnagar, 25% of FIRs indicated that the complainant had reported the 
incident at issue within a week of its occurrence, and 70% within a month.   
 
The police also seem to have registered the FIRs quite promptly after the crimes 
alleged were reported by complainants.  In Kotwali, 95% of FIRs were registered the 
same day that complainants made their complaint.  In Jagdishpur and Nathnagar, all 
FIRs were apparently registered the same day that the police received complaints.   
These records are at odds with official and civil society reports that criticised delays 
in registering FIRs.  The particular sample of FIRs we were privy to could genuinely 
have been registered promptly, but it is also possible that the dates on many of these 
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records were misrecorded – since complainants do not get copies of FIRs, they do not 
know whether it accurately reflects their complaint to and interaction with the police.   
 
Prompt complaints by victims and witnesses should suggest that the resulting FIRs 
would be detailed, as complainants would reliably recall the incidents in question.  
However, when we look at the FIRs, we find that while they include the details of the 
incident, they tend not to include the details of the accused.   
 
• In Kotwali, only 2 out of 100 FIRs – or 2% - record the actual names of the 
alleged perpetrators. 38 identify a ‘mob’ as responsible for the acts alleged.  
This is despite the fact that the complainant in 78 out of 100 FIRs is the victim 
of the crimes alleged.   
• In Jagdishpur, less than 1% of FIRs identify the accused by name, while 68% 
record the details of the incident but say the perpetrators were a mob.  77% of 
these FIRs were lodged after victims of the alleged incidents complained.  
 
• In Nathnagar, none of the FIRs record the names of perpetrators.  This is 
despite the fact that 80% of the FIRs were lodged on the complaints of the 
victims themselves.     
 
Very few of the FIRs across the three police stations were omnibus FIRs, that joined 
together and blurred the boundaries between unrelated, disparate incidents. So 
while the police seem to have recorded details of incidents, the Bhagalpur FIRs 
suggest that the police erased names of perpetrators.  A number of factors could 
have contributed to the absence of names.  In some villages, attacks were led by large 
groups from outside the village, so it is possible that victims or eyewitnesses were 
not able to name attackers.  Where complaints related to property damage, it is 
sometimes the case that inhabitants have already fled, so cannot identify perpetrators 
by name.  It is also likely that victims were scared to name powerful, or politically 
connected perpetrators.  But even taking into account all these factors, the very high 
proportion of nameless assailants in these FIRs suggests that the police simply 
omitted this detail.  And of course, once the names of perpetrators are dropped from 
the FIR, the investigation that follows is necessarily weakened and much more likely 
to lead to cases being closed without trial.   
 
2. Arrests and Bail 
 
The pattern of arrests during and after mass violence in Bhagalpur reflected strong 
bias against Muslims.   
 
The Commissioner of Bhagalpur said as much about initial arrests: ‘Notwithstanding 
the fact that…Muslims were at the receiving end for most of the time the number of 
Muslims arrested in substantial cases or in preventive cases was originally much 
higher than those of Hindus.  After the new administration took over the arrests 
were examined and innocent persons released and by middle of January the number 
of Muslims in custody became less than those of Hindus’191. 
 
After the Tatarpur Chowk incident, 194 Muslims were arrested, but the district 
administration put nothing on record to suggest that any Hindus were arrested in 
relation to violence in other parts of Bhagalpur on the 24th or 25th of October.  The 
Tatarpur Chowk violence was followed by harsh searches of Muslim homes in 
Bhagalpur town.  The Commission noted, ‘Not a single house was spared even 
though the cause of action for such searches in most cases was revengeful’192.   
 
The ADM, Law & Order’s review of government action after the violence criticized 
the arrests of influential Hindus and Muslims who were peace committee members, 
saying ‘it is debatable if they were really instrumental in inciting the riots…with their 
arrest, some of the saner elements who could have helped check the spread of riots 
were removed from the scene while doubtful characters like Mahadeo Singh moved 
around freely with the police.  It was commonly believed that Rameshwar Yadav, the 
chief conspirator of the riots, was not arrested because of his close links with 
Mahadeo Singh’193.  Several months after the violence, the Commissioner told the 
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Commission of Enquiry that ‘whatever village are visited [sic] they still complained 
that prime accused have not been arrested and they are threatening the riot affected persons’ 
[emphasis added]194. 
 
The ADM, Law & Order noted that the district police arrested almost the same 
numbers of Hindus and Muslims, despite the fact that Muslims had largely been at 
the receiving end of violence.  ‘At one point…it stood exactly at 900 each.  For a short 
while it because 900 Muslims and 1100 Hindus.  But generally the balance was 
maintained…even in matters of release of the arrested persons.  Keeping in view the 
fact that Hindus had been aggressors in most of the cases, one wonders whether the 
District Administration should have made efforts to keep the number of arrests 
uniform for both the Hindus and Muslims’195.  
 
The Commission of Inquiry found that from 24 October onwards, the police arrested 
Muslims in large numbers, including individuals whose names were not mentioned 
in FIRs, and many faced brutal treatment after arrest.  The Special ADM, Law & 
Order deposed before the Commission that on 26 October, he saw Muslim prisoners 
who had bullet injuries and were being forced to walk through two rows of standing 
constables who were beating them, while senior district officials watched196.   Many 
witnesses testified to being arbitrarily arrested and beaten197.   Official records 
indicated that on 26 October 1989, police fired upon a confrontation between Hindu 
and Muslim rioters.  The police arrested a large number of Muslims, but there was 
no record of any Hindus being arrested198. 
 
The police alleged that most people who were arrested were preparing to riot and 
had been manufacturing bombs and storing illegal arms.  In all the cases of alleged 
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seizure of weapons and bomb, the Commission noted that ‘there was not a single 
independent witness to the recoveries and in all the case the informants were always 
the police’ and ‘no seizure list barring a few indicting the recovers was filed’ before 
the Commission.  The ‘so called bombs were not examined by any forensic expert’.  
The lawyer for the district administration argued before the Commission that the 
administration’s aggressive searches helped to quell the riots, but, ‘had no answer to 
our query whether the houses of Hindus were similarly searched’199. While the 
administration had a list of Muslim homes that were searched, they did not have a 
corresponding list of Hindu houses that were searched.  The Commission noted that 
‘absence of such list...indicated close collaboration between the police and Hindu communal 
group [emphasis added]’200.  Documents submitted by the district administration 
showed that a majority of people arrested and sent to prison were Muslims. 
 
The Inquiry Commission opined that only a ‘meagre number of Hindus were 
arrested’201. It noted, ‘Admittedly, hordes of…Hindus, the number going into 
thousands, attacked the localities and villages of Muslim inhabitants, but no body 
was arrested in the process. No body cared to enquire from where these massacring 
invaders descended upon Bhagalpur and the villages.  The figures expose the group 
and the individuals who were responsible for preplanning and how successful it was 
with the able assistance of the district administration, particularly the police’202. 
 
Two different official reports submitted that the disproportionate arrests of Muslims 
were a result of strong police bias.  The Inquiry Commission heard evidence from 
different parties, including victims, alleged perpetrators, and the police, and reached 
the strong conclusion that the police failed to arrest Hindu participants, while 
unfairly targeting Muslims in Bhagalpur district for arrest.   
 
The Bihar Government did not respond to our RTI applications on the grant of bail to 
those arrested in connection with the massacre.  Media reports suggest that bail was 
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granted liberally to the accused.  Kameshwar Yadav, for example, was arrested 
following an FIR alleging murder, but granted bail.  Two murder cases against him 
were closed after the witnesses in these cases turned hostile203.   Jaiprakash, a leading 
participant in the Logain massacre where 116 Muslims were killed, occupied about 
250 acres of land belonging to victims of the massacre after their families fled the 
village204. 
 
3. Summary closure and charge-sheets 
 
By the end of December 1989, the administration had registered 564 cases in relation 
to the massacre.  Of those 564 cases, 174 were charge-sheeted, while 375 were closed 
summarily.  As the Commissioner of Bhagalpur noted, this meant that of the cases 
initially registered in the aftermath of the Bhagalpur massacre, almost 70% were 
closed summarily and about 30% resulted in charges being framed against the 
accused.    
 
In some of the worst affected police stations, the percentage of cases which were 
summarily closed, where no charges were framed, were as follows205: 
 
• Kotwali: 86% 
• Mushairpur: 59% 
• Nathnagar: 62% 
• Jagdishpur: 83% 
• Sabour: 59% 
• Shahkund: 56% 
• Rajoun: 41% 
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• Amarpur: 41% 
 
The 85% summary closure rate in Kotwali is particularly striking, since Kotwali PS 
dealt with some of the worst violence in Bhagalpur town. 
 
The Commissioner ascribed the high rate of summary closure to ‘very bad drafting 
of FIRs, delay in commencing investigations, not allowing a roving inquiry by police 
officers, elections, the need to complete investigations in time.  Be…[that]…as it may, 
this would result in lower convictions’206.  The Bhagalpur Commissioner noted 
‘important persons reportedly behind the riots have not been chargesheeted even in 
the mass killings of Muslims in Nayabazar, Sahebganj and Noorpur207. 
The Bhagalpur Commissioner’s report includes information on the percentage of 
cases that have resulted in charge-sheets being filed, disaggregated by the religion of 
the accused and the complainant208 – it seems to reflect a sample of total complaints 
registered with the police.  We cannot analyse these figures too deeply, since the 
Bihar Government did not disclose copies of all the complaints, FIRs and charge-
sheets underlying them.  However, some of the figures point to distinct choices by 
the police that demand closer scrutiny. 
 
- The highest percentage of FIRs that led to charges being framed against the 
accused were the ones where the police filed the complaints against Muslim 
accused – 77% (30 out of 39) of complaints were ‘charge-sheeted’.  By 
contrast, only 45% (26 out of 86) of complaints by police against Hindu 
accused resulted in charge-sheets.  Some part of this big gap might be due to 
stronger prima facie evidence in particular cases where the accused were 
Muslims.  However, the difference between the trajectory of police 
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complaints against Hindus and Muslims strongly indicates bias against 
Muslims in how FIRs were drafted and how cases were investigated.  
- 45% (21 out of 49) of FIRs featuring Hindu complainants and Muslim accused 
resulted in charge-sheets.  51% (62 out of 122) of FIRs where Muslims 
identified Hindu accused resulted in charges being framed. On the face of it, 
these figures are reassuring.  However, we would argue that they actually 
point towards poor, most likely prejudiced, investigation. Muslims were 
killed, injured and looted in significantly greater numbers than Hindus in 
Bhagalpur district, so one would expect a higher proportion of FIRs with 
Muslim complainants against Hindu accused to result in charges against the 
accused. 
- Less than a quarter of FIRs (23% - 36 out of 153) featuring Muslim 
complainants against unknown or unidentified assailants resulted in charge-
sheets.  The high closure rate isn’t surprising for cases where the accused are 
not identified by name.  However, it is striking that of 290 FIRs based on 
complaints by Muslims, over half are against unknown attackers.  This could 
be in part because some villages in Bhagalpur district were attacked by large 
groups of outsiders.  In cases of property damage, the FIRs we have seen 
suggest that the victims were often away when the crime was committed.  
That said, the large number of cases featuring ‘unknown’ accused could be 
due in large part to the ‘very bad drafting of FIRs’ identified by the 
Commissioner of Bhagalpur.  Particularly in a situation where senior officials 
themselves described the police as strongly biased against Muslims during 
the violence, it is likely that complaints by Muslims were treated with less 
sympathy and recorded with less care, or deliberately mis-recorded, after the 
violence.   
It is highly likely that many of the cases summarily closed should have been 
taken further.  In one instance, the Commission noted that the case against Laxmi 
Yadav was closed, though Laxmi Yadav was named in an FIR alleging the 
kidnapping and murder of a young Muslim woman, ‘undoubtedly under the 
influence of his father Kameshwar Yadav patently in the assistance of the 
police’209. 
 
The high rate of summary closure was due not only to misrecorded FIRs, but also 
to the police’s failure to investigate complaints.  The Commissioner of Bhagalpur 
noted that the police had made no attempt to unearth who was responsible for 
inflammatory rumours about Hindu students getting killed, and had not 
registered a case in this regard210.  Police also failed to investigate the extent to 
which rural attacks by large, thousand-strong groups of assailants shouting 
‘provocative Hindu slogans’ were organized by Hindu Right groups, despite 
prima facie evidence that these attacks were organized in Bhagalpur and 
Amarpur211.    
 
Muslim organizations complained to the district administration that the number of 
Muslims killed or missing was much higher than the numbers recorded by the 
police.  The Jamaite Ulama submitted a detailed list to the administration in 
January 1990, but ‘on account of election and other more pressing engagements212‘ 
this information was not verified until May 1990 – several months after the 
murders were committed.  The Bhagalpur Commissioner admitted that fresh FIRs 
were being lodged but ‘the delay in lodging these FIRs means that no worthwhile 
investigation can be made’213.  
Despite the presence of the army, Central security forces and State security forces, 
in addition to the police, there were no raids for the recovery of looted property or 
seizing arms, ammunitions and explosives214. 
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4. Trials, acquittals and appeals 
 
The Bihar Government did not respond to our Right to Information queries about 
magistrates and sessions courts trials, and resulting convictions, acquittals and 
appeals.  Poorly recorded FIRs and grossly negligent investigation were, of course, 
shaky scaffolding for the trials in the 30% of cases where charges were framed 
instead of the cases being summarily closed.  The Special ADM, Law & Order, 
Bhagalpur reported ‘witnesses are afraid of going to the court and making 
depositions against the strong people of the area,’ going on to observe ‘Whether they 
would depose against the police and magistrate is also a debatable proposition.  
What can one do if the protectors themselves became the killers’215.   The fairly senior 
official writing this poses the problem as an intractable dilemma, but surely his 
response should have been to provide enough protection for victims that they felt 
able to depose in court. 
Civil society reports indicate that 142 cases were filed in the Sessions court, covering 
1392 people of participating in physical violence and property damage.  In 1995, 
when the Commission of Inquiry finally submitted its report, 87 cases against 901 
accused were still pending. Of the 55 cases decided, 11 ended in convictions in which 
50 people were variously sentenced, though we do not have official details of 
conviction and punishment.  The PUDR reported that of the 142 cases that were tried 
in the Sessions court, 38 were murder cases.  By 1995, 12 cases had been decided, and 
only one resulted in conviction – of 95 people charged with murder, 94 had been 
acquitted216.   
 
In the years that followed, cases that survived summary closure made their way 
slowly through the courts.  The Chanderi massacre case, for example, was decided 
only in February 2001.  38 people were accused in the case over the murder of 65 
people.  The sole surviving eyewitness, Mallika Begum, was threatened and offered 
bribes.  In 2001, 16 of the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.  22 of the 
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accused, including the man who hacked off Mallika Begum’s leg, were acquitted217.   
 
When the the JDU-NDA coalition came to power in Bihar in 2006, the Chief Minister 
ordered the Crime Investigation Department to inquire into the investigations that 
followed cases filed after the Bhagalpur massacre218.  Following the CID 
investigation, the State Government set up a second commission of inquiry in 
February 2006, which was asked to review 27 riot-related cases and assess why the 
accused were acquitted despite considerable evidence219.  The Commission was 
intended to examine how the police and prosecution had done their jobs, and 
identify lapses that led to acquittal or closure.  The 2006 Commission has not 
completed its inquiry, but its existence tells us that many cases that were not 
summarily closed ended in the accused being acquitted.   
 
The JDU-BJP government re-opened 29 cases against Bhagalpur accused, including 
against Kameshwar Yadav, alleged to be one of the primary leaders of violence at the 
time, and against the accused in the Logain massacre220.  In FIR No. 83/90, lodged 
with Kotwali police station, Bibi Walima has accused Yadav of having shot dead her 
son Munna. In FIR No. 77/90, a shopkeeper has accused Yadav of killing his son and 
making off with the body.  Both these cases collapsed when witnesses turned hostile, 
allegedly because of political pressure.  These cases were amongst those re-opened 
by the Janata Dal (United)-BJP government in 2006.  Yadav was supported by the 
Sangh Parivar at the time of the riots, but subsequently was close to the RJD, which 
reportedly protected him from effective prosecution221. Yadav has since been 
convicted of murder in two of the re-opened cases against him222.   In November 
2007, a sessions court found him guilty of murder, as well as offences under Sections 
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364 (kidnapping), 201 (destruction of evidence) and 149 (unlawful assembly) of the 
IPC223.   In 2009, he was convicted of murder. 
 
In June 2007, 14 people were found guilty of murder and sentenced to life-
imprisonment in 2007 for their role in the Logain massacre224.   Amongst the 14 
people were the Officer-in-charge of Jagdhishpur police station  at the time, Sub-
inspector Ramchandra Singh and Thakur Paswan, the police  chowkidar of Logain 
village at the time.   The accused were convicted of murder, rioting, unlawful 
assembly, causing disappearance of evidence and mischief by fire or explosive 
substance with the intent to destroy property.  Even this re-trial showed the effects of 
the long delay, as well as granting bail even when this was likely to cause harm.  Of 
24 named accused in the case, six died during the trial, while four never turned up, 
prompting the court to proclaim them absconders and order attachment of their 
properties.  At the time of the 2007 verdict, the police were trying to arrest 
Jaiprakash, a native of Logain225.   
 
In July 2007, 6 people were found guilty of being involved in murder, though not 
being the direct perpetrators, and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment226. Media 
reports have said that, by 2008, 325 accused in cases related to mass violence were 
convicted, of whom 125 received life sentences227.  However, the Bihar government 
did not disclose official records that would allow us to verify these reports, or match 
the number of individuals convicted to the number of cases on trial.  In September 
2010, 10 people out of 20 accused on trial were convicted of attacking a police party 
during mass violence and sentenced to 7 years in prison228. 
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The JDU-BJP government reportedly designated a police official, GN Sharma as 
Special DIG in Bhagalpur, specifically to monitor riot-related cases229.  Concrete steps 
such as this, along with a general shift in political willingness to prosecute the 
accused, clearly made a striking difference to the outcome of trials.  Witnesses who 
had previously turned hostile testified for the prosecution when cases were re-
opened.  The guilty verdicts in re-opened cases are almost certainly being appealed.  
Nevertheless, the results of the fresh trials demonstrates that, the first time around, 
trials collapsed because of gross negligence or collusion by the State.   
 
D. Accountability of public officials 
 
The Bhagalpur Commission of Inquiry was asked to scrutinize the Bhagalpur district 
administration’s performance and identify any official lapses.  The majority report by 
the Commission was surprisingly direct in some of its findings.  Two of the reports 
by government officials before the Commission were also striking because they 
identified individual political functionaries as well as civil servants as irresponsible 
or involved in violence.   
 
The Commission criticized the district administration for failing to tackle rumours 
about Hindu killings by Muslims, and Hindu mass graves230.  It also said that the 
administration ‘suffered from culpable amnesia, deliberate indifference and patent 
communal bias, incompetence in not anticipating the riot’231.  While the Commission 
took the view that Muslim participants were as willing to be violent as Hindu 
participants, it emphasised that Hindus who participated could wreak far more 
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The Commission held the police in Bhagalpur district primarily responsible for the 
scale and ferocity of mass violence.  The Commission detailed lapses and active 
participation by the police at various levels of seniority, and noted that ‘from the 
evidence on record…we have no manner of doubt that the police force was totally 
anti Muslim in their attitude and had no desire or will to save the life of innocent 
Muslims’232 and that ‘every unlawful act succeeded totally uninterrupted by any 
administrative interference except in one or two cases’233. 
a) Failure to prevent violence 
Official assessments found that the police did not do enough to avert violence, and in 
fact, allowed the ramshila procession to go into a sensitive part of Bhagalpur town 
without prior permission.  The Commission felt that despite considerable warning of 
likely tension, the police had not provided enough security on the route of the 
Ramshila procession234.  The Commission notes that the on 24th October 1989, the 
Ramshila procession headed towards Tatarpur even though it wasn’t licensed to go 
to this area.  The district police did not prevent this detour. 
b) Bias as violence unfolded 
The Commission of Inquiry detailed many instances of the police watching violence 
against Muslims without intervening, and some instances of police actively 
participating in such violence. 
 
Clear police bias against Muslims also emerges from information in official 
documents about police firings during the riots.  The Commission report records 
various episodes where large groups of at least a hundred, but often running into 
one or two thousand, attacked people during the riots.  Of ten episodes that are 
described as attacks by large Muslim mobs on Hindu people and property, the 
Commission records police firing in nine episodes.  Of five episodes where Hindu 
and Muslim mobs were ranged against each other, the report records police firing in 
three episodes.  By contrast, of 25 episodes that are described as attacks by Hindu 
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mobs on Muslims, there are records of police opening fire on six of these occasions.  
On three of these occasions, the police were commanded by the same officer, Ajit 
Dutta. 
 
The Commissioner of Bhagalpur acknowledged allegations that, during curfews, the 
administration issued passes to Hindus allowing them almost complete freedom of 
movement, while being very restrictive with passes to Muslims235. 
 
Biased policing during the rioting gave way to disproportionate arrests of Muslims, 
and poor investigation, as discussed earlier, and in some instances, false allegations 
against the Muslims that the police never substantiated.  The Commission noted the 
absence of forensic evidence in at least three instances236, where the police alleged 
that bombs were thrown at the police by Muslims, and that explosives were 
recovered.  
c) Subverting disciplinary proceedings 
The police resisted the attempts of the Commission of Inquiry to assess their actions 
during mass violence.  The Inquiry report notes several serious discrepancies in 
police records and police testimony before the Commission.  On one occasion, the 
police said that they had been attacked by a large mob of Muslims and had fired on 
the crowd, killing one man.  The Commission noted that the same incident was 
described differently in an FIR filed by H. Rehman, S.I. of police who was on duty – 
he said that the police had been firing, but not in self defence.  An FIR by the dead 
man’s wife alleged murder by Sgt. Om Prakash and his colleagues.  The Commission 
noted that ‘if the magazine had really been attacked more than person should have 
lost their lives, justifiably by protective firing of the police on duty…the story of 
attack on magazine was a concoction in defence’237. It is rare for an official body to so 
directly accuse government officials of dissembling, and quite telling that the 
Commission did so on multiple occasions. 
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After 24th October, amidst serious concerns about the SP’s neutrality and 
competence, the State Government decided to transfer him out of Bhagalpur.  On 26th 
October, when the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arrived in Bhagalpur, a crowd of 
police constables led by Sergeant Om Prakash demonstrated against the SP’s transfer 
in the company of members of the BJP.  They attacked a Minister and the Speaker of 
the State Assembly.   A complaint case was filed against Sgt. Om Prakash238, but we 
do not know how far it proceeded.   
 
However, neither the SP nor any other officials arrested or dispersed the 
demonstration, which defied curfew, and disrupted the PM’s security.  The 
Commission noted that the demonstrators had not even been disciplined for their 
behaviour and recommended that the administration do so239.  It was of the opinion 
that ‘this unholy alliance between the police and the BJP…boosted the morale of the 
communal elements…and conveyed...they have not only the support of the police 
but its active participation in their activities’240.  At the time, the shocking breach of 
protocol by the police succeeded in stopping the SP’s transfer – the Prime Minister, 
Rajiv Gandhi agreed to stop the SP’s transfer241, and the Chief Minister complied 
with this.  The SP’s conduct up to then was most likely highly partisan, and was 
certainly perceived as such by the Muslim community.  Some of the worst violence 
around Bhagalpur town unfolded in the two days after the SP’s transfer orders were 
revoked.  It is likely that this early gesture shielding the SP from accountability 
emboldened the police in Bhagalpur to support or ignore violent attacks in the days 
that followed.   
 
After the riots, the Bhagalpur police association demanded that ‘false cases’ against 
police officials be withdrawn and suspended officers reinstated.  While the criminal 
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cases were not withdrawn, some of the suspended officers were reinstated, including 
Bhuvaneshwar Singh, Inspector, Amarpur PS who had allegedly looted and sold the 




The Commission faulted the army for coordinating poorly with the district 
administration, as well as for relying too heavily for information on the district police 
who were ‘communally biased’243. The Commission took the view that Major Virk 
should have acted immediately to take Muslims in Chanderi village to a relief camp, 
rather than leaving them in the protection of local police officers244.   
3. District administration 
 
The Commission found the entire district administration as a whole ‘entirely 
responsible for whatever happened’245, and identified some officials for particular 
censure.   
 
It singled out the SP, KS Dwivedi as being ‘wholly responsible’ for the violence and 
said that ‘his communal bias was fully demonstrated not only by the manner of 
arresting the Muslims and by not extending adequate help to protect them246‘. The 
Commission faulted Dwivedi for failing to act against Sgt Om Prakash and his 
colleagues who demonstrated against his transfer.  Other official documents indicate 
that the SP ignored signs of imminent violence before 24 October. The SDM, Sadar 
ordered police to patrol 27 vulnerable points in anticipation of possible violence, but 
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was told that the force wasn’t available.   He reported this to the DM and the SP, but 
the SP seemed not to respond to this247.   
 
The Commission identifies KC Dubey, OiC, Kotwali police station and Navin 
Kumar, as ‘able assistants248‘ to Dwivedi, and says that they ‘not only let loose 
fascism like aggression on the Muslims of Bhagalpur but were silent spectator[s] to 
the loot and arson in Sujaganj and Parvatti respectively. 
 
The Commission said that the SDO, Arun Kumar Sinha, along with the officials 
named earlier, failed to separate violent criminals from the peaceful participants in 
the ramshila procession.  It also held the BDO at the time responsible for failing to 
control violence, and held Mukund Mishra, ADM, Incharge Control Room, C.R. 
Mehta, Executive Magistrate, Bhagalpur who failed to save lives during a massacre 
of Muslims sheltering in a Hindu home at Naya Bazar, KK Singh, OIC Mujahidpur 
Police Station who participated in the massacre of Muslims of mohalla Ishakchak, 
Om Prakash, Sgt Major against whom a murder charge was pending at the time of 
the enquiry, Kailash Chandra, Officer In Charge, Sabour; Ramchandra, ASI 
responsible for the massacre in Lugai, Achyuta Pathak, Officer in charge, Nathnagar 
police station, Seheodas Singh, ASI of Tatarpur police station, Narendra Singh, ASI 
of Nathnagar police station, BDO Nathnagar, PS Bihar Administrative Service 
Officer, RN Jha ASI of Shahkund PS, Prahlad Kumar, Dy S.P. Nathnagar P.S. 
 
The Commission also recommended that the constabulary of Bhagalpur be 
scrutinized in the round, and that constables who acted out of bias can be identified 
by checking who was on duty when particular episodes of violence occurred and 
investigating the role of the constables249.  
 
The Bihar government refused to give us information about whether and how far it 
had followed the Commission’s recommendations and taken action officials named 
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as negligent or complicit.  The Inquiry report was tabled in the Bihar Assembly in 
1995.  Following this, in 1996, the PUDR noted that the State government had issued 
show cause notices to some of the officials.  In addition, G P Dohre, then IG 
Bhagalpur and later director general of police, Bihar, was transferred250.  
 
Reports in 2007 indicated that the Bihar government had decided to reopen cases 
against police and civil officials identified by the Commission of Inquiry, including 9 
IPS and IAS officials, as no action had been taken thus far251.  A more recent media 
report indicated that the Bhagalpur district police have begun departmental 
proceedings against 25 policemen for negligent investigation of cases related to the 
1989 mass violence.  13 sub-inspectors and 12 assistant sub-inspectors were 
investigating officers in 25 cases that were closed, but re-opened and prosecuted 
more recently, strongly indicating  that the  investigating officials had been biased.  
They did not respond to show-cause notices issued by the SP of Bhagalpur in 2010252.   
 
4. State government 
 
Although the Bhagalpur Commission of Inquiry was not asked to examine the state 
government’s behaviour, Commission members felt moved to apportion blame for 
serious failures by the senior State Government officials.   
 
The Commission noted that ‘superior officers cannot absolve themselves so lightly 
from this responsibility’253 and that state government officials should have been 
communicating constantly with the district administration.  It took the view that ‘the 
State Government … did not respond adequately to the seriousness of the situation.  
If the army had been sent on the 24th itself by Chief Secretary, who should have 
obtained the order of the Government to that effect…and it [the army] had taken 
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charge of the whole town and the district…matter [would have]…been brought 
immediately under control’254. 
 
The Commission made a point of noting that the Chief Minister personally reversed 
the DGP’s efforts to transfer the SP255, despite the SP’s divisive and biased 
performance.   Civil society reports indicate that the Prime Minister at the time, 
visiting the area, ordered this reversal.  This was not a decision for the Central 
Government to make.  The Commissioner of Bhagalpur in the aftermath of the riots 
noted that cancelling the SP’s transfer had ‘an adverse effect in as much as the 
Muslim community interpreted [it] as the surrender of Government to the Hindu 
forces while section of the Hindu group was definitely embolden[ed] by it’256.  It also 
criticized the fact that inexperienced officials were posted in an area the state 
government knew to be sensitive, at a time the state government also knew was 
sensitive, and speculated whether this was driven by electoral considerations257. 
 
 
5. Political office holders 
 
The Commissioner of Bhagalpur suggests that parliamentary elections should have 
been postponed, but were not because the ruling party might potentially benefit 
from the riots.  He said that ‘the popular perception in Bhagalpur was that ex-CM 
Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad wanted to have a controlled riot in Bhagalpur to boost him 
[sic] election prospects’258.  Another official report says that the District Magistrate 
wrote to the Election Commission asking for the election to be postponed, but the 
State Government decided to press on regardless259.  Because the State Government 
did not postpone elections, the district administration was diverted towards 
preparation for elections rather than responding to victims of violence. The 
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Commissioner says that district officials could not spend time in relief camps.  They 
did not discover the mass killings in Logain and Sahibganj for some weeks, ‘which 
meant that the bodies of victims had decomposed.  We have…come to the conclusion 
that very large number of persons, close to 1000, are missing…not much 
investigations can be made after such a long time’260.   
 
6. Political parties 
 
Soon after the Bhagalpur riots, Bihar had State Assembly elections in February 1990.  
In addition to the BJP, the Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha also contested the 
elections ‘in a big way’, and the BJP won several seats, according to the Bhagalpur 
Commissioner.  ‘Shri Madho Mandal who has been chargesheeted in connection 
with the communal riots and probably backed by VHP has won the election from 
Amarpur Assembly constituency.  Shri Ratan Mandal and Shri Kameshwar Yadav 
whose role in the riots left much to be desired finished 2nd and 3rd respectively in 
Nathnagar Assembly Constituency’261. 
 
While the Commission did not identify members of political parties as responsible 
for violence (this was beyond its remit), witnesses before the Commission identified 
BJP, VHP and RSS members as responsible for spreading rumours about Hindu 
killings and Hindu mass graves262.  The Commission also noted that Kameshwar 
Yadav, allegedly close to the Hindu Right at the time and later to the RJD, led an 
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As mentioned earlier, the Bhagalpur Commission of Inquiry’s report was not  
publicly accessible, and there is no public information about how far the State 
Government acted upon its recommendations and findings.   In 1996, the PUDR 
noted that the Bihar government had not submitted a memorandum of action taken 
in response to the report even a year after the report was put before the State 
Assembly (the memorandum should be submitted in 6 months)264.  Several years 
later, the Bihar government refused to disclose the memorandum to us, and it is not 
clear if the memorandum was ever put before the Assembly (though the Inquiry 
report was).   
 
As already noted, in February 2006, the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar set up a new 
Commission of Enquiry on the Bhagalpur riots, shortly after coming to power265.   In 
addition to reviewing why criminal proceedings against participants in the 1989 
mass violence failed, this new Commission was asked to examine whether victims 
sold properties under duress.  The Bihar Government has stated that it would 
attempt to return such property to the original owners and identify those guilty of 
forcing distress sales.  It was also asked to review progress on the recommendations 
of the previous Commission.   
 
The new Commission was set up in response to accusations that the ruling party in 
Bihar had shielded some of the primary accused in the Bhagalpur riots from effective 
prosecution, out of political and caste loyalties – the Chief Minister was a Yadav, and 
so, it is suggested, Yadavs accused of violence found the criminal justice system 
sympathetic to them.  The new enquiry, under a new political regime, was supposed 
to unpack the resulting miscarriage of justice, and lay the ground for fresh legal 
proceedings.  The enquiry was supposed to last 6 months, however the Commission 
submitted an interim report after 18 months, and has yet to complete its work at the 
time of writing. Media reports say that, in response to an Right to Information 
application the Bihar Government admitted to spending about Rs. 3 lakhs a month, 
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and almost 1.5 crores in all, on the Commission up to October 2009266.  The interim 
report is not in the public domain, and the Bihar Government ignored our Right to 
Information application and appeals to get a copy.   In September 2011, the state 
government told the media that the new commission would soon submit its final 
report267. 
 
E. Relief and Rehabilitation 
 
We have discussed earlier the heavy toll that the Bhagalpur mass violence took on 
people. Over 1000 people were murdered, hundreds were injured, over 10,000 homes 
were destroyed and thousands of people were displaced.  This cost was borne, to a 
large extent, by Muslims in Bhagalpur district, though Hindus also lost lives and 
property. 
Victims of mass violence also paid a heavy monetary price.  The Muslims in 
Bhagalpur and its surrounding villages, many of whom worked in the textile trade, 
were fairly well off relative to Muslims in other parts of India268.   Perhaps this was 
one reason why attackers made what one official described as ‘systematic 
attempts…to weaken the other community economically’.  Shops were looted and 
burnt.   Almost all the handlooms belonging to Muslim weavers in Baisbighhi Narga, 
Murgachak and MTN Ghosh Road were looted or burnt.  Power looms were stolen 
and the yarn burnt269.  Civil society reports suggest that many weavers fled 
Bhagalpur, and never returned.  They were pushed into ad hoc construction jobs, 
permanently losing skilled livelihoods270. In rural areas, such as Tamauni and 
Salempur, attackers burnt tractors and stole tools belonging to Muslim farmers.  
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They stole cattle and destroyed wells by filling them with mud and stone.  In some 
cases, attackers harvested and stole paddy as well271. Loss of property – personal and 
professional – was estimated at Rs. 30 crores.   
 
We have very limited official information about relief measures, and there are no 
detailed assessments of how effectively victims were compensated.   However, the 
Bihar Government disclosed the standards of compensation that it applied to victims 
of mass violence in 1989.  These standards were fairly progressive, and we discuss 
them in more detail below.   
1. Displacement and relief camps 
 
While the Bihar Government did not respond to our Right to Information query 
about the number of people displaced by mass violence in Bhagalpur district, official 
reports written soon after the riots suggest that almost 50,000 people were displaced 
from their homes and fled to relief camps272.  However, we do not have information 
on how many relief camps there were, and whether these were government run or 
privately run.   
 
2. General standards on monetary compensation 
 
We sought information regarding general standards for granting compensation and 
relief.  We were given the Bihar Famine and Flood Relief Code, 1957 (hereinafter ‘the 
Relief Code’) and letters sent by the department of home to various district 
Collectors in 1986 and 1987.  The Relief Code, which details the state’s response to 
famine, did not guide relief and rehabilitation measures after the Bhagalpur riots.   
We discovered that, instead, Bihar had developed guidelines on compensation for 
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victims of communal violence in the 1980s, which applied to victims of the 1989 mass 
violence273.   
a) 1986 norms 
Standards formulated in 1986 set down compensation for death and injury, 
compensation for movable property and for immovable property. 
a. Relief for Death and Injury;  
The rate of compensation for death was Rs. 20000; for permanent disability it 
was Rs. 5000; for grievous injury it ranged from Rs. 500 and 1000.  Listed 
criminals and people who participated in communal violence were to be 
excluded from  compensation. 
b. Relief for damage to property: residential, commercial and religious 
The rate for permanently destroyed property was Rs. 15000 for urban 
property and Rs 10000 for rural property.  Houses that have been insured 
were not to be given relief.  On the face of it, this seems to penalize owners 
who had the foresight to get home insurance.  However, in the Indian 
context, poorer people are less likely to have insurance, and so this measure 
concentrates relief on them, at least in theory.   
c. Relief for movable property 
Movable property, including household items, and vehicles could be 
compensated at Rs. 2000, which even in 1989 would likely have been low.   
 
b) 1987 norms 
Another set of standards, formulated in 1987274, incorporated the 1986 standards, 
and expanded coverage to victims of terrorist activity, insurgency, caste violence 
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for compensation.  
274 Letter Number 1701, dated 21 September 1987.  
and displacement.  The 1987 standards also made special provision for some 
vulnerable groups.   
• For example, students whose parents’ annual income is less than Rs. 6000 a 
year would receive relief up to Rs 200 by the Block Division Officer (BDO) 
and up to Rs. 500 by the Collector. 
• The District Magistrate was empowered to direct the civil surgeon, to buy 
medicine from the open market and to give discretionary medical relief of Rs. 
200.   
• The BDO could spend Rs. 50 per person to transport people to relief camps. 
The 1987 standards also detailed the amount of ration per person per day275.  
• In a particularly salient provision, the 1987 standards required the BDO to 
give a week's rations to families when they returned from relief camps to 
their homes.  While displaced and poor families are likely to need more than 
a week’s assistance, the 1987 standards did at least think about helping 
families at a very precarious time. 
• The 1987 standards enjoined the district administration to help business 
owners get loans to restart their businesses, as well as facilitate quick access 
to insurance.  
The 1987 compensation standards laid down by the Bihar Government displayed 
some thought and detail beyond the ‘standard’ post-riot monetary hand-outs.  In 
addition to the provisions above, we also think it interesting that the standards 
covered not just communal violence, but also caste and terrorist violence, thus 
establishing a common minimum across different categories of potential victims – an 
important step in Bihar’s fraught environment in the 1980s.   
                                                        
275 This was: 
Food item  Per adult  Per child 
Dal   25 gms 15 gms 
Chana   50 gms 25 gms 
Rice 150 gms 100 gms 
Chooda  100 gms 50 gms 
Gur  20 gms 10 gms 
 
c) 1989 relief package 
The Bihar Government announced a relief package specifically for survivors of mass 
violence in Bhagalpur at the end of December 1989276.   
• Deaths 
Most strikingly, the Bihar Government increased the amount of compensation for the 
families of the dead from Rs. 20,000 set in 1987 to Rs. 1 lakh.  The amount given is 
considerably higher, not only compared to the 1987 guidelines but also in 
comparison to the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, after which the Delhi Government initially 
gave Rs. 10,000 to families of the dead, increasing the amount to Rs. 20,000 in 1986. 
The amount of compensation was to be divided equally among the family277, a 
measure likely to help women in the family and reduce family disputes over 
compensation.   In addition, the Centre sanctioned Rs. 10,000 for the families of those 
killed.   If a person was missing for more than 2 months the family would be given 
compensation for death, if they undertook to return the money if the person returned 
from the dead.  This provision, which departs from the usual legal requirement that 
someone needs to be missing for 7 years before being treated as dead, is particularly 
striking.  It demonstrates sensitivity to the forms that murder took in Bhagalpur, 
with many people drowned and many others buried in mass graves.    
 In 2009, the Central Government sanctioned Rs.3.5 lakh per deceased278.  From 2009, 
the State Government has also begun to provide pension of Rs. 2500 per month to 
women widowed in 1989.  The Bihar Government reportedly negotiated increased 
compensation from the Government of India citing the increased compensation 
given to the survivors of the 1984 Anti Sikh riots.  
• Injury 
In 1989 the government awarded Rs.5000 compensation to the permanently disabled 
and Rs 500 – Rs.1000 to the grievously injured. In 2009 the government of India 
                                                        
276 Letter dated December 29, 1989, sent from the Relief Commissioner to the District Collector and 
the Block Division Officer.  
277 “Family” defined as widow, husband, dependant son, unmarried daughter and aged parents. 
278 Letter Number 6044, dated August 14, 2009. 
increased the compensation to Rs. 1,25,000 per person with a caveat of deducting the 
amount of compensation received in 1989.   
• Property damage 
Compensation for property damage varied depending upon the type of property 
lost279.  Those who lost huts were sanctioned Rs. 1000 per room for a thatch roof, Rs. 
2000 per room for a tiled roof and Rs. 5000 per room for a completely destroyed 
household.  Those who lived in permanent structures were to be given Rs. 15000 per 
house in an urban area and Rs. 10000 per house in a rural area.  The government also 
sanctioned Rs. 15,000 for each religious structures that was damaged.   
The Bihar Government granted compensation of Rs. 2000 for damage to ‘movable 
property’ which covered everything to household goods to means of livelihood, such 
as bullock carts, shops and looms. 
These amounts of compensation for property damage and loss seem extremely low, 
even for 1989.  As one commentator pointed out, the compensation scheme gave the 
same amount to someone who lost a small shop, and large concerns like the National 
Watch Company.   
• Other measures 
Every family was to receive free ration for a week when they left the relief camps. In 
case of incidents of starvation, the BDO was empowered to provide free grains to the 
families till he deemed fit.   
The state government also directed the district administration to install hand pumps 
in affected villages, a possible response to bodies of the dead being dumped in wells, 
making the water undrinkable. 
3. Accessing compensation 
 
On paper, compensation measures in 1989, layered upon the 1987 general standards, 
are relatively progressive and incorporate some important steps.   
                                                        
279 Parameters for granting relief based on letter number 1701 of September 21, 1987. 
The DM circulated a public notice on 5th November 1989 announcing the relief 
measures to be undertaken by the State and also ‘asking the public to stake their 
claim and submit applications to their Local BDO’s office by 10th November 1989.’280   
While we did not speak to survivors about how and when they accessed 
compensation, third party commentary suggests that the higher officials like the 
Relief Commissioner were honest and helpful but officials at the frontline of 
distributing compensation were often corrupt.281  Claimants reported having to give 
bribes to access compensation.   In certain cases the police rejected the claims of the 
victims’ on the grounds that those killed were rioters or killed in police firing282, thus 
implying that all those killed by police firing were rioters and not innocent 
individuals despite the dubious role of the police during the Bhagalpur mass 
violence.   In 2008, it came to light that as many as 2440 files on compensation claims 
were missing at the district level283.   This suggests at best that the district 
administration did not attend to claims by victims diligently; it may also indicate that 
compensation claims were deliberately ignored and misplaced. 
While corruption and negligence marked victims’ access to compensation, political 
calculations seem to have played a strong role in how much compensation victims 
were granted and whether they were counted amongst the grantees.  Media reports 
indicate that, in 2001, the RJD regime in Bihar decided to stop identifying victims 
who had not received compensation so far284.    Reports also suggest that the Centre’s 
grant and release of additional compensation for victims was strategically timed to 
coincide with the 2009 general elections, to benefit the UPA285. 
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282  Ibid 
283 “Files on Bhagalpur Riot Victims Missing” DNA, September 26, 2008 available at dnaindia.com. 
 
284 “Bhagalpur Burning,” The Sunday Indian, December 6, 2009.   
 




4. Places of worship 
 
The mass violence in Bhagalpur destroyed nearly 60 mosques, mazaars and 
imambaras.  A senior official noted after the riots that some of the mosques ‘must 
have taken 3 to 4 days in being pulled down.  Obviously the rioters had all the time 
and the freedom for this,’ implying of course, that the police looked the other way as 
Muslim sites were desecrated.  The same official reported that several Muslim sites 
were covered with Hindu symbols – statues of Bajrang Bali were placed over them, 
and a mazar at Tamauni was converted into a devisthan286.  
 
The Bihar Government disclosed that it sanctioned Rs. 15000 for each religious 
structure damaged during mass violence.  However, it did not respond to Right to 
Information queries about whether and when the district administration repaired 
damage to religious sites.   
F. Summing up 
 
Looking back at the Bhagalpur mass violence, it is clear that biased policing, 
particularly from senior police officials, ensured a high death toll as well as shoddy 
investigation.  This, in turn, paved the way for weak evidence and impunity for 
perpetrators.  The police cooperated with Hindu Right organisations, tolerating and 
assisting in violence.  The Congress was in power in Bihar in 1989, followed by the 
Rashtriya Janata Dal.  Neither government protected victims testifying in court, or 
punished complicit officials.  Public officials who participated in a criminal, 
communal massacre were protected by successive governments, led by different 
political parties, who ostensibly opposed the BJP and its sister organisations.  So, the 
aftermath of the Bhagalpur violence presses home the extent to which protecting 
officials and political functionaries has become systemic, regardless of the political 
dispensation of the day. 
 
However, official records also reveal that government officials doing their jobs 
diligently can contribute significantly to holding people accountable. The actions of a 
                                                        
286 Report of Special ADM, Law & Order, Bhagalpur. 
 
few district officials led to mass graves being discovered after the massacre. Officials 
responsible for relief set more progressive standards for compensation than have 
been applied in comparable situations.  Reports by government officials helped the  
Commission of Inquiry to provide a fairly detailed analysis of the violence as well as 
a catalogue of official culpability.  This record is important in its own right, and 
becomes even more so because non-State documentation of the Bhagalpur violence is 
limited.   It no doubt strengthened the efforts by victims and the government to try 
perpetrators that began in 2006.  These renewed efforts by the state government, 
born of greater accountability and political considerations, are still unfolding.  
However, the results of trials so far demonstrate that when police, prosecutors and 
administrators do their jobs as they are supposed to, the gains in accountability after 
mass violence are evident.  




In this chapter, we focus on mass violence in Gujarat in 2002, in which around 2000 
people were killed288, another 2500 are estimated to be missing289 and around 2 lakh 
people290 were displaced from their homes.  This was one of the worst episodes of 
mass violence that India has seen since independence, not just in its scale and 
brutality, but also because of the evidence of planning and support from the highest 
levels of the government291. It was also scrutinized and reported on more closely 
than previous episodes of mass violence, and so extensive documentation of the 
administration’s failure to control and punish violence exists.  
 
This episode of mass violence is also marked by relentless litigation to pursue justice 
by survivors, social and legal activists, which has secured some momentous results.  
Gujarat 2002 saw the emergence of sustained, long-term human rights activism 
                                                        
287 Researched and written by Prita Jha, who would like to acknowledge the work of those who 
continue to devote time and energy to ensuring justice for the survivors of 2002.  Special mention has 
to be made of four organizations, Nyayagrah, Centre for Social Justice, Jan Sangharsh Manch and 
Citizens for Justice and Peace who have, with remarkable energy and commitment, sustained the fight 
for more than ten years. 
288 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(Gujarat, 2005): 6, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf. There is a huge disparity between 
the official figure of 1069 deaths provided by the state, and civil society estimates which place the 
figure above 2000. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid., 2. 
291Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 2, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005) available at http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/tribunal2.pdf. See pages 75- 80, for the 
role of Gujarat government, and pages 81-96 for role of the police, its communalisation and names 
several police officers guilty of gross negligence. There is also extensive evidence of state complicity 
in other reports, in particular see Human Rights Watch, “We have No orders to Save you” available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/], Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Communal Violence in Gujarat”(Gujarat, 2005); International Initiative for Justice in 
Gujarat, “Threatened Existence: A Feminist analysis of the genocide in Gujarat”, (Forum Against 
Oppression of Women, December 2003); People’s Union for Civil Liberties, “Violence in Vadodara:  
A report prepared by PUCL, Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan”, (May 2002); Forum Against 
Oppression of Women and Awaaz-e-Niswaan, "Genocide in Rural Gujarat: the experience of Dahod 
District",  (Bombay, June 2002); and Mander, Harsh, “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of 
Massacre” (India: Penguin Books, 2009). 
confronting a belligerent and recalcitrant state, on a scale unlike any previous 
episode of mass violence. 
 
Below, we describe the violence and some of the major interventions by civil society, 
as well as official watchdogs such as the NHRC.  We then discuss access to criminal 
justice, followed by whether officials and political office holders have been held 
accountable, and finally sketch out access to relief and rehabilitation for survivors of 
violence. 
 
B. Sources of information 
 
We received extensive responses to RTI applications in Gujarat.  In addition to this 
information we also rely heavily on petitions filed by activists, survivors, NGOs and 
orders issued in these cases, as also orders issued by the National Human Rights 
Commission, and information submitted to the Nanavati Commission of Inquiry that 
have reliably entered the public domain.   We draw upon the first part of the 
Commission of Inquiry’s report, which deals solely with the Godhra incident.  We 
also rely on human rights documentation and NGO reports produced after 
interviews, field visits and public hearings in the months following the outbreak of 
violence in Gujarat.   
 
C. The Context  
 
On February 27, 2002, 57 karsevaks were burnt alive at Godhra train station when 
the two bogeys of the train that was carrying them caught fire. The cause of the fire is 
disputed – while some describe it as a complete accident, others say it is best viewed 
as an accident abetted by the negligence of government agencies.  The Gujarat 
government’s view was that the Godhra incident was a “terrorist conspiracy”292 
                                                        
292 The Chief Minister, Narendra Modi initially made statements suggesting evidence of pre-planned 
conspiracy, which was later supplemented with statements of ISI plot. See The Hindu front page 
reports on March 1st, 2nd and 3rd 2002, available at 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/03/01/01hdline.htm, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/03/02/ and http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/03/03/]. Also 
see Para 3, page 6 of the “Nanavati-Mehta Inquiry Report” (herein after referred to as the “Godhra 
report”), which records that Gujarat government suspected this incident to be part of conspiracy 
hatched by Muslim terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir, with some Muslim fundamentalists from 
aiming to destabilize Gujarat.  Even in official documents, the Godhra incident is 
described as the cause of the violence that followed in the rest of the state.293  
 
Civil society accounts make clear that while mass violence across Gujarat followed 
the Godhra incident, the violence was too well coordinated to be spontaneous. There 
is a vast amount of information in the public domain294 mapping the violence and 
offering detailed testimonies from victims and witnesses all over Gujarat. Within 
hours of the Godhra incident, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad295 (VHP) gave a call for a 
Gujarat bandh on February 28th, which was supported by the Gujarat Chief Minister 
(CM), Narendra Modi, who   is alleged to have held a meeting with the senior most 
police and administration officials on the evening of February 27th 2002, and issued 
(clearly illegal) instructions to those present not only to not act impartially, but to 
“allow the Hindus to vent their anger”296. What followed were violence, murder and 
looting by armed mobs.  Numerous incidents of violence were reported in 16 
districts297 across Gujarat. Below, we briefly set out the nature of the violence which 
comprised large scale urban and rural298 planned armed attacks by large mobs.  
There is evidence in many civil society reports of systematic work by Hindu Right 
organisations in inciting and executing the violence. There is also evidence that they 
                                                                                                                                                              
Godhra “to spread terror ...” available at 
http://home.gujarat.gov.in/homedepartment/downloads/godharaincident.pdf.  
293 Many FIRS, witness statements recorded by police suggest that because of “Godhrakand” large 
mobs attacked Muslims elsewhere in Gujarat. 
294 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, 2 and 3 (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005) available at http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/tribunal2.pdf. The reports, 
spread across three volumes, are the most comprehensive that exist on the riots to date. It collected 
2094 oral and written testimonies from victim survivors, women’s groups, human right groups, NGOs 
and academics. 
295 The VHP, the RSS (Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh), and the “Bajrang Dal” the youth wing of the 
VHP are a cluster of right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations belonging to the “Sangh parivar” 
family, who actively propagate the ideology of a Hindu Rashtra. The “kar sevaks” who were killed in 
the Godhra train tragedy, were returning from Ayodhya after rendering voluntary service in pursuit of 
building a contentious Hindu temple there.  
296 “A Plot from the Devil's Lair”, Outlook Magazine, June 3, 2002 issue available at 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?215889) reported that a cabinet minister made such an 
allegation against Chief Minister Modi before the Concerned Citizens Tribunal, which was presided 
over by Supreme Court judge, Justice Krishna Iyer.  
297 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice and 
Peace, 2005) Vol. 1, 19.  
298   Forum Against Oppression of Women and Awaaz-e-Niswaan, "Genocide in Rural Gujarat: the 
experience of Dahod District",  (Bombay, June 2002) available at 
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/rural/rural-gujarat.pdf.  
were recruiting, organizing and “saffronising” people from tribal groups in the 
preceding years, many of whom were trucked in to launch attacks on Muslims in the 
rural areas especially in Dahod and Panchmahal. 
 
1. Instances of mass violence 
a) Gulbarg Society Massacre, Chamanpura, Ahmedabad299 
This massacre relates to the brutal attack on the home of Congress MP Ehsan Jaffrey 
who was sheltering many Muslims in his home in Gulbarg. He, along with seventy 
others, was murdered by armed mobs of 20,000 to 22,000 over a period of seven 
hours. Ten to twelve women and girls are reported as having been raped and 
murdered from this area300. Evidence has been found to suggest that the attack and 
murder of Jaffrey was pre-planned.301 The police, despite being well aware of the 
build-up and the threats to loss of many lives, failed to intervene in time.302 There 
were also allegations of foul play in the registration and investigation of offences, 
and it was alleged by witnesses that the police had refused to write down the names 
of accused they were giving. However, this massacre sparked survivor and activist 
efforts, and eventually led to the incumbent CM being investigated and interrogated 
for the charge of criminal conspiracy to murder. We return to this later. 
 
b) Naroda Gam and Naroda Patiya, Ahmedabad.303 
Evidence from civil society reports, eye-witness accounts and a sting operation by 
the Tehelka magazine304 strongly suggest that the attacks on these Muslim areas on 
                                                        
299 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005), 26-35.  
300  Ibid., 28, para. 1 , “It was between 3.30-4.30 p.m. that 10-12 women were first raped, 
then cut into pieces with guptis, and then thrown into the fire.” 
301 Ibid. Also see the FIR of Zakia Jaffrey dated June 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.cjponline.org/zakia/060608%20Zakia%20FIR.pdf. The complainant Zakia Jaffrey lists 62 
accused, which include Police Commissioners, Ministers and the Chief Minister, as being party to a 
criminal conspiracy to murder Ehsan Jaffrey and others. 
302 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005). 
303 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005) 36-43, has a detailed account gathered from eyewitness accounts and victim 
testimonies. See later discussion on investigation and charge sheet defects. 
304 See Tehelka, Issue 46, December 1, 2007. 
the morning of February 28, 2002, by a large mob of 5,000 to 10,000 people armed 
with spears, swords, acid bombs and petrol bombs was pre-planned. The rioters 
used gas cylinders to blow up businesses, houses, cars and taxis. Religious buildings 
and symbols like mosques and tombs were targeted, attacked, damaged and 
destroyed. The residents of Naroda claim305 that when they tried to defend 
themselves the police fired at them.  Again, civil society reports306 suggest that 
during the seventeen or so hours that the areas were under attack, many women and 
girls of Naroda Gaon and Patiya were raped.  Some of the most chilling victim 
testimonies and narratives of cold-blooded, brutal murder, rape and mutilation 
emerged out of this massacre, and close to 150 persons are estimated to have been 
burnt alive after being gang-raped, hacked and cut. Several high profile VHP and 
BJP leaders were named by survivors as being complicit in the violence307 -- for 
example, Gordon Zadephia, the Minister of State for Home, and Mayaben Kodnani, 
a BJP Member of the Legislative Assembly were named by some of the accused as 
having incited and encouraged the violence.308 
c) Sardarpura and Deepda Darwaja Massacre 
Two brutal massacres took place in Mehsana. In Sardarpura, thirty-one Muslims 
seeking shelter were locked in a room and murdered by a mob. The police are 
alleged to have a role in this murder309. Also in Visnagar, in the Deepda Darwaja 
area, eleven people from the same family: five women, five children and one man 
were hacked to death. The police were called repeatedly by the victims under attack, 
but they arrived too late.310 
                                                        
305 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005) 36-43. See the section on Naroda Gam and Naroda Patiya. 
306 Ibid. 
307 “VHP, BJP workers named in FIR on riots” Times of India, Ahmedabad edition, March 3, 2011. 
The five BJP and VHP workers named in the Naroda-Patia incident as reported here are Kishan 
Korani, PJ Rajput, Harish Rohera, Babu Bajrangi and Raju Noble.  
308 Tehelka, Issue 46, December 1, 2002 available at 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename=Ne031107NarodaPatyaMassacre.asp&page=4.  
309  Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 2, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005), 92.  
310  Ibid., 91.   
d) Pandharwarda Massacre, Panchmahal 
In Pandharwada village on March 1, 2002, thirty-eight Muslims were killed in an 
attack on the village by a well-organized mob of 15,000, which included tribal people 
from nearby villages. In this village, there was evidence of mobilization and pre-
planning of the assault by VHP/Bajrang dal outfits in the weeks before the attack. In 
its report, PUDR notes that there was even evidence of a betrayal of trust by Hindu 
neighbours, who led two groups of Muslims to shelters in houses and fields, where 
they were then attacked and murdered.311 There were two cases registered in respect 
of the killings in this village. One of these, FIR No. 9 of 2002 from Khanpur dated 
February 28, 2002 has been registered against three Muslims accused by Hindu 
complainants, who admit that they were involved in breaking and damaging 
Muslim property on the same day. The case was tried and the accused acquitted by 
July 21, 2002. FIR No. 11 of 2002 from Khanpur was registered by the police as the 
complainant and noted only eight murders.312 The accused in this case were 
acquitted within six months of the incident in November 2002,313 mainly on account 
of the police charging the wrong accused.314 Many witnesses named accused not 
named in the charge sheet, and even the trial judge noted the poor investigation by 
the police. In 2006, the case was reinvestigated and many accused, including the 
village Sarpanch315 were charged, but let out on bail316 despite facing serious charges 
of murder. The original massacres and progress of the criminal case of the murders 
has since been overshadowed by the victim’s search for missing relatives317, which 
has entailed another spate of litigation with the government. In a well-publicized 
event, victims (having failed to get any official information from the authorities in 
                                                        
311 People’s Union for Democratic Rights, “Maaro! Kappo! Baalo! State, Society, and Communalism 
in Gujarat”, (Delhi, May 2002), 8-10, available at 
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pudr/pdf/full_report.pdf. Victim testimonies 
can be accessed on http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2002/marapril/Panchmahal.htm, and 
Combat Communalism, March-April 2002 issue. 
312 This is based on information received from Panchmahal in respect of this case. 
313  Accessed from http://www.gujarat-riots.com/illegalmassgrave.htm, 
314 See Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 15 (July 19 - August 01, 2003). 
315 Elected head of the village. 
316 Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 15 (July 19 - August 01, 2003). 
317 Langa, Mahesh, “The anatomy of a Hindutva lab, ‘Missing’ Show Up in Lunawada Grave”, 
Tehelka, Januray 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main16.asp?filename=Ne012106the_anatomy_SR. asp.  
respect of their missing relatives) unearthed skull and bones in a ravine near a 
nearby river, the Paanam, outside Lunavada318. The Khanpur police who were silent 
spectators to the mass deaths of Muslims on February 28 and March 1, acted 
speedily, registering an FIR319 for illegal exhumation of bodies against the survivors 
and those supporting them.  It took the victims several years of litigation in the High 
court and Supreme Court to eventually get possession of bodily remains for a 
dignified burial.320   
e) Ode Massacres 
In Ode village in Anand, twenty people were burnt alive in an attack; two FIRS have 
been lodged at the local Khambolaj station. Police again failed to respond to protect 
the Muslim citizens in question.321 The complainants say that police have only 
confirmed four deaths and twenty two bodies were declared missing, thought to 
have been disposed of as a systematic effort to destroy evidence of crimes 
committed322.  
 
f) Best Bakery  
In Vadodara, thirteen members of a family owning a business called “Best Bakery” 
were targeted and murdered in an attack lasting more than eight hours. The criminal 
case came to be known as the Best Bakery case. 
 
2. Role of the Police 
 
The reports speak with one voice regarding the failure of the police to prevent 
violence and protect lives. There are many narratives on the partisan role played by 
many police officers, who either watched silently while people were being attacked 
or failed to respond to calls for help.  In some cases, the police were alleged to be 
party to attacks on the Muslim community.  
 
                                                        
318 Ibid. 
319 FIR no. 13 of 2006.  
320  “The Hard facts” available online at http://www.gujarat-riots.com/illegalmassgrave.htm. 
321  Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005) 87-89.  
322 Ibid. 
In Ahmedabad, a survey conducted across 17 relief camps involving 2797 
respondents, found that an alarming half – 870 of the 1783323 respondents – alleged 
inaction by police who were present at crime scenes.  673 respondents, amounting to 
more than a third of those surveyed, said that police had acted against the victims.   
275 respondents reported that this action against victims took the form of police 
firing on the victims.  Only 80 (corresponding to 4.49%) respondents said that the 
police action was supportive.  
 
A report on violence in Vadodara by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties324 
analysed 1314 incidents of violence that occurred in May, 2002.   Their findings are 
tabulated below.325  
 
 















incident. Total cases 
814 (62%) 397 (30%) 60 (4%) 25 (2%) 27 (2%) 1314(100%) 
 
Shockingly, only 2% of the police acted to prevent violence in accordance with their 
constitutional duties here and only 4.49 % as per the research in Ahmedabad (see 
above) 
 
3. The Central Government’s reaction 
 
                                                        
323 See “Hard Facts”, table 4.6, entitled “Details Regarding the Action Taken by Police”, in Concerned 
Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice and Peace, 
2005), 26. The table records that out of a total of 2797 survey forms that were completed, the 
information regarding police action was not available in 1014 cases. The figures and analysis presented 
here excludes the 1014 cases in which no information was available, and is based only on the 1783 
responses where some information was provided. 
324 PUCL, “Violence in Vadodara:  A report prepared by PUCL, Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti 
Abhiyan”, (May 2002), available online at 
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pucl/index.htm.  
325  PUCL, “Violence in Vadodara:  A report prepared by PUCL, Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti 
Abhiyan”, (May 2002), 132, Chapter 6, entitled “Role of Police”.  
The Centre is duty bound under Article 355 of the Constitution to protect states 
against external aggression and internal disturbance. It is empowered, under Article 
356, to impose President’s rule in a state when there is a “failure of constitutional 
machinery” in that state.  Article 356 allows the Centre, in effect, to assume “all or 
any” of the functions of the state government.   The Central Government could have, 
and should have in the circumstances, intervened in restoring law and order and 
called in the army to do so.    
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition at the Centre, led by the BJP, did 
not do this, and defended its own failures as well as the manifest failure of the 
Gujarat administration. A Lok Sabha motion to censure the Gujarat government’s 
failure to provide security to the minority community, seeking intervention of the 
centre under rule 355 was defeated by 94 votes.326  On April 29, 2002327, the ruling 
coalition supported a Rajya Sabha motion328 seeking federal intervention in Gujarat 
as it lacked the numbers to defeat the motion.329 On May 6, 2002, the Rajya Sabha 
passed a unanimous resolution expressing anguish about the persistence of violence 
for over six weeks and urging the Centre to intervene to protect lives and properties 
of citizens as mandated by the constitution and to provide effective relief and 
rehabilitation to the victims of violence.  However, far from invoking its powers 
under Article 355, the Centre did not even put pressure on the Gujarat government 
to implement the recommendations of the NHRC.330  Coalition politics is assumed to 
have a moderating influence on the positions of major political parties.  However, in 
2002 it was clear that coalition partners would tolerate mass violence rather than 
withdraw support from the government and risk their own positions331.   Many BJP 
                                                        
326 “Censure motion on Gujarat to be voted on April 30”, The Economic Times, April, 24, 2002, 
available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2002-04-
24/news/27365498_1_gujarat-issue-adjournment-motion-discussion.  
327 “Indian M.P’s back Gujarat Motion”, BBC, May 6, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1970415.stm.  
328Ibid. A Rajya Sabha motion was passed unanimously on May 6, 2002, expressing anguish about the 
persistence of violence for over six weeks and urging the Centre to intervene to protect lives and 
properties of citizens as mandated by the constitution and to provide effective relief and rehabilitation 
to the victims of violence.  
329 “Obligations under Art. 355 will be fulfilled: Advani” The Hindu, May 7, 2002. 
330 See earlier discussion on NHRC intervention.  
331 Baxi, Upendra, “The Second Gujarat Catastrophe” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, Issue 
34, (Aug 24, 2002).  
politicians defended, and even praised Mr. Modi. Coalition partners also supported 
the Gujarat government and downplayed the violence. George Fernandes, Union 
Defence Minister at the time claimed that there was “nothing new” in the allegations 
of mass rape, as this was a regular feature of communal violence in India.  
The Centre’s refusal to intervene allowed the Gujarat government to tolerate and 
support large-scale violence against Muslims across Gujarat.  In the months 
following mass violence, the state government set up a Commission of Inquiry (“the 
Nanavati Commission”).  In the months and years that followed, survivors and civil 
society groups kept pressing for accountability. They pressed directly – by filing 
criminal complaints and applying for compensation. They also pressed indirectly – 
they petitioned the Gujarat High Court as well as the Supreme Court and challenged 
problems in criminal proceedings as well as access to compensation.  They also 
pressed specifically for senior officials and political office holders – including the 
Chief Minister Narendra Modi – to be held accountable for colluding in mass 
violence.  Survivors’ efforts often met with frustration, but also resulted in 
unprecedented measures, such as transferring major criminal trials out of Gujarat, re-
opening 2000 criminal cases that had been summarily closed, and the appointment of 
a Special Investigation Team (SIT) by the Supreme Court to examine evidence in 
some particularly serious cases.   
 
We look at some of these developments in more detail below, as we examine access 
to criminal justice, accountability of public officials, and compensation and 
rehabilitation.  
 
D. Access to Criminal Justice 
 
Below, we look at how the criminal justice system in Gujarat responded to mass 
violence in 2002.     
 
1. Complaints and FIRs 
 
a) Complaints  
 
The table below captures the responses we received across districts regarding mode 
of receipt of complaints. 
 
Mode of Complaint 
 
By phone By Fax Attended in person 
By registered 
post 
1 13 937 1 
 
• 937 complaints were made in person, showing that approximately 25% of 
victims were sufficiently proactive to make the journey to the police station to 
get their FIR registered. This is significant given the highly charged 
communalized atmosphere confronting the survivors. The actual numbers 
are likely to be higher given that many police stations and districts simply 
did not provide the information regarding mode of complaint, but simply 
told us overall figures regarding the number of FIRs registered. 
  
• Our inspection of one police station in Kadi indicated that there was no 
system maintained for recording the mode by which the complaint came to 
the police station except by individually reading the FIR (which often 
incorporated the complaint). The only information that police stations can 
accurately provide from their records are that X or Y number of FIRs were 
registered in connection with 2002. 
 
• Given that we would expect most victims to pick up the phone and contact 
the local police when confronted with an emergency or an unexpected attack, 
it is surprising that only one complaint was received by phone as per the RTI 
response across districts. This finding is contradicted by research conducted 
in the immediate aftermath of the violence in Gujarat in 2002. A research 
survey conducted amongst survivors in relief camps between 5th-13th March 
2002, within a week of the outbreak of violence showed 59.41% of those 
surveyed said they had contacted police by phone; this increases to 73.02% of 
survey participants if we exclude the 72 respondents who did not answer this 
question.332 
 









not available Total 
Number 230 81 4 72 387 
Percentage333 59.41 20.93 1.03 18.61 100 
% discounting cases 
(72) where no 
information. 






In Gujarat an unprecedented 4252334 FIRS were registered in the wake of mass 
violence, far more than in any previous episode that we examined.   
 
• We learnt that people filed FIRs in 24 districts of Gujarat. Information 
received from RTI shows that FIRS were registered in 251 police stations 
across Gujarat. In Ahmedabad city alone 959 FIRS were registered.  
• Only one district, Dang, responded by saying there was no incident of 
violence in 2002.   
                                                        
332 See Table 4.5 on page 25. This table is reproduced from Citizen’s Initiative, Centre for Social 
Justice, “Hard Facts: From a Survey of 2797 Families who have survived the Violence in Gujarat. A 
Report by Citizen's Initiative,” (Ahmedabad, 2002), which carried out a survey of 2797 families across 
17 camps of Gujarat in the period 5-13th March 2002. The permission to quote and reproduce 
information from the report has been expressly sought and granted by Gagan Sethy, Centre for Social 
Justice.   
333 We have added this row to the table for our analysis. 
334 A table setting out the number of FIRS, summary, charge-sheeted cases and acquittals was 
published in Frontline, and has been relied upon in various subsequent reports, (including the 
International Initiative for Justice) and court petitions. See The Frontline, Vol. 20 Issue 15, (July 19 
2003 – August 01, 2003). 
• In 8 districts, Ahmedabad (1049), Sabarkatha (469), Bhavnagar (310), Mehsana 
(176), Panchmahal (181), Vadodara rural (242), Anand (199), Kheda (190) the 
number of FIRs filed was in excess of 100. 
• The epicenter of violence was Ahmedabad followed by Vadodara. Mehsana, 
Panchmahal, Sabarkantha, Kheda, Anand, Dahod, Bhavnagar and 
Gandhinagar. 
 
The number of FIRs filed is an indicator of the level of violence experienced by a 
particular area.  However, merely taking a numerical count does not tell us how 
serious the violence was, and how well the police handled it. In Bhavnagar, though a 
huge number of FIRs were filed, the information from all the reports, civil society 
and media show that the police were effective in controlling the violence largely due 
to proactive policing under the then-D.S.P. Rahul Sharma. In this case, a higher 
number of FIRs could actually indicate that the police were doing their jobs more 
diligently than in other districts. 
We analysed 400 FIR’s across nine districts of Gujarat including 5 districts with a 
high incidence of violence. The table below records the spread of incidents and FIRS 
as recorded in the FIRs.  
 
Spread of Incidents and registration of FIRs 
 








Incidents 219 84 38 33 19 4 3 400 
Nos of FIRs 99 117 107 42 24 7 4 400 
 
We see that over  half (54.75%) of the incidents had taken place in the first three days 
and over a 1/5th ( 21%) of incidents took place in the next 5 days so by the end of the 
first week around ¾ (75.75%) of incidents had happened. This is corroborated by the 
evidence in the public domain which shows that violence was most intense and 
concentrated in the first three days when the massacres were carried out by large 
mobs. 
 
We also computed delay in registration of each FIR. 
 



















Numbers 34 189 59 44 67 5 2 400 
 
Less than 1/10th (8.5%) of the FIRs were filed within a few hours of the incident. 
Almost half (47.25%) were filed within 24 hours and a further 59 (14.75%) were filed 
within three days. A total of 282 , equalling 70.5% FIRs were filed by the end of three 
days, which is reasonable given the kind of fear and insecurity the survivors were 
confronting during this period. In 74 cases, there was a significant delay of more than 
8 days which according to legal requirements has to be justified and this requirement 
was often unfulfilled by the police. 
 
Also, in none of the FIRs analyzed have the police recorded the delay as being on 
account of their actions; on the face of the records, registration took place within 
hours of a complaint being reported to the police.  So the delay, where it exists, 
appears to be on account of late reporting by the complainants. Where the police do 
not accurately record the reason for a gap in the incident in question and the 
registration of the FIR, the delay becomes something that can later be used by the 
defence to throw doubt on the complainant’s account of events. 
   
c) Complainants and Accused as per the 400 sample analysis. 
 
Out of 400 cases, the police were complainants in 148 cases (amounting to 37% of 
total).  In 113 of these 148 FIRs with police complainants, the accused were described 
as an “anonymous mob”. That is to say that there in 3/4 complaints (76%) filed by 
police, the accused were not named.  Out of 400 FIRs, including the ones where 
victims or third party witnesses were the complainants, the accused are described 
only as an anonymous mob in 291 cases i.e. in 72.75% or nearly three quarter of the 
FIRs registered. So as per the sample it did not make a significant difference whether 
police or witnesses registered the complaint, in either case, around 75% the accused 
were not named. 
 
d) Problems encountered during registration 
 
The picture emerging from RTI results, of an overwhelming number of FIRs not 
disclosing any names of accused, is supported by the evidence of deliberate erasure 
of names by the police, as was recorded by the NHRC in its reports and orders and 
in various court petitions and applications made by social and legal activists.335  The 
main problems that complainants faced when registering complaints with the police 
are summarised below. 
 
• The police refused to register FIRs in some instances. There is overwhelming 
support of this in victim testimonies and interviews recorded by various 
NGO inquiries and reports. It is also a ground of complaint in the petitions 
filed for reinvestigation and transfer of some of the massacre cases and the 
victim petition filed regarding the closure of around 50% of the 4252 FIRS 
that were filed.336 An IPS officer in Gujarat in 2002, Sreekumar, also asserted 
in his affidavit to the commission of inquiry that there were complaints that 
the police pressured and dissuaded survivors from filing complaints.  
 
• The most significant noted failure of the police was to tailor the informant’s 
version, especially their refusal to note the name of the accused, which led to 
closure of many cases337. There is evidence of this in the cases being followed 
up by Nyayagrah and also from research conducted by the Centre for Social 
Justice within a week of the outbreak of violence. The research showed that in 
                                                        
335 There is evidence of this in victim testimonies filed before the SC in the victim petition and also in 
interviews given by many survivors to activists and journalists in fact finding reports, see in particular, 
the Criminal Justice section of report, Crime against Humanity, also see chapter four, entitled, “Role 
Of the Police” of PUDR (Public Union of Democratic Rights) report entitled “Maaro! Kappo! Baalo! 
State, Society, and Communalism in Gujarat”, People’s Union for Democratic Rights, (Delhi, May 
2002), Also see International Initiative for Justice in Gujarat, “Threatened existence: A Feminist 
analysis of the genocide in Gujarat”, (Forum Against Oppression of Women, December 2003), 49-52, 
Section 4.4. 
336 PUCL, “Violence in Vadodara:  A report prepared by PUCL, Vadodara and Vadodara Shanti 
Abhiyan”, (May 2002), 134, where it is stated at 12 places the police refused to register FIRs. Also see 
International Initiative for Justice in Gujarat, “Threatened existence: A Feminist analysis of the 
genocide in Gujarat”, (Forum Against Oppression of Women, December 2003), 80. Also see Para-20 
(viii) of NHRC report, National Human Rights Commission Report on Gujarat, (New Delhi: March - 
May, 2002) available at 
http://www.cjponline.org/gujaratTrials/statecomp/pdf%20files/pdfs/NHRC%20Report%20%20July%2
02002.pdf.  
337  As noted earlier, the accused were not named in around 75% of cases of our 400 sample. 
74 of 139 (just over 50%) FIRs registered, the accused were not named in 
complaints related to major offences.338 
 
• The police created “omnibus” FIRs, where multiple disparate incidents were 
clubbed together, ensuring chaotic, unwieldy trials with many witnesses and 
many accused, which made a fair trial very difficult unless steps were taken 
to separate incidents into separate cases, and rectify the investigative 
errors.339 
 
• The police filed “cross cases” –  false cases against Muslims – under the 
influence of powerful persons with the sole aim of using the cross case as a 
bargaining tool to facilitate “compromise”, or pressure the complainants to 
drop the case against the accused.  This clearly amounts to abuse of process 
by the police and has led to a serious loss of confidence by Muslims in the 
criminal justice system.340 
 
The experience of Bilkis Bano is an example of the difficulties complainants faced 
when registering complaints. Ms. Bano’s complaint was an especially serious one, 
but nevertheless, she encountered active hostility from the police.  The “Bilkis Bano 
case” was a multiple rape and murder case from Dahod district. Bilkis Bano, a young 
Muslim woman, five months pregnant was on the run with seventeen others from 
her village when they were confronted and assaulted by a mob of 20 to 30 men 
carrying swords and sickles.  The mob gang raped four women, including Bilkis and 
her mother, and murdered many including her three-year-old daughter by 
“smashing” her on the ground. Of the seventeen who left the village, only three 
survived, the bodies of eight of whom were found while six are still missing. Ms. 
Bano fell unconscious and was taken as dead. Later, she found the courage to go to 
                                                        
338 “Citizen’s Initiative, Centre for Social Justice, “Hard Facts: From a Survey of 2797 Families who 
have survived the Violence in Gujarat. A Report by Citizen's Initiative,” (Ahmedabad, 2002)”, 46, 
footnote 39. Of the total FIRS analysed, the police is the complainant in 64, and those filed by citizens 
are 75, making a total of 139. 
339 Evidence regarding this comes mainly from court documents filed in the Supreme Court for 
reinvestigation on account of poor investigation in the massacre cases (subsequently investigated by 
Special Investigation Team) and the challenge to closure of 2000 summary cases, combined with the 
insights and experiences of Nyayagrah Justice Project from around 150 cases. 
340 This insight is drawn largely from the grass-roots work of the legal justice project, Nyayagrah. 
the police station. The police at Limkheda Police Staion acted to subvert justice in the 
following manner: 341 
 
• They initially refused to register her FIR342. 
• Threatened her with the administration of a poisonous injection.  
• Recorded a fabricated complaint, which said, the attackers were an 
anonymous mob of 500 despite the fact of Ms. Bano naming twelve of her 
attackers.343 
• Did not include specific allegations of rape as narrated by her.344  
• The police failed to record a proper witness statement from her.345 
 
 
2. Complaints and FIRs on Sexual Violence 
 
 
There is widespread evidence of sexual violence against women in the unofficial 
reports on mass violence in 2002.346 Detailed and chilling testimonies of rape 
survivors are recorded in various civil society reports347, but the responses from 
police stations to our RTI applications suggest that very few cases of sexual violence 
were actually reported and recorded.   
 
There were three sexual offences reported by Panchmahal district, but the FIRs 
provided do not record any sexual offences, indicating either that witness statements 
specifying sexual assault were taken after a complaint that didn’t include specific 
allegations of rape, or that the police deliberately excluded such references, or that 
                                                        
341 See paragraph 3, pages 4-9 of the trial court judgement of Bilkis Bano, which sets out the 
prosecution’s case which was largely accepted by the trial judge. Sessions case number 634 of 2004, 





344 Anand, S., “Bilkis Bano’s Brave Fight” Tehelka, Vol. 5, Issue 4, February 2, 2008, Available at 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main37.asp?filename=Ne020208bilkis.asp. 
345 Ibid. 
346 International Initiative for Justice in Gujarat, “Threatened existence: A Feminist analysis of the 
genocide in Gujarat”, (Forum Against Oppression of Women, December 2003).  
347 See “Hard Facts”, 42 -45, which covers details of three rape cases in Naroda and one in Gulbarg, 
also The IIJ report and see the sections on Narodagaon, Patiya, Sardarpura and Gulbarg in the 
Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 2, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice and 
Peace, 2005) available at http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/tribunal2.pdf. 
they erroneously undercharged the accused despite the complainant alleging sexual 
assault. This error was made in one of cases where Nyayagraha is supporting the 
victims.  Despite one of the witnesses alleging gang rape and having undergone a 
medical examination, the FIR did not include a rape charge.  In this case the charge 
sheet was also similarly defective, and was only rectified to include the rape charge 
upon an application by the victim’s advocate.   
 At least one post-mortem in the Naroda patiya case indicated a possible case of 
sexual assault, yet no investigations were carried out. Dozens of survivors reported 
rape, but not one of the three charge sheets included a rape charge.348  
The Bilkis Bano case, discussed above, is the only rape case that has been successfully 
prosecuted so far.  Six police officers and two doctors were also names in the charge 
sheet in that case. 
 
3. Summary Closures and Reopen Cases 
 
In Gujarat, the police class summary closures under four categories. Summary A 
denotes genuine criminal cases where the offences have taken place, but the police 
cannot trace the accused. This is the most common ground of closure. Summary B 
refers to cases that the police consider not to be genuine – essentially false 
complaints.  Summary C refers to cases which are really civil matters outside the 
purview of criminal law. Summary D is filed where the alleged accused have died. 
 
The government of Gujarat reported to the Supreme Court that of 4252 cases 
registered, 2020349 were closed summarily.  Therefore, 47.5% of cases registered never 
proceeded to trial.  202 police stations across 24 districts gave us information on 
summary closures.   According to the information we received, summary closures 
were spread across four different categories as tabulated below. 
 
  Summary A Summary B Summary C Summary D Total 
Response 
as per RTI 1411 7 7 2 1427 
                                                        
348 “A Window to Horror”, Tehelka Vol. 5, Issue 16, (April 26, 2008). 
349 Affidavit filed in reply by the state. 
 
So, almost 99% of cases summarily closed were cases where the police took the view 
that the complaint was genuine, but the accused could not be traced.  We did not 
receive information on summary closures from Vadodara city (reported to have 204 
summary closures), Surat and Rajkot city police stations and 39 other police stations, 
including seven police stations in Ahmedabad.  We anticipate that summary closures 
from these police stations will account for the most of the 593 summary closures that 
we could not secure through the RTI process.   
 
A high rate of “Summary A” cases means that if the police find enough evidence to 
mount a charge in the future, the case can be re-opened.  If the police are doing their 
jobs diligently, we should see a significant number of re-opened cases.  We examined 
a sample of 400 cases to see how many cases summarily closed as “Summary A” 
were subsequently reopened.  We found that out of 400 cases, 157 cases were initially 
concluded by summary, amounting to 39% (which was 11% less than the overall of 
an aproximately 50% summary rate in 2003). Thirty three of the 157 summarily 
closed cases (around a 1/5th of total summaries in sample of 400) were reopened, and 
31 of these were charge sheeted which amounts to 19.74 % of cases initially closed 
being reopened.   
 
 



















400 157 33  2  31   
 
As in other episodes of mass violence, it is clear that the high rates of summary 
closure, and the low rate of such cases being re-opened in the future, are not co-
incidental.  Cases are summarily closed because they are poorly investigated.  In 
many cases, particularly those implicating politically influential accused, the police 
actively destroyed evidence in Gujarat.  The Bilkis Bano case and the Naroda Patiya 
case exemplify this dynamic.    
a) Bilkis Bano case 
 
The police registered Ms. Bano’s FIR reluctantly, and then proceeded to classify the 
case as “Summary A”.  Subsequent events revealed the omissions and commission of 
police errors that allowed such a serious case to be deemed fit for summary closure. 
• The police did not preserve evidence, such as the clothes she was wearing at 
time of arrival to police station. 
• They did not go immediately to the scene of murder to collect evidence and 
did not perform proper procedures like the recovery and preparation of 
inquest panchnamas. This is also a problem encountered in many other cases 
being followed by Nyayagrah. 
• It was after Ms. Bano disclosed details of her ordeal to the district magistrate 
(DM) of Panchmahal, who was visiting the Godhra relief camp where she 
was housed, that the DM recorded her statement on the same day. Realizing 
the seriousness of the case, the DM then and ordered a medical examination 
by a civil surgeon in Godhra, and directed the Superintendent of Police, 
Dahod to take appropriate and immediate action. Proper medical 
examination followed by taking samples for forensic examination was done 
on March 7, 2002, four days after the alleged rape. 
• The police made no effort to find witnesses who could corroborate Ms. Bano’s 
evidence. 
• Filed application of closure, claiming accused could not be traced, without 
informing Ms. Bano. 
 
The case was classed as “Summary A”, (accused were untraceable) and submitted to 
the Limkheda judicial magistrates 350 which closed the case on March 25, 2003 
without giving notice to Ms. Bano, the complainant in the case.   
 
Supported by the National Human Rights Commission, Ms. Bano successfully 
petitioned the SC, who ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to take over 
the investigation in December 2003. It was once the CBI took over that many 
investigation deficiencies (some of which were outlined above) came to light. The 
CBI claimed that the police had visited the site of offence following the complaint 
                                                        
350 As argued by Harish Salve, Ms. Bano’s counsel in Supreme Court, and reported in news article, 
“Gujarat agrees to CBI gang rape”, Times of India (December 17, 2003). 
and taken photos, but had not carried out the panchnamas, which is the first listing 
of evidence infront of independent witnesses that the police is required to make at 
the scene of an offence, as is required by law They instead left the bodies unguarded, 
and staged a false panchnama the next day with fictitious panch witnesses, followed 
by destruction of evidence by burying all the bodies together in a pit with common 
salt351 and without carrying out the recovery and forensic examination as per law, 
such as recovering the clothes and articles found on bodies and taking samples of 
blood etc for forensic examination. The CID Gujarat also handed over two sets of 
photographs of dead bodies taken at different times which were inconsistent with 
one another and proved that the bodies had been moved from the murder site. Some 
bodies, such as that of Ms. Bano’s three-year-old daughter were missing from the 
photographs later recovered by the police. The CBI also unearthed evidence to show 
that the two doctors had carried out a perfunctory post-mortum and fabricated 
evidence by writing notes, which they knew to be false. 
 
In this case, the deliberate destruction of evidence came to light when a national 
investigative body took over the investigation.  This turn of events exposed the way 
criminal cases across Gujarat were undermined and closed without charges being 
filed.   
b) Naroda Patiya case 
 
The Naroda Patiya case was another extremely serious massacre where the police 
went beyond gross negligence, to actively destroying evidence.  The following 
defects are noted following investigation and analysis of the charge sheets of the 
Naroda Patiya case by the magazine Tehelka in conjunction with an advocate from 
the NGO Action Aid.352 
 
• No autopsies on 41 bodies: The police did not carry out postmortems on 41 
bodies recovered from Naroda Patiya and Naroda Gaon. No explanation has 
been offered for this act of grave negligence and omission.353 
 
                                                        
351 This was discovered two years later when the CBI exhumed some of the bodies. 
352 “A Window to Horror,” Tehelka Vol. 5, Issue 16, (April 26, 2008).  
353 Ibid. 
• Crucial evidence destroyed: The pit in which a large number of people were 
burnt alive was not even examined by the police. No samples were taken of 
the soil, of the traces of human tissue or of the remains of burnt fuel. The pit 
does not even figure in the police version of the massacre. 
 
• Dying Declarations not taken354: The dying declarations of as many as seven 
victims were not recorded; two of them died on March 11 after prolonged 
treatment, but no explanation is forthcoming in the charge sheet on why their 
statements were not recorded. 
 
• No mention made of rapes355: Three charge sheets were filed in the Naroda 
Gaon and Naroda Patiya massacres. None of them mentions a single rape, 
although dozens of survivors reported that women were raped. At least one 
post-mortem indicated a possible case of sexual assault, yet no investigations 
were carried out.”  
 
• Mobile phone of an accused recovered from the spot not examined356: On 
the day of the massacre, a survivor named Mirza Hussain Biwi Moherble 
recovered a mobile phone near her residence in Naroda Patiya. It had been 
inadvertently dropped by one of the accused, and was handed over to the 
police. On enquiry, Additional Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, A. K. 
Surolia found that it belonged to one Ashok Sindhi, an accused in the 
massacre. Mr. Surolia launched an investigation and started collecting the call 
records of Babu Bajrangi (a leader of the Gujarat-wing of the Bajrang Dal) and 
other accused, including Mr. Sindhi. Mr. Surolia was subsequently 
transferred.  
 
• No proceedings against absconding prime accused357: Many important 
accused were allowed to flee after the police was forced to register FIRs 
against them. Babu Bajrangi, Kishan Korani, Prakash Rathod and Suresh 
Richard, for instance, were arrested three months after the FIR was issued. 





Bipin Panchal was arrested after a year and a half. But the police did not 
follow any of the usual procedures when an accused absconds, such as 
pasting notices outside the house of the accused declaring him an absconder, 
confiscating his properties, or anything of the sort.  
 
Reopening of 2000 Summary Closures358 
 
By 2003 the experience of survivors and activists on the ground had revealed faulty 
and biased investigation, ineffective and biased prosecution and non-filing of 
appeals by the State of Gujarat against bail orders and acquittals in the post-Godhra 
cases.   In 2003, a writ petition to the Supreme Court359 drew attention to the 
deliberate and systemic nature of summary closure across Gujarat.  The petitioner 
argued that:  
• The indiscriminate acceptance of closure reports filed by the police in around 
2000 cases was contrary to law in that there was evidence of non-application 
of minds by the judiciary in ordering closure. 
• The closures were also in contravention of the legal requirement to give 
notice to the victim/ complainant/informant interested in pursuing the case.  
 
The Supreme Court360 responded by directing the government of Gujarat to do the 
following: 
• Constitute a cell consisting of Deputy Inspector Generals and Range 
Inspector Generals, whose job was to review the 2000 cases where summary 
closure reports had been filed and where necessary, reopen and reinvestigate 
the cases.  
• The government was directed to submit quarterly reports to the SC. The first 
of the reports was to be submitted within 90 days of the order i.e. by 
November 11, 2004. 
                                                        
358 Also see section on “Summary Closures”. 
359 Vide Supreme Court order dated March 26, 2008, Criminal Miscellaneous Application, Writ 
Petition (Criminal) No. 109 of 2003. 
360 Vide Supreme Court orders dated August 17, 2004, August 23, 2004 and December 06, 2004 in 
Criminal Misc. Petition No.’s 3741 & 3742 of 2004.  
•  The Gujarat government was also directed to record reasons if after review it 
came to the conclusion that further investigation is not necessary. These were 
to made available online for the purposes of informing anyone who may be 
interested in bringing the matter to the attention of the court. 
 
However, the government of Gujarat refused to comply substantively with the 
Supreme Court direction, in that it only provided superficial information on 18 out of 
2000 cases that it had decided to close without further investigation.  
 
The petitioners challenged the government’s non-compliance on the following 
points: 
• It was argued361 that releasing information only for 18 cases out of the total of 
around 2000 cases, and that too in a manner that concealed relevant 
information which was crucial to the victims in their efforts to pursue justice, 
amounted to violation of the orders of the court in letter and spirit. 
• That the local police or the riot cells were not providing any information to 
the concerned person or non-governmental organizations to facilitate their 
efforts to ensure just proceedings were followed in the 2000 cases. 
• In fact, the victim petition claimed that the police were still not making 
witnesses feel secure, to encourage them to come forward and give 
statements. They were not providing protection to witnesses even when it 
was asked for. 
• A key defect repeatedly pointed out by the NHRC in its various orders was 
the various complaints it received regarding poor investigation on account 
of political interference. The NHRC unsuccessfully sought information from 
the Gujarat administration on the identity of those responsible for political 
interference and who had allegedly committed and incited serious offences. 
Its repeated recommendation to transfer the high profile massacre cases to 
CBI went unheeded, eventually leading to an application for transfer of 
those out of Gujarat. This led to a stay being granted in these cases and delay 
                                                        
361  An application was filed within the Criminal Misc. application 3741 of 2004 and 3742 of 2004, 
arguing for set of rights for survivors and implementation of the SC orders listed above. Accessed from 
Nyayagrah records. 
of around six years before the SC granted reinvestigation by SIT in 2008 in 
nine serious cases.362 
 
The petitioners’ persistence yielded some results.  In the second quarterly report of 
January 31, 2006, the committee responsible for reviewing closures stated that 1594 of 
2020 cases had been re-opened for reinvestigation, 13 new cases had been registered 
and 640 people had been arrested.  It also reported that departmental inquiries had 
been initiated against 41 policemen for alleged lapses in investigation. Of the 41 





We sought information on arrests by the police following investigation based on FIRs 
registered.  We received information from 202 police stations across 24 districts, 
which showed that there were 14830 arrests across these police stations.  The total 
number of arrests in Gujarat will be significantly more, as this data does not include 
information from around 49 police stations, including no information from Vadodara 
and fourteen police stations in Ahmedabad.  
 
From the records on 14,830 arrests that we were given access to, 3213 people arrested 
were Muslim and 9926 were Hindu.  The information received shows that on the 
whole the vast majority of accused were Hindu across Gujarat.  A significant number 
of accused in the districts of Bharuch, Dahod and Panchmahal were from tribal 
communities, which, as discussed earlier, supports the allegations in civil society 
reports of an increasing Hindu right-wing presence in these areas. 
 
• There was generally a correspondence between the number of FIRS filed and 
the number of arrests, with the sites of most intense violence being 
Ahmedabad, Mehsana, Panchmahal, Sabarkatha, Anand and Kheda where 
more than a thousand accused were arrested.  
                                                        
362The SIT was appointed by an order of March 26, 2008 in Writ Petition (Crl) 109 of 2003, NHRC v. 
State of Gujarat and others, accessed at http://judis.nic.in/temp/109200342632008p.txt. 
363“Gujarat riot probe panel moves against 41 cops”, The Indian Express, February 9, 2006, available at  
http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/87579/. 
 
• From the figures provided, Bhavnagar stands out for having a lot less 
accused (352 arrests of 310 FIRs) given the number of FIRs filed.  
 
• In Panchmahal (1617 of 181 arrests), Anand (2459 of 199 arrests), Mehsana 
(1353 of 176 arrests) and Kheda (2176 of 190 arrests) the number of FIRs is less 
than 200, but the accused well over a thousand. The large number of accused 
reflects both the reality of massacres that took place at these sites, as well as 
the reality of a large number of omnibus FIRs that were filed. 
 
• Sreekumar, a senior IPS officer, noted in his affidavit to the commission of 
inquiry that a major complaint of victims is that the Investigating Officers 
avoided arresting politically powerful Hindu accused, despite their names 





From Gujarat, we received some information on remand applications made in 
relation to criminal cases after mass violence, which was in contrast to the other 
episodes we looked at, where no records on remand survive.  107 police stations 
responded to our query on remand applications, giving us at least a partial picture of 
such applications. Across these 107 police stations, out of 14830 persons arrested, the 
prosecution made applications to put 2911 of those arrested on remand, i.e. detain 
them in prison custody.  674 of these applications were refused and 2165 were 
granted. Of the successful applications for remand, 1457 of those remanded were 
Hindu, 609 of those remanded were Muslim. Also, in many instances we received 
unclear responses to this RTI. 
 
While we did not get comprehensive records on remand, the sample we received 
suggests that the prosecution chose not to apply for remand in most instances – it 
applied for remand for only 2911 out of 14830 people arrested, i.e. only in 20% of 
cases.  Following mass violence, where witnesses and victims who belong to a 
minority group are likely to be extremely intimidated, one would expect a higher 
rate of remand applications.  Where the prosecution made a remand application, it 
was likely to be granted. Based on our records, 74% of applications were successful.   
 
A notable exception to the usual grant of remand was in the Odh village massacre 
cases of Anand district, where 26 people were burnt alive on March 1, 2002. The 
judicial magistrate rejected the remand application, and granting interim bail for 8 
days to 18 accused to celebrate the Hindu festival of Shivratri, despite the seriousness 
of the offences they were charged under.364 
 
As a caveat, since the response rate was much lower for this information than that 
regarding arrests (107 police stations compared to 202), it may well be that many 
more remand applications were made but we simply have not been provided the 





We requested information about bail applications made by the defence in trials 
related to the 2002 riots. We received information from 118 police stations. Amongst 
the cases registered at these 118 police stations, a total of 4858 accused applied for 
bail and a total of 4516 accused were granted bail. The prosecution opposed only 283 
applications. 455 out of 4858 applications were rejected. 
 
Again we note that the information we received is incomplete365 as many police 
stations failed to respond.  However, unlike the case of other episodes of mass 
violence where this information was unavailable, we did receive this information 
from over a hundred police stations.  
 
What is clear from these figures, despite their partial nature, is that the vast majority 
of bail applications were successful.  Based on the records we have, 93% of accused 
                                                        
364  Page 17, Paragraph 13 of Zakia Jaffrey’s FIR. 
365 There are gaps and inaccuracies in the information in that in many cases the total figure for total 
bail does not tally with bail granted broken down by number of Hindus, Muslims, Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. We surmised that in response to some applications, the concerned Public 
Information Officer has confused the number of cases where bail was granted with the number of 
persons who were granted bail. 
who made bail applications were successful. Their success in unsurprising – the 
prosecution opposed less that 6% of bail applications.   
 
Of course, this has serious implications for whether victims and witnesses will be 
intimidated, and whether trials will progress smoothly, which we discuss in more detail 
later.  
 
The NHRC366 noted discriminatory treatment on account of a larger percentage of 
Hindus being granted bail compared to Muslims. The allegations of discriminatory 
treatment of Muslim accused also appear in victim testimonies,367 and in the affidavit 
of RB Sreekumar to the Nanavati Commission. In his affidavit to the Commission, 
Mr. Sreekumar asserted that accused persons belonging to the Hindu community 
who were arrested for non-bailable cases were immediately released on account of 
the partisan stance taken by the government public prosecutor, and also due to lack 
of keenness of the police. These allegations are supported by a comparison of the bail 
and remand experience of the 105 Muslim accused in the Godhra trial (one of the 
nine SIT trials) to those of the Hindu accused in the other 8 SIT trials368.  
 
7. Charge-sheets  
 
The Gujarat government has stated in its report to the NHRC that 2037 charge sheets 
were filed in relation to mass violence in 2002369.  We secured copies of 1202 charge 
sheets filed across 24 districts covering 182 police stations. Since this is 60% of total 
charge sheets filed, the sample is likely to correspond strongly to the trajectory of all 
the criminal cases where charges were framed.   
 
Across several districts, the number of charge sheeted cases amounted to about 50% 
of the FIRS filed, i.e. only half of all FIRs registered progress to a trial.   
                                                        
366 National Human Rights Commission’s Order on Gujarat, (April 1, 2002), available at 
http://nhrc.nic.in/gujratorders.htm#no2. The NHRC noted discriminatory treatment from the figures it 
obtained for arrests of Hindu and Muslim accused. The NHRC noted discriminatory treatment from the 
figures it obtained for arrests of Hindu and Muslim accused. 
367 Many victims complained about the grant of bail to Hindu accused charged with serious offences. 
368 See section on “Special Investigation Teams trials”, in current paper.  
369 National Human Rights Commission, “Annual Report: 2003-2004”, para 3.18, available at 
http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR02-03ENG.pdf notes that NHRC received a report dated  June 




District Name FIR Chargesheet 
Ahmedabad 959 315 (without information from 14 PSs) 
Vadodara rural 242 104 
Sabarkhatah 469 185 
Bavnagar 310 46 
Anand 199 134 
Kheda 190 136 
Maheshana 176 47 
Panchmahel 181 102 (based on cases finalised) 
 
 
Of the 1202 charge sheeted cases we examined, so far only 549 have been “finalized” 
or taken to completion. This means that 54.32 % of cases that proceeded to trial are 
still to be decided more than nine years after the incident. 
 
We looked closely at 400 cases where we have a substantial number of case records 






sheeted cases Pending post charge 
Total cases 
finalised Total acquittals 
400 274  175 99 98 
 
 
Charge sheets have been filed in 68 % of the cases registered. Of the total 274 charge 
sheeted matters, 99, have been finalised, 175 of the charge sheeted cases (64 % of 
cases)   are still pending as per the data analysed.    
 
FIRs in only 109 of these cases include the names of accused. Chargesheets were filed 
in 274 (68%) of these cases. This suggests that names of the accused were recorded in 
165 cases after they were registered.  This supports the survivor testimonies to 
various fact-finding inquiries to the effect that the police initially refused to note 
down the name of the accused.  It is possible that when victim statements were 
recorded and the accused were named in the statements, the police were compelled 
to put names of some persons as alleged accused.   
 
 
8. JMFC and Sessions Court Trials 
 
 
We sought information on how many cases were tried in Magistrate’s courts and 
how many by Sessions courts. Trials following the mass violence in 2002 continued 
for many years – the majority of trials have not finished to date. Layered upon these 
trials, and the ordinary investigation and prosecution involved, is investigation and 
evidence gathering by a “Special Investigation Team” (SIT) appointed by the 
Supreme Court. The SIT370 has been created by the Supreme Court to investigate nine 
particularly serious cases. These are Gulbarg, Naroda Gam, Naroda Patiya, 
Sardarpura, two cases in the Odh village of Anand, Sardarpura, Visnagar, Mehsana 
and Godhra371. Below, we discuss developments in JMFC trials and Sessions court 
trials, and focus in particular, on cases under the purview of the SIT.  
 
We received relatively little RTI information on JMFC and sessions court trials in 
Gujarat.  Only 125 police stations sent us information on JMFC trials. Forty-one of 
these police stations reported that none of the FIRs recorded there resulted in JMFC 
trials. The 84 remaining police stations had 156 cases being tried in Magistrates 
Courts. Nineteen of these cases had resulted in acquittals. Trials in the other 136 
cases are either pending, or no information was given.    
 
We received information from 142 police stations about Sessions court trials.  51 
police stations said there were no Sessions court trials resulting from FIRs filed after 
mass violence. The remaining 91 police stations informed us that there were 315 
sessions court trials based on FIRs filed after mass violence. 116 police stations did 
not respond to our query. We estimate that the number of trials is likely to be much 
larger.  Given the low response from the police to this question, we had access to a 
relatively small sample of official records. 
 
• Sabarkantha was the only district where we received a good response to our RTI 
applications regarding the number of charge sheets filed and the number of total 
trials underway and completed. In total, 200 charge sheets have been filed, 
implying that significantly less than 50% of the cases where FIRS were registered 
                                                        
370 Supreme Court Order dated March 26, 2008, Criminal Miscellaneous Application, Writ Petition 
(Criminal) No. 109 of 2003.  
371 Ibid. 
(469) ended up in trial. Of these, over two-thirds of the cases were Session court 
trial-worthy, less than a third tried in JFMC, and 243 shown as summarily closed 
(it is unclear how many of these have now been reopened).  
 
• In Panchmahal, 90 out of 95 completed cases were tried in a Sessions Court. Only 
4 cases have been completed in the JFMC courts, showing the serious nature of 
offences that were committed in this district.  
 
• In Dahod, of the 45 cases charge sheeted, 25 cases were completed in the Sessions 
Court.  
 
We also wanted to gauge, for both types of trials, attempts made to rectify 
investigative errors or refine the case as the trial proceeded, by asking about 
applications made by the prosecution for reinvestigation, adding witnesses, adding 
accused and amending charges.  However, we drew an almost universal blank from 
all districts on this query. 
 
It is clear from this that most police stations have little data computed on 
applications made during trials.  There seem to be no systems in place to monitor the 
progress of the trials. Even to get the status of trials, PIOs in police stations across 
Gujarat requested courts for updates.  The details of interim applications appeared 
well beyond the understanding of most of the PIOs dealing with the RTI 
applications.   
 
Even from the limited information we received, it is apparent that trials have 
continued for years and been very protracted. This is a direct consequence of the 
police filing unwieldy, omnibus FIRs. Many cases have a large number of accused, 
which makes every court date an exercise in coordination and also makes it more 
likely that hearings will be adjourned as adjournment applications can come from 
any of a number of accused.   The high rate of bail is also likely to contribute to this.  
Since most accused are not in custody, they are able to absent themselves from court 
hearings more easily.  Nyayagraha’s experience supporting victims pursuing trials 
has been that a number of cases are stuck at the committal stage due to absconding 
accused or failure of all accused to attend court together as required.  Below, we 
discuss in some detail the trajectory of some of the cases under the purview of the 
SIT. Looking at these cases, we believe, illuminates the problems facing trials in cases 
related to 2002.    
a) SIT trials 
Special, fast-track courts have been constituted to try many of these cases.  So far 
only two of the nine SIT cases, the Godhra case and the Sardarpura case, have been 
completed.  Both were “finalized” in 2011, nine years after the events at issue took 
place.  The other trials are all in their final stages.   
 
The Gulbarg case:  Sixty nine people were killed, but only 31 bodies have been 
identified. In FIR 67 of 2002 from Meghnaninagar, the SIT received 59 applications372 
from witnesses and interested parties, examined 227 witnesses373, arrested 18 
accused and filed three chargesheets.374 Among those arrested was K G Erda375 
(police investigator at Meghnaninagar in 2002) who was charged with abetment to 
murder, abetment to riot, gross dereliction of duty and tampering with evidence and 
remanded to 5 days custody.  The alleged neglect include not collecting blood 
samples of the deceased, not calling the fire services at the riot spot and not making 
preventive arrests following a call for a bandh by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 
on February 28, 2002376. 
Naroda Gaon and Naroda Patiya massacres.  Ninety five people were killed at 
Naroda-Patiya on February 28, 2002, and 67 persons are facing trial for the offence in 
the city sessions court which have been specially appointed in Ahmedabad for the 
last couple of years.  The evidence of prosecution has almost been completed. The 
SIT examined 791 witnesses in total in these 2 cases and 37 more accused were 
arrested. VHP leaders Jaideep Patel and Maya Kodnani, were amongst those arrested 
by the SIT. 
The victim witnesses have made a number of applications, including application 
seeking further investigation, in which they urged the court to direct the SIT to 
                                                        
372 This information is recorded in the Supreme Court order of May 1, 2009, in Writ Petition 
(Criminal.) No.109 of 2003, available at http://www.cjponline.org/gujaratTrials/SCOrdermay0109.pdf. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid. 
375 See “First police officer arrested in Gujarat”, The Indian Express, February 9, 2009, and “Arrested 
cop Erda sent to 5 day police custody”, The Indian Express, February 10, 2009.  
376 Ibid. 
conduct detailed analysis of phone call records, and on the basis of various 
evidences, probe into the roles of senior police officers, including the then city Police 
Commissioner P.C. Pande, then Joint Commissioners of Police M.K. Tandon and R.J. 
Savani, besides politicians, including the then State Home Minister Gordhan 
Zadaphia.  Jan Sangharsh Manch, representing some victims, told the court that 
proper analysis of call details provided by IPS officer Rahul Sharma would expose 
the larger conspiracy behind the 2002 riots.  
Ode massacres: There were two cases filed377 in the village of Ode, Anand District. 
One was in the Pirawali Bhagol locality, on March 1, 2002 in which 23 Muslims were 
killed after a Hindu mob had attacked the two two-storied buildings in which 
around 30-32 Muslims had taken shelter. The SIT reported378 it had added 55 
witnesses to the existing 30 witnesses and added 16 more accused and filed an 
amended charge-sheet. 54 accused379 are facing trial. All were reported to be on bail 
on account of powerful political connections.380  
The second Ode case is the murder of three members of a family who were burnt to 
death by a mob near Malav Bhagol area of Ode village on March 1, 2002. SIT filed 
charge sheets against 37 accused, including 7 absconders. The witnesses applied 
under section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers the court to 
proceed against any other person who appears to be complicit in the commission of a 
crime, and succeeded in securing the addition of four accused whose participation in 
violence was revealed by the testimonies of witnesses in June 2010 at the trial court. 
The trial court decision was upheld by the High court of Gujarat on appeal.381 There 
are 41 accused under trials at present. The special court recently held a physical 
inspection of the murder site. Sixty-seven witnesses have given evidence and the 
case is in its final stages. 
                                                        
377 FIR numbers 23 of 2002 and 27 of 2002 dated March 1, 2002 were registered at Khambolaj police 
station. See Supreme Court order of May 1, 2009, in Writ Petition (Criminal.) No. 109 of 2003, 
accessed at http://www.cjponline.org/gujaratTrials/SCOrdermay0109.pdf.  
378 See Supreme Court order dated September 1, 2005, para 1, which sets out the progress, in the 
consolidated Progress Report submitted by the SIT. 
379 “Two Government Pleaders in Ode Riot case quit”, Times of India, July 18, 2010. 
380 “Our Irrelevant State”, The Indian Express, December 9, 2007. 
381 “Plea of Ode massacre accused rejected”, Times News Network, April 20, 2011 available at 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-20/ahmedabad/29450790_1_ode-village-ode-
massacre-witnesses. 
Deepda Darwaja, Mehsana Visnagar: This case involved the burning alive of eleven 
and seriously injuring another twenty-one in the Visnagar area of Mehsana. Two BJP 
leaders were added as  accused under section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code by 
the special Mehsana court after witnesses named382 the MLA, Prahlad Gosa, and a 
member of the Taluk Panchayat, Dahyabhai Patel, as participating and inciting the 
violence against  Muslims. Some of the witnesses also deposed that the two BJP 
leaders were present at police station and pressured the police not to include their 
names.  
 
Prantij  / British national case: This case involved the murder of three British 
Nationals and their Gujarati driver. A special court in Himmatnagar is trying the 
case – 73 witnesses, including the complainant, have deposed. The three eye-
witnesses turned hostile in 2009.383 The accused who had been on bail since 2004, 
were remanded in custody for 14 days on application of SIT, who alleged that a 
second round of lie detector tests as advised by forensic experts had not been carried 
out by the police384. This case is also the only one in which the kin of the deceased 
have filed civil law suits against the state administration, claiming damages of 
around Rs. 22 crore from the state administration, Mr. Modi, Mr. Zadephia, DGP 
Chakravarty, home secretary Ashok Narayan and 10 other who are named as 
respondents.385 
 
The SIT cases discussed above are particularly serious ones.  They are also cases that, 
since the formation of the SIT, have garnered particular scrutiny and investigation.  
Special, fast-track courts have been constituted to try many of these cases.  The 
media regularly reports on developments in these cases.  Despite such scrutiny, these 
cases continue to suffer from delays and prosecutorial apathy. Most criminal trials 
resulting from mass violence in 2002 are not monitored by the Supreme Court and 
                                                        
382 “Gujarat High Court Orders Fresh Probe into Kalol riots,” The Hindu, February 12, 2010, available 
at http://www.hindu.com/2010/02/12/stories/2010021260791000.htm. 
383 “Court Issues Summons to Two British Envoys”, The Hindu, October 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2517731.ece. 
384 “Six Remanded in Murder of British Nationals in Prantij,” Times News Network, September 6, 
2008, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-09-
06/ahmedabad/27932807_1_police-custody-remand-gujarat-high-court.  
385  “NRIs seek Rs. 22 crore damages”, Times News Network, April 30, 2004, available at 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-04-30/ahmedabad/28343342_1_damages-british-
nationals-prantij.  
the media as is the case in these nine SIT cases. Thus it is likely that the “ordinary” 
trials taking place face even more delays and missteps than the SIT trials.   
 
9. Acquittals and Appeals  
 
Many police stations across Gujarat did not respond to our query about the result of 
trials related to the 2002 mass violence.  We received records confirming acquittals in 
524 different trials across Gujarat. From the information we received, we traced the 
trials that resulted in the accused being acquitted as a percentage of total trials 
completed. Here we have defined an acquittal as a case in which all the accused were 
discharged in respect of all the offences they were charged with. Below, we frame 
cases resulting in acquittals as a percentage of total cases “finalized" in the 8 districts 
where over 100 FIRs were filed.  
 
Table as per overall RTI response 
 
District (Acquittals as per RTI) 
Total cases 
finalised 
Rate of acquittal 
district wise 
Panchmahal 96 102  94% 
Sabarkatha 98 101 97 % 
Ahmedabad 108 109 99 % 
Bhavnagar 19 20 95 %  
Mehsana 23 24 95% 
Vadodara No information ---- ---- 
Kheda No information ---- ---- 
Anand  32  34 94  % 
Total  376 390  96%. 
 
Across the 6 districts that sent us information on acquittal, a staggering 94-99 % of 
cases completed so far have resulted in acquittals of all the accused.   
 
a) Deficient Investigation and Witness Intimidation 
 
The reasons for these extremely high rates of acquittal are not difficult to discern.  
We have already discussed the poor and deliberately derelict investigation by the 
police. This results in a large number of cases being summarily closed.  It also results 
in incomplete evidence being presented in cases that are charge sheeted and tried.  
Layered upon this weak foundation, is apathetic and biased prosecution. We found 
from the records available to us that the prosecution often did not often make 
applications to amend charges or add evidence once the trial began. We also found 
that the prosecution rarely opposed bail applications made by the accused. A panel 
of public prosecutors led by Mr. PS Dhora, who is known to be an RSS sympathizer, 
handled the Ode massacre cases.  This panel also handled other 2002 cases in Anand 
and Kheda districts.386 
 
Judges, in turn, seem to grant bail to the accused in mass violence cases quite 
liberally, even where there is a high risk that they will abscond or intimidate 
witnesses.  As just one example, K.G. Erda, a police inspector at Meghnaninagar in 
2002 who was charged with, inter alia, abetment to murder, abetment to riot, gross 
dereliction of duty and tampering with evidence in the Gulbarg case was granted 
bail by the Ahmedabad City and Sessions court on February387 24, 2009.   
 
The results of powerful accused not being remanded in custody are predictable.  
Witnesses – third party witnesses as well as victims – have faced intimidation and 
pressure to turn hostile.    The Gulbarg case illustrates the challenges that witnesses 
face.  66 accused are currently facing trial in this case.  Six new IPC sections were 
added against all accused in March 2011,388 after it was in the hands of the SIT.   57 of 
the 66 accused are on bail whilst nine are in custody.389  
 
On April 5th 2010, the counsel for Gujarat in the Gulbarg case, opposing a further 
stay of the trials (stay was sought by victims on account of the alleged 
malfunctioning of the SIT) reported that 1061 witnesses had now testified in the 
trials, about 100 had turned hostile and over 2,000 witnesses were yet to depose. So, 
                                                        
386 As reported in an online document which outlines the background of prosecutors in the 2002 cases, 
available at  Citiszens for Justice and Peace website, url: 
http://www.cjponline.org/best/partisanprosecutor.pdf.  
387 “Arrested DYSP gets bail from Sessions Court”, The Indian Express, February 25, 2008, available 
at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/arrested-dysp-erda-gets-bail-from-sessions-court/427746. 
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(disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant), section 337 (causing hurt by act 
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armed with deadly weapon), section 447 (punishment for criminal trespass) and section 449 (house 
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389 “Gulbarg massacre accused demand bail” Times of India, April 5, 2011. 
despite the cases being under the watchful eyes of the SC, 10% of witnesses who 
gave evidence turned hostile. In these cases, a large chunk of witnesses are official, 
such as police officers, doctors, forensic experts. These witnesses are less likely to 
face personal threats, and are likely to have easier access to official protection if they 
are threatened. It is usually ordinary citizens who were targets or witnesses of the 
crimes who are under the most intense pressure to turn hostile390, so the percentage 
of important private witnesses who turned hostile will be much larger than 10%. 
 
The danger to witnesses should not be underestimated.  In the Naroda Patiya case, 
an important eyewitness, Nadeem Saiyad, was killed in broad daylight even though 
he had witness protection. A number of witnesses in other SIT trials have reported 
feeling insecure as witnesses and have applied for protection and complained that 
SIT was not responding quickly to their urgent requests.391 
 
Witnesses in mass violence cases have faced intimidation not just from the accused, 
but from the police as well.  When Ms. Bano petitioned the Supreme Court to 
transfer her case to the CBI, she alleged that was being harassed by the Gujarat CID 
police. Police officials called her for questioning at 10 p.m. on September 16, 2003.  
She was informed that she needed to be taken to Godhra to identify dead bodies. Ms. 
Bano refused to go, as the massacre had taken place 18 months ago and no 
identification would have been possible. The Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat 
CID to leave her alone till her application for transfer was adjudicated upon.392   
 
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court transferred the Bilkis Bano case to the CBI.  
The CBI submitted chargesheets against twenty accused, and reported to the Court 
that the Gujarat police had been complicit in derailing the investigation.  The CBI 
also requested the DGP and IGP of Gujarat to provide protection to 33 trial witnesses 
to ensure they were not pressurized by the accused.393 In May 2004, Bilkis was given 
CISF394 protection following continued threats to her and some of the other 
witnesses.395 
                                                        
390 Insight is based on authors work with Nyayagrah justice project. 
391 See report on Witness Protection, available at http://www.cjponline.org/witnesprotection.htm 
392  http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/25godh1.htm  accessed  on December 21, 2011.   
393 Ibid. 
394 Central Industrial Security Force, a security agency under the aegis of the Central Government. 
395 “Bilkis Bano’s brave fight” Tehelka, Vol. 5, Issue 4, (February 02, 2008). 
 
She successfully applied to the Supreme Court for transfer on ground that a fair trial 
was not possible in rural Ahmedabad on account of the communal atmosphere.  
The police have failed to protect witnesses in Gujarat, and sometimes actively 
harassed them.  Such harassment has extended beyond survivors and witnesses, to 
civil society advocates.  Whilst police are failing to act against the absconding 
accused in many cases leading to delay and injustice, they were quick to wrongly 
issue a summons to Teesta Setalvad, an activist supporting survivors of mass 
violence, in the illegal graves case arising out of the Pandawada massacre.  The 
Gujarat police kept insisting that she attend the police station in Lunavada, in 
response to the summons. Setalvad relied upon Section 160 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, whereby a female witness can record a statement where she is 
residing, since she was not living in Gujarat.396 The police persisted in issuing 
summons and named her as an absconding accused before the court.  Eventually, the 
High Court quashed the summons, describing it as “glaring mistake” and said that it 
was clear that the Gujarat government “had miserably failed in showing a single 
instance from which it can be said that the petitioner (Teesta Setalvad) had not 
cooperated with the Investigating Agency….”. 
The combined effects of partial or distorted evidence, lazy or biased prosecution, and 
witness intimidation are reflected in the Best Bakery case.   We examine the trajectory 
of this case below.   
 
Best Bakery case  
 
The case concerns a Muslim business called Best Bakery, located in a lower middle 
class, Hindu neighbourhood. The Best Bakery was attacked by a Hindu crowd from 
about 8.30 p.m. on March 1, 2002 to 10 a.m. on March 2, 2002. Fourteen people were 
murdered in the attack. Zahira Sheikh, the main witness, registered a FIR with the 
police on March 2, 2002, and the first arrests took place on March 21, 2002397.  
                                                        
396 See High Court order of Hon’ble Justice G.B. Shah in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7094 of 
2011, May 27, 2011, available at Gujarat High Court website. 
397 People’s Union for Civil Liberties “Violence in Vadodara:  A Report”, PUCL and Vadodara and 
Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan (May 2002).  
 
The trial took place from February 20, 2003 to June 27, 2003. Seventy-three witnesses, 
including victims, eyewitnesses, expert witnesses and police officers gave evidence. 
Thirty-seven of the seventy-three witnesses, including the immediate victims turned 
hostile, and all twenty-one accused were acquitted.  Ms. Sheikh and her family then 
turned to the organization, Citizen for Justice and Peace, and made representations 
to the NHRC saying they turned hostile under threats and pressure from local 
politicians, lack of support from police and prosecution and alleged intimidation 
before and after the court hearing. A central argument they made was that the 
arrangement for this trial had been administratively changed to allow a VHP 
prosecutor to conduct the trial, and that he had behaved more as a defence rather 
than a prosecuting counsel398. Some rather strange things had happened, such as the 
prosecutor and the judge both failing to elicit why such a large number of witnesses 
had turned hostile. Some key witnesses were not present at court because of the 
state’s failure to go through the correct procedure to ensure their attendance at court. 
One witness was suddenly declared insane and unfit to give evidence by the 
prosecution, and the judge accepted the submission without the prosecution 
fulfilling the requirement of producing appropriate medical evidence.399 
 
The prosecution filed an appeal against acquittal to the Gujarat High Court under 
pressure from NHRC and the Supreme Court.  The appeal was dismissed by the 
High Court in December 2003.  The case was then taken to the Supreme Court by the 
complainant Ms. Sheikh, supported by the NHRC.   
 
The Supreme Court ordered retrial and reinvestigation and transferred the case from 
Gujarat to neighboring Maharashtra.400 The Supreme Court judgment lambasted the 
Gujarat administration for failing in its constitutional duties to maintain law and 
order and for its partisan, non-secular role in the violence. The Supreme Court found 
                                                        
398  Zahira Sheikh and others v. State of Gujarat, April 4, 2004, page 4, 446-449, arising out of Special 
Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 538-541/2004 available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs.aspx. 
399 Ibid.  
400 Ibid.  
the prosecution tainted and partisan401. It was equally critical of the quality of 
adjudication delivered by the Gujarati judiciary.   
 
In the Best Bakery case, the prosecution and the trial judge were so remiss in 
performing their roles that it was not difficult to gauge their bias.  The combined 
efforts of the survivors, civil society groups brought this bias to light.  Since this case 
concerned an especially brutal massacre, the media gave it relatively sustained 
attention.  Other trials related to the 2002 mass violence play out far from media 
scrutiny, and most have taken place in a similar context of official incompetence and 
bias, coupled with witness intimidation. The high acquittal rate that we saw from 





The corollary to a high acquittal rate in mass violence cases is, of course, a very low 
rate of conviction. We received very little RTI information from police stations on 
convictions. Forty-two police stations across 10 districts responded to our queries.  
549 cases across these 42 police stations had been finalized. Only 25 of these resulted 
in convictions. We are defining conviction case as one in which at least one or more 
accused were convicted of one or more offences that they faced.402 The rate of 
conviction, based upon the records we accessed, is just under 5%.   
 
Below, we tabulate convictions in some major criminal trials. Two of these, Godhra 
and Sardarpura were under the purview of the SIT since 2008, and another two, the 
“Bilkis Bano” and “Best Bakery” cases were transferred out of Gujarat. In Ms. Bano’s 
case, twelve people were convicted of criminal conspiracy, rape and murder and 
received life sentences. A three year jail sentence was imposed on the head constable 
of Limkheda PS for framing a false complaint.403 However, four police and two 
medical officers were acquitted on account of doubt about their role. The judge 
                                                        
401 “Best Bakery Case” 2004 Cri LJ 2050. 
402 If we were to use a similar definition for conviction as we have for acquittal i. e only define cases as 
conviction where all accused were convicted of all offences they faced, we would have what would 
almost account to a zero rate of conviction, as in most cases involving multiple accused and multiple 
offences, some of the accused were acquitted either of all, or at least of some, of the offences. 
 
expressed the view that prosecution had proved there was evidence tampering and 




Convictions in Some Major Criminal Trials 
 





Accused Conviction Acquittal 
Vadodara / Best Bakery 
Supported by CJP. Retrial in 
Mumbai. 





 9 life sentences 8 acquitted 
Dahod / Bilkis Bano 
Supported by NHRC and 
CSJ. Trial in Mumbai. 
14 died 19  12 life and one 
police officer for 
fabricating 
evidence. 




Sardarpura / Mehsana (SIT) 33 died 73 31 life sentences 42  
Godhra / Panchmahal (SIT 
case) 
57 died 94 31-11death 
sentences, 20 lifers 
63 acquitted 
Ghodaser / Kheda405, 






60 12 life sentences 
and three accused 
received 2 years  
48 acquitted 
Viramgaam (Nyayagrah) 3 died 10  2 life sentences, 1 
to 10 years, 1 to 6 
yr. and 2 to 5 yr. 
4 acquitted 
Gharghoda / Anjanwarda, 
supported by NGO. 
  2   
 
There were 62 people convicted in the two SIT cases. The SIT’s investigation, under 
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court and the resulting scrutiny of the media and the 
interested NGOs has very likely meant that these cases are being prosecuted more 
diligently than other mass violence cases.  The SIT not only plays a role in 
investigation, it also plays a role in choosing prosecutors.  Prosecutors with clear 
Hindu right sympathies are less likely to be conducting these trials.  In addition, the 
                                                        
404 Bilkis Bano judgment, Sessions Case No. 634/2004, January 21, 2008. 
405 Bhunsha, Dionne, “Justice against all the odds”, Frontline Vol. 20, Issue 25, (December 06 - 19, 
2003) available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2025/stories/20031219004003900.htm. 
police are less likely to be harassing witnesses, and more likely to respond to 
complaints of witness intimidation. 
 
There were 21 convictions in the two cases transferred out of Gujarat. The retrial of 
the Best Bakery case in Maharashtra started in October 2004 and ended with 
conviction for murder and life sentences for nine persons on February 24, 2006, and 
acquittal for eight.  Four of the accused that had not faced trial were declared 
absconding406. Eleven people were convicted of criminal conspiracy, rape and 
murder and received life sentences. 
 
Also it is notable that all the above cases were supported by NGOs, which gave the 
victims access to legal representation, the opportunity to challenge investigatory 
defects and to seek police protection if they felt threatened. 
 
These convictions demonstrate that when the authorities investigate and prosecute 
reasonably competently, and when witnesses are not placed under pressure, it is 
possible to secure convictions. The high rate of acquittal reflects official failures, 
rather than inherent weaknesses in many mass violence cases.  
 
The effects of biased investigation, prosecution and adjudication become even more 
apparent when we turn from the post-Godhra cases, to the Godhra case.  The 59 
victims of the Godhra incident were Hindu, and many were karsevaks, involved in 
cultural and political Hindu right groups. The police acted immediately, here 
arresting and remanding 28 Muslims from the locality on February 27 and 28. 
Another sixty-five Muslims were accused before the trial began.  
 
The FIR and the first charge sheet dated May 22, 2002 were premised on the theory 
that the fire was pre-meditated, started by a mob standing outside the train 
carriage407.  However, a forensic report dated May 17, 2002, recorded a finding that 
the fire could not be started from outside, and estimated that around 60 liters of fuel 
would have been required to cause the fire that burnt the coach. The police were 
evidently in a rush to investigate the case and secure convictions. They totally 
                                                        
406 “Nine convicted in Best Bakery Case”, Times of India, February 2006. 
407 Ramakrishnan, Nitya, “Godhra: The Verdict analysed” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 46, No. 
15, (April 2011).  The facts and analysis presented here rely on Ms. Ramakrishnan’s rigorous and 
insightful analysis of this judgment. 
overlooked the inconsistency between their own expert evidence (the forensic report) 
and their theory of the fire being started by a mob standing outside. It has been 
argued that they tried to fix these defects by introducing and creating new 
evidence.408 
 
The trial judge concluded that the fire was pre-meditated, that petrol had been 
bought in advance and six conspirators had broken into the train and set the carriage 
on fire.  These findings are controversial409. None of the 41 train passengers 
interviewed by the police mentioned anyone breaking into the train.410  Vendors of 
the local petrol pump had said nothing of the sale of 140 liters of petrol that they 
later (in statements given on February 23, 2003) claimed to have sold on the eve of 
the fire to some of the accused men when they were questioned in April 2002. The 
same witnesses later told a correspondent of Tehelka magazine on camera that they 
were forced by the police to implicate the accused. However, the Judge did not allow 
this previous inconsistent statement as evidence. The trial judge relied upon the 
confession of one of the accused, Jabir, as evidence against other accused. However, 
such a confession can only constitute evidence against Jabir himself, as under 
criminal procedure laws, the use of a confession made in police custody is 
forbidden.411 
 
Ninety-four accused were tried in the Godhra case. In 2011, the trial judge acquitted 
63, but controversially upheld the criminal conspiracy theory, and convicted eleven 
of the accused to death, and twenty to life imprisonment. All twenty-right 
individuals arrested immediately after the Godhra incident were eventually 
acquitted as the prosecution was unable to prove their presence on the spot of the 
incident.412 An individual who was initially depicted as the main conspirator, Maulvi 
Umarji, was acquitted after nine years in prison.  The only evidence against him was 
a remark in the confession of Jabir, later retracted, that he had heard from someone 
                                                        
408 Ibid. 
409 Ibid, page 40. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. Ramakrishnan refers to a long series of Privy Council and SC judgments, the most recent being 
the Parliament attack case, Navjot Sandhu (2005) SCC 600 in support of this point. See footnote 30, 
page 44 of her article.  
412 Ibid.               
else (hearsay evidence) that Mr. Umarji had instructed him or her to set the coach of 
the train ablaze. 
 
The Godhra case is troubling, and reveals the same tendencies in the police, 
prosecution and judiciary that the post-Godhra cases reveal.  Official authorities 
seem entirely willing to discard the rules laid down by the Criminal Procedure Code 
to get the result they want. This has extended, in some post-Godhra cases, to 
destroying crucial evidence.   The judiciary has shown itself willing to play along. In 
the Godhra case, this has meant arrests, denial of bail, accused being kept in remand 
for many years, and convictions in the face of dubious evidence. In post-Godhra 
cases, this has often meant lackadaisical investigation, failure to oppose bail, and 




We received responses to RTI applications on appeals from only nine police stations 
across five districts. One hundred and eighty two police stations provided no 
information, and 72 police stations said none of the mass violence cases under their 
purview had resulted in appeals. However, it was unclear from their responses if this 
meant that trials in charge-sheeted cases were still continuing, or if trials that had 
ended in acquittals were not being appealed. Given the exceedingly low response rate, 
the information obtained is too random and incomplete for any useful analysis save to 
state the obvious that this information is not easily available.  
 
This information seems not to be available with either the Home Department or the 
Legal Department of the state government, nor with district administrations, nor 
with police stations.  In 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the Attorney General of 
Gujarat to monitor the status of appeals in mass violence cases.  If the government 
were complying with this order in any seriousness, the information we requested 
should have been available. When we were refused this information, we appealed 
the refusal and argued that, following the Supreme Court’s order, this information 
should be readily available.  We were told that we could only get this information for 
any particular trial if we obtained details of the case number, acquittal date and 
acquitting court.  Since such details are not easily available in public, this means that 
ordinary citizens cannot access information on whether cases are being appealed. 
This makes it easier for the government to accept acquittals, and to neglect to file 
appeals even where an appeal is warranted and viable.      
 
 
E. Accountability of public officials 
 
 
In 2002, federal checks and balances entirely failed to work.  The Central government 
did not exercise its constitutional power to intervene and control mass violence.  The 
Rajya Sabha passed an ineffectual resolution ruing the violence, and the Lok Sabha 
failed even to pass a resolution.  Coalition politics at the Centre operated such that a 
spectrum of political parties tolerated violence, rather than moderating and checking 
the Hindu right stance of the BJP, which led the coalition. So while the Central 
government shielded the state government, the BJP government in Gujarat has never 
apologized for what happened in 2002, and even shielded senior office holders 
involved in violence.    
 
The NHRC, soon after the outbreak of violence, issued reports and orders criticizing 
the state government’s negligence and collusion. The Gujarat government set up a 
commission of inquiry – the Nanavati Commission – initially to look only at the 
Godhra tragedy.  In the face of criticism, it expanded the commission’s terms of 
reference to examine the responsibility of senior members of government for mass 
violence in 2002.  Survivors and civil society groups petitioned the NHRC and 
participated in the commission’s inquiries.  However, they went beyond this, and as 
mentioned earlier, filed criminal complaints and applied for compensation.  They 
also deployed public law remedies to challenge discrimination and incompetence in 
criminal proceedings and compensation. They persuaded the Supreme Court to take 
important protective measures, including the transfer of major criminal trials out of 
Gujarat and the re-opening of 2000 cases that the Gujarat police had summarily 
closed for lack of evidence.   
 
The very fact that the Supreme Court took these steps is, in and of itself, an 
indictment of the Gujarat administration. The Court was clearly persuaded that 
certain trials simply would not be conducted fairly, and that a large number of cases 
were likely to have been unlawfully closed.  In addition to these measures, the 
Supreme Court also appointed a Special Investigation Team to look into a number of 
serious cases in Gujarat. In the course of the commission of inquiry and the SIT 
proceedings, a few senior police officials in Gujarat have spoken out about the role 
played by the ruling party in furthering the mass violence and allowing perpetrators 
to escape with impunity.   
 
All these developments together have kept the spotlight on the role of the Gujarat 
administration and on whether those involved have been held accountable.  We 
discuss below the findings of the NHRC.  We then discuss the role and findings of 
the Nanavati Commission thus far (its work continues at the time of writing this).  
We also examine accounts by IPS officers in Gujarat.  We look at the findings of the 
Special Investigation Team appointed by the Supreme Court.  Finally, we discuss the 
limited information available on steps taken by the state government against 
government personnel involved in the 2002 mass violence.     
 
1. NHRC intervention 
  
The NHRC intervened soon after the violence broke out on account of the media 
reports and calls by concerned citizens suggesting “inaction by the police and the 
highest functionaries of the state”,413 by issuing a fax notice to the chief secretary and 
Director General of Gujarat Police on March 12, 002 asking them to respond urgently, 
setting out the measures taken and contemplated to prevent any further escalation in 
the violation of human rights that had been alleged.  
 
The main concerns raised and recommendations made by the NHRC in its orders are 
summarized below414 . 
• The NHRC was quick to notice the apparent intelligence failure admitted by 
the state and central agencies in their report415 where they claimed not to 
have the specific information about the return of karsevaks from Ayodhya 
                                                        
413 NHRC recommendation, National Human Rights Commission Report on Gujarat, (New Delhi: 
March - May, 2002) available at 
http://www.cjponline.org/gujaratTrials/statecomp/pdf%20files/pdfs/NHRC%20Report%20%20July%2
02002.pdf. 
414  Suo Motu Order of NHRC, Case No. 1150/6/2001-2002, April 1, 2002. Available at http://gujarat-
riots.com/reports/NHRC%20Report%20%20July%202002.pdf.  
415 Suo Motu Order of NHRC Order, Case No. 1150/6/2001-2002, April 1, 2002, page 11, para 20(iv).  
and to conclude that this416 “serious failure of intelligence and action by the 
state government marked the events leading to the Godhra tragedy and the 
subsequent deaths and destruction that occurred.” The NHRC also doubted 
the conspiracy theory put forward by the state because, “whilst the report 
filed by the Gujarat state maintained that the Godhra was “pre-meditated”, it 
did not set out who was responsible for the attack.” 
• The Commission noted political interference with the police, as suggested by 
the presence of political personalities in police stations and demanded that 
the state government identify and take action against these political 
personalities.  
• The commission sought but did not receive a response from the state 
government “regarding reports and allegations of groups of well organised 
persons armed with mobile telephones and addresses, singling out certain 
homes and properties for death and destruction, sometimes within view of 
police stations and personnel”.417 
• The failure to provide security to two Muslim High Court judges who had to 
leave their homes for safety and whose properties were attacked by mobs. 
The Gujarat administration claimed that the judges had left of their own will 
and it could not guarantee safety to all “societies”. The NHRC pointed out 
that the judges had to leave on account of the “pervasive insecurity”. 
• The NHRC also noted418 that “numerous allegations” had been made to it, 
and in the media, about FIRs being “poorly recorded” or “distorted” and 
that “there was widespread lack of faith in the integrity of the investigating 
process and the ability of those conducting investigations”.  
• NHRC419 also made an early recommendation to the state government to 
appoint a CBI investigation in Godhra, Gulbarg, Naroda Patiya, Best Bakery 
and Sardarpura case in Mehsana, given the evidence and serious allegations 
made in respect of police malpractice and mala fide investigation. 
• It also sought accountability of public servants: 
“Given the wide variation in the performance of public servants in the 
discharge of their statutory responsibilities, action should be initiated 
                                                        
416 Ibid., 11-12, para 20 (v) and vi. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid., 12, para 20 (viii).   
419 Ibid.,15, para 21(i), Part I, recommendations under “Law and Order”. 
to identify and proceed against those who have failed to act 
appropriately to control the violence in its incipient stages, or to 
prevent its escalation thereafter. By the same token, officers who have 
performed their duties well, should be commended.”420 
• The Commission sought protection for witnesses to prevent intimidation and 
to ensure a fair trial. 
• It sought a guarantee from the Gujarat administration that relief camps 
would not be forcibly closed, and sought adequate rehabilitation and 
compensation for the displaced.421  
• The NHRC asked the state to address the issue of damage and destruction to 
around 535 mosques and dargahs.422 
 
The NHRC also said,  
“There is no doubt, in the opinion of this Commission, that there was a 
comprehensive failure on the part of the state government to control the 
persistent violation of the rights to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the 
people of the state...”423. 
 
The government of Gujarat refused to hand over the massacre cases to the CBI.424 So 
the NHRC went further and petitioned the Supreme Court to transfer these cases 
outside Gujarat, arguing that a fair trial was not possible in Gujarat.  This was an 
important step. In previous episodes of mass violence, official watchdogs hesitated 
to identify systemic bias and collusion. The NHRC, in petitioning the Supreme Court, 
identified such bias and took the view that it was so serious and persistent that the 
state government could not be trusted to pursue criminal justice effectively. Evidence 
and recommendations by the NHRC reinforced advocacy by private citizens. The 
systematic undermining of criminal trials in Gujarat became harder for the Gujarat 
government to deny and for the Supreme Court to ignore.    
 
                                                        
420 Ibid., 16, para. 21(viii). 
421 Ibid., 17, Part II, para. 21(iv), recommendations under “Camps”, and recommendation under  Part 
III, para 21(ii).  
422 Ibid.,, 17, Part III, para. 21(i), recommendation under “Rehabilitation”. 
423 Ibid., para. 64.  
424 Ibid. The reluctance and non-cooperation of the state is noted by the NHRC at various points in its 
orders in the period March- September 2002.  
The NHRC’s observations, made soon after the mass violence took place, also serve 
as an important record when official processes that are more sympathetic to the 
Gujarat government present a more diluted account of what happened in 2002.  
 
 
2. Commission of Inquiry  
 
Unlike previous episodes of violence, which took place when the visual and 
electronic media were not as routine a part of public life as they had become by 2002, 
the public had access to horrific images of pain and suffering that had not been 
witnessed before. There was a national outcry that the state government had to 
respond to by setting up a Commission of Inquiry.425 However, despite many 
allegations of state complicity and failures in preventing and controlling the violence 
right from the beginning, the ambit of inquiry initially controversially limited itself 
only to the Godhra incident.  It was only in July 2004, after persistent public pressure 
and criticism, that the terms of reference were expanded to include the functioning of 
the state apparatus.426 This widening of terms of reference was very likely the result 
of a change of government at the centre, from the BJP-led NDA to the Congress-led 
United Progressive Alliance. The Gujarat government widened the inquiry, rather 
than contending with a competing inquiry instituted by the central government.   
 
Interestingly, the Commission received 46,494 statements/affidavits in total, of these 
41,999 – i.e. 90% - were received in response to the final notification which concerned 
the part played by the state427.  It is clear from the volume of responses on the state’s 
role in the 2002 violence what ordinary citizens felt most strongly about. The vast 
majority of these affidavits are from individual survivors, but a few are from three 
IPS officers, RB Sreekumar, Rahul Sharma and Sanjeev Bhatt. These three officers 
also gave evidence in person to the commission.  Their testimonies shed light on why 
violence unfolded on the scale it did, and the degree of state collusion in mass 
violence in 2002.   
                                                        
425 Commission Report (September 2008), 182, under “Annexures”. See here for the exact wording of 
the Government notification of March 6, 2002 setting up the commission, accessed at 
http://home.gujarat.gov.in/homedepartment/downloads/godharaincident.pdf  
426  Ibid., 184 – 188,  for exact wording of amending notifications, which expanded the terms of 
reference to include the role of state and to extend the time period coverage of violent incident to May 
31, 2002. 
427 Ibid., 7.  
 
a) Evidence of RB Sreekumar 
 
Mr. Sreekumar was the first IPS officer to publicly oppose the unofficial, but 
clear, policy of the government to not act against communal organizations. As 
chief of the SIB in 2002, he advised other officers428 that Muslim citizens felt 
insecure in the face of aggression by Hindu right organizations and had little 
faith in the police.429  He emphasized the need to apprehend those responsible 
for the violence. His advice was ignored.430 He claimed that he was denied 
promotions, and transferred following his failure to support the State’s official 
line of “normalcy” to the election commission in 2002.431 He also alleged that 
there were serious illegal attempts to coerce him into testifying falsely before the 




b) Evidence of Rahul Sharma 
 
Mr. Sharma, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhavnagar submitted an affidavit 
before the Commission that sets out in detail (with evidence such as minutes of 
                                                        
428The information presented here comes from a register maintained by Sreekumar, at the S.I.B. where 
he recorded verbal instructions (39 entries) given to him by officers in the rank of DGP and above for 
the period of April 16, 2002 to September 19, 2002. These entries record that the Chief Minister and 
other senior bureaucrats did not heed advice given by Sreekumar and others to act against persons 
connected to the Sangh Parivar family, who were alleged to have committed serious offences in 
Ahmedabad. Details of these entries can be accessed in Combat Communalism, July-August 2007. 
Reference to this register is also made in other media reports, see “Gujarat Riot Muslims Eliminated” 
BBC News, April 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4445107.stm and 
“Retired Sreekumar Promoted as DGP”, The Indian Express, May 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/retired-sreekumar-promoted-as-dgp/304865/. 
429 This is deduced from his entries and affidavits submitted to the commission. For details of  
Sreekumar’s affidavit, see extracts at “Muslims Perceive”, Tehelka March 12, 2005, available at 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main11.asp?filename=ts031205Muslims_perceive.asp. Sreekumar 
reported that the “The Muslim community felt vulnerable and at the mercy of right-wing communal 
organizations like Bajrang Dal and VHP…”; also, “The Muslims had no faith in the criminal justice 
system and were developing a deep sense of grievance and an intense sense of revengefulness against 
the Hindu community on account of the loss they suffered and also on account of their perception that 
the state administration and the police were heavily biased against Muslims”. Also see Communalism 
Combat, July-August 2007 edition. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
432 See “Cop Nails Gujarat Lie,” Tehelka March 12, 2005, available at, 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main11.asp?filename=ts031205Cop_Nails.asp. 
meetings, newspaper reports, letters, memos and call records) the preparations 
to counter violence anticipated on February 28, 2002 after Hindu right groups 
announced a bandh, or strike. This kind of a record of a DSP’s movement, 
actions, orders given, and phone calls received and made during the critical 
hours of violence demonstrate that it was possible to control violence and 
protect lives if district police officials were determined to do so. Mr. Sharma, for 
example, held long meetings on February 27 and 28, 2002 instructing the police 
force under his command to control violence. The Bhavnagar police identified 
sensitive areas, and Mr. Sharma requested additional police forces from outside 
Bhavnagar to keep the peace. Mr. Sharma personally attended sites of violence 
and directed his juniors to use appropriate, legal force to disperse mobs. He 
responded to news of gathering mobs at various sites by attending with his 
striking force to disperse mobs. Along with the district magistrate a curfew was 
declared, and he ordered police officers to implement this stringently.   
 
 Mr. Sharma also moved quickly to respond to hate speech in the local press.  The 
editor of the newspaper Sandesh published a provocative article on March 1, 
2002, which criticized the “leaders of Bhavnagar” for failing to punish 
Muslims433, though it refers to Muslims as “a certain community”, possibly on 
legal considerations. The article praised “Hindu organizations” who “opened 
third eye in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Rajkot, Godhra, Modasa, Surat and other 
cities and have punished the elements of certain community who had spread 
terror....”434.  Mr. Sharma wrote to the relevant authorities on 9.3.02, and asked 
them to take action against Sandesh under the Press Council Act for instigating 
violence435. Thus, he was aware of and willing to employ the various 
institutional mechanisms that Indian law provides to address hates crimes and 
mass violence. Rahul Sharma also collected and presented records of phone calls 
made by various direct participants and politicians during the period of riots to 
the commission. 
 
                                                        
433  Ibid, page 21. See “Anger of bitter Hindus affiliated to Hindu ideology. Hindus are burnt alive in 
Godhra and fattu leaders even thinking of throwing a stone in the name of Bandh in Bhavnagar,” 
Sandesh, Bhavnagar edition, March 1 2002, page 11.  
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid., pages 18-20.  
 For his efforts to control violence, he was transferred from Bhavnagar to the 
DCP control room Ahmedabad. It is alleged that he was transferred from 
Ahmedabad to Surat on account of finding flaws in the investigation of massacre 
cases of Naroda Patiya and Gulbarg.436 He now stands accused of gross 
misconduct under Section 3(1) of All India Service Rules 1969,437 for providing 
information to a judicial commission without prior authorization. 
 
c. Sanjeev Bhatt’s evidence 
 
Mr. Bhatt, an IPS officer who was the deputy commissioner of intelligence, state 
intelligence bureau at the time of the mass violence in 2002 has testified that he 
was present at a meeting called by the Chief Minister of Gujarat on February 27, 
2002 where the Chief Minister said that the Gujarat police were not to adopt a 
secular approach to violence unfolding after the Godhra massacre, and that the 
death of karsevaks required that the “Muslims be taught a lesson so that such 
incident did not recur… and it was imperative that police allow the Hindu mobs 
to vent their anger.438 Mr. Bhatt’s evidence echoes the account of Haren Pandya, 
a cabinet minister in the state government during mass violence who was 
subsequently murdered439.   
 
Mr. Bhatt has claimed that he has evidence that he had informed the police 
commissioner of Ahmedabad city, and the CM about the mob that was 
gathering and violence that was building at Gulbarg on February 28, 2002. He 
has recently written to the Commission providing them with copies of faxes 
showing that the Home Minister of State in 2002, Mr. Zadephia, the Joint 
Commisioner of Police of Ahmedabad, Mr. Pande, and the CM, Mr. Modi, had 
                                                        
436 “Carrots and Sticks,” Tehelka March 12, 2005, claims that nine senior state officials who kept silent 
or supported the government policy have been rewarded by promotions whilst five who acted to 
prevent violence and spoke out against the State were punished. 
437“Gujarat charge-sheets IPS officer for misconduct”, The Hindu, August 13, 2011, available at 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2353644.ece. 
438 These allegations were initially made to the SIT asked by the SC to investigate the complaint of 
Zakia Jaffrey, and subsequently in an affidavit to the SC alleging that the SIT was not acting 
impartially by not following up leads provided by Bhatt. Copy of Bhatt’s affidavit, April 5, 2011 can 
be accessed at NDTV website at http://drop.ndtv.com/common/pdf/Sanjiv_Bhatt.pdf. Portions of it also 
appeared in “Truth about Godhra SIT Report” Tehelka, Vol.8 Issue 6, February 12, 2010, 28-41. Also 
Tehelka, Vol. 8 Issue 7, February, 30- 37. 
439 “A Murder Foretold,” Outlook, November 19, 2007. 
received intelligence inputs warning of gathering mobs around Gulbarg Society 
and Naroda Patiya, and even distress calls from Ehsan Jaffrey, the MLA who 
was murdered, amongst others, at Gulbarg.440  
 
Mr. Bhatt has put evidence before the commission of inquiry, the special 
investigation team appointed by the Supreme Court, as well as before the 
Supreme Court. He has alleged that since he spoke out about events in 2002, he 
and his family have been at risk, but the state government has refused his 
requests for better security and protection.441  
 
Bhatt has claimed that Mr. Modi and Amit Shah, Minister of Home Affairs in 
2002, asked him to destroy important documentary evidence regarding Haren 
Pandya’s murder, which he refused to do. This refusal led to him being 
transferred and kept without any posting for over two months in November 
2003.442  
 
More recently, Mr. Bhatt was suspended from the IPS for dereliction of duty. He 
was arrested on September 30, 2011 for threatening a public servant, wrongful 
confinement and fabricating false evidence, based on a complaint filed by his 
former driver three months earlier on June 24, 2011 who claimed that Bhatt had 
threatened and forced him to sign false affidavits.443  Bhatt’s arrest came within 
48 hours of him filing an affidavit in the Gujarat High court alleging indirect 
involvement of the CM and Mr. Shah in the murder of the Cabinet Minister Mr. 
Pandya, who had allegedly feared for his life after giving an interview to 
Outlook magazine about the CM’s involvement in mass violence.444   
 
                                                        
440 It was reported that fax messages sent to Modi and Zadaphia show how the SIB was informed about 
the situation. A first message said that mob was gathering. In a second alert, the ministers were told 
that Jafri and his family were in danger. “Zadaphia lied, Sanjiv Bhatt tells Godhra commission” Times 




442 “Modi Government arrests Sanjiv Bhatt”, The Hindu, September 30, 2011.  
443 Ibid. 
444 “A Murder Foretold”, Outlook, November 19, 2007. 
The Commission has still not completed its inquiry on the controversial role of the 
government in 2002. Its inquiry was split into two parts – first, the Godhra incident, 
which led to loss of 57 Hindu lives and was limited to an incident lasting a few hours 
on one day at the Godhra train station and second, the state-wide violence that led to 
the loss of, according to official estimates, 1037 lives.   
 
The report on the Godhra incident was published in 2008, and it gave the Gujarat 
government a clean chit on how it handled the incident. The report supports the 
Gujarat government’s theory that Godhra was a pre-planned terrorist conspiracy445, 
despite the existence of substantial pieces of evidence presented to Commission that 
make this theory implausible.446. The report fails to address the two most important 
allegations against the CM made before the panel – that he issued illegal instructions 
on February 27, 2002 to the police that violence against Muslims should not be 
controlled, and that he decided that the bodies of Godhra victims could be shown in 
public, in contravention of the advice of the Godhra district magistrate.   
 
The Commission turned down applications by civil society groups such as Jan 
Sangharsh Manch (JSM) to summon Mr. Modi and two former staff members from 
the CM’s office for questioning. The Commission seems not to have considered, fully 
and adequately, the detailed testimonies presented before it, including evidence by 
the senior IPS officials who have spoken out.  Thus, there are fears amongst 
survivors of violence and activists that the report of the Commission on the role of 
CM and the state in the violence that followed the February 27th Godhra incident will 
be a “whitewash”.  
 
3. The Supreme Court’s Special Investigation Team (SIT) 
 
The Commission of Inquiry has the potential to be one of the most significant 
mechanisms of accountability for the 2002 mass violence, but its performance so far 
suggests that much of this potential is being jettisoned.  However, it operates 
alongside other mechanisms that are also significant. The NHRC is a standing, 
national watchdog, and it played an important role in responding to mass violence in 
                                                        
445The trial judge in the Godhra case, whilst acquitting the main conspirator along with 63 others has 
controversially upheld the “criminal conspiracy” theory, and convicted 11 accused to death and 20 to 
life in imprisonment.   
446 There were 31 convictions and 63 acquittals in Godhra trial.  
2002.  The NHRC’s efforts contributed to creating another mechanism – the Special 
Investigation Team (SIT).  
 
The NHRC approached the Supreme Court on July 31, 2002 seeking transfers of the 
major trials out of Gujarat, under section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code447. The 
NHRC argued that biased investigation and prosecution was undermining any 
chance of successful criminal trials against the perpetrators. The NHRC noted that in 
several major cases important witnesses had either not been examined, or the police 
had inaccurately recorded their statements, with a view either to exclude the accused 
from the charge sheet, or to securing their acquittal. The police had taken no steps to 
arrest the accused named by many witnesses in their police statements.  The 
government had appointed prosecutors with openly Hindu right sympathies. 
 
In response to the petition, the Supreme Court stayed all trials on November 21, 
2003. As discussed earlier, it transferred the Bilkis Bano trial and Best Bakery trial out 
of Gujarat.  The 9 other major trials entered a legal limbo for more than four years till 
March 26, 2008, when the SC ordered a Special Investigation Team to be set up in 
respect of nine cases448, eight of which are cases of mass murder. One case concerns 
the murder of a British national in Sabarkantha, whose family are also pursuing a 
case against Mr. Modi using the principle of command responsibility.  
 
The SIT order is an important one as its foundations are underpinned by the 
requirement to show that investigation and prosecution are not tainted by communal 
and partisan considerations. The order records that the Gujarat government accepted 
the need for further investigation “so that people’s faith in the transparency of action 
taken by state is fortified”. However, this begs the question as to why the Gujarat 
government did not accept this need in 2002 and transfer the said cases to CBI as 
suggested by NHRC.  In the SIT order, the Supreme Court set out a framework set 
up special fast track courts. The SIT was to be consulted in the appointment of 
prosecutors by the government and the SIT decision was to be the final one in case of 
a difference of opinion about a prosecutor.  
                                                        
447 Criminal Writ Petition 109 of 2003, submitted in the SC by the petitioner, National Human Rights 
Commission. 
448 Gulberg, Naroda Gam, Naroda patiya, Ode massacre (two cases), Godhra, British national case in 
Subarkatha, Sardarpura and Deepda Darwaja. 
 
There was an important development in June 2008, when Zakia Jaffrey, the widow of    
murdered Congress Member of Legislative Assembly, Ehsan Jaffrey, attempted to 
register a complaint for serious offences449 including criminal conspiracy to murder, 
against Mr. Modi, eleven of his Cabinet Ministers, three sitting M.L.As., three 
members of the Bharatiya Janata Party, three office bearers and three other members 
of an extremist right wing organization, and thirty-eight high ranking police officers 
and bureaucrats (including IPS and IAS officers), including the Director General of 
Police and the Chief Secretary of the government of Gujarat.  
 
The complaint is an impressive document of over a hundred pages, with annexures 
running over 2000 pages. It was originally sent to the DGP of Gujarat Police, PP 
Pande, who was the police commissioner of Ahmedabad city in 2002, and is named 
as an accused in the complaint. Upon the refusal of the DGP to register a complaint, 
Ms. Jaffrey450 petitioned the High Court, again in vain.  Ms. Jaffrey then approached 
the SC by way of a special leave petition (SLP) in March 2008, appealing the 
dismissal by the High Court of her petition.  On April 26, 2009, the SC ordered the 
SIT already in place to investigate the charges in the SLP and take action according to 
law. During the course of this investigation, Chief Minister was interviewed, an 
important development because the commission of inquiry had thus far refused to 
question the Chief Minister.    
 
a) SIT Findings451 
 
The SIT has submitted a report to the Supreme Court that has not been released to 
the public.  However, media outlets that secured a copy of the report covered its 
                                                        
449  There are 63 persons named as the accused in the FIR for offences punishable under Section 302, 
read with Section 120B, as also under Section 193, read with Sections 114, 186 & 153A, 186, 187 of 
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. FIR is dated June 8, 2006. Available at 
http://www.cjponline.org/zakia/060608%20Zakia%20FIR.pdf.  
450 Fully supported by the NGO, Citizens for Justice and Peace. 
451 This section and other discussion of the content of the 600 page report are based on the coverage in 
Tehelka Vol. 8, Issue 6, February 12, 2011. (In particular, the cover story, “The smoking gun,” “The 
Artful Faker” and “India reacts”. The magazine claimed to have secured a copy of the SIT report. The 
report is confidential and not in the public domain. There are no reports to suggest the contents of the 
report are inaccurate. Sanjiv Bhatt in an affidavit to the SC expressed his concerns about personal 
security based on the possibility of the SIT leaking information he had given to it.     
findings in some detail.  The SIT’s findings, as reported in the media, are discussed 
below. 
(i) Findings against the Police:452  
• The SIT report supports the documented claims of many survivors and NGOs 
regarding the mala fide nature of police investigations in the Naroda Patiya 
and Gulbarg Society massacre cases. The police, the report claims, 
deliberately overlooked the cell phone records of Sangh Parivar members and 
BJP leaders involved in the riots. Prominent among them were the Gujarat 
VHP president Jaideep Patel and BJP minister Maya Kodnani453.  
• The report notes that the police administration failed to explain why it did 
not impose curfew in Naroda until 12 pm and Meghaninagar (Ahmedabad 
city) until 2 pm on February 28, 2002. The imposition of such a curfew could 
have saved hundreds of lives.  
•  The former Ahmedabad Joint C.P., MK Tandon, in whose area around 200 
Muslims were killed, has been found guilty of deliberate dereliction of duty. 
(After the riots, however, far from being censured, he got prestigious postings 
and retired as Additional Director General of Police in June 2007.)  
• Mr. Tandon’s junior, former Deputy Commissioner of Police, PK Gondia, has 
also been found responsible for allowing the massacres. The SIT says that if 
the two had just carried out their duty, hundreds of Muslims could have been 
saved.454 Neither of these officers was held accountable by the Modi 
government. 
 
(ii) Findings on Individual Ministers 
• The SIT has also found evidence against the then minister of state for home 
Mr. Zadaphia (who was reporting directly to Mr. Modi) for his complicity in 
the riots, and has arrested another minister Ms. Kodnani. 
 
                                                        
452 Ibid. 
453 Pages 101-105 of the SIT report. 
454 Pages 48 – 50, SIT Report. 
(iii) Findings on communal bias and collusion by the government 
• The report found evidence to support claims that the government of Gujarat 
had placed two senior ministers — Ashok Bhatt and IK Jadeja — in the 
Ahmedabad city police control room and the state police control room during 
the riots. The SIT chairman comments that the two ministers were positioned 
in the control rooms with “no definite charter”, which led to the conclusion 
that they “had been placed to interfere in police work and give wrongful 
decisions to the field officers”. “The fact that he (Mr. Modi) was the cabinet 
minister for Home would heighten the suspicion that this decision had his 
blessings455.”  
• The report affirms that police officers who took a neutral stand during the 
riots and prevented massacres were transferred by the Gujarat government to 
insignificant postings. SIT’s Mr. Raghavan has termed these transfers 
“questionable” since “they came immediately after incidents in which the 
officers concerned were known to have antagonized ruling party men456”.  
• The report says, “The Gujarat government has reportedly destroyed the 
police wireless communication of the period pertaining to the riots.” It adds, 
“No records, documentations or minutes of the crucial law and order 
meetings held by the government during the riots had been kept457.”  
• The SIT confirms that the government appointed VHP and RSS-affiliated 
advocates as public prosecutors in sensitive riot cases. The report states, “It 
appears that the political affiliation of the advocates did weigh with the 
government for the appointment of public prosecutors458.” The SIT chairman 
further comments that “it has been found that a few of the past appointees 
were in fact politically connected, either to the ruling party or to 
organizations sympathetic to it459.”  
                                                        
455 Ibid., 12. 
456 Ibid., 7-8. 
457 Ibid., 13. 
458 Ibid., 77. 
459 Ibid., 10.  
• According to the report, the Gujarat government did not take any steps to 
stop the illegal bandh called by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad on February 28, 
2002. On the contrary the BJP had supported the bandh460.  
 
(iv) Findings on the Chief Minister 
• The report states that, “In spite of the fact that ghastly and violent attacks had 
taken place on Muslims at Gulbarg Society and elsewhere, the reaction of the 
government was not the type that would have been expected by anyone. The 
Chief Minister had tried to water down the seriousness of the situation at 
Gulbarg Society, Naroda Patiya and other places, by saying that every action 
has an equal and opposite reaction461.”  
• The report also notes that Mr. Modi’s statement “accusing some elements in 
Godhra and the neighbourhood as possessing a criminal tendency” was 
sweeping and offensive, coming as it did from a Chief Minister, that too at a 
critical time when Hindu-Muslim tempers were running high462.”  
• “His (Mr. Modi) implied justification of the killings of innocent members of 
the minority community read together with an absence of a strong 
condemnation of the violence that followed Godhra suggest a partisan stance 
at a critical juncture when the state had been badly disturbed by communal 
violence463.”   
• The report says Mr. Modi displayed a “discriminatory attitude by not visiting 
the riot-affected areas in Ahmedabad where a large number of Muslims were 
killed, though he went to Godhra on the same day, travelling almost 300 km 
on a single day464.” The SIT chairman also comments, “Modi did not cite any 
specific reasons why he did not visit the affected areas in Ahmedabad city as 
promptly as had in the case of the Godhra train carnage465.”  
                                                        
460 Ibid., 69. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid., 13. 
463 Ibid., 153. 
464 Ibid., 67. 
465 Ibid., 8. 
 
There were repeated questions raised regarding the functioning of the SIT and the 
independence of its members in the media.466  Two members of the SIT, Shivanand 
Jha and Geeta Johri were removed from the SIT following allegations of bias. The SIT 
report arising out of the SLP filed by Ms. Jaffrey was viewed by many as having been 
tainted by the influence of the state machinery. Mr. Bhatt filed an affidavit to the SC 
on this issue, informing SC that the SIT had not followed up all the investigation 
leads it should have on account of the information it received and also accusing some 
members of leaking information to the alleged accused. 
 
The SC replaced its amicus curiae in the case with another amicus curiae.  The new 
amicus curiae was asked by the SC to examine, analyse and assess the statements of 
witnesses recorded by SIT and if needed to “interact with” witnesses had previously 
been examined by the SIT, including the police officers if he thought that was 
needed.  Most importantly, the order of May 5, 2011 gave the amicus curiae an 
explicit instruction to record his opinion as to whether any person could be charged 
with any offences on the basis of the material available on record.  Thus, the amicus 
curiae’s role was to be a check on how the SIT functioned. 
 
The amicus curiae filed his report to the Supreme Court in July 2011 amidst media 
reports467 that he had taken a different view regarding the reliability of Mr. Bhatt as a 
witness, and regarding culpability of Mr. Modi and other senior police officers. This 
was seen as exonerating the Gujarat government of complicity in mass violence, and 
welcomed by the Chief Minister468. The amicus curiae reportedly made the point that 
the reliability of witnesses such as Mr. Bhatt and others, who deny his presence at 
the meeting with the CM on January 27 needs to be tested by due legal processes 
such as cross-examination before adjudication by the trial court rather than the SIT as 
an investigatory body deciding prematurely that there is no evidence on basis of 
                                                        
466“JSM Accuses Lower Rung SIT Official of Bias”, Indian Express, December 17, 2008. Dr. Mukul 
Sinha alleged that SIT was not carrying out its investigation properly. Teesta Setalvad has also 
criticized the SIT on various counts, as seen in website url: www.cjp.online.org. 
467“Modi needs to be cross examined, says Raju Ramachandran”, NDTV, available at 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/modi-needs-to-be-cross-examined-says-raju-ramachandran-143834. 
Also see article, “Book Gujarat cops for neglect during riots: Amicus curiae” Times of India, October 
23, 2011.  
468 “ “God is great,” tweets relieved Modi”, The Hindu, September 12, 2011.  
their testing and assessment of particular witnesses.469 In a media interview, the 
amicus explained what would happen at this point, after his report and the SIT’s 
report have been submitted to the Supreme Court.470 The SIT can choose to prosecute 
the accused in the cases it is investigating, or choose not to do so.  If it chooses to 
close a case against an accused, the complainant has a right to object by filing a 
protest petition. The amicus curiae report may either agree or disagree with the SIT 
on its assessment of various pieces of evidence.  If the amicus disagrees with the SIT 
report, a complainant could draw support from the view of the amicus. Even if the 
SIT and the amicus both agree that a matter ought not to proceed further, the 
complainant still has the right in law to be informed of and to question a closure 
report.  
 
On September 12, 2011, the SC gave its final order, referring the matter back to the 
SIT to file its final report with the trial court dealing with the Gulbarg case in 
Ahmedabad and specifically noting the right of the complainant to be heard if a 
closure report is filed.471  
 
Despite the controversies surrounding the SIT, the SIT enquiry has led to arrest of 
many accused including a BJP MLA, Ms. Kodnani, for her alleged role in leading and 
inciting mobs and an inspector of police, KG Erda, in respect of his failure to act 
during the Gulbarg Massacre.  It was a historic moment when the chief minister of 
Gujarat was interrogated by the SIT for over 12 hours, with regard to the Gulbarg 
massacre, where the widow of Congress MLA, Mr. Jaffri, has given evidence that the 
CM not only refused to provide the protection that could have saved many Muslim 
lives, but also was verbally abusive to the Congress MP472.  
 
                                                        
469 “Amicus report lays the ground for charge sheeting Narendra Modi”, The Hindu, October 23, 2011. 
470“The case has gone from no FIR, to being heard in a criminal court” The Hindu, September 16, 
2011. 
471 See  para 9 of the final  order of Zakia Ahsan and another v. State of Gujarat and Others, arising 
out of Special Leave Petition, 1088 of 2008 and Criminal Appeal 1765 of 2011, available at the 
Supreme Court website  at http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/sr%20108808p.txt. 
472  Ibid., Mr. Modi claimed in his answers to the SIT that he could not remember receiving any phone 
calls from Jaydeep Patel or from the VHP. 
If the media reports on the findings of the SIT are accurate, then this court appointed 
investigative body has validated, in large measure, the accounts of survivors and 
civil society groups about government complicity in mass violence473. However, it 
has been severely criticized for failing to institute criminal proceedings against many 
including top police officers, ministers and the CM, Mr. Modi. The SIT filed its final 
investigative report before the trial court on Wednesday February 8, 2012 amidst 
media reports that it has again recommended that there is not sufficient evidence to 
sustain criminal charges against Mr. Modi474. Two judges, also part of the CCT 
tribunal headed by SC Judge Mr. Krishna Iyer, have questioned the reported SIT 
stance and claimed that the SIT has neglected the evidence they gave to it regarding 
what they heard from the Cabinet minister Mr. Pandya, and also claiming that 
recorded testimony of Mr. Haren Pandya exists.475 Such audiotape evidence, if it 
adduced and admitted by the trial court, together with the testimonies of the two 
judges and Mr. Bhatt has the potential to land CM Mr. Modi in serious trouble. But 
of course, this could only happen if the trial court, after having considered the report 
and having heard representations from the complainant, Ms. Jaffrey, decided that 
there was prima facie sufficient prosecutable evidence against Mr. Modi. It would 
require a level of courage and independence from the local trial court, which has so 
far largely been missing. Given the trajectory of criminal legal cases against the 
powerful, it is likely that Ms. Jaffrey will face rejection at the trial court, and will 
have to pursue appeals all the way to the Supreme Court. 
 
 
4. Measures by the Gujarat government 
 
 
We filed RTI applications on how many government personnel were involved in 
mass violence and what measures the government had taken against them.  
However, these applications met with very limited success.   
 
                                                        
473 Ibid. 
474 The SIT report is not in the public domain but has been leaked to large sections of the electronic, 
print and visual media who unanimously reported that SIT has given clean chit to Mr. Modi.  
475 “2002 Gujarat riots: former Judge says there is audio tape with evidence against Modi,” NDTV, 
February 17, 2011, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/2002-gujarat-riots-former-judge-
speaks-out-against-modi-says-sit-ignored-testimonies-177298?pfrom=home-lateststories. 
We had access to RTI information on the involvement of government officials in 
Sabarkantha in the riots, and whether the concerned government departments had 
the information needed to facilitate action against those involved476. Nineteen police 
stations in Sabarkantha responded with names of 49 government officers and their 
area of work e.g. village panchayats (3 officers), schools (25 officers), railway (1 
officer), state road transport driver etc.  It is worth noting that nearly 50% of those 
officials involved in mass violence were teachers. So one can imagine that the 
education imparted to children in these schools may have severe communal 
overtones.  
 
There is very little information in the public domain about the steps taken by Gujarat 
government to hold any senior or junior members of the police or administrative 
service accountable for the lapses of duty that lead to murder and mayhem. There is 
perfunctory information on the Riot Cell website477, which says that 152 investigating 
officers or supervisory officers are facing departmental enquiries, and also that 
departmental enquiries are contemplated against 72 others. We were unable to get 
any further information on the status of the departmental enquiries and the 
designation of the officers facing such enquiries. From the information received so 
far, there were only two FIR’s registered against government officers. One of these 
officials has already been acquitted.   
 
F.  Rescue, relief, rehabilitation  
 
1. Failure to rescue 
 
We have already discussed the abysmal failure of police and district authorities in 
rescuing citizens under attack. The role of other emergency service providers such as 
fire brigade and medical services also left a lot to be desired. Research478 regarding 
                                                        
476 Authors are grateful to Usmanbhai, coordinator of Justice Unit in Sabarkantha for initiating and 
following these RTIs and sharing the received information with us. 
477 Such a website was ordered to be set up by the SC by its order of August 17, 2004 in Crl. MP 3741 
of 2004.  This a measure to keep the public informed, in anticipation of the review of 2000 cases. 
478 “Hard Facts” in Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005), 38, Table 7.3. Total respondents in this survey were 2797. 1892 of these 
alleged burning of houses, however only about a third, 592 said they were able to call the fire brigade. 
the response of fire brigade revealed that in 78.89 % of cases where the fire brigade 
were called, they failed to come. Only 13.7%479 of the grievously injured (those who 
died eventually) received medical assistance and only in 15% of cases was the 
assistance timely.480  Figures were better for those injured –  78.71% received medical 
help, though only 12.3% received help within 1-4 hours of being injured.481 
 
2. Internal Displacement  
  
Around 2 lakh people482 were estimated to have been displaced from their homes on 
account of the large-scale attack on Muslims and their properties. This was not the 
first bout of mass violence to create a displaced population, but it was the first time 
that the inactive and ineffective response of the state in rehabilitating the displaced 
was closely examined and focused upon by activists, official bodies such as the 
NHRC, Planning Commission, Minorities Commission, large sections of the media 
and international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty.  As a result of their efforts, we know that nearly ten years after the mass 
violence, the problems of people internally displaced are very much a live issue. We 
examine the contours of this humanitarian situation in two parts.  
 
a) Internally displaced, Phase 1: Insecurity and Vulnerability in Relief 
Camps. 
 
Here we examine the crisis and living conditions of the displaced in the immediate 
aftermath of their forced homelessness between about February 27, 2002 to the end of 
December, 2002.  There is no reliable data available regarding the people who 
                                                                                                                                                              
Out of 592 people who called the fire brigade, 467 reported that the fire brigade failed to reach the 
affected place. 
479 “Hard Facts” in Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005), 11.  
 480 “Hard Facts” in “Concerned Citizens Tribunal, Crimes Against Humanity”, (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005), 12. Of a sample of 2397, there were 146 deaths reported by respondents. Of 
these, only 20 said they received any medical assistance, while 82 said that no medical assistance was 
available. Of the 20 who received medical assistance, only 3 (15%) said they received medical help 
within 1 to four hours of the attack. 
481  “Hard Facts”, Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 2, (Mumbai: 
Citizens for Justice and Peace, 2005), 19-20.  
482 Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the State 
of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, Ahmedabad: 2007), 5. 
migrated out of Gujarat, or emigrated from India or those who found safety amongst 
extended family.  So this discussion is based upon numbers and experiences of 
people who stayed in Gujarat, and had to seek help outside their extended families. 
 
The vast majority of the homeless took shelter in temporary makeshift camps, 
referred to as relief camps in all the documentation.  RTI information,483 as well as 
unofficial sources shows that there were a total of 138 camps set up in Gujarat across 
10 districts.  
 
 
Number of relief camps per district. 
 
Ahm Vadodara Sabar Anand Kheda Dahod Mehsana P’mahal G’nagar Patan 
77 10 6 20 1 9 6 6 2 1 
 
It was estimated that a total of over 113, 697 people484 were living in these camps.  
We see that over 50% of total camps were set up in Ahmedabad, this is unsurprising 
as the intense violence and displacement in Ahmedabad was by far the worst.   
Around 75,000 people were living in camps in Ahmedabad city alone. It was 
estimated that 95% of those displaced across Gujarat were Muslim485.  In the face of 
displacement of this scale, in March 2002, the Revenue Minister Haren Pandya 
placed the official number of the relief camps all over Gujarat at ninety-one.486  
 
(i) Relief Camps in Ahmedabad 
 
In response to our RTI application to Ahmedabad we received a response requesting 
us to come and inspect the files at the collectors office in Ahmedabad, as there was 
                                                        
483 The table is produced by combining the RTI responses with the information in the reports. Apart 
from Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Anand, the RTI application was transferred from the district to 
various talukas, and in some cases we received a response from one or two talukas, but largely no 
response was received, or it was nil. The information regarding Dahod comes mainly from “Genocide 
in Rural Gujarat: The Experience of Dahod District, A report prepared by Forum Against oppression of 
Women and Aawaaz-E-Niswaan, Bombay (2002) available at 
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/rural/rural-gujarat.pdf last accessed April 3, 
2012. 
484 Communalism Combat, March - April 2002, 17. 
485 Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the State 
of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, Ahmedabad: 2007), 5.  
486 “A Memorandum to the Government of Gujarat on its Duties”, Amnesty International, March 28 
2002, available at http://www.sacw.net/Gujarat2002/amnestysGujaratreport.pdf. 
voluminous data and the PIO was unsure about the exact nature of required 
information. We spent two days in the collector’s office going through the files to 
identify the information that we thought was relevant in each camp file. We found 
that we saw that each file had an affidavit which was sworn by the organizers by 
way of an indemnity bond promising to run the camp in accordance with the rules, 
and each had a standard annexure providing details of facilities available at camps 
and names of camp residents, including details of number of men, women and 
children. Also there was routine correspondence passing between the offices, 
requesting cash payment, wheat etc. In some files there was evidence of inspection 
and a report by a “liaison officer”, who was an officer appointed by the state to 
monitor the camps. There were 81 separate files487 maintained in respect of camps, 
but four camps were not approved and in respect of five camps, no records on file 
were made available to us. 
 
There were a total of 77 camps approved in Ahmedabad, of which 41 (amounting to 
more than 50%) were started on March 3, 2002 and 40 (again, over 50%) were closed 
by May 31, 2002. A further twenty-nine camps (close to 38%) were closed by July 31, 
2002. Only eight camps (amounting to around 10% of the total camps) were 
functioning between August and December. Of these, 39 camps were run by Muslim 
administrators, mainly for Muslims and 34 were run by Hindus, mainly for Hindus, 
but there were two camps where the camp residents were Muslim and Hindu in 
almost equal numbers.488  The large number of camps for Hindus is contrary to the 
information in the public domain489. The official records show that the Hindu camps 
account for almost 50% of the camps, which raises an interesting question as to why 
such a large number of camps were needed for Hindus, who suffered a small fraction 
of casualties compared to Muslims. We don’t have lists of Hindu/Muslim residents 
                                                        
487 “Collector Statement on All Camps”, provided on inspection at Collectors Office, March 31, 2010. 
488 We could not have gleaned this information from the list of camps itself. We initially divided the 
camps into Hindu/Muslim, based mainly on the name of the camp and camp organizers. However, then 
there was some amount of follow-up and checking details of camps on the ground carried out by Mr. 
Kishor M Chauhan, coordinator of the Ahmedabad Justice Unit of Nyayagrah, which revealed that we 
were largely (around 90%) accurate in our identification of Hindu and Muslim camps. 
489 Both Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 1, (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005)and Mander, H., “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: 
Penguin Books, 2009), section on “Compensation” state that there were a handful of Hindu camps. 
to enable us to check the number of residents and their religious identity in each 
camp.  
 
The response to our RTI applications confirmed that the responsibility for providing 
immediate shelter and refuge fell on NGOs, mainly religious bodies, as the Gujarat 
government did not set up any camps490.  
 
Our difficulty in accessing information on relief camps is indicative of the lack of 
government engagement in relief provision.  Surprisingly, information about relief 
after such serious mass violence was not available at the district level.  Our RTI 
applications were transferred to various DDOs, and then to the Taluka Development 
Officers. We have received responses from almost all of the districts confirming that 
there were no government camps, and sending details of NGO camps that were set 
up. A few districts have provided details of facilities at camps. 
 
Below we summarize the main issues that emerge from the official records we 
accessed as well as the detailed NGO documentation491 regarding the failures of the 
state towards the displaced and dispossessed:  
 
• Failure to set up relief camps:  
The government’s own records inform us that the state did not set up any camps 
in the face of serious, widespread violence in the state. It has however made 
available to us via a circular492 dated April 30, 2002, whereby senior officers were 
assigned responsibilities to supervise the facilities provided in the Relief Camps 
to the affected persons.  This was likely put in place in the face of enormous 
                                                        
490Mander, H., “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: Penguin Books, 2009) It 
has been argued that prior to Gujarat, 2002, governments have consistently organised relief camps for 
people who were internally displaced by the violence, but the Gujarat government was the first 
government to refuse to set up relief camps after a major communal conflagration. 
491 See Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 2, (Mumbai: Citizens for 
Justice and Peace, 2005); PUCL, “Violence in Vadodara:  A Report”, PUCL and Vadodara and 
Vadodara Shanti Abhiyan (2002); Amnesty International Report; "We Have No Orders to Save You: 
State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat", Human Rights Watch, Vol. 14, 
No. 3(c), April 2002, and Mander, Harsh, “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: 
Penguin Books, 2009) particularly the “Relief and Rehabilitation” sections  in all, which deal with the 
conditions in relief camps. 
492 Resolution no. R.H.L./232002/513(8)/S.4, dated April 6, 2002 on file with author. 
public pressure to take relief measures by the NHRC, litigation in the courts and 
various national and international relief organisations). 
 
• Failure to provide essential food 
Government assistance to the camp organizers was a daily food ration493 for 
enlisted residents of ‘recognized’ camps, and cash doles of as little as 5 rupees 
per day494 for the first two months, which was then increased to seven rupees495 
per day. 
 
However the government only started issuing food rations for the displaced 
persons around one week after the camps496 had been set up, and so in the initial 
period the task of providing food, as well as shelter, clothes and medical 
treatment to the victims of the violence had been left entirely to local 
communities or NGOs. This allegation is supported by the information we 
received from RTI which shows that the circular sanctioning the cash dole per 
person was only issued on March 6, 2002497.  It is important to remember that 
most of the survivors of the mass violence escaped with no personal belongings. 
They needed some money daily for their minimal personal expenses, which was 
just not available during their extended residence as internal refugees in the relief 
camps.  
 
It was also reported that many camps were not receiving any rations or were not 
receiving them regularly. The government files that we examined in respect of 
one of the biggest camps in Ahmedabad, Shah Alam, records complaints 
regarding late payment of rations and inadequate supply of food stock.498 The 
                                                        
493 Ration was a standard amount for each person, consisting of 400 grams flour, 100 grams rice, 50 
grams sugar, 50 grams oil, 50 grams milk powder. Circular No.  RHL 232002/513/S.4, dated March 5, 
2002. 
494 “Rs. 5/- per person per day shall be paid towards the miscellaneous expenses such as vegetables, 
fuel, condiments etc. to the NGOs, that are running the Relief Camp.” Circular No. 
RHL:232002:513(3)-S.4 dated April 6, 2002. 
495 Circular No. RHL/232002/513(3)/S.4, dated April 30, 2002. 
496 Circular No.  RHL 232002/513/S.4 dated March 5, 2002. 
497 Circular No. R.H.L. 232002/513(3)/S.4 dated March 6, 2002. 
498 We found evidence of this in the “Shah-Alam” file, which was obtained from the Collector’s Office 
in Ahmedabad. A letter requested that the “arrears of stock of food be supplied immediately from 
March 1, 2002 and March 15, 2002, and till date for 10537 persons.” 
authorities did not respond quickly enough to the increasing population of the 
camps, thereby causing severe hardship to the camp dwellers. It is reported that 
there was shortage of food for more than 300 people in the camps of Halol, Kalol 
and Himmatnagar and there are a number of media reports alleging that the 
quality of ration was of poor quality and insufficient.499 
 
• Failure to provide safe access to potable water.  
None of the camps were connected to the public water distribution system of 
their towns. Some received water supplies, others had to make private 
arrangements.500 
 
• Sanitation facilities were reported to be non-existent or poor. 
The facilities that the organizers of the camps could muster for sanitation, 
bathing and drinking water were painfully inadequate. The Sahmat (Safdar 
Hashmi Memorial Trust) fact-finding team in March 2002 found only one mobile 
toilet with four chambers for nearly 9,000 people in the Shah-e-Alam camp. A 
month later the numbers in the camp had swelled to a high of 12,000, but there 
were only 18 toilets. Even these became badly clogged as they were rarely 
cleaned, and emanated a nauseating stench and attracted swarms of flies.501 
There is also evidence of inadequate water supply at this camp for the first 
twenty-six days.  From the file correspondence on the biggest relief camp, Shah 
Alam, which was set up in Ahmedabad, official records confirmed that there was 
no toilet facility, and inadequate water supply in the camp for at least the first 
twenty-six days502.  
 
• Failure to provide security in the camps.  
                                                        
499 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(2005: Gujarat): 8, available at: 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf. Also see media reports, Times of 
India March 5, 2002, April 9, 2002 and June 9, 2002 and Indian Express March 25, 2002 and May 15 
2002. 
500 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(2005: Gujarat): 9, available at: 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf. 
501 Mander, Harsh, “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: Penguin Books, 2009). 
502 We found evidence of this in the Shah-Alam file obtained from the Collector’s Office in 
Ahmedabad. 
Government files we examined on Shah Alam camp indicated that the camp had 
no security for the first 26 days. 
 
Unofficial reports confirm this, and describe the insecurity faced by camp 
organizers and those dwelling in them regarding threats of closure. One camp in 
Dahod was ordered to be closed over a phone-call within hours of the new 
District Collector taking over. After complaint and protests it was reopened but 
many in the camp had already left to go back to villages from where they had 
fled. There are details of attacks on camps in Odhav and Sukhsar reported where 
the police present failed to provide security.503  
 
• Lack of access to essential medical services.   
RTI data from Ahmedabad indicates that medical services were provided on a 
daily basis and five doctors were “ honorary”.  However, civil society surveys at 
the time revealed that only a sixth of camps received free medical services504, and 
in many camps were discontinued after a month.505  The scale of violence – and 
resulting injuries – make this a serious failure. 
 
• Access to psychological and social services, especially to survivors of sexual 
violence and to children. 
 The voluntary leadership managing the camps was almost entirely male, and not 
sensitive to the special needs of women. In relief camps, except for some non-
government efforts, there was little counselling or mental health support for the 
traumatized women victims of sexual violence. They were left to fester in their 
memories and inner suffering, sharing occasionally in groups, but mostly 
engaged in helping their families survive this ordeal.506 
 
                                                        
503 Forum Against Oppression of Women and Awaaz-e-Niswaan, "Genocide in Rural Gujarat: the 
experience of Dahod District", (Bombay: June 2002) 9-10, and Human Rights Watch, “We Have No 
Orders to Save You” available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/.  
504 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(2005: Gujarat), 12, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf.  
505 Ibid. 
506 Mander, Harsh, “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: Penguin Books, 2009). 
• Replacing identity documents  
The majority of the camp dwellers were unable, while fleeing their homes, to 
collect official document such as ration cards and proofs of residence. Research 
amongst the internally displaced showed that government officials were not pro-
active in issuing the necessary identity documentation to the survivors.507 This 
made it impossible for them to access their legal rights and statutory entitlements 
that required proof of identity.  
 
• Forcible closure of Relief Camps.  
RTI information reveals only one camp of 201 residents that closed within 4 
weeks of being set up on June 30, 2002. All the camps in Mehsana and 
Panchmahal closed by June 30, 2002. Most official relief camp files that we 
examined had the necessary paperwork for opening and closure of camps, in that 
there were letters on file from the camp owners requesting closure on ground of 
insufficient residents.  
 
However, this official picture of camps being closed voluntarily is contested by 
affidavits filed by camp managers in court, alleging that the government forcibly 
closed camps after three months, claiming the situation had become normal. The 
“arm-twisting”508 methods that were used to achieve closure emerge most clearly 
from the affidavits filed in a Gujarat High Court petition to prevent closure of the 
camps. Twenty-six509 affidavits were filed by camp managers, some of which 
speak of tactics such as non-payments or late payment of the moneys due, and 
checking the number of people at camp without notifying the organizers at odd 
times.510  This was in clear violation of the NHRC’s recommendation that no one 
should be forced to leave the camps till suitable alternative arrangements had 
                                                        
507  Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the State 
of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Ahmedabad: Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, 2007), 25, 
reports that it was only the “mamlatdar” (officer in Collectorate, responsible inter alia, for issuing of 
ration cards) of Vadali district who acted proactively by coming to the camp on his own initiative and 
reissuing ration and voter identity cards. 
508 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Vol. 3, (Mumbai: Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, 2005), 30-34, Annexure 4.  This is a phrase used by more than one relief manager in the 
extracts of the affidavits annexed to the High Court petition, and reproduced as annexure CCT report, 
Vol. 3.  
509 Ibid., 30. 
510 Ibid., 30-31. 
been made for them.511 Most of the displaced received compensation of only Rs. 
1250512 at the time of leaving the camps.  
 
• Discriminatory treatment.  
Human rights observers at the time alleged discriminatory treatment of Muslim 
camps on account of Hindu camps receiving more regular rations, better facilities 
and more visits from senior government officials.513  
 
• Disrupted education and employment. 
 50% of the children surveyed in camps had to go schools supported by local 
NGOs as they could not access government schools once they were displaced514.  
70% of those surveyed in camps were unable to earn a living.515 
 
(ii) Relief camp litigation.  
As noted earlier, many relief camp providers and managers issued a petition on 
April 1, 2002,516 alleging that the state was failing to provide basic facilities such 
as water, sanitation and medicine to vulnerable citizens517.  The proceedings 
lasted only a few months and were superseded by a PIL issued by CJP covering 
the same issues.  The High Court’s order dated April 19, 2002518 pursuant to this 
petition demonstrates the hostility that survivors and their supporters faced from 
all branches of the Gujarat government, even the judiciary, at the time. The High 
Court lambasted the petitioners, stating that their absence (due to a 
                                                        
511 National Human Rights Commission, order of April 1, 2002 and May 30, 2002. 
512 Resolution No. (1) R.H.L.- 232002/513, S.4, dated March 5, 2002 of Revenue Department.  
513 “A Memorandum to the Government of Gujarat on its Duties”, Amnesty International, March 28 
2002, available at http://www.sacw.net/Gujarat2002/amnestysGujaratreport.pdf, refers to the Hindu 
Camp of Kankaria that was regularly visited by high-profile personalities, including a visit from BJP 
leader, Mr. Advani. 
514 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(Gujarat, 2005), 18, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf.. 
515  Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat”(Gujarat, 2005), 17, available at 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.net/images/GPID%20FINAL.pdf.. 
516  Special Civil Application No. 3773/2002 in Gujarat High Court.  
517 Interestingly, there is no reference or mention of any legal dispute or proceedings in any of the relief 
camp files. 
518 See Order dated April 19, 2002 in Special Civil Application No. 3773/2002 in Gujarat High Court.  
miscommunication regarding the date, as it transpired at the next hearing) from 
court on this date showed that there was “no foundation” for the petition and 
that their absence from court also showed that the petitioners, “who are posing 
as caretakers on behalf of the inhabitants of the camps” were not interested in 
pursuing the petition, in which, he said, “reckless allegations” had been made. 
The judge went on to say that he would not deal with the report submitted by the 
Gujarat government in the absence of the petitioners but noted that the 
“exhaustive report” submitted by State contained minute details of services 
provided to the camp inhabitants. The High Court felt that the government was 
taking more than “reasonable care” in maintaining the camps and “looking after 
the inhabitants.”519  
 
b) Internal Displacement, Phase 2:  Relief colonies  
 
After the Gujarat government pressured camp organisers to close relief camps while 
they were still needed, families in camps were compelled to return to their original 
places of residence.  When they returned to their homes, many Muslim families 
found they were not allowed back in to their villages unless they agreed to withdraw 
legal cases, and agreed to repress themselves socially by, for example, not using 
loudspeakers for azaan, the Islamic call to prayer.520  Many Muslims were unable to 
return to their homes on account of fear, threats and the existence of social and 
economic boycotts of Muslims in many areas.  As a result, many displaced Muslim 
families migrated to urban areas where they clustered together in “relief colonies”.  
 
On May 7, 2003, the NHRC passed an order noting inadequate rehabilitation by the 
state.  It instructed a local NGO, Centre for Social Justice, to produce a status report 
based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on the Internally Displaced in April 
2004.521 CSJ found that, in 2004, there were more than 40 relief colonies and over 4000 
                                                        
519 Ibid. 
520 For an account of the experience of returning families in villages and towns across Gujarat, see 
Mander, Harsh, “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” (India: Penguin Books, 2009) and 
also Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the 
State of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Ahmedabad: Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, 2007). 
521 Centre for Social Justice, “Status Report on Rehabilitation of Victims of Communal Violence in 
Gujarat” (Gujarat, 2005). 
families still displaced from their original homes.522 CSJ conducted another survey in 
April 2005 and found that the number of colonies had increased to 47, housing 5170 
families. In 2007523 the number of colonies had increased to 69.   
 
The Commissioners of the Supreme Court on the right to food524 received disturbing 
information in 2005 about acute food and livelihood distress of people who were 
internally displaced by the 2002 riots in Gujarat.  The Commissioners, mandated by 
the Supreme Court to monitor food and employment schemes in India, wrote to the 
government of Gujarat to remedy this. The Gujarat government denied the very 
existence of the displaced, post the closure of relief camps.  It stated that no relief 
colonies existed in Gujarat, and that those who choose not to go back to their original 
homes do so on account of better livelihood options where they have decided to 
settle, not on account of any fear or socio-economic boycotts.525   
 
The Supreme Court Commissioners commissioned a survey, and found 81 relief 
colonies with 4545 families, comprising around 30,000 persons, living in very 
difficult conditions.526 All of the 81 colonies surveyed, without exception, were found 
to have been established by various Muslim organizations, ranging from 
conservative groups like the Jamiat Islami and Gujarat Sarvajanik, and more centrist 
religious organizations like Jamiat-ulema Hind, to a heterogeneous range of small, 
local Muslim organizations, and in at least one case by funders with known 
proximity to the mafia.527 The land was mostly purchased from Muslim landowners 
at commercial rates, therefore it is not surprising that the locations of many of the 
colonies were commercially unattractive: their poor locations meant lower costs for 
the organizations that purchased the land to establish the colonies. The colonies were 
invariably built in the vicinity of other Muslim settlements, because it is only among 
people of their own faith that the displaced people felt secure.528 
 
                                                        
522 Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the State 
of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Ahmedabad: Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, 2007). 
523 Ibid.  
524 Appointed in Civil Writ Petition, 196 of 2001. 
525  Mander, Harsh “Inside Relief Colonies in Gujarat: Surviving State Hostility and Denial”,  




The findings of this research were conveyed to the Supreme Court through a letter 
from the Commissioners in March 2007. In this letter the Commissioners 
recommended that contempt of court notices be issued to the Chief Secretary and 
other officials of the government of Gujarat, for misrepresenting facts and furnishing 
incomplete and inaccurate information to the Commissioners appointed by the 
Supreme Court. In response to this letter the government of Gujarat filed an affidavit 
in the Supreme Court in August 2007 apologizing for the wrong information. The 
Commissioners of the Supreme Court then gave detailed instructions to the state 
government to provide a range of services to the internally displaced persons.  
 
The National Commission of Minorities also sent a fact-finding team to Gujarat in 
August 2006.529 The team also found that the Gujarat state was still claiming that 
people were staying voluntarily in colonies and denying any insecurity or fear as 
being reasons why they could not return and denying basic facilities to the people 
living in the camps.530It concluded that the government was not fulfilling its basic 
constitutional responsibilities and had failed to provide a safe atmosphere to 
facilitate the return of displaced to their homes, even four years after the violence.531 
 
3. Monetary Compensation 
 
Our RTI applications on compensation were transferred between various 
departments.   We eventually received a response from the Department of Revenue 
Department, which provided us with a bundle of circulars in Gujarati on 
compensation relating to the mass violence of 2002 on death, injury, loss and damage 
to residential property and losses to commercial property and relief camps. We did 
not receive any information on compensation for sexual violence or religious 
desecration. Below, we discuss what we learned from official and unofficial records.  
 
4. Compensation for Death  
 
                                                        
529 Hashmi, Shabnam, “The Uprooted, caught between Denial and Existence: A Document on the State 
of the Internally Displaced in Gujarat,” (Ahmedabad: Centre for Social Justice and Anhad, 2007), 7- 8. 
A team from the National Commission for Minorities visited 17 colonies following a complaint filed to 
the commission in August 2006. 
530 Ibid. 
531 Ibid. 
The Gujarat government had initially fixed higher compensation rates for Hindus 
killed in the Godhra incident,532 although it was was later forced to equalise the 
amount533 to Rs.1.5. lakhs534.   
 
The state government responded immediately to the loss of Hindu lives at Godhra 
and announced on the very day of the Godhra incident a compensation of Rs.2 lakh 
to families of those killed. The Government Resolution (“GR”) dated February 28, 
2002, well before the investigation into the matter, speaks of “assassination” of 
karsevaks (markedly different from the language used in official records regarding 
deaths of Muslims, “as a reaction to Godhra”).  
 
The compensation for death resulting from violence in all other incidents, which 
were overwhelmingly Muslim lives, was initially fixed at Rs.1 lakh – 50% less than 
the compensation for those killed in the Godhra incident. It appeared that, to the 
government, Muslim lives were worth half as much as Hindu ones. Of course, there 
was a huge outcry against this outrageous step, and the Gujarat government had to 
backtrack and it made compensation for both Hindus and Muslims who were killed 
in 2002 incidents of violence, Rs.1.5 lakh. However, as the NHRC noted in one of its 
orders,535 the reason the Gujarat government gave for this backtracking was not to 
treat everyone who had lost their lives equally, regardless of religion, but the fact 
that Hindu karsevaks had written to the government accepting reduced 
compensation. Interestingly, the Gujarat government did not give us details of the 
Rs.2 lakh circular it originally announced in favor of Hindus. It appears that this 
circular has been deleted from official records. 
 
The timing of the government’s response was also point to discriminatory behaviour. 
It announced relief for families of those killed on the same day as the Godhra 
                                                        
532 This fact is confirmed by the National Human Rights Commission, 2002- 2003 Annual Report, 
available at http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR02-03ENG.pdf, as well as in the "Crime Against 
Humanity: Concerned Citizen Tribunal Report", Vol. 1, (Citizens for Justice and Peace, Mumbai: 
2002). However, no circular was provided to confirm this. 
533 Resolution no. RHL/ 232002/513-S.4, dated February 28, 2002 received by letter dated April 6, 
2010 from the Revenue Department, Gujarat. 
534 Resolution no. RHL/ 232002/ 513(2)- S.R, dated March 4, 2002. 
535 NHRC recommendations dated April 1, 2002, National Human Rights Commission Report on 
Gujarat, (New Delhi: March - May, 2002), para 20 (xii), available at 
http://www.cjponline.org/gujaratTrials/statecomp/pdf%20files/pdfs/NHRC%20Report%20%20July%2
02002.pdf. 
incident, but took 3-4 days to respond to the killing of hundreds of Muslims all over 
Gujarat.536   
 
Compensation for families of the dead was later supplemented by Rs.3.5 lakh 
compensation from the Central Government in 2006, after the UPA coalition came to 
power at the Centre.537 
 
The main problem that survivors of those killed faced in applying for compensation 
was the requirement of a death certificate. Many people who died could not be 
traced or identified, mainly because of the brutal methods used in killing and 
disposing of the remains.  Under the law, a person can be presumed to be dead if 
they are shown to have disappeared for seven years. This meant that heirs of missing 
persons could not make claims till 2009. Also this compensation is presently only 
available to legal heirs, not other members of the missing person’s family.  
 
The government claims that it has paid Rs.5 lakh to families of 1166 people, out of a 
total of 1169 people on the official list of those killed, i.e. only 3 families remain 
uncompensated.538  Of course, this does not account for the families of the over 1000 
more people who civil society groups have estimated were killed in 2002.  
 
5. Compensation for Injury 
 
There is evidence of discrimination between Hindus and Muslims by the Gujarat 
government in both the speed of response as well as the quantum of compensation 
for injury. It announced compensation for injuries for Godhra victims by a circular 
dated February 28, 2002, which provided for compensation of Rs. 1000 to Rs. 5000 for 
temporary disability and Rs. 5000 to Rs. 50,000 for permanent disability.     
 
Injury compensation539 for all other victims of mass violence was dated March 4, 
2002 and was at a lesser rate.  
• In cases of 10 % disability, Rs. 2,000/-. 
                                                        
536 The massacres described earlier and the majority of mass deaths of Muslims took place on February 
28, 2002 and March 1, 2002. 
537  Resolution no. RHL/102007/2477S.4 dated September 24, 2007. 
538 See SCA (Special Civil Application) 14664 of 2008, dated September 7, 2011.  
539 Resolution no. RHL: 232002/ 513(2) - S.R, dated March 4, 2002. 
• In cases of more than 10 % and up to 30 % disability, Rs. 3,000/-. 
• In case of more than 30 % and up to 40 % disability, Rs. 5,000/-  
• In cases of more than 40 % disability, Rs. 10,000/- was to be paid as 
immediate assistance, and the remainder was to be paid after obtaining 
the certificate of permanent disability. 
 
Whilst the maximum in both cases was Rs. 50,000 for permanent disability, the 
amount for lesser injuries is less and harder to obtain as per this circular. This 
circular was changed by another dated April 30, 2002,540 which was applicable to all 
persons injured. 
• Injury compensation was increased to Rs. 1.25 lakh in 2009. 
 
The main problems here have been getting the evidence to prove the injury and the 
discretionary nature of decision-making by the administering authorities and also 
the administrative problems encountered by amendments to the circular.541  
 
The State claimed in SCA 14664 of 2008 that it had made payments in 2513 of 2548 
cases, (amounting to Rs. 31,84 crores), further payments of Rs. 15.6 lahks in 13 cases, 
and only had 22 cases left to make payments on in its identified list of eligible 
victims.542 
 
6. RTI on women victims and sexual offences  
 
We asked for information on compensation and rehabilitation measures tailored to 
victims of sexual violence, as well as measures tailored towards women. We were 
informed that there were no relevant norms, circulars or guidelines, and the Gujarat 
government had not offered any compensation of this nature.543 
                                                        
540 Resolution no. RHL: 232002/ 513(2) - S.4 dated April 30, 2002. This circular  provided that  
• In case the disability is 10 % disability, Rs. 5000/- should be paid instead of the old standard 
of assistance of Rs. 2,000. 
• In case the disability is more than 10 % to 30 %, Rs. 15,000/- should be paid instead of the old 
standard of assistance of Rs. 3,000/-.  
• In case the disability is more than 30 % to 40 %, Rs. 25,000/- should be paid instead of the old 
standard of assistance of Rs. 5,000/-.  
In case the disability is more than 40 %, the immediate assistance was Rs. 10,000/- and on obtaining 
the certificate of permanent disability, Rs. 40,000/- and thus, in all Rs. 50,000/- was the limit for 
assistance. The said standard continues till date. 
541 Information sharing and Training meeting between CJS and NG on 9.10.10 
542 Special Civil Application, 14664 of 2008, dated September 7, 2011. 
543 RTI response from PIO Revenue Department, dated April 6, 2010. 
 
The above responses are troubling because, despite widespread and brutal sexual 
violence in 2002, the Gujarat government saw no need to provide a specific circular 
and compensation to meet the needs of survivors affected by sexual violence. 
Chronic neglect of sexual violence comes across in the High Court’s refusal to 
consider this issue in response to a writ petition544 on behalf of the survivors.545  
 
7.  Residential Property and Goods Loss  
 
The NHRC report of 2003-2004 indicated that the amount of compensation for 
property loss was, in many cases, grossly inadequate and the attitude of the state 
government towards tackling relief and rehabilitation “indifferent”.546 
 
The NHRC in its annual report of 2003-2004 recorded that: 547 
“... whilst the maximum limit of compensation fixed by the State Government 
was Rs. 50,000548, the average compensation being paid for a fully damaged 
house was only Rs. 6678.28 per house in rural areas and Rs. 8554.58 per house 
in urban areas. As per the report of the police agency, the total damage to 
properties (including houses, business establishments, vehicles etc.) was to 
the tune of Rs. 687.34 crore, whereas the State Government had distributed 
only Rs. 56.37 crore to the affected persons, which works out to just about 9 
per cent of the loss.” 
 
The government refused to follow the NHRC’s suggestion to set up a grievance 
redressal unit to deal with the numerous complaints, on the grounds that that the 
matter was under judicial consideration on account of pending litigation. The NHRC 
noted that the mere fact of a petition being filed before the High Court was not a 
sufficient ground for not attending to the grievances of affected citizens549. 
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available at http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR02-03ENG.pdf.  
547 National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report: 2003-2004, 20, para 3.24, available at 
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548This is confirmed by the circulars we received from RTI, Resolution No. R.H.L. 232002-513(5)-S.4, 
dated March 20, 2002 of Revenue Department.   
549 National Human Rights Commission, “Annual Report: 2003-2004”, 20, paragraphs 3.23, 3.24, 
available at http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR02-03ENG.pdf.   
  
The process of claiming compensation was lengthy, complex and unpredictable and 
most inaccessible for those who were most needy, i.e. the illiterate and destitute. 
Many people were unable to claim because of the requirement to produce various 
documents such as FIRs, panchnamas and the requirement of a “survey report”. 
Many could not because their houses had not been surveyed. Even where there was 
both a survey report and a panchnama stating the damage, people received a small 
proportion of the maximum damage.  
 
The amount of residential compensation was increased by a factor of ten in 2009, so 
that victims were eligible to receive nine times the amount they had received 
previously.550 However, only those who had already received compensation for 
residential damage could apply for enhanced compensation.  Claimants who had 
most likely been left out after the first compensation circular would have been those 
who were poor and less educated.  So the pre-condition for enhanced compensation 
seems to punish the neediest, rather than trying to reach all those who are eligible.   
 
According to an affidavit filed by the Gujarat government in March 2011, it had paid 
out Rs. 289.10 crores to 29,107 claimants and had a further Rs. 3 crores to pay to 360 
claimants.  By August 5, 2011, it claimed that Rs.126.83 lakhs had been paid to 293 
claimants, leaving only 67 unpaid claims.  
 
8. Compensation for commercial loss 
 
Compensation for commercial loss was initially fixed at a very low level of up to a 
maximum of Rs 10,000.  The payment was subject to proper supporting evidence 
regarding earning assets / instrument. However, there was a provision to allow a 
payment of 5000/- on the basis of the affidavit / indemnity bond of the affected 
person, where no proof of the earning asset was available.551 The Central 
Government increased this amount ten times – to a maximum of Rs. 100,000 - on July 
24, 2007552.  However, as with residential property loss, only those who claimed and 
received compensation for commercial loss the first time round in 2002 were eligible 
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551 Resolution no. R.H.L. 232002/ 513(4)/ S.4, dated March 11, 2002. 
552 Letter dated April 27, 2007, Human Resources Division, Ministry of Home Affairs. 
to claim what was now nine times the amount that they had previously received. 
Many businesses chose to opt for a loan, which was the alternative option open to 
claimants in 2002.  Many of these never actually received the loan but were 
consequently ineligible for increased compensation as they had not received 
anything earlier.  
 
The final order regarding compensation for commercial loss recorded that on March 
17 2011, there were a total of 19,373 identified cases of uninsured commercial loss 
and the government had paid out Rs. 83.68 crores, and had Rs. 2 crores left to pay to 
a further 355 claimants. The government had paid a further Rs. 174.44 lakhs in 282 
cases by August 5 2011, leaving only 72 unpaid cases and unpaid compensation 
amounting to Rs. 25.12 lakhs.   
 
9. Desecration of Religious Places 
 
In 2002, symbols of Muslim identity were attacked, damaged and destroyed all over 
Gujarat.   Under pressure from the NHRC, the Gujarat government initially 
conceded that it should repair destroyed religious structures, but has refused to do 
so in the years since 2002.   
The NHRC in its order of April 1, 2002 noted that the Gujarat government had in 
principle agreed that the damage to religious buildings should be repaired.  A year 
later, the NHRC noted the state’s non-compliance regarding this in its report of 2002-
2003. In 2003, the NHRC tried to pursue this further, but the Gujarat government 
refused to indicate whether it was going to repair destroyed religious structures 
because the matter was “sub judice”, pointing out that the Islamic Relief Committee 
of Gujarat (IRCG) had issued a petition553 demanding that the Gujarat government 
implement the NHRC’s recommendation and either repair religious buildings or 
give compensation in lieu of rebuilding and repair. The NHRC noted, however, that 
a writ petition did not constrain the government from repairing and rebuilding 
property damaged during mass violence.  The NHRC Chair, retired Supreme Court 
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Chief Justice Verma, wrote a letter554 to the PM, notifying him of the state 
government’s non-cooperation and urging the Centre to step in. 
 
The Gujarat government dragged its feet on the litigation555 initiated by IRCG for 
many years, until the Chief Justice of High Court of Gujarat pulled it up, in March 
2010. The Advocate General argued that the State Government could not make any 
commitments to the court as rebuilding and repair was “a policy matter.”  The Chief 
Justice asked the government to “sit together, keeping all the grievances of the past 
aside, and amicably solve the issue” and to “move forward” keeping the people and 
their sentiments in mind....”.556 
 
The government did not shift its position, and reiterated before the Court that it 
would not pay anything as it had a firm policy of no compensation for religious 
buildings – it had, government counsel claimed, not paid any compensation for 
damage to religious structures caused by the 2001 earthquake, or by the terrorist 
attack on Akshardham temple in 2002.557 Counsel for IRCG pointed out in turn that 
the government had failed to protect the fundamental right to religious identity in 
2002, and therefore failure to repair or rebuild religious structures violated Articles 
14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 
 
The High Court asked both the state and Central governments whether they had 
received the NHRC’s report on this issue, whether this report had been placed before 
Parliament and the State Assembly and what action, if any, they had taken in 
response to the report.558 The Central Government confirmed that the NHRC’s report 
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555 The matter was listed more than 41 times by 2010 without any real progress. 
556 Dasgupta, Manas, “Provide the healing touch, court asks Gujarat”, The Hindu, March 24, 2010 
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557  “Gujarat not to aid rebuilding riot-damaged religious buildings”, Legal India, January 25, 2011 
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Analysis, December 23, 2011, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_gujarat-government-
to-consider-nhrcs-report-on-religious-places_1629318. 
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News and Analysis, March 22, 2011, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_damage-to-
religious-structures-gujarat-government-centre-asked-to-reply_1522827. This was confirmed by the 
Gujarat High court order dated March 21, 2011, in relation to SCA 3023/03.  
was put before Parliament on December 21, 2004, and that there is an action taken 
report (“ATR”) on this issue, which it has to file before the court.559  Media reports560 
indicate that the Gujarat government has filed an affidavit which denies receipt of 
the NHRC report of 2002-2003 until 2011, and has informed the court that it intends 
to table the NHRC report at the next Assembly session in February-March 2012. On 
February 8, 2012, the High Court delivered a landmark judgment rejecting the state’s 
contention that its responsibility to compensate was limited to places of residence 
and places of business561.  
 
The acting Chief Justice of Gujarat, Bhasker Bhattacharya and Justice Pardiwala held 
that the religious places had been destroyed on account of “negligence”, and the 
policy adapted by the state not to compensate was violative of articles 14, 25 and 26 
of the Indian Constitution562. It also held that the state had violated section 20 of the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 by not putting the annual report of NHRC 
before the legislative assembly, despite receiving it in 2005563. The court also ordered 
the state government to give compensation for restoration of the buildings and set 
out a detailed mechanism for implementation of its order within six months. It 
appointed the Principal District Judges as learned Special officers of the affected 
districts for deciding the amount of compensation within six months of receiving the 
claim from applicants.564  
 
In this case we note once more the Gujarat government’s delay, inaction, refusal to 
acknowledge responsibility for harm suffered by survivors of mass violence, even in 
the face of scrutiny by the NHRC and the High Court.   
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10. Other rehabilitative measures 
 
Survivors of the 2002 mass violence faced discriminatory rates of compensation, 
strikingly low rates of compensation for personal injury and property damage, and 
bureaucratic barriers to accessing compensation.  They face continuing displacement 
from their homes, and continuing loss of livelihood.   
 
Survivors of 2002 have tried turning to the Gujarat High Court to counter these long-
term financial effects of mass violence based on proposals by the Central 
government.   In a writ petition, Special Civil Appeal No. 14664 of 2008, they sought 
compassionate appointment in the government of the children of those killed in mass 
violence, as suggested by the Central Government in a letter to the Gujarat 
government dated May 14, 2007.  The letter proposes: 
• Family members of riot deceased be given preference in recruitment in 
paramilitary forces, state police forces, public sector undertakings and other 
state and Central government departments. 
• Special recruitment drives to accommodate eligible members from riot-
affected families. 
• Allow those who lost their jobs to rejoin their old jobs. 
• To provide pensionary benefits to those who had left their jobs due to riots, 
and subsequently crossed the retirement age, by relaxing normal rules to the 
extent possible565. 
 
The High Court held that grant of compassionate appointment was a matter of 
government policy and that it would not pass any specific order, in light of the 
detailed affidavit filed by the state of Gujarat categorically expressing its inability 
to accept the suggestion of the Government of India dated May 14, 2007.  
 
The Gujarat government made the same argument it had made in relation to 
repairing religious structures damaged during mass violence – that 
compensation was a “policy matter”.  The High Court was too easily persuaded 
by this imprecise and blanket argument.  Any government’s policies are 
intertwined with the laws passed by the Central and state legislatures.  
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Policymaking is bounded and guided by statutory and Constitutional 
obligations.  The authority of the courts to assess and review the quantum of 
compensation for human rights violations, and in tort, is well established.  So, 
while it is for the government to work out the details of a compensation package, 
it is the duty of the Court to assess whether compensation is fair, and to hold the 
government to established standards of just compensation for serious human 
rights violations.    
 
G. Summing up 
 
In this episode of mass violence, there is undeniable evidence of state complicity, 
which has been documented in detail by official bodies, civil society groups and 
survivors themselves. It is also the episode that has seen the most active and 
sustained intervention by victims and NGOs (at the local, national and international 
levels). It has been the most litigated upon episode, with some early and effective 
intervention by the NHRC and the Supreme Court. 
 
While the high-profile SIT trials have garnered headlines, we still know very little 
about whether and to what extent the Gujarat government has examined allegations 
against the hundreds of government officials and political functionaries who were 
alleged to have acted negligently and in gross dereliction of their duties. While 
disciplinary action remains pending against vast majority of the officials who failed 
in their duties, those who fulfilled their official duties during the 2002 mass violence, 
and resisted political pressure were “unofficially” punished, demoted, transferred 
and harassed.  Two such officials, Sanjeev Bhatt and Rahul Sharma, are presently 
subject to criminal proceedings, initiated, they claim, on instructions from the 
uppermost echelons of the Gujarat Government. 
 
This episode of mass violence demonstrates the limitations of the present systems 
that are in place, to secure accountability from individuals situated in positions of 
power within the administrative and political hierarchy. The context of mass 
violence in Gujarat alerts us to the need to seek accountability from institutions 
responsible for upholding human rights. The NHRC was one institution that 
intervened with urgency and insight into the ground realities. It can be said that it 
was accountable and carried out its constitutional role by persistently 
communicating and engaging in dialogues with a recalcitrant state to secure criminal 
justice and prevent human right violations of the displaced. The Gujarat state 
however failed to cooperate and implement the advice, orders and recommendations 
of the NHRC, which it is mandated to do under the Human Rights Act, and in line 
with its constitutional duties. Examples of its non-cooperation, delay and evasive 
tactics include:  
 
• Delay in response to the urgent notice issued by NHRC, coupled with its 
“perfunctory” response. 
• Failure to furnish important information regarding names of political 
functionaries involved in violence. 
• Refusal to transfer key cases to CBI. 
• Failure to take appropriate measures to protect witnesses to ensure fair 
trials. 
• Failure to implement NHRC recommendations regarding non-voluntary 
closure of relief camps, setting up grievance procedures regarding 
compensation, repair and renovation of damaged/destroyed religious 
buildings and adequate rehabilitation of the displaced. 
 
This episode alerts us to the difficulties of securing accountability from the police.  
The facts and figures here demand that we develop and think about changing the 
institutional culture of the police, which has clearly not imbibed the constitutional 
values of protecting citizens regardless of their religion. 
 
Similarly, the failure to impose timely curfews and maintain public order and 
thereafter to provide adequate protection and shelter to the displaced across most of 
the sixteen affected districts denotes a systemic failure at the administrative level. A 
handful of sarpanch or panchayat members directly indicted by survivors have been 
arrested, but the vast majority has not been held accountable for their inaction 
and/or complicity. 
 
On the whole, the judicial response at the trial or high court level did not inspire 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process in the immediate aftermath of 2002. 
The SC intervened effectively in the “Best Bakery” and “Bilkis Bano” cases, and 
managed to secure convictions against some of the accused that had either been 
acquitted or not tried at all by the lower court. But again, the problem was not 
limited to one or two cases, which could be addressed by reprimanding the 
concerned judges or rectifying their errors. The closure of 2000 cases without any 
evidence of proper application of mind by the lower judiciary amounted to “rubber-
stamping”566 rather than checking and guarding against any abuse of process by the 
investigation agency, as per the constitutional duty of a judge. The failure to close 
hundreds of cases without notifying the complainants as required clearly by law 
denotes a systemic, institutional failure that requires a rethinking and reformulation 
of the accountability mechanisms in place for an independent and competent 
judiciary.  
 
The SC acted in line with its constitutional role delivering a fierce judgment in Best 
Bakery upholding the idea of a secular India founded on the rule of law. However, 
the facts that the NHRC and various survivors have thereafter sought its 
intervention in 2002 cases points to a gap between the constitutional ideals 
enunciated by the SC and the ground reality of Gujarati courts. Also, it is far from 
clear why the SC thought it appropriate to transfer just two of the massacre cases to 
CBI and outside Gujarat, the SIT cases have been riddled with controversies with 
many doubting the independent functioning of the SIT.   Any policies and laws to 
combat communal violence will tend to focus on the police and district 
administration. It is imperative that these efforts also try to address the thorny issue 
of judicial accountability in episodes of mass violence. 
 
There has been steady advocacy to compel the government to deliver basic 
compensation and rehabilitation.  The first wave of litigation and public campaigns 
were focused around providing adequate facilities (clean water supply, sanitation, 
food and medical facilities) in the relief colonies which were mainly run by NGOs, 
trust and religious bodies, and preventing their forceful closure.  Then, as the camps 
closed and many people still had nowhere to go, various relief colonies were set up 
and various NGOs and activists took up the issue of the internally displaced people 
within Gujarat. This campaign was backed by the intervention of various bodies 
such as the Planning Commission, the Commission for Minorities and the Supreme 
Court Food Commissioners, and eventually led to the state recognizing the existence 
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of these people, that it had denied till early 2008. The next phase of group litigation 
focused on compelling the government to implement compensation and restoration 
packages already announced by the centre and also to compel the state to provide 
compensation or to undertake renovation of the religious buildings damaged and 
destroyed. 
 
The fight to formally prosecute the CM and senior police officers is still very much 
alive with Mr. Zadephia confirming he was not responsible for internal security and 
did not take the controversial decision to bring dead bodies of karsevaks back to 
Ahmedabad. The Gulbarg trial is far from over. The High Court’s recent judgment 
on religious compensation is a historic one confirming that the state had indeed 
violated the constitution.  The Gujarat episode is remarkable both for the level of pre-
planning and complicity of the state in mass violence and the vigorous civil society 
and media activism to uncover the truth and hold the highest senior functionaries 
accountable. 




This study tries to understand, through official records, the performance of the 
criminal justice system in response to an episode of mass violence.  To do so, we 
sought information on the entire chain of official proceedings from when an 
individual first complains to the police, to the result of criminal appeals in court.  In 
this chapter, we consider what we learned across the four episodes of mass violence 
that we examined.   
 
The quality and quantity of data available for each episode varied greatly depending 
on official records already in public and the State’s response to our RTI applications.  
We had access to far more information on Delhi 1984 and Gujarat 2002 than on mass 
violence in Bhagalpur and Nellie.   We also had greater access to information on 
some parts of the criminal justice process as compared to others.  Our analysis below 
reflects this uneven access.    However, despite gaps in the records we extracted, 
some themes emerge very clearly across all four episodes.  It is clear that the police, 
at a very early stage, deflect, ignore and misreport victims’ complaints in ways that 
undermine, often fatally, any proceedings that follow.  We discuss what we learnt in 
more detail below.  
 
 
B. Complaints and FIRs  
1. Complaints 
 
We attempted to secure copies of citizens’ complaints in the aftermath of mass 
violence, as well as copies of the FIRs registered as a result of these complaints.  We 
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had hoped to compare the two records, and trace whether the substance and details 
of complaints were accurately reflected in FIRs.  However, we found across the four 
episodes studied that the police did not retain copies of complaints.  Police stations 
did not have information on number of complaints received in Nellie in 1983, Delhi 
in 1984 and Bhagalpur in 1989.  We got some information on complaints from police 
stations across different districts in Gujarat.  Out of a small sample of 952 complaints, 
937 complaints were received in person, 13 by fax, 1 by registered post and 1 by 
phone.  This information suggests that many people sought help in person from the 
police, despite the risks involved in travelling at the time.  It also suggests that the 
police may track complaints, distinct from FIRs, when complainants go in person the 
police station but they do not reliably track complaints received over the phone.     
 
Failure to track complaints and quick destruction of complaints that are officially 
tracked can have serious implications for a survivor of violence.  If she later 
challenges the accuracy or completeness of the FIR, her initial account – which would 
back up the challenge if it is accurately recorded - no longer survives.  If the police 
refuse to register an FIR, evidence that a complaint was made soon after an alleged 
offence helps to establish that delay in registering the case was not the fault of the 




(a) Non-registration of FIRs 
 
Reports by the media and human rights groups record that survivors of mass 
violence have often faced refusal by the police to register cases.   Such refusal does 
not flow from the provisions of the law.  Section 154 of the CrPC 1973 governs 
registration of FIRs, and requires that “every information relating to the commission of 
a cognizable offence [emphasis added]” be written down, the resulting FIR be read 
out to the informant, if needed, and that a copy be given “forthwith” to the 
informant.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained that the duty to register is 
a mandatory one – where a citizen’s complaint discloses the commission of a 
cognizable offence, the police have no discretion on whether to register a case or not.   
 
In Hem Raj v State of Punjab568 the SC held as follows:  
 
“….The law is very clear and well settled that a report which discloses the 
commission of a cognizable offence must be treated as the First Information 
Report under Section 154 Cr. P.C. It does not matter whether the person 
lodging the report had witnessed the commission of the offence or not, nor is 
it necessary that all details should be mentioned in the report about, the 
manner of occurrence, the participants in the crime, the time and place of 
occurrence etc. The requirement of Section 154 Cr. P.C. is only this that the 
report must disclose the commission of a cognizable office and that is 
sufficient to set the investigating machinery into action.” 
 
Clearly, the law on registering a criminal case is sufficient to allow anyone, not 
necessarily an eye-witness or victim, to register a complaint with the police.  But our 
research revealed that across all episodes of mass violence police repeatedly failed to 
register cases. This was recorded by commissions of inquiry as well as media and 
NGO accounts of survivors’ experiences after mass violence.   
 
By failing to register FIRs, the police silence complainants.  Official records cannot 
reflect what percentage of crimes committed were not registered and were not 
pursued following failure to register.  Any official surveys of crimes such as that 
carried out by the National Bureau of Criminal Records will not capture these cases 
because they were never registered as crimes.  It would take research amongst 
communities that experienced mass violence to capture the number of victims who 
were deterred by police refusal to register an offence and estimate how many alleged 
offences were never investigated on account of police refusal to act in conformity 
with the law.  All too often it is the most vulnerable survivors of violence, those who 
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are poor and illiterate, who are likely to face resistance by the police when they 
attempts to register crimes. 
A further issue for future research is how the police deal with officials who refuse to 
register a reported crime.  Is non-registration of an offence considered a serious 
matter internally?   What sort of record keeping might make refusal to register an 
FIR easier to trace?  What measures – such as citizen’s inspection committees – might 
be used to detect refusal to register FIRs and support victims in their dealings with 
the police?  
 
Even where an FIR is registered, it might be incomplete.  The police may entirely 
omit certain facts, so crimes based on those facts will not be charged.  Most of the 
FIRs we examined across all four episodes listed appropriate sections of the Indian 
Penal Code in relation to the offences disclosed by the facts recorded in the FIR.  
However, FIRs in some cases in Gujarat were discovered to have left out important 
facts entirely.  In the Bilkis Bano case for example, the police did not initially record 
Ms. Bano’s description of being sexually assaulted.  This case received considerable 
national attention, and this omission came to light.  Most FIRs that omit significant 
facts will not be detected as being flawed.   
 
 
(b) Defects in FIRs 
 
Clearly, there are many “missing” FIRs – FIRs that should have been recorded but 
were not.  The FIRs that are recorded after mass violence reveal flaws that 
considerably undermine their role as the starting point of criminal investigation and 
prosecution. As discussed above, the FIR is very important because it is the earliest 
report made to the police and is supposed to initiate police investigation which may 
lead to the arrest and trial of the alleged offenders. 
 
We secured copies of FIRs registered after all four episodes of mass violence that we 
studied.    
 
• 668 FIRs were registered after the Nellie massacre, of which we secured 525 
FIRs.  These appear to be the FIRs that have survived.  
 
• We were informed that 458 FIRs were registered after the 1984 mass violence, 
of which we secured 425 FIRs.   
 
• 595 FIRs were registered in the months following mass violence in Bhagalpur 
in 1989.  The Bihar government disclosed only a small sample of X FIRs in 
response to our RTI applications.  
 
• 4252 FIRs were registered after the 2002 mass violence in Gujarat.  We 
secured a sample of these from across different districts, and analysed 400 
FIRs in depth. 
 
Before we turn to our analysis of the FIRs we received, we want to consider the 
number of FIRs registered after the four episodes we studied, as a proportion of the 
officially acknowledged death toll.  Of course, FIRs registered after mass violence 
relate not only to the crime of murder but to a range of crimes against persons and 
property.   However, the death toll indicates the intensity of violence more generally, 
and is very likely to correlate with other types of violent crimes.  The smallest 
number of FIRs registered as a proportion of the officially acknowledged death toll is 
in Nellie, followed by Bhagalpur.  The largest number of FIRs – 4252 - more than six 
times that in any previous episode of mass violence, were registered in Gujarat.   The 
large number of FIRs in Gujarat reflects the fact that mass violence in 2002 was 
spread over 24 districts, across hundreds of police stations over a period of more 
than 6 months, claiming an officially acknowledged 1037 lives, though unofficial 
estimates of the death toll are higher.  High FIR registration also suggests that 
victims came forward to complain in greater numbers than after earlier episodes of 
mass violence, reflecting perhaps the combined effect of greater civil society support, 
media coverage and NHRC intervention.    
 
That said, the number of FIRs recorded only partially reflects whether crimes can and 
will be investigated.  The quality of FIRs recorded is very important.  We analysed 
the FIRs we received to check whether they captured important details about the 
offence alleged.  We tracked the following: 
 
• The time between when the incident alleged took place and when it was 
reported 
• The between when the incident was reported and when it was recorded in an 
FIR 
• Whether, if there were delays in reporting the incident or recording the 
incident, the FIR notes the reason for the delay 
• Whether the FIR was clear, in that it included details of the accused, the 
complainant and a reasonably detailed description of the incident in question 
• Whether the FIR resulted in a chargesheet or in summary closure 
 
 
The FIRs we analysed were filed in different states, at different points in time, in a 
number of formats and don’t record exactly the same categories of information.  So 
the information we tracked could not always be directly compared across different 
episodes.   We found, across the four episodes, serious defects in the FIRs registered, 
which we discuss below.   
 
(c) Unnamed accused 
 
A large number of FIRs across all four episodes did not record the names of the 
accused.   In Nellie, 42% of FIRs did not record names of alleged perpetrators.  In the 
sample of FIRs we accessed from Bhagalpur, over 98% did not record names of 
perpetrators.  Out of 400 FIRs related to Gujarat 2002, including the ones where 
victims or third party witnesses were the complainants, the accused are described as 
an anonymous mob in 291 FIRs i.e. in 73% of FIRs.   We found a high correspondence 
between FIRs where police were complainants and where perpetrators were not 
named, but recorded as “anonymous mob” in FIRs.  At the same time, there were a 
large number of FIRs, particularly from Nellie and Bhagalpur, where despite victims 
of violence being complainants – and therefore more likely to be able to identify or 
describe perpetrators - the accused were recorded as mobs.  78% of FIRs from 
Bhagalpur where the complainant was the victim did not name the accused.   From 
Gujarat, the percentage of FIRs where the accused were recorded as mobs was the 
same – 73% - whether the police, victims or witnesses were complainants.    This 
parity between FIRs based on complaints by private citizens and complaints by 
police officers strongly suggests a blanket erasure of names.  The police seem to have 
omitted the names of the accused, even where the complainant could and did 
identify who they were. 
 
Commissions of inquiry noted that this recording of “anonymous mobs” was a result 
of police misreporting and omission.  The Mishra and Nanavati inquiries into mass 
violence in 1984 which heard many victim testimonies confirmed that the reason 
behind unknown and untraced accused often resulted from the police refusing to 
register names of accused, sometimes under political pressure and sometimes due to 
the  political allegiance of individual police officers.  More recently, the Supreme 
Court found persuasive the evidence it heard on how the police in Gujarat had 
routinely refused to record the names of perpetrators despite complainants 
identifying them.  As a result, the Court ordered that 2000 cases that had been 
summarily closed should be reopened and reinvestigated.   
 
The effects of erasing the names of perpetrators are not difficult to gauge.  It makes 
investigation more difficult, and also provides an alibi for lackadaisical investigation 
and summary closure.       
 
(d) Standard format rather than individualised complaint 
 
After mass violence in Nellie in 1983, almost all the registered FIRs used the same text 
as the complainant’s account, suggesting that the police were either not questioning 
individual victims at all, or ignoring individual accounts.  The individual particulars 
recorded were the property lost by the complainant, and sometimes a list of family 
members who were murdered.   
 
After mass violence in Delhi in 1984, many FIRs also had a standard format.  The Jain 
Aggarwal Committee observed that “the police had devised a format for receiving 
complaints. This format contained various columns including the names and 
addresses of the complainants, the damage to the person, the kind and description of 
the looted/burnt property and the quantum of loss suffered by them. There was no 
column or space for recording facts about incidents of murders, the names of the 
deceased persons and the names of the culprits if these were known.”  
 
The standard format FIRs from Nellie and Delhi appear to be designed to allow 
compensation claims for looting and arson, but by erasing the complainant’s account 
of the crime committed, lay a weak foundation for investigating the crime.  In 
Gujarat, many FIRs used the same stock phrases to justify or explain offences against 
Muslims, citing “Godhrakand” as the reason for the criminal acts at issue in that 
particular complaint.  The Chief Minister of Gujarat expressed the view that mass 
violence in 2002 was a reaction (with the subtext that it was an inevitable, justifiable 
reaction) to what happened in Godhra.  Seeing stock phrases about crimes 
committed “in response” to violence in Godhra in FIRs recorded across Gujarat, at 
different points in time indicates either striking consonance amongst individual 
police officers across the State with the Chief Minister’s view, or direction given to 
the police about the tone and content of FIRs.    
 
(e) Delays in registration 
 
We examined FIRs for two different types of delay – (1) how much time had elapsed  
between the alleged crimes occurring and the complainant reporting the crime to the 
police, and (2) how much time had elapsed between the complainant reporting the 
crime and the police registering the FIR.   
 
The second type of delay – delay by the police in recording an individual’s complaint 
- is rarely captured in FIRs.  The law states, as discussed earlier, that the police 
should register all complaints alleging a cognizable offence, and don’t need to make 
preliminary enquiries before they do so.  Hence, there should be no delay between 
the complaint and the FIR being registered.  FIRs after mass violence in Nellie were 
registered over 2 months after the massacre.  33% of FIRs registered in relation to the 
anti-Sikh violence were registered in 1985, 1987, 1991 and 1993.   After mass violence 
in Bhagalpur, there were serious delays in filing FIRs, which were noted by the 
ADM, Law & Order, who reported that it took about 3 months for FIRs to be 
registered.     
We raised earlier the problem of FIRs simply not being registered.  It is probable that 
the police, after these episodes of mass violence, either did not register FIRs at all, or 
did so fairly promptly.  However, it is also likely that the police don’t record delays 
between reporting and registration as the law requires that there be no delay.  For 
example, FIRs in Delhi registered in 1995 in response to a commission of inquiry 
have recorded no delay between receiving the complaint and registering the FIR.  
The experience of the victims as reflected in inquiry reports suggests that the 
complainants in at least some of these 1995 FIRs probably approached the police in 
1984 without success.  The new FIRs should have acknowledged this in some way, 
but most did not do so.   
Delay between the incident and the complaint is captured in FIRs, unless the date of 
the incident is left out.  There were significant delays between the incident at issue 
and the complaint only in Delhi, where many FIRs showed delays of over 12 months, 
and over 2 years in a few instances.  FIRS from Gujarat 2002, Bhagalpur 1989 and 
Nellie 1983 showed delays between the crime and the complaint of days rather than 
weeks.  In a situation of mass violence, such delay was very likely the result of 
people waiting for violence to subside.  The longer delays reflected in the Delhi 1984 
FIRs suggest that people seeking to complain were turned away when they 
approached the police, and the police registered FIRs only after the intervention of 
commissions of inquiry.   
 
The striking and serious flaw in FIRs across all 4 episodes was that when there was a 
delay between the crime and the complaint, the police did not record the reason for 
the delay in the FIR.  For example, the prescribed format for FIRs in Gujarat requires 
the police to record the reason for delay between the incident and the complaint, but 
we found it was not recorded in 68%  of FIRs.   
 
This is a serious omission because when and if the case comes to trial in the future, 
the judge can draw a prejudicial inference from the delay if it is not explained or not 
believed.  Where such delay is unexplained, the court is expected to be far more 
vigilant for any contradictions or indications of fabrication by the complainant569.  
Clearly, omitting the reason for the delay might weaken the prosecution’s case.570   
 
(f) Omnibus FIRs 
 
We examined whether the FIRs we saw were “omnibus” FIRs, putting in this 
category FIRs that were unclear on details of the complainant, accused and incident, 
and put in a single FIR disparate, unconnected incidents.  We did not see omnibus 
FIRs related to the Nellie massacre – possibly because it was so concentrated in space 
                                                        
569 See Tara Singh and ors v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 63, para 4, where it was stated, “unless 
there are indications of fabrication, the court cannot reject the prosecution version as given in the FIR 
and later substantiated by the evidence merely on the ground of delay. These are all matters for 
appreciation and much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 
570 See Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh and ors, MANU/SC/0065/2003, para 10, where it was said, 
“[t]here is no heard and fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR would automatically render the 
prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily depends upon facts and circumstances of each case whether 
there has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt about the veracity of the 
prosecution case and for this a host of circumstances like the condition of the first informant, the nature 
of injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to provide medical aid to them, the 
distance of the hospital and the police station, etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no 
mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either way merely on account of delay in 
lodging of the FIR.” , 
and time, and also because these FIRs seem intended to facillitate compensation 
rather than prosecution.  None of the FIRs we had relating to Bhagalpur 1989 were 
omnibus FIRs, though these were a small sample of the total.   The Bhagalpur inquiry 
report does not discuss omnibus FIRs.  6% of FIRs relating to Delhi 1984 were 
omnibus FIRs, in 84% of which the police were complainants.   
 
The CrPC does not explicitly prohibit omnibus FIRs.  Drafting FIRs so as to combine 
unconnected incidents is clearly such bad practice, that it was probably not thought 
necessary to bar it explicitly when the Code was drafted and when it has been 
amended over the years.  The CrPC does have a number of provisions on framing 
charges so as to maintain clarity571.  Even where an FIR is recorded in an omnibus 
fashion, such an FIR should give rise to several chargesheets and separate trials, if 
the police and prosecution abide by the CrPC.    
 
However, after episodes of mass violence, when the police put many violent 
incidents that are unconnected or tangentially connected in a single FIR, the 
investigations that follow are likely to be confused and the resulting chargesheets 
and trials yoke together incidents in different locations, involving different actors. 
These trials have a large number of defendants, and witnesses, and are lengthy, 
cumbersome and confusing.   Trial hearings tend to get adjourned repeatedly, if any 
of the many defendants cannot be in court – a strategic advantage that the accused 
are not slow to exploit.  Built on an unclear and unwieldy foundation, the 
prosecution’s case is also likely to be unclear and fail to meet the necessary standard 
of proof.         
                                                        
571 Section 218 requries that distinct charges have to be framed for separate offences.  A complex 
incident where an individual committed a number of crimes must, therefore, result in a number of 
different charges.  Section 219 provides that an individual can be charged together with up to three 
offences of the same kind, i.e. offences that punishable with the same amount of punishment under the 
same section of the Indian Penal Code or of any special or local laws.  Section 220 allows different 
offences committed by the same person to be charged and tried together, as long as they are committed 
in a series of acts that are connected together so that they could be considered a part of the same 
transaction.  Section 223 lays down when different people can be charged together, and requires, inter 
alia, that two or more people charged together committed the same offence or different offences as a 
part of the same transaction.  
 
(g) “Doctored” FIRS 
 
The Bhagalpur commission of inquiry discussed a few serious incidents of police 
changing details of FIRs after the FIR had been registered, either to hide traces of 
their own initial negligence, or to slant the trajectory of a case.  Official records on 
Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984 and Gujarat 2002 did not identify similar doctoring of FIRs by 
the police.   
 
The defects in FIRs discussed above may have appeared separately in a FIR but often 
there were multiple defects in one FIR.   So, for example, a single FIR may have been  
omnibus, vague and lacking names of the accused. 
 
Defects in the FIR can be corrected or compensated at various points in the 
proceedings that follow.  A defective FIR need not  – and should not – damage  
investigation by the police.  However, records from the four episodes we examined 
indiate that defective FIRs allow the police to avoid thorough investigation.  Unclear, 
incomplete FIRs make it easier for the prosecution to frame inadequate charges, and 
thereafter, to try the case in question ineffectively.   
 
 
C. Investigation and summary closure of cases 
 
Across all four episodes, a large number of cases were summarily closed – they never 
proceeded to trial.  The absolute number of cases closed was high and the summary 
closure rate for cases after these episodes of mass violence was far higher than the 
general summary closure rates prevalent at the time.  The national rate of summary 
summary closure572 – cases summarily closed as a percentage of all cases registered – 
was 7.54% in  1981,  5.71% in 1991,  5.2 % in 2002, 4.88% in 2003 and 4.48% in 2004.573  
 
We compared the closest available national rates of summary closure compiled by 
the National Bureau of Criminal Records with the summary closure rates after each 




Gujarat 2002 Bhagalpur 
1989 
Delhi 1984 Nellie 1983 
% of cases 
summarily 
closed  
50% 70% 37%  56% 
The closest 





5.71% 5.71%-7.54%  7.54% 
 
We see summary closure rates 10 times higher than the closest national rate in each 
episode of mass violence, except for Nellie, where the summary closure rate is 8 
times higher than the closest national rate.  These summary closure rates are 
strikingly high, particularly considering that most of the crimes reported would have 
been committed in the open, during the day, by large groups.  They were witnessed 
by many victims and bystanders, and sometimes by television cameras.  The highly 
concentrated and relatively public nature of these crimes would suggest a lower rate 
of summary closure than the relevant national average.  So summary closure of cases 
at a rate this much higher than the national average was almost certainly not the 
result of general incompetence or happenstance.  These rates suggest that FIRs were 
                                                        
572 The National Bureau of Criminal Records does not track the rate of summary closure at a state level, 
which would have offered a more rigorous comparison.  Nevertheless, the national rate is instructive. 
573 These percentages have been calculated from figures provided in Table 4(A)Disposal of IPC Crime 
Cases by Police-Decadal picture, accessed at http://ncrb.nic.in/CII-2009-NEW/cii-
2009/Chapter%204.pdf.(National Criminal Bureau Records 2009. 
faultily recorded to a far greater degree than is usual; they suggest that cases, once 
registered, were investigated poorly or not at all, again to a far greater degree than is 
usual.  These summary closure rates also indicate that unusually large numbers of 
flawed FIRs and shoddy investigation was not caught or corrected by senior police 
officials in supervisory roles.  This in turn, strongly indicates that the 
“incompetence” of junior police personnel who were interacting with complainants, 
registering FIRs and investigating cases was condoned at a minimum, but very likely 
required by senior officials under political pressure.   
 
We saw earlier that there is no discretion when it comes to registering a complaint 
that discloses a cognizable offence.  But the police do have discretion over 
investigating a complaint once it is registered.  Under Section 157, they have a duty 
to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding a complaint brought to their 
attention and if necessary, to take steps to take measures for the discovery and arrest 
of the offender.  There are two grounds on which the police need not proceed with 
the investigation - (1) where the offence under investigation is not of a serious 
nature574  or (2) if it appears that there are insufficient grounds to enter into 
investigation575. However, under Section 157(2) police are required to report their 
decision not to proceed with a criminal investigation by filing a summary closure 
report with reasons to the concerned magistrate.  The police are also required under 
Section 157(2) to inform the complainant that the case is not being investigated. The 
discretion given to police officers to investigate offences is necessary – no criminal 
justice system can function without such discretion. An absolute requirement to 
investigate all offences would overload the system to an unworkable level.  
However, this discretion has clearly been misused after episodes of mass violence, so 
as not to investigate cases effectively and close them summarily.   
 
                                                        
574 Section 157(1)(a) CrPC 
575 Section 157(1)(b) CrPC 
Case law has  further strengthened the rights of victims by requiring that the 
concerned magistrate must give notice to the victims and the right to represent thier 
views on a proposed closure report.576 
 
The official records we accessed do not record whether the complainant was given 
notice, as the CrPC requires, when cases were summarily closed.  However, it is 
highly unlikely that the police and the magistrates involved gave such notice in most 
cases, given the high rates of unchallenged closure.   Clearly, neither the police, nor 
the prosecutors and judges played their legally prescribed role.  The extent of this 
failure strongly suggests that it was not commonplace slips and faults, but a 
response tailored to cases emerging from religious massacres where the perpetrators 
had political support. 
 
1. Re-opened cases 
 
A subset of summarily closed cases emerging from mass violence in Gujarat, 
Bhagalpur and Delhi were re-opened, or registered afresh.  Cases were re-opened 
when there was a significant intervention – not by the police on their own initiative.  
Reopening of the  cases in Gujarat was the result of a petition before the Supreme 
Court.  Reopening of the cases in Delhi was the result of intervention by a 
commission of inquiry.  A few cases on the Bhagalpur mass violence were re-opened 
when the JDU-BJP government came to power in 2006, after many years of an RJD 
led government.  None of the cases related to the Nellie massacre have been re-
opened. 
 
                                                        
576 See Bhagwant Singh v Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537 , the Supreme Court has 
categorically held that the magistrate must inform the complainant and give him or her an opportunity 
to be heard before accepting the final report resulting in closure of the case.  Further, the Supreme 
Court held that a magistrate, on receiving a summary closure report form the police, has 4 courses: (1) 
accept the report and drop the proceedings, (2) direct further investigation by the police, (3) investigate 
himself or direct another magistrate to do so, or (4) take cognisance of the matter as a private complaint 
under Section 200 of the CrPC when the material is sufficient in his opinion and if the complainant is 
prepared for this course of action. 
We examined how many re-opened / re-registered cases have been summarily closed 
– in effect, a second time.   Of 2000 cases re-opened by order of the Supreme Court in 
2004, 59 cases, or 3%, have been closed so far.  Of 255 re-opened cases related to the 
Delhi 1984 mass violence, 123, or 50% have been closed.  We did not secure official 
records on the 29 re-opened cases in Bihar, but media reports suggest that none have 
been summarily closed so far.   
 
Intervention by the courts or quasi-government watchdogs can lead to cases being 
reopened.  But this does not mean re-opened cases will be investigated thoroughly 
the second time around.  The high summary closure rate of re-opened cases relating 
to 1984 suggests that these cases were as concertedly neglected as they were the first 
time around.  That said, even if these re-opened cases were taken seriously, the lost 
time would make investigation and prosecution difficult.  The damage from 
summary closure soon after mass violence can rarely be substantially undone. 
 
Amongst the samples of case records we had, there is a big difference between the 
proportion of re-opened cases closed summarily a second time in Delhi (50%) and in 
Gujarat (3%).  However, it is premature to make too much of this figure, because we 
do not know how many re-opened cases will be closed in the coming months and 
years.  Many of these re-opened cases are still being investigated.   
 
Survivors of violence in Gujarat are pursuing re-opened cases in Gujarat (as did 
survivors of the 1984 mass violence in Delhi).   The number of cases being pursued in 
Gujarat by survivors privately and supported by activist groups and NGOs is higher 
than in any previous episode of mass violence.  Interventions by the NHRC and the 
Supreme Court’s order re-opening 2000 cases, which criticised large-scale summary 
closure, have clearly had enough of an impact that the Gujarat government may not 
be able to close re-opened quite as easily as the Delhi government was able to in the 





We sought information on the number of people arrested in connection with cases 
registered after the four episodes of mass violence we studied.  After the Nellie 
massacre, 1668 people were arrested, but information on the religion of those 
arrested no longer survives.  We accessed official records on 2734 arrests in Delhi in 
1984.  These records indicated that only a very small minority of people arrested 
were Sikh.  The majority were Hindu and some people arrested belonged to other 
religious groups.  In Bhagalpur, by contrast, official records, including the 
commission of inquiry, note that equal numbers of Muslims and Hindus were 
arrested despite the fact that far more Muslims were victims of violence.  The 
Bhagalpur inquiry report records incidents of police brutality against Muslims who 
were arrested.  It also notes that politically powerful accused persons connected to 
the ruling RJD party or connected to Hindu Right organisations were not arrested 
despite being named in FIRs.   
 
We accessed records on 14,830 arrests in Gujarat in 2002, which were a fraction of 
total arrests.  67% of those arrested were Hindu, 22% were Muslim and the rest 
belonged to other religious groups.  The proportion of Muslim persons arrested was 
high, considering that Muslims were overwhelmingly the targets of violence in 2002. 
One reason for this might be that the police registered “cross cases” against Muslim 
complainants and arrested them to put pressure on them to withdraw their 
complaints.   
 
After each episode of mass violence, the police failed to arrest accused, often over 
many months, even where the these individuals were identifiable and in the area.  In 
Nellie, FIRs were not registered for about three months and the number of people 
eventually arrested was very small compared to the police’s own estimate in FIRs of 
15000 attackers.  Although most offical records will generally not capture failure to 
arrest the accused, some of the records we looked at acknowledged and discussed 
this failure.  For example, the ADM’s report in Bhagalpur notes that some accused 
were not arrested and continued to intimidate victims.  In Bhagalpur, Delhi and 
Gujarat, there was evidence that often it was politically connected accused, members 
of Hindu Right organizations in Bhagalpur and Gujarat or Congress politicians in 
Delhi in 1984, who evaded arrest.  Sreekumar, a senior IPS officer in Gujarat in 2002, 
noted in his affidavit to the Nanavati Commission that victims were distressed by 
police failure to arrest politically powerful Hindu accused, even though their names 
figure in FIRs for major offences.    
 
Senior political leaders complicit in mass violence are unlikely to be named in FIRs 
because they do not participate directly in inflicting violence.  Politically connected 
participants in violence named in FIRs will almost always be more junior.  Even 
these more junior participants have wielded enough power locally that they evaded 
arrest in Bhagalpur, Delhi and Gujarat.  It is worth contrasting the efficiency with 
which the police in Gujarat arrested the accused in the Godhara case – almost 
immediately from the site of the incident – with their delayed, evasive response in 
other mass violence cases in Gujarat.  
 
E. Remand and Bail 
 
When someone is arrested, the police can detain him or her in police custody for a 
maximum of 24 hours before producing the individual before a magistrate,577 unless 
the individual is detained under particular preventive detention laws.  Such 
detention by the police before a criminal charge is often referred to as “police 
remand” or in police custody.   Once an accused is charged, he or she will be 
remanded in judicial custody or released on bail.  Such post-charge, pre-trial 
detention is in the prison system, and is described as being “undertrial” or in 
“judicial remand”.    
 
We applied for information on remand and bail in an attempt to examine whether 
and for how long the police held individual for questioning, and whether the 
                                                        
577 Section 50, CrPC; DK Basu v West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 
prosecution opposed bail.  We found that records on remand and bail no longer exist 
for Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984, and Bhagalpur 1989. Neither the police nor the 
prosecution nor the magistrates and sessions courts retained these particular records, 
and do not seem to maintain records on bail applications more generally in any 
organised fashion.    
 
However, 107 police stations in Gujarat responded to our query on remand 
applications, giving us at least a partial picture of such applications. Across these 107 
police stations, out of 14830 persons arrested, the prosecution made applications to 
put 2911 of those arrested on remand, i.e. detain them in prison custody.  674 of these 
applications were refused and 2165 were granted. Of the successful applications for 
remand, 1457 of those remanded were Hindu, 609 of those remanded were Muslim.  
 
The sample of remand applications we received makes clear that the prosecution 
chose not to apply for remand in most instances – it applied for remand for only 2911 
out of 14830 people arrested, i.e. only for 20% of suspects.  Where the prosecution 
made a remand application, it was likely to be granted. 74% of the applications from 
our sample were successful.   
 
We requested information about bail applications made by the defence in trials 
related to the 2002 riots. We received information from 118 police stations in Gujarat 
about this.  Amongst the cases registered at these 118 police stations, a total of 4858 
accused applied for bail and a total of 4516 accused were granted bail. The 
prosecution opposed only 283 applications. 455 out of 4858 applications were 
rejected.  This sample suggests that the vast majority of bail applications were 
successful - 93% of accused who made bail applications were granted bail. Their 
success in unsurprising – the prosecution opposed less that 6% of bail applications.   
 
The effects of this failure to oppose bail, or apply for bail cancellation when 
defendants violate bail conditions, are not difficult to anticipate.  When the accused 
are at large, they are able and likely to intimidate victims and witnesses.   The 
prosecution’s duty to oppose bail is surely heightened after mass violence where a 
particular religious or ethnic community has been targetted, and victims and 
witnesses from that community will be especially vulnerable.   
 
Layered upon the prosecution’s failure to apply for suspects to be remanded in 
custody, and the failure to oppose bail, are concerns about discriminatory responses 
by judges to bail applications.  The NHRC578 noted that a larger percentage of 
Hindus were being granted bail in the aftermath of violence as compared to 
Muslims. The allegations of discriminatory treatment of Muslim accused also appear 
in victim testimonies,579 and the affidavit of RB Sreekumar to the Nanavati 
Commission.  
 
F. Trials, acquittals and convictions 
 
 
Cases that are not summarily closed are “chargesheeted” – after investigation, 
charges are filed against the accused and the case proceeds to trial.   
 
- 299 out of 688, or 44% of cases relating to Nellie 1983 were chargesheeted.  
- 63% of FIRs out of a sample of 418 relating to Delhi 1984 resulted in charges 
being filed. 
- 30% of cases were chargesheeted overall in Bhagalpur 1989, but in most 
police stations the average was closer to 50% 
- 2037 chargesheets were filed in relation to mass violence in Gujarat in 2002, 
according to the Gujarat government.  This amounts to almost 50% of the 
4252 FIRs registered after mass violence. 
                                                        
578 See order dated 1st April 2002 and report of 2001-2002 of NHRC. The NHRC noted discriminatory 
treatment from the figures it obtained for arrests of Hindu and Muslim accused. 
579 Many victims complained about the grant of bail to Hindu accused charged with serious offences. 
We secured copies of chargesheets from a sample of cases filed after the Nellie, Delhi 
and Gujarat episodes of mass violence in response to RTI applications.   The Bihar 
police and prosecution did not disclose any chargesheets connected to mass violence 
in Bhagalpur.   While we could examine a selection of chargesheets from cases 
stemming from Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984 and Gujarat 2002, we had extremely limited 
access to other records related to trial proceedings, such as bail applications, interim 
applications to amend chargesheets, or reports on the outcomes of trials. 
 
1. Nellie 1983 
 
We know, of course, the outcome of trials following the Nellie massacre.  The 
government of Assam withdrew all the cases related to the massacre following the 
Assam Accord.  Applications for withdrawal were made under section 321 of the 
CrPC .   Section 321 allows the prosecution to withdraw a case with the consent of 
the court at any time before judgment.  If a case is withdrawn before charges are 
framed, the accused is discharged and if it is withdrawn after charges are framed, the 
accused is acquitted.   
 
The wholesale withdrawal of cases relating to the Nellie massacre was, in our view, 
clearly unlawful.  The Assam Accord only allowed a “review” of criminal cases that 
did not concern “heinous crimes”.  The prosecution in cases across Assam went 
much further, and withdrew cases that did concern heinous crimes.   This clearly 
indicates a policy rather than case by case review, which the Accord seems to allow.  
In deciding, across the board, to withdraw cases, the government of Assam violated 
the law at the time on withdrawal of cases.  In Chandika Mohapatra580, P.N. Bhagwati, 
J., as he than was, observed:- 
 
"The paramount consideration in all those cases must be the interest of 
administration of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down not can any 
                                                        
580 State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra (1976) 4 SCC 250 
categories of cases be defined in which consent should be granted or refused. 
It must ultimately depend on the facts and the circumstances of each case in 
the light of what is necessary in order to promote the ends of justice, because 
the objective of every judicial process must be the attainment of the justice." 
 
In Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar581, the Supreme Court said: 
 
"The statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal squarely vests on 
the public prosecutor. It is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away in 
favour of those who may be above him on the administrative side. The 
Criminal Procedure Code is the only master of the public prosecutor and he 
has to guide himself with reference to Criminal Procedure Code only. So 
guided, the consideration which must weigh with him is whether the broader 
cause of public justice will be advanced or retarded by the withdrawal or 
continuance of the prosecution." 
 
The law required that the prosecutor not cede his or her independent discretion over 
withdrawal to other sections of the administration, that withdrawal be considered on 
the facts of a particular case, and that withdrawal be in the interests of justice.  
Blanket withdrawal of cases clearly violated the law as it stood at the time, and 
amounted to State-sanctioned impunity for perpetrators of the Nellie massacre.   
 
2. Delhi 1984 
 
Commissions of inquiry and civil society reports have documented delayed and 
flawed trials, resulting in a high rate of acquittal.  A survey of 126 Sessions Court 
trials showed that 94% had resulted in acquittals582.  Almost 30 years after mass 
violence in 1984, there are appeals pending in the appellate courts.  Congress 
                                                        
581 AIR 1977 SC 2265  
582 Aman Trust, Public Prosecution in India, April 2005, 81 discussing V. Grover, Quest for Justice: 
1984 Carnage, VMAP-Oxfam, Unpublished, 2000 
politicians who participatedly directly in attacks on Sikhs have still not been 
effectively put on trial.   
 
3. Bhagalpur 1989 
 
We got very little official information in response to RTI applications about trials that 
followed mass violence in Bhagalpur 1989.  Civil society reports indicate that 142 
Sessions court cases were filed, a small number relative to the scale and ferocity of 
mass violence583.  38 of these 142 cases were involved charges of murder.  By 1995, 12 
of these murder cases, implicating 95 accused, had been decided and only one case 
had resulted in any convictions.  Of 95 people charged with murder in various cases, 
94 were acquitted.   
 
27 major trials were conducted so incompetently that the Bihar Government 
appointed a second commission of inquiry in 2006 to examine where the police and 
prosecution had been remiss in cases filed after 1989.  The government then re-
opened 29 cases related to the 1989 mass violence, focussing on cases related to 
prominent, politically powerful accused.  Media reports indicate that by 2008, 325 
accused in cases related to mass violence were convicted, of whom 125 received life 
sentences.  Kameshwar Yadav, a leading actor in the violence, was convicted of 
murder and destruction of evidence in 2007.  14 people wree convicted for their role 
in the Logain massacre in 2007.   Trials in re-opened cases appear to have been 
relatively speedy and effectively prosecuted.     
 
4. Gujarat 2002 
 
Slightly less than 50% of FIRs registered proceeded to trial in Gujarat.  We received 
information from over a 100 police stations across different districts about cases that 
went to trial.  The sample of records we could access suggests that over 50% of cases 
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that were tried went to the Sessions Court.  In some districts, the proportion of 
Sessions Court cases was higher.  Trials have been unwieldy and protracted and  
many have still not been completed. 
 
 
Special, fast-track courts have been constituted to try many of the cases under the 
purview of the Special Investigation Team constituted by the Supreme Court.   So far 
only two of the nine SIT cases, the Godhara case and the Sardarpura case, have been 
completed.  Both were “finalized” in 2011, nine years after the events at issue took 
place.   
 
In the 6 districts in Gujarat that sent us information on acquittal, a staggering 94-99% 
of cases completed so far have resulted in acquittals of all the accused on trial.  By 
corollary, the conviction rate in mass violence cases is extremely low.     
 
5. Problems across episodes 
 
Commissions of inquiry as well as non-government observers have recorded the 
same problems in the criminal justice system across all four episodes of mass 
violence.   Citizens who complained were turned away, intimidated or inaccurately 
recorded by the police.  The police investigated cases very poorly and the 
prosecution tried cases ineffectively.  Many observers do not comment on the role of 
the courts, but it is clear from the trajectory of mass violence cases that the judiciary 
has also contributed significantly to undermining these trials.   
 
(a) Poorly drafted FIRs 
   
As discussed above, this was a problem across all four episodes.  In Bhagalpur, for 
example, reviews by officials themselves admitted that the police drafted FIRs so 
poorly that it was difficult to redeem the investigation and trials to follow.   Having 
said this, the FIR is only the first step of a criminal case, and the police are expected 
to develop the case far beyond the information contained in the FIR.  The Supreme 
Court has made it clear in many judgments that the FIR is not supposed to be 
encyclopaedic or have an exhaustive account of all facts connected to the incident584.  
An FIR is not substantive evidence and its only evidentiary value is to corroborate 
the testimony of the person who had lodged the FIR585. 
 
(b) Poor investigation 
 
There is unequivocal evidence of faulty investigation by the police after all four 
episodes of mass violence, manifest in official records, and documented by 
commissions of inquiry, civil society observers and the media.  The police failed to 
question witnesses and gather evidence related to crimes committed during mass 
violence.  They also failed to secure expert medical and forensic evidence where it 
was needed.  Failure to conduct panchnamas and identify procedures promptly and 
correctly can lead to loss of important evidence such as recovery of weapons from 
the accused.  In the aftermath of Bhagalpur 1989, for example, the commission of 
inquiry noted that the police completely failed to search the homes of Hindu accused 
for arms and ammunition.  So flawed is investigation of mass violence crimes that it 
seems to go well beyond ordinary systemic incompetence, suggesting that senior 
political figures and officials have encouraged, tolerated, and required faulty, 
incomplete investigation.  The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in its Best 
Bakery and Bilkis Bano decisions, where it transferred cases connected to two 
particularly gruesome massacres outside Gujarat.   The Court took an even more 
unusual step, and created a Special Investigation Team to investigate nine especially 
serious cases related to mass violence in 2002.  It also appointed an amicus curiae 
who seems to have operated, in recent months, as a counterpoint to the SIT.    
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(c) Ineffective prosecution 
 
In a criminal trial, it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt.  The State, representing citizens, is supposed to seek a fair result 
rather than seeking to punish or avenge crime in a personal way.  The prosecution’s 
role is to assist the court in this endeavour, which requires the ability to be neutral 
and independent.   The CrPC requires that public prosecutors should have been 
practising as advocates for a minimum of 7 years.  The institutional arrangements for 
prosecution differ somewhat from state to state.   Some states like Delhi have a 
directorate of prosecution, while others like Gujarat do not have a directorate of 
prosecution.   Across different states, however, public prosecution is not 
institutionalised so as to protect prosecutorial independence586.  Prosecutors at the 
High Court level are appointed by the central or state government after consulting 
the court.  Prosecutors in Sessions Courts and Magistrates Courts are appointed by 
the state government.  District Magistrates consult the Sessions Judge and prepare a 
panel of eligible candidates.  The state government then appoints prosecutors from 
this panel.  Alternatively, the state government creates a cadre of prosecutors and 
appoints individuals from this pool587.  The executive thus plays the primary role in 
appointing prosecutors with very little oversight.    
 
Courts have emphasised the public role played by a prosecutor and struck down 
appointments that violate the Criminal Procedure Code and the state rules for 
appointing prosecutors588.  The Delhi High Court has held that an advocate formerly 
representing the complainant in a criminal trial could not later serve as a public 
prosecutor in the same case as he his neutrality had been compromised589.  Such 
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review by the courts of individual appointments has not addressed the more 
fundamental problem of inadequate independence.  In some states, prosecutors 
function directly under the police590.  In other states, including Delhi and Bihar, the 
directorate of prosecution is housed within the Home Department591.  In any event, 
prosecutors are appointed in ways that make them vulnerable to pressure and 
influence.       
 
Mass violence cases that suffer from poor, often biased, investigation by the police, 
are in particular need of vigilant and independent prosecution.  There is still a 
possibility of securing justice if a case is diligently prosecuted by taking the 
necessary steps to rectify police errors and support witnesses.  An effective 
prosecutor would, wherever necessary, take steps such as the following: 
• apply to add new accused or new offences against an existing accused;  
• apply to add or recall witnesses; 
• apply for reinvestigation to ensure witnesses who have relevant knowledge 
in relation to offences are examined; 
• Seek and use expert and forensic evidence; 
• Remedy defects in the FIR such as failure to record the reason for a delay in 
registering the FIR by bringing the reason on record; 
• keep witnesses informed of important developments affecting their case; 
• make use of existing case law to argue that the existence of defective 
investigation and/or hostile witnesses does not necessarily mean there is no 
prosecution case; 
• emphasize that the court should keep the context of mass violence in mind 
when evaluating evidence. 
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The high incidence of acquittals in mass violence cases testify to the prosecution’s 
inability or unwillingness to make a robust case based on the evidence before it.  
Cases following the Nellie massacre were withdrawn, as discussed earlier.   
 
In RK Jain the Supreme Court noted that prosecutors could withdraw from 
prosecution on the ground of “public order and peace”, which might involve, inter 
alia, “political purposes”.  At the same time, the Court emphasised that “[t]he 
discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and 
none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone else…The 
government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he may withdraw from the 
prosecution but none can compel him to do so”.592  Clearly, prosecutors making 
withdrawal applications in the wake of the Assam Accord did not function 
independently – they operated as conduits for the party in power at the time.   
 
Prosecution of cases connected to mass violence in 1984 was incompetent and 
politically compromised.     The collapse of 27 major trials related to Bhagalpur 1989 
indicates similar unwillingness by prosecutors to do their jobs effectively and 
independently.   
 
Media and civil society reports in Gujarat have documented how prosecutors with 
Hindu Right sympathies were appointed cross different districts.  So extreme was 
prosecutorial bias and incompetence in Gujarat, that the Supreme Court transferred 
the Best Bakery and Bilqis Bano cases to Maharashtra on the ground that a fair trial 
was simply not possible in Gujarat.  In so doing, the Court implicitly acknowledged 
that the prosecutor was entirely influenced in cases such as these by the goals and 
sympathies of the ruling party.   The Supreme Court stated in its decision in Best 
Bakery that the prosecutor who “acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability 
to the fair judicial system”593.   During the Sessions Court trial, the prosecution had 
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alerted the court that the accused were pressuring and intimidating witnesses.  
Several witnesses turned hostile.  The Prosecutor also refused to examine important 
witnesses, claiming without basis that they were mentally unfit for examination.  The 
prosecutor also actively assisted the defence by putting several family members of 
the accused on the witness stand as prosecution witnesses.    
 
The media has highlighted a few examples of dereliction by the prosecution in mass 
violence cases.  Efforts by survivors and their supporters have resulted in correctives, 
such as the transfer of major trials or Supreme Court scrutiny over SIT trials.  
However, some gross instances of prosecutorial malpractice have escaped the 
spotlight, such as blanket withdrawal of cases connected to Nellie 1983.  Moreover, 
extremely high acquittal rates suggest that most mass violence trials are undermined 
by poor prosecution. 
 
In the four episodes of mass violence we examined, the government of the day was 
complicit in violence on account of its failure to act in accordance with the law to 
protect lives and had a stake in protecting direct participants who were on trial.  
Public prosecutors in these cases were very likely chosen because they agreed with 
or were willing to cooperate with those in political power.  Weak institutional 
independence also renders prosecutors in such cases more willing to work towards 
politically desirable outcomes.  This substantially inverts a legal framework 
intended, in theory, to promote fair trials.  Prosecutors are supposed to be 
independent actors seeking a fair outcome, rather than partisans for the State.  In 
mass violence cases, experience shows that prosecutors do not just abandon 
neutrality, they sometimes act to strengthen the defence.    
 
Across these four episodes of mass violence there have been very few convictions.   
When we look at cases that resulted in convictions, such as the re-opened trials in 
Bhagalpur, the Sardarpura massacre case, the two Odh massacre cases , and the Best 
Bakery and Bilkis Bano cases, these reveal that it took active campaigning to 
highlight the failures of investigation and prosecution accompanied by a demand to 
act against such miscarriages of justice.  It was only in response to such pressure that 
the political establishment in Bihar and the Supreme Court in relation to Gujarat took 
steps to improve how these cases were prosecuted.   
 
(d) Witness intimidation  
 
Witnesses in trials following mass violence turned hostile for multiple reasons, 
ranging from economic necessity, fear, lack of confidence in the justice system, and 
lack of protection from police.  Whether or not  victims and third-party witnesses 
will report a crime and play their part in a criminal case depends on their confidence 
in the criminal justice system regarding the likelihood of obtaining justice and their 
own security.  Political parties were directly and indirectly involved in all four 
episodes of mass violence that we examined.  These parties were in power during 
mass violence, or, in Assam for example, came to power later and ran the 
government when these episodes were being investigated and tried.  In Delhi and 
Gujarat in particular, some direct participants in violence went on to hold high office 
in government.  It is no coincidence that the police failed to investigate complaints 
adequately and prosecutors did not prosecute cases in court properly.      
   
Official records from Gujarat on bail and remand show that the prosecution rarely 
opposed bail for the accused, and rarely applied for the accused to be held in 
custody.  As we discussed in the previous chapter, witnesses in criminal trials in 
Gujarat faced intimidation and pressure to “compromise” – drop the criminal 
complaint or turn hostile during trial.  The ADM’s report in Bhagalpur noted that 
perpetrators were at large in the months following mass violence, causing survivors 
to feel insecure.  Such pressure are layered upon the difficult experience of a criminal 
trial, navigating the opaque workings of the criminal justice system, confronting 
attackers and facing repeated delays and the resulting loss of livelihood for many 
witnesses.  Trial records from the Sessions Court in Delhi show the prosecution’s 
failure to raise before the court fears expressed by the witness, which would have 
explained the witness’ failure to appear in court594.    
 
The police and prosecution went beyond neglecting the concerns of witnesses being 
threatened.  The police themselves harassed complainants and their supporters in 
some instances.  Some complainants in criminal cases related to mass violence in 
1984 were tried for perjury after they turned hostile595.  In the Best Bakery trial, the 
prosecutor called witnesses who were related to the accused, and did not call 
witnesses who were crucial to the case against the accused.  Bilkis Bano was harassed 
by the Gujarat police, as were human rights activists supporting survivors of mass 
violence. 
   
The Supreme Court, in its Best Bakery decision, expressed serious concern about 
witnesses turning hostile: 
 
“Time has become ripe to act on account of numerous experiences faced by 
the Courts on account of frequent turning of witnesses as hostile, either due 
to threats, coercion, lures or monetary considerations at the instances of those 
in power, their henchmen and hirelings, political clouts and patronage and 
innumerable other practices ingeniously adapted to smother and stifle truth 
and realities coming out to the surface rendering truth and justice to become 
ultimate casualties.”596 
The Court emphasised the urgent need for a law to protect witnesses: 
As a protector of its citizens the state has to ensure that during a trial in court 
the witnesses could safely depose without any fear of being haunted by those 
against whom he had deposed. Legislative measures to emphasize 
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prohibition against tampering with witness, victim or informant have become 
the imminent and inevitable need of the day.”597  
The Supreme Court’s demand for legislation598 has also been espoused by the Law 
Commission  for many years599 and the NHRC more recently.  The NHRC’s petition 
to the Supreme Court in the wake of the Best Bakery trial focussed primarily on how 
the trial had capsized because witnesses had been intimidated and pressured.   In 
response, the Supreme Court observed:  
“No law has yet been enacted, not even a scheme has been framed by the 
Union of India or by the State Government for giving protection to the 
witnesses. For successful prosecution of the criminal cases, protection to 
witnesses is necessary as the criminals have often access to the police and the 
influential people. We may also place on record that the conviction rate in the 
country has gone down to 39.6% and the trials in most of the sensational 
cases do not start till the witnesses are won over.”600 
The Court asked the Gujarat government for information on measures to protect 
witnesses, and also what steps it had taken to punish those who had pressured 
witnesses into turning hostile.  It directed the state government to take such 
measures.  Several years later, witnesses continue to face pressure and intimidation.  
10% of the 1061 prosecution witnesses who had testified in the Gulbarg massacre 
case up to April 2010 had turned hostile, according to media reports601.  66 
defendants are on trial in that case, of whom 57 were on bail.  The Gulbarg trial is an 
SIT case, unfolding under the supervision of the Supreme Court.  Witnesses in trials 
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that are not being supervised, that are not being reported in the press, are even more 
likely to face pressure.   
 
In 2006, the main witness in the Best Bakery case was found guilty of perjury for 
repeatedly changing her account of events602.  Punishing individual witnesses, 
however, seems misdirected when perpetrators continue to pressure witnesses in 
mass violence cases, and witnesses receive scant support from the police, prosecution 
and judiciary.   
 
(e) Poor adjudication 
 
Judges have considerable power and discretion to shape the quality of a criminal 
trial, even where investigation and prosecution are poor.  A trial judge can order 
reinvestigation603, summon witnesses604, issue warrants for the arrest of witnesses 
where necessary, and order production of evidence.  The judge in a criminal trial can 
ask the accused whatever questions he or she thinks necessary,605 so has the 
opportunity to make queries that the prosecutor may have neglected to make.  
During the course of a trial, the court can add accused to the proceedings if it 
considers that the evidence points to the involvement of individuals who are not 
currently on trial606.   A judge hearing applications for summary closure or 
withdrawal from prosecution has discretion over whether to grant the application or 
not, and the inherent power, as the decision maker to make procedural and 
substantive queries.  For example, a judge can ask whether the police have 
complainants notice of summary closure.  In addition, a criminal court can order the 
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government to pay reasonable expenses of any complainant or witness attending 
proceedings before the court607.   
 
The trajectory of mass violence cases makes apparent that criminal courts have not 
exercised their considerable powers to ensure fair proceedings.   High rates of 
summary closure demonstrate that judges have clearly not ensured that 
complainants are given notice of summary closure, or queried whether closure is 
genuinely warranted.  Any court exercising independent judgment should not have 
accepted the wholesale withdrawal of cases related to the Nellie massacre.  The 
judiciary has been substantially willing to acquiesce in flawed investigation and 
incompetent, often biased, prosecution in mass violence cases. 
 
The Supreme Court has admonished the judiciary in Gujarat for being a “silent 
spectator”608 to the failures of police, prosecution and politically powerful forces, and 
advised judges to participate far more actively in the proceedings before them.   
 
“If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the 
Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine 
by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and 
elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to 
find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both 
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We received almost no information from state governments on appeals in response 
to our RTI queries.  The way our applications were transferred between public 
authorities suggested that decision-making on appeals is muddy, and the prosecutor 
at trial often has little knowledge about what happens after he or she submits a 
report when the trial finishes.       
 
There were, obviously, no appeals in cases relating to the Nellie massacre.   
 
Media reports suggest that about 44 appeals in cases relating to mass violence in 
1984 are pending in the Delhi High Court.  Given that trials stemming from the 1984 
mass violence are still continuing, there are likely to be more appeals in the future.  
In some recent decisions, the Delhi High Court has upheld the acquittal or 
overturned the conviction of the accused as the evidence left room for doubt.  In one 
such case, Bhagat Singh610, the High Court acknowledged that the police had failed to 
accurately record the initial complaint, and filed an omnibus supplementary 
chargesheet.  It also noted the broader context of police failure in the aftermath of 
violence.  Nevertheless, the court found witnesses in the case unreliable and 
overturned the guilty verdict in that case.   In Permanand611, the High Court also 
overturned the accused’s conviction because it found the witnesses unreliable, but it 
rejected the defence’ argument that delayed investigation was sufficient ground for a 
case to be discharged.   In Abdul Rashid612, too, the High Court upheld the acquittal of 
the accused, alleged to have participated in the Trilokpuri massacre, on the ground 
of unreliable evidence.  These decisions demonstrate how difficult it is to secure a 
conviction in a criminal trial once many years have elapsed since the crimes in 
question, particularly where the police did not gather important evidence soon after 
those crimes were committed.  The Delhi High Court has upheld convictions as well 
in 1984 cases, dismissing defence arguments that a single witness’ testimony is 
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insufficient for a finding of guilt613 and that the bodies of victims necessarily have to 
be recovered to secure a conviction for murder614.  In Sajjan Kumar v CBI, the High 
Court dismissed Sajjan Kumar’s challenge to charges being framed against him, 
holding that if a prima facie case is made out, it is not necessary that delay in 
registering an FIR, investigation and filing the chargesheet is a ground for dismissing 
the charges.  The Court took into account 'systemic delays', and the fact that the 
investigating agency may have been politically coerced into delaying proceedings.  
The Court also noted that every delay doesn't prejudice the accused, and delays can 
work to his advantage – a particularly salient observation in a mass violence case.   
 
The Delhi High Court has developed jurisprudence in recent years that should be 
used by trial court judges to more effectively adjudicate trials related to mass 
violence.  The Supreme Court, as discussed earlier, has a mixed record on cases 
concerning mass violence in 1984.  In two decisions, it upheld the convictions of the 
accused but treated violence at the time as spontaneous mob frenzy, contrary to the 
findings of commissions of inquiry and the High Court, and further considered 
participation in a mob a mitigating rather than an aggravating factor for 
sentencing615.  
    
The Bihar government gave us no information on appeals in cases concerning mass 
violence in Bhagalpur.  We strongly doubt whether the government actively 
appealed acquittals before 2006, given that cases were prosecuted so ineffectively at 
the trial stage.   Three major trials where the accused were found guilty were 
concluded in 2007.  It is likely that the Patna High Court will be hearing appeals in 
the 29 re-opened cases in the near future.  It also seems likely that the Bihar 
government, as long as the current dispensation is in power, will seriously appeal 
acquittals and challenge appeals by the defence against conviction.   
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The Gujarat government also declined our RTI applications on appeals.  Experience 
with appeals so far does not inspire confidence.  Civil society reports indicate that 
the Gujarat government has repeatedly failed to appeal acquittals and inadequate 
sentences.  Complainants have pursued revision petitions, but a revision does not 
allow the same degree of review as an appeal.  After the severely critical decisions of 
the Supreme Court in the Best Bakery and Bilkis Bano cases, it is possible that the 
Gujarat High Court will consider appeals with more care, taking into account the 
context of mass violence in 2002.   The High Court’s 2009 decision cancelling bail for 
former Minister Maya Kodnani is heartening. The Court held that the lower court 
had erred in granting Kodnani bail, and recognised that statements by victims had to 
be considered against the background of fear, pressure and manipulation of evidence 
by the government.  It said: 
 
“The exercise of judicial discretion in favour of the respondents, who are 
ascribed leadership roles, on irrelevant grounds of they having not tampered 
with the evidence or being unlikely to commit other offence was highly 
improper and perverse and calls for interference, particularly when the 
investigation is still underway and the respondents still hold the status or 
position from where they can influence the witnesses…The distance in time 
from the date of the alleged offences to the present stage of investigation is 
unfortunate and attributable to the failure of law-enforcement agencies, but it 
cannot derogate from the requirements of bringing to book all the persons 
who might have had a role in rudely disrupting the lives of millions of 
citizens…”616 
 
The Supreme Court has taken robust measures in response to petitions raising 
miscarriages of justice in mass violence cases in Gujarat.  It took the unusual step of 
transferring trials from Gujarat to Maharashtra.  Setting up the SIT was an even more 
unusual device.  The Court has recognised in its decisions so far that the State 
apparatus in Gujarat was undermining access to justice in a sustained manner in the 
aftermath of violence, which suggests that future appeals will receive nuanced, 
context-sensitive consideration.  However, given that it is already seized of matters 
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raising such serious concerns about access to justice, the Court should take suo motu 
action against the Gujarat government for its failure to comply with directions and 
orders.  This includes the failure to comply adequately with the Court’s 2004 Order 
on re-opening and re-investigation of cases as well as the Court’s directions on 
protecting witnesses.    
 
Given that a large number of trials are still underway, including trials in SIT cases, 
many appeals will come before the appellate courts.  In 2009, the CrPC was amended 
to extend the right to appeal to against the trial court’s decision to “the victim” of an 
offence617.  This is a striking departure from the principle that prosecution and 
punishment of crime is the responsibility of the State, rather than a private 
individual.  The contours of this new right to appeal seemed poorly thought out 
when the CrPC was amended.  It was not clear whether the victim needs to seek the 
permission of the High Court before filing an appeal.   It is also unclear, on the face 
of the amended provision, how it will apply to trials concluded before the new 
provision came into force.  Different High Courts are resolving these moot points in 
different ways.  The Gujarat High Court held in 2010 that the  victim of a crime could 
file an appeal only if the State has not filed one, on the ground that a private 
individual’s right to appeal cannot be higher than the State’s prerogative to do so. 
Other High court such as Bombay and Delhi have however not followed the same 
reasoning and have allowed appeals by victims regardless of whether the state has 
filed an appeal or not. The Gujarat High Court ruling is in process of being 
challenged in the Supreme Court.  Notwithstanding these ambiguities, this extension 
of the right to appeal is particularly salient for victims of mass violence, as the State 
has been pointedly derelict in investigating and prosecuting crimes committed 
during these episodes.   It is important that the higher judiciary use the progressive 
jurisprudence available when considering appeals in mass violence cases, regardless 
of whether an appeal is preferred by a victim or the relevant state government.      
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H. Sexual violence 
 
We applied for information on cases of sexual violence registered after the four 
episodes of mass violence we studied.  We thought it worth asking specifically for 
this information, in addition to our requests for information on all cases registered, 
because sexual crimes are so often ignored or taken less seriously than other violent 
crimes.   
 
We received no response to our query on sexual violence in relation to Nellie 1983 
and Bhagalpur 1989.  None of the FIRs we examined relating to either episode 
recorded sexual crimes.  According to the RTI information we received, 3 cases of 
sexual violence were registered in Gujarat.  5 FIRs from Delhi record the crime of 
rape.   
 
Clearly, there is a considerable discrepancy between sexual violence recorded by 
civil society reports in 1984 and 2002, and the number of FIRs recorded and 
prosecutions mounted for sexual crimes.  Particularly in Gujarat in 2002, there is 
considerable documentation that women were targets of serious and systematic 
sexual violence.  Some survivors, such as Bilkis Bano, have spoken out about the 
brutal violence they suffered.   
 
For Nellie 1983 and Bhagalpur 1989, we have very little independent civil society 
documentation in the aftermath of mass violence, so we do not know whether and to 
what extent sexual crimes were committed.   However, we should be cautious about 
concluding that no sexual offences took place without engaging with survivors of 
these episodes of violence.  Given the stigma against victims of sexual crimes, these 
crimes are underreported to the police.  The few cases we examined in Gujarat reveal 
the extreme legal and social difficulties victims of sexual violence face when they 
come forward and report these crimes.     
 
I. Summing up 
 
Access to criminal justice remains elusive for victims of mass violence.  The official 
records we examined showed that the criminal justice system let down victims of 
crime from the point the police were first informed that a crime had been committed.  
Defective, incomplete FIRs, leaving out details of the complaint lay the ground for 
defective, incomplete investigation, which in turn paves the way for large-scale 
summary closure of mass violence cases.  High rates of summary closure strongly 
indicate that the police are misusing the discretion given to them under Section 157 
of the CrPC, and ignoring the requirement to give notice of closure to the 
complainant.  A competent prosecutor and alert judge have the power under the 
CrPC to work towards a fair result, even in the face of failures by the police.  
However, these powers are rarely exercised.  The episodes of mass violence we 
examined were marked by politically biased prosecution and compliant judges who 
ignored obvious signs of witness intimidation, and easily accepted the police saying 
powerful accused could not be traced.  The Supreme Court, NHRC and Law 
Commission have rightly urged legislative measures to protect witnesses and allow 
them to play their key role in bringing perpetrators to justice.   In the communalised 
context of mass violence, victims of crimes are not dealing simply with the ordinary, 
day-to-day deficiencies of the criminal justice system.  In the episodes we looked at, 
institutions and personnel entrusted to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate failed to 
carry out their professional duties independently, according to the letter and spirit of 
the law.  This undermined the basis of an adversarial criminal justice system where 
the State is supposed to hold accountable those who commit crimes.  The Indian 
criminal justice system, like most common law systems, is heavily reliant on the 
police to ensure a fair, comprehensive and competent investigation. Poor 
investigation by police made it all the more important that vigilant prosecutors and 
adjudicators rectify these errors.  The prosecution rarely did this, and far too many 
trial courts maintained the status quo by delivering acquittals based on negligent or 
subverted investigation rather than using their considerable powers to ask questions 
and order reinvestigation. 
 





Our enquiry in this report is about accountability of responsible public officials, 
broadly speaking, for mass violence.  We have described earlier the State’s 
performance on criminal justice, including how information on criminal justice is 
preserved and disclosed.  In this chapter, we examine a narrower aspect of 
accountability - action against officials, both career civil servants and elected officials 
for being involved or ineffective during mass violence.     
 
We look at both administrative and criminal action against officials.  We look at 
provisions in Indian law on criminal prosecution of public officials, and identify 
problems and gaps in the law that allow senior and mid-ranking officials to tolerate 
or encourage mass violence.  As we discuss below, the State does not take 
administrative and criminal action against officials often enough, and fast enough, 
after mass violence.   We then turn to a device that the State deploys after every 
major episode of mass violence – the commission of inquiry.  We discuss what role 
public inquiries can perform, and how effective they have been.   
 
 
B. A look across episodes 
 
1. Withholding information 
 
We asked State Governments and the Central Government reports by Commissions 
of Inquiry after each episode of mass violence we looked at.  We also asked for the 
‘Action Taken Reports’ a government is required to file in response to the 
Commission’s report.  We filed Right to Information applications asking what action 
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was taken against officials named as remiss or complicit in violence by Commissions 
of Inquiry where (1) Commissions had recommended such action, and also (2) where 
they had not made a specific recommendation but their analysis and findings clearly 
indicated negligence or complicity.  Finally, we asked State Governments and the 
Central Government for copies of any applications for permission to prosecute a 
public servant under Section 132 or Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 
for alleged involvement in or acts of omission or commission during these episodes 
of mass violence.  We also asked for copies of replies to those applications.    
 
On this issue – action against public servants - perhaps more than any other, there 
was scant information in public, and our Right to Information applications were 
repeatedly ignored or transferred.  We managed to secure copies of reports by 
Commissions of Inquiry after an unexpected degree of effort, but in three out of four 
cases were unable to access records on the official response to these Commissions – 
whether there were administrative inquiries, criminal proceedings, or any internal 
systemic reviews. The Delhi Government disclosed Action Taken Reports, but the 
governments of Assam and Bihar did not.  In any event, because the 1984 mass 
violence resulted in so many inquiry Commissions and Committees, some expressly 
mandated to look at the role of public officials, the information on offer was more 
detailed than that available for Bhagalpur or Nellie.   On mass violence in Gujarat in 
2002, we received some replies to our Right to Information applications, but the 
Nanavati Commission has yet to complete its enquiry.  
 
2. Patterns of neglect and complicity 
 
From the official and unofficial material available, we see that functionaries across 
different branches of the State have tended to be negligent or complicit in the 
following ways: 
 
Police: The police clearly have the most direct power to respond to violence, to 
prevent crimes and to investigate crimes in the aftermath of violence.   
Correspondingly, across the four episodes of mass violence, the police bear the most 
direct responsibility for allowing violence to unfold.  The vast majority of officials 
identified as negligent or complicit by Commissions are police officials.  Whether in 
Delhi, in Bhagalpur or in Gujarat, the police constables at the frontline allowed 
attacks on minorities in large numbers. Whether in Nellie, Bhagalpur or Gujarat, 
some senior police functionaries – officers in charge of police stations, SDPOs, SPs – 
allowed their troops to be derelict, and in some cases encouraged them to be derelict. 
In some instances, police officials led attacks themselves, such as ASI Ram Chandra 
Singh in Lugain in Bhagalpur or K.G. Erda in Ahmedabad in 2002.   When we delved 
into the records on police firing during mass violence in Bhagalpur in 1989, we found 
strong suggestions of police bias against Muslims.   In the aftermath of violence, the 
police failed, in large numbers, to record victim complaints accurately and to 
investigate complaints effectively.  In Gujarat, there were many recorded instances of 
the police telling people they would not record their complaints.  This sort of 
harassment is, obviously, not reflected in official records.  But the way the Gujarat 
police  harassed activists and registered false cases against them indicates their 
willingness to deploy such tactics against survivors who were not compliant.  In 
some cases, as in Bhagalpur, the police quite literally, buried evidence by burying the 
dead before they could be identified.  More typically, shoddy investigation doomed 
most criminal prosecutions to failure.    
 
Other government officials:  Other government servants emerge with a more mixed 
record than the police.  It is clear from the four episodes of mass violence that we 
considered that the District Magistrate and his or her subordinates can make a big 
difference in protecting victims and assisting them in the aftermath of violence.  In 
Bhagalpur, several district officials were criticized by the Commission of Inquiry for 
being ineffective in 1989.  However, Bhagalpur also provided examples of 
administrative service officials who, in the aftermath of violence, were very diligent 
about recording what happened, and diligent about setting relatively nuanced 
standards for relief and compensation.   
 
State level officials largely escape detailed scrutiny, as do Ministers in the State and 
Central Governments, since they are several layers removed from direct action 
against attackers or for victims.  The Commission of Inquiry for Bhagalpur criticized 
the State Government for appointing inexperienced district officials, and shuffling 
officials around too frequently. In Gujarat in 2002, there are few records of district 
magistrates standing up against the mass violence and enforcing fair and effective 
police action. Civil society groups and the media closely tracked the direct and 
indirect complicity of senior office holders, and as discussed earlier, this led to a 
Minister in the Gujarat State Government being prosecuted, and the Chief Minister 
being questioned by the SIT.    
 
MPs and MLAs: MPs and MLAs have not been scrutinized closely by Commissions 
of Inquiry and generally the media, unless they were directly involved in violence.  
In Bhagalpur, criminal gangs involved in violence had close political links, and the 
Commission briefly mentioned that some of the perpetrators benefitted from 
political patronage.  In Gujarat, MLAs directly involved in violence, such as Maya 
Kodnani in Gujarat, were covered by the media. However, there seems to be little or 
no official reflection, and limited civil society scrutiny, on the indirect supporting 
roles played by members of the legislature during these episodes of mass violence.  
During widespread violence, as in Gujarat in 2002, it is clear that members of the 
legislature had strong links with members of their political party, and with non-
party affiliates who were directly involved in violence.   
 
While MPs and MLAs should be scrutinised more closely for what they did, it is also 
worth thinking about what they failed to do.  Members of the State or Central 
legislature do not have specifically enumerated positive duties in the face of mass 
identity based violence in the area or constituency they represent.  However, their 
general responsibility to represent their constituents and watch over the executive 
becomes particularly urgent at these times.   
 
Judiciary and prosecution:  The previous chapter discusses how public prosecutors 
perform their jobs weakly at best, and how some prosecutors have been openly 
biased against victims and witnesses.  It also highlights how judges, particularly trial 
court judges, fail to exercise the powers they have to ensure that the trial is free and 
fair – it is clear that judges should be doing far more to query whether summary 
closure is justified, correct omnibus FIRs, press police to arrest absconding accused, 
protect witnesses, summon witnesses, ask questions that the prosecution fails to ask, 
query major gaps in investigation, and intervene when defense counsel harass 
prosecution witnesses.   
 
3. Legal and administrative proceedings against officials 
 
Commissions of Inquiry and civil society reports tell us what official functionaries 
did, or did not do, during episodes of mass violence. Officials identified by 
commissions were accused in a few instances of direct participation in violence, 
including not just direct physical participation but also encouraging and inciting 
violence.  More often, however, they were accused of a failure to prevent violence by 
private actors.     
 
The Tewary Commission identified four district level officials as highly negligent 
before the Nellie massacre in 1983, but recommended that the government take 
action only in the most general terms. The Commissions and Committees of Inquiry 
formed to examine mass violence in 1984 in Delhi were more concrete. The Lata-
Mittal Commission recommended disciplinary proceedings against 85 public 
officials, in some cases specifying that the misdemeanour in question should attract a 
major penalty.  The Bhagalpur Commission laid out in detail acts of omission and 
commission by district officials, most of whom were police officials, and 
recommended that the State Government conduct inquiries and take disciplinary 
action, but did not specify what type of action.  On the 2002 mass violence, the 
Gujarat government has disclosed that 152 police officials are ‘facing’ departmental 
inquiries and that departmental inquiries are ‘contemplated’ against 72 others619.  
However, the Gujarat government did not respond to out RTI query about how far 
these proceedings had progressed.   
 
 
C. Administrative action  
 
Significantly, all the Commissions of Inquiry recommended administrative discipline 
rather than filing criminal proceedings, even where a criminal complaint was 
arguably warranted.  So, it would seem that while Commissions of Inquiry have 
been the main public forum for victims of mass violence to present their case, 
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administrative discipline has been the only possible consequence for officials found 
remiss by Commissions, if at all.   
 
Administrative discipline is regulated by ‘service rules’, which lay down duties, 
standards of behaviour, disciplinary procedures and penalties.  Different public 
services have different service rules – officials in the Central Civil Services are 
governed by a different set of rules from officials in each State Administrative 
Service.   
 
As an example, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 (‘the All 
India Rules’) lay down disciplinary procedures and penalties for, inter alia, the 
Indian administrative and police services.  The Central Civil Services (Classification, 
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (‘the Central Rules’) govern disciplinary action 
against all government servants except those in the railways and the All India 
Services.    
 
Space does not permit detailed discussion.  However, administrative disciplinary 
rules detail the procedure for disciplinary inquiries and penalties.  They provide for 
basic due process in consonance with Article 311 of the Constitution which states 
that no civil servant shall be removed or reduced in rank except after inquiry in 
which he has been informed of the charges against him and has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to defend himself.  The civil servant must be given a copy of 
the charge as well as all necessary documents to prepare a defence620.    
 
The All India Rules as well as the Central Rules provide for ‘major’ and ‘minor’ 
penalties.  Major penalties under both sets of Rules include demotion to a lower 
rank, compulsory retirement and removal from service621.   Minor penalties include 
censure, withholding promotion or pay raises, and recovery of loss to the public 
exchequer622. The Central Rules provide that major penalties should be imposed in 
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cases where there is reasonable ground to believe that a penal offence has been 
committed by a government servant but the evidence is not enough to prosecute in a 
court of law.623   The Central Rules (but not the All India Rules) take corruption very 
seriously, and provide that for offences of corruption and disproportionate assets the 
penalty should be termination with or without disqualification from future 
employment under the government.624  By contrast, neither the Central nor the All 
India Rules provide guidance specifically on instances where officials allow their 
subordinates to commit crimes, or where officials are negligent, partisan or complicit 
in the face of mass violence.  
 
Beyond these basic procedures, the public knows little about the technicalities and 
tenor of departmental inquiries within government that followed episodes of mass 
violence.  We found it difficult to ascertain even whether State governments 
conducted the inquiries recommended by Commissions, because public authorities 
consistently refused to disclose information on this issue.  We don’t know, for 
example, whether the many police officials identified by the Bhagalpur Commission 
faced administrative proceedings.  While the Gujarat government has disclosed that 
some inquiries are in progress, it has not made public how far these inquiries have 
gone, and what the results are.  The Delhi government has been more forthcoming 
and responded to our Right to Information query about what disciplinary action they 
took in relation to the 1984 mass violence.   However, while we know which of the 85 
police officials identified by the Kusum Lata Mittal committee faced administrative 
inquiries, we do not know the results of those inquiries in 47 cases.  We know that 15 
police officials against whom the Kusum Lata Mittal Committee recommended 
disciplinary proceedings escaped these proceedings because they had retired by the 
time the Government acted on the recommendations625.  We know that inquiries 
against 4 police officials were dropped, and 1 was exonerated.     
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The Rules provide that the disciplining authority and the member of service can call 
witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses on the other side626.  However, the 
disciplining authority and the inquiring authority are under no obligation to inform 
or call upon victims of the official’s alleged offences or misdemeanours.  Where the 
misdemeanour alleged may not have direct victims who suffered death or assault – a 
corruption charge, for example – this is of somewhat less consequence, although 
victims have a right to know whether officials were punished for corruption charges 
as well.  However, where an official is facing disciplinary charges for acts or 
omissions that contributed to deaths, injuries or other harm to specific individuals 
rather than more generalised harm to the public exchequer, it is important that 
victims have the opportunity to address the disciplinary authorities in some way, 
and at a minimum, be informed about action against the official.   
 
Even the most attenuated conception of a State’s duties includes controlling violence 
and preventing coercion.  Public officials who do not take reasonable steps to control 
group attacks when they are empowered to do so are undermining the State’s most 
basic, ‘night watchman’ role.  Beyond the direct harm to victims who are attacked, 
such violence leaves a legacy of instability and distrust in government machinery.  
Arguably, in these cases the records of disciplinary proceedings should be made 
public; at a minimum, the results of proceedings should be disclosed.   
   
On the face of it, there seems to be some incentive within government to investigate 
and punish public officials who participate in or tolerate violence, but mainly at 
junior levels and after prodding by Commissions of Inquiry.  However, 
countervailing incentives pull away from robust investigation and discipline.  If the 
political party in power supports the violence, or finds it politically expedient, public 
officials who participate or who allow mass violence to unfold are likely to be 
rewarded rather than punished. Rewards might mean a coveted position, or 
protection from prosecution and administrative enquiry.   
 
More generally, at a systemic level, government officials responsible for inquiring 
into dereliction of duty by their counterparts might be inclined to ‘protect their own’ 
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rather than exposing them to public scrutiny, or deal with them instead by imposing 
a ‘shadow penalty’ – such as a transfer to a post considered undesirable627.   Senior 
officials in particular, might escape a proper enquiry.  The Nanavati Commission on 
the 1984 mass violence found that the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi at the time, PC 
Gavai, did not treat the ‘law and order situation’ with the seriousness it demanded 
and that he ‘could not escape responsibility for the failure’.  The Delhi Government’s 
ATR in response to the Nanavati Commission report states that PC Gavai was 
replaced by MMK Wali on 4 November 1984, implying that this constituted sufficient 
action.  Given how many people were killed between 31st October and 4th November 
1984, merely replacing someone who was found by an official commission to be 
remiss was clearly not enough.  The Nanavati Commission took the view – not 
surprisingly - that the Commissioner of Police in Delhi at the time, SC Tandon, had 
to be held responsible for the government’s complete failure to maintain law and 
order.   The Delhi Government’s ATR said that Mr. Tandon had been replaced as 
Commissioner of Police on 11 November 1984.  Once again, merely being relieved of 
a post counted as sufficient action.  
 
This seems to be standard practice, and the more senior the public official, the less 
likely it is that he will face even a shadow penalty of this sort.   Sajjan Kumar, Jagdish 
Tytler and Kamal Nath have all held high office, including Ministerial posts, in 
governments led by the Congress.  Tytler were pushed to resign from the office of 
Minister for Overseas Indian Affairs after the Nanavati Commission, which  found 
"credible evidence" of a possible role "in organizing the attacks" was tabled in 
Parliament in August 2005.  Sajjan Kumar also resigned as Chairperson of the Delhi 
Rural Development Board, a position of Cabinet rank in the Delhi government628.  In 
Gujarat, Maya Kodnani was forced to resign from the post of Minister of Women and 
Child only after the SIT summoned her in 2009.  Six years previously, in 2003, the 
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Gujarat police questioned her following complaints that she participated in the 
Naroda Patiya and Naroda Gram massacres, but claimed they found no evidence 
against her.   
 
 
D. Criminal proceedings against errant officials 
 
1. Substantive law 
 
While Indian law, as it stands, lacks some substantive offences that capture the 
peculiarities of identity-based violence629, it criminalises the usual array of serious 
violent acts.   Like any reasonably developed criminal justice system, it includes 
principal and accessorial criminal liability for violent crimes.   So, in theory it bites 
upon the acts of officials who directly participate in violence, by committing violent 




a) Acts of omission 
 
However, Indian criminal law does not criminalise acts of omission by government 
functionaries in senior positions.  It does not criminalise, for example,  the failure to 
prevent and control violence by officials empowered and duty bound to do so.  The 
law also does not criminalise senior officials who fail to prevent and punish their 
subordinates from committing crimes.  In light of this, there is a strong case for 
explicitly delineating as a criminal offence tolerance of or tacit acquiescence in mass 
violence by officials whose duties include controlling violence.   
 
b) Command responsibility 
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We noted earlier some examples that suggest senior officials are likely to face 
‘unofficial’ censure rather than formal administrative or criminal penalties.  Senior 
officials who are complicit in mass violence also escape criminal liability because 
Indian law does not criminalise the failure of superiors to prevent or punish crimes 
by their subordinates.   
 
Criminal liability for direct participation – for committing a crime – includes 
principal liability (planning, physical commission), as well as accessorial liability 
(aiding, abetting, ordering, instigating).  The defendant must either intend to plan or 
intend to commit the crime or be ‘aware of the substantial likelihood that a criminal 
act or omission would occur as a consequence of his conduct.’630  There will typically 
be several layers between a senior public servant and a violent crime committed on 
the ground, and it will be difficult to prove direct involvement to the criminal 
standard of proof.  Senior officials who are principals or accessories in crimes during 
episodes of mass violence will generally be shielded from criminal liability by the 
fact of their seniority.   
 
Command or superior responsibility631 is a mode of indirect criminal responsibility 
in international humanitarian law632, which allows military and civilian leaders to be 
held liable for the criminal acts of their subordinates.  The principle of command 
responsibility allows an individual to be held criminally responsible for acts or 
omissions committed by his subordinates if he knew, or should have known that the 
subordinate was about to commit or had committed such acts, and the superior fails 
to take reasonable measures to prevent his subordinate committing those acts or 
omissions, or fails to punish his subordinate for those acts or omissions. 
 
In international law as it presently stands, the principle command responsibility has 
been applied to military as well as civilian superiors, to formal as well as informal, or 
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de facto633, superiors634.  For a superior to be responsible for the crimes of a 
subordinate, the following conditions should hold: 
 
• There should exist a superior-subordinate relationship between the superior 
(the accused) and the perpetrator of the crime 
• The crimes should be committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces 
• The superior either knew or should have known that his or her subordinates 
were committing, or planning to commit, or had committed the crimes in 
question.   
• That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to investigate and 
punish the crimes.  So, command responsibility encompasses the failure to 
take reasonable steps to prevent crimes, as well as the failure to punish 
crimes that have occurred.   
Command responsibility is not vicarious liability for the acts of another person.  It is 
liability for the superior’s omission, or failure to control, which renders him 
individually culpable.  We should emphasise that a commander who engages in 
positive acts to encourage his subordinates to commit crimes will have ‘planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation, or execution of a crime.  Command responsibility in international 
criminal law involves ‘indirect’ responsibility for failure to act635.   
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634 We use the terms “superior” and “subordinate” to describe to both civilian and military chains of 
command.   
635 However, under command responsibility, the superior is convicted not of dereliction of duty as a 
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While some elements of the command responsibility principle continue to be 
debated636, it has been extremely significant in international criminal proceedings 
dealing with mass violence since the Second World War.   
 
At a practical level, international experience shows us that proving direct 
involvement of senior leaders, particularly political leaders, is extremely difficult.  
Particularly where individuals in high political office have a hand in orchestrating 
violence, they are likely to be well insulated from the physical perpetrators on the 
ground.  They are also likely to be able to manipulate or erase records of their own 
involvement after the fact.  Under such circumstances, the risks of acquittal loom 
high, and as Osiel points out, ‘[w]hen political leaders are acquitted in a criminal 
proceeding, they choose (unsurprisingly) to interpret this legal result as a complete 
vindication of their story.’637  The principle of command responsibility offers a mode 
of liability that is morally justifiable, but also makes it practically possible to hold 
senior office-holders accountable in criminal proceedings.   It deals with acts and 
omissions that are crucial in enabling mass violence, but do not fall within existing 
crimes of incitement and conspiracy.   
 
After the Second World War, many of the Allied countries incorporated the principle 
of command responsibility into domestic criminal law638.  Unlike some of these other 
jurisdictions, India lacks criminal liability for culpable omissions by senior officials.  
It has also seen very serious episodes of mass violence on many occasions.  On 
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The standard the ICTY Trial Chamber articulated in Celebici remains authoritative:  
 
“A superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific information was in fact 
available to him which would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates…It is 
sufficient that the superior was put on further inquiry by the information…that it indicated the 
need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed 
or about to be committed by his subordinates.”636  
 
 
637 M. Osiel quoted in Danner & Martinez, ibid., 96. 
638 Danner & Martinez, ibid.  
several of these occasions, some of which we have discussed earlier, there was 
significant evidence that violence unfolded because it was allowed to unfold, senior 
officials actively or tacitly supported violence, or tolerated it.  So, the lack of 
command responsibility is particularly serious in the Indian context.  The law should 
be amended to include this principle, and reflect in law that the relevant moment of 
choice for someone in a position of official leadership is when he chooses not to 
monitor subordinates or punish them for participation in identity based violence.   
 
2. Procedural barriers 
 
In addition to the substantive gaps discussed above, Indian law also has procedural 
barriers that make it harder to secure criminal convictions against public servants.     
Some classes of public officials – elected, appointed, as well as career civil servants - 
are procedurally shielded from prosecution, as compared to the average Indian.   
 
Article 361 of the Indian Constitution protects the Head of State, i.e. the President of 
India, and heads of individual states, i.e. Governors, from being sued while they 
hold office, for acts done in the exercise of the powers and duties of office.  It is 
worth noting that Article 361 does not confer immunity upon the Chief Minister or 
Council of Ministers in a State Government, or the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Ministers in the Central Government.   
 
Judges and some administrative officials cannot be prosecuted for acts committed in 
the discharge of public duty without explicit sanction by the government, under 
Section 197 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure.  This procedural barrier applies to 
public servants ‘who are not removable from office save with the sanction of the 
government’.     
 
It is a moot question whether Section 197 applies to Members of Parliament and 
Members of Legislative Assemblies, as there is some legal debate about whether MPs 
and MLAs are public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal 
Code.   In AR Antulay v. R.S. Nayak639, the Supreme Court took the view that an MLA 
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is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21.  In the JMM bribery case640, 
the Supreme Court said that an MP was a public servant under the terms of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act.  However, once a person is no longer an MP or an 
MLA, he does not fall under the ambit of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1973. 
 
The State Government is the sanctioning authority where the public official facing 
potential prosecution is employed by the State Government or was employed by the 
State Government at the time he committed the alleged offences, and the Central 
Government is the sanctioning authority for its employees.  So, granting sanction to 
prosecute is within the domain of the executive – it is an administrative decision.  If 
prosecution is sanctioned, the administrative decision maker conveys this to the 
prosecuting authorities641, who then initiate prosecution.   Sanction to prosecute the 
protected class of public servants is a prerequisite to criminal proceedings, and the 
Supreme Court has held that absence of sanction to prosecute vitiates trial642.   
 
This additional procedural hoop for prosecuting public servants is intended to 
protect them from harassment, to insulate them enough so that they can do their jobs 
without being apprehensive about malicious complaints and prosecution.   Public 
servants who fall within the ambit of Section 197 are protected even after they retire.   
However, this layer of insulation only applies to acts done by the public official in 
the course of her service and in the discharge of her duty.  A public servant who 
commits a crime in his private capacity, outside office hours, will clearly not attract 
the protection of Section 197.  Similarly, a public servant who commits an illegal act 
using his official position but not in discharge of his duty cannot benefit from Section 
197643.   To illustrate, where police officers on duty during the course of a bandh were 
alleged to have committed excesses during the bandh, sanction was necessary 
because the crimes alleged were done while they were performing their official 
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duty644.  Where a public servant asks for a bribe while performing his official duties, 
the act of demanding a bribe is inherently outside the course of official duty.  While 
holding a particular office might enable the accused to commit an offence, this does 
not imply that the offence is within the course of duty.   
                           
Given the intention of this legal provision, the courts have held that questions of 
whether an act is within the course of official duty should be narrowly construed.  
Only acts that are clearly within the course of duty should attract this procedural 
protection.  However, once any act or omission has been found to have been 
committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty, then the body deciding upon 
whether to sanction prosecution should construe Section 197 liberally in favour of 
protecting officials from unnecessary prosecution.  
 
What implications does this have for prosecuting officials involved in episodes of 
mass violence?  Public servants who participate in mass violence as principals or 
accessories should not ordinarily benefit from Section 197, since acts of violence and 
property damage would clearly fall outside the scope of official duty.  The 
prosecution would not need sanction to prosecute, for example, an official in the 
Department of Agriculture who joins a violent mob.  However, officials accused of 
using excessive force or unlawful methods while tackling violence, or moving 
groups of people from one location to another, would fall within the ambit of Section 
197 – the prosecution would need sanction to proceed against them.  This should 
only include officials who have powers and duties to maintain law and order, such 
as the police, the district magistrate, or senior decision-makers in the Home 
Department.   
 
For the episodes of violence we considered, the governments concerned have refused 
to disclose information on sanction to prosecute.  As a result, we cannot assess 
whether sanction was in fact granted according to established legal guidelines.   
However, Section 197 clearly covers the police performing (or not) a law and order 
role, and police personnel are the functionaries most often accused of breaching their 
duty during mass violence.  Therefore, this procedural protection has serious 
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implications for holding errant State functionaries accountable, particularly because 
past experience indicates sanction is granted late and infrequently.  Should the law 
be reformed so that Section 197 no longer applies to complaints about complicity in 
mass violence?  In light of the State’s poor record in holding its functionaries 
accountable for enabling violence, there is a strong argument for doing so.  At a 
minimum, the law should be amended so that permission to prosecute is not 
required in these cases, unless the government can persuade the court to the 
contrary.    
 
Given the substantive gaps in the law, such as lack of command responsibility, and 
the procedural impediments to prosecution, government functionaries have rarely 
been held accountable for crimes committed during mass violence.  When 
government officials have been prosecuted, these prosecutions are compromised by 
the same problems that hamper criminal trials after mass violence more generally.  In 
2010, the Delhi High Court upheld the acquittal of police officers accused of 
participating in the Trilokpuri massacre in 1984645.   It was alleged that the police 
functionaries in question were called to Trilokpuri and saw houses burning.  They 
told Sikh men to go inside certain houses and then directed a violent mob to those 
houses.  The Misra Commission found that investigation into the role of the police 
and the alleged leaders of the mob, inlcuding the Block pradhan of Trilokpuri, had 
been perfunctory.   It took 23 years after the Mishra Commission’s findings for the 
case to be prosecuted and the appealed.  The accused were acquitted for lack of 
sufficient evidence against them, which is not surprising given the delayin trial and 
the initial failure to investigate. 
 
E. Commissions of Inquiry 
 
In the four episodes of mass violence we examined, we asked State and Central 
governments about government follow-up after commissions of inquiry 
recommended action against officials.  In the first chapter, we acknowledged our 
reservations about restricting ourselves to officials identified as remiss by 
commissions of inquiry, given that we felt the performance of commissions 
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themselves is mixed at best.  This chapter has focused on how public servants have 
been and can be held accountable for their acts and omissions during mass violence.  
Those who staff commission inquiry are, at least temporarily, public servants (and 
typically, are retired members of the judiciary and civil services).  Setting up a 
commission has been one of the State’s main responses after an episode of mass 
violence.  Therefore, it is important to look briefly at how accountable these 
commissions are to the public.   
 
Commissions are set up under and regulated by the Commissions of Inquiry Act 
1952.  A commission could be created either by the Executive (State or Centre) or by 
the State or Central legislature to inquire into questions of public interest. The scope 
of the commission is defined in the notification that creates it. It does not have the 
authority to go beyond the scope already defined.  The commission has been given 
powers of a civil court to conduct proceedings but it can only report findings and 
make recommendations, which are not binding on the executive.  However, a 
commission’s report must be tabled before the legislature within six months of it 
being submitted to the government, along with an ‘action taken’ report (‘ATR’) by 
the government646.   
 
Where crimes have been committed on a large scale, why set up a fact finding body 
rather than simply allowing the criminal justice machinery to function?  
Commissions and trials have different, though overlapping, purposes.  A 
commission of inquiry will typically have a broader mandate than a trial and can 
analyse patterns of abuse, their causes and consequences.  A commission that does 
its job well can identify institutional responsibility for past abuses and serve as a 
catalyst for prosecution, compensation and for educating the public.   Most 
fundamentally, it can establish a factual record that, because it is an official record, is 
more difficult for State and Central Governments to dismiss than the word of victims 
and civil society groups.   
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The Commissions of Inquiry we looked at fell short of these goals, due to the 
commissions’ own performance, but also because of the State’s weak response to 
them.  
 
Bias: Commissions of inquiry are appointed by the government of the day, and will 
be asked to pass judgment on the performance of that government.  The appointers 
have an incentive to appoint members who will be ‘safe’, unlikely to be too critical, 
particularly of those who occupy high office.  While the Commissions we looked at 
were more direct when identifying the failings of junior functionaries, they tended to 
adopt an emollient tone when discussing the acts of senior officials.  Most of the 
Commissions we looked at resorted to euphemism when pronouncing on official 
failings, and tended towards pious intentions and intangibles when making 
recommendations, urging the government they were addressing to, for example, 
‘spread the message of national integration amongst the youth’ and ‘build leadership 
skills’.  
  
Over and above the likelihood that commission members will be fairly forgiving, 
governments have sometimes chosen members who are evidently partisan, and 
biased in their favour.  In Chapter 4, we criticised the Ranganath Mishra Commission 
on the 1984 mass violence for ignoring the substantial roles played by politicians and 
government functionaries.  Ranganath Mishra, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
when he headed that commission, went on to become a Congress MP in the Rajya 
Sabha.  The Bhagalpur Commission on Inquiry was initially set up as a single-
member commission, but, as discuused earlier, the sole member was perceived as 
biased and two other members were added to the commission.  Ultimately, the 
Chairperson submitted a dissenting report, which was very much at odds with the 
majority report and took a far more positive view of the government’s role in 
allowing mass violence647.  The choice of Justice Nanavati to chair the commission on 
mass violence in Gujarat in 2002 was also controversial not least because he was 
simultaneously chairing a commission on the 1984 riots.   More recently, the Chair of 
the Commission to enquire into violence against Christians in Kandhamal, Orissa in 
2008 stated publicly when the Commission began its work that the violence did not 
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target a particular religious group.  The Mohapatra Commission’s interim report 
declared that violence in Kandhamal was the result of resentment by tribal groups 
and made no mention of the well-documented role played by Hindu Right groups648.  
The Panigrahi commission, looking into the first round of anti-Christian violence in 
Kandhamal in 2007 reportedly refused to adjourn hearings even when fresh violence 
made it difficult for victims and advocates from Kandhamal to attend the hearings649.    
 
In addition to choosing pliant members, the government of the day will have a 
strong incentive to set the mandate of the Commission in a way that shields the 
powerful.  The Bhagalpur Commission was restricted to looking at the performance 
of the district administration, though it reached beyond its remit and commented 
upon what it saw as faulty decisions by the State Government.    When Congress 
politicians implicated in the 1984 mass violence challenged the legality of the Jain-
Bannerjee Committee in the Delhi High Court in 1987, the Delhi Government did not 
counter their challenge.  The Committee was “stayed” by the High Court in 1987, 
and quashed in 1989.  Clearly, the government had never intended the Committee to 
conduct its inquiry effectively.   
 
The current law on appointing Commissions takes a benign view of a government’s 
willingness to expose its failures and excesses to scrutiny.  It is always difficult to 
push governments to appoint independent watchdogs, and this will hold especially 
true for inquiries into the serious lapses that allow mass violence to unfold.    Clearly 
Commissions of inquiry must draw more fully upon democratic and federal checks.    
 
Inefficiency: Except for the Tewary Commission report on election violence in 
Assam, none of the Commissions we looked at completed their inquiries on time.  
Inquiries into identity-based violence should be made as urgently and efficiently as 
possible.  However, repeated extensions are the norm.  The Bhagalpur Inquiry began 
in 1989, but was not completed until 1995.  The Nanavati Commission, set up in 2002, 
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had yet to complete its report in December 2011.  As discussed earlier, there have 
been several commissions and committees inquiring into different aspects of the anti-
Sikh pogrom on 1984, between 1984 to the present. 
 
Opacity: We found that the reports of Commissions of Inquiry set up after Nellie 
1983, Delhi 1984, Bhagalpur 1989 and Gujarat 2002 were extremely difficult to access.  
The Parliament library had copies only of the Mishra and Nanavati commissions.  
We could not access the collections of State Legislative Assemblies.  Right to 
Information applications to each relevant Legislative Assembly elicited no response.  
Shockingly, the Ministry of Home Affairs claimed it did not have copies of 
Commission of Inquiry reports in response to our Right to Information application 
for these reports.  Libraries in major universities and research institutes did not have 
these reports.     
 
The Bihar and Delhi Governments disclosed Commission Reports to us after Right to 
Information applications and appeals.  The Home Department of Assam disclosed 
the Tewary Commission report, not in response to a direct application for the report 
(which it denied), but in response to an application for information on the district 
administration’s response to the violence.  We now have what we suspect is one of 
the few surviving copies of a report that was never (even theoretically) made public.   
No government disclosed material placed before the commissions of inquiry – 
government documents, affidavits, records of proceedings.  This material is an 
important and necessary public record of what happened and how the State 
responded.  Not only should it be in public, the Governments that have this material 
should make it as accessible as possible.     
 
While commission reports and background materials are not in public and 
apparently not in the possession of the Home Ministry, the resources used by 
commissions of inquiry are also hidden from public view.  Again, the governments 
concerned should make public the salaries and perquisites of members and staff, as 
well as how much time is spent on hearings.    
 
So commission reports and materials are very difficult to access after the fact.   
Commission proceedings have also sometimes been hidden from view.   The 
proceedings of the Mishra Commission after the 1984 mass violence were held 'in 
camera' or behind closed doors.  There as also an effective press ban – the media was 
directed to not publish any stories on the proceedings of the Commission. As 
mentioned in Chpater 4, the victims' representative body was denied affidavits 
received by the Commission, on the grounds of national security.  
 
The Executive’s failure to respond: Perhaps more dismal than delays by 
Commissions themselves are delays by State Governments and the Centre in 
responding to them.  The Assam Government never made the Tewary Commission 
report public at all.  After the Assam Accord, any criminal proceedings against 
people who committed violent crimes were dropped.  The only official assessment of 
what happened and who was responsible was never released. The Bihar Government 
appears not to have an ATR in response to the Bhagalpur Commission report, and 
neither does the Bihar State Assembly.  The Delhi Government did not submit ATRs 
for several of the commission and committee reports on the 1984 riots.        
 
The failure to file ATRs and the quality of ATRs that are filed indicates the quality of 
action taken.  In Bhagalpur, as discussed earlier, a second commission of inquiry was 
set up in 2007 to review whether the recommendations of the first commission had 
been implemented (suggesting that they had largely been ignored).  In 2005, the 
Nanavati Commission report on the 1984 mass violence was tabled in Parliament650 
(after a special mention on the delay in laying the report before the Lok Sabha)651.  In 
the discussion that followed, MPs from the Congress party noted the failure to give 
adequate compensation to victims of other episodes of mass violence, and 
commented on the weaknesses of commissions of inquiry more generally.  The Prime 
Minister, while acknowledging that the massacre was “a national tragedy”, also 
stressed that the Nanavati Commission had exonerated senior Congress party 
officials.  He did not address the obvious point that some of the officials and 
Congress party functionaries in question had been relatively senior in Delhi at the 
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time, and some went on to hold senior positions in State and Central governments.  
The Prime Minister offered to take action against the junior functionaries mentioned 
by the Commission, stating:  
“In the case of some others, it has said that it is probable that they may have 
some involvement in some of the incidents, and that there is evidence to that 
effect. The Commission is in itself not certain, however, of the role of these 
individuals. As the ATR says, Governments cannot act when the Commission 
itself is uncertain of these issues. … (Interruptions)… 
However, there is something called perception, and there is the sentiment of 
the House. The Government respects and bows to that sentiment. Therefore, 
keeping in view the sentiments expressed in the House today, our 
Government assures the House that wherever the Commission has named 
any specific individuals as needing further examination or specific cases 
needing re-opening and re-examination, the Government will take all 
possible steps to do so within the ambit of law. “ 
 
It is troubling that the Prime Minister thought it necessary to emphasise that the 
commission had not conclusively determined the responsbility of particular 
individuals – it is not the role of a commission of inquiry to determine guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.  The government’s commitment to take action against indicted 
individuals seemed to come not from accepting the responsibility of those in power 
in Delhi in 1984, but as a concession to “perception” and “the sentiment of the 
House”.   
 
There is room for, and certainly a need for, a closer and more detailed critique of 
how Commissions looking into episodes of mass violence have functioned.    Some of 
the reports we examined  – the Kusum Lata Mittal report on the 1984 violence and 
the Bhagalpur Commission report, for example – make an important contribution to 
establishing a factual, or forensic record.   Overall though, commissions seem to 
function tacitly as a means to evade genuine accountability for the State’s failures. 
 
Legal limits: It is also important to remember what commissions cannot legally do, 
no matter how well they function.  Inquiries are not trials: they are investigations.  
They do not result in the determination of rights or liabilities; they result in findings 
of fact and recommendations.  To preserve the right to a fair trial, statements made 
before a commission cannot be used against the person making the statement in civil 
or criminal proceedings652.  A commission’s report does not have evidentiary value 
in a criminal trial653.  While a commission can compel a witness to testify, such 
testimony, even if self-incriminating, cannot be directly used to incriminate the 
person in subsequent criminal proceedings.   
 
Clearly, governments are disingenuous if they claim that they are waiting for the 
results of an inquiry before initiating administrative or criminal proceedings against 
officials widely alleged to be complicit in mass violence.  Inquiries can divert the 
limited financial and emotional energies of victims, civil society organisations and 
religious groups, even as they offer limited recourse in holding individuals 
accountable.   The delays that result can count against the victim in criminal trials 
that follow.    
 
F. Summing up 
 
When participants in mass violence are not punished, and do not even have to face 
criminal proceedings, this impunity is stitched in to the daily lives of communities 
for years to come.  However, while we argue for more effective prosecution of the 
full range of participants in mass violence, it is also true that holding public servants 
accountable is particularly important.  High-level government officials and political 
office holders are not like everyone else.  They have positive obligations to maintain 
law and order, and to enforce certain standards of behaviour on subordinates under 
their control.   
 
Viewed through the four episodes of mass violence we examined, India’s record on 
holding bureaucrats and politicians accountable is dismal.  Commissions of inquiry 
have tended to be timid, and skimmed over the complicity of senior functionaries.  
Administrative action against errant officials is largely hidden from public view, and 
in many cases they are transferred or resign rather than facing genuine discipline.  It 
is worth noting that political functionaries complicit in mass violence have not been 
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removed from office – they resign “voluntarily”.  Governments, thus, have not taken 
the initiative to remove people who have participated in or encouraged serious 
crimes.  The individuals themselves are forced to resign ostensibly in response to an 
official investigation or inquiry.  However, as the aftermath of the 1984 and 2002 
mass violence show, governments have ignored several investigations and inquiries, 
and jettisoned complicit individuals only when criticism by the media, civil society 
and the opposition in the legislature reaches a tipping point.   
 
Trials that follow mass atrocities are politically symbolic, and play a part in forging a 
new equilibrium between victims, their local context, and the government.  
Punishing officials who acquiesed in mass violence is important to restore a sense of 
security for members of the group that was targeted.  In light of this, the Indian State 
needs to amend the law to incorporate command responsibility principles, and 
review procedural barriers to prosecution.   
 
It is important also to scrutinize commissions of inquiry – the default official 
response after mass violence – and identify how inquiries can be designed so that 
they are more effective.  Civil society, in its turn, needs to be vigilant that the State 
does not use inquiries, which cannot affix individual guilt, to evade administrative 
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Effective reparation is closely tied to prosecution and truth-telling.  When the State 
gives victims of mass violence money as compensation, but does not prosecute 
perpetrators or account openly for its own failings, the money it hands out arguably 
does not constitute full legitimate reparation. 
    
That said, compensation to victims is the most tangible way the State can attempt to 
remedy the harm victims have suffered655. Criminal prosecution, even when pursued 
effectively (not the case in any of the episodes we studied), focuses squarely on the 
role of the accused.  The adversarial trial cannot account for the victim’s continuing 
pain and hardship, and neither can it punish complicit officials.  Public testimony 
and information sharing can offer the relief of official acknowledgement, but rings 
hollow without more direct reparation.  Finally, institutional reform is a protracted 
endeavour, and victims are unlikely to benefit directly from it. 
  
So, while immediate relief and monetary compensation is not sufficient, it is 
necessary and the Indian state’s measures in this regard demand close scrutiny. In 
this chapter, we examine information on compensation after Nellie 1983, Delhi 1984, 
Bhagalpur 1989 and Gujarat 2002.  We look at national standards and practice on 
compensation.  We look then at standards under international law, and consider 
what might be involved if India moved from narrow monetary compensation 
towards deeper, fuller reparation.  
 




Rescuing those in danger of mass communal violence involves identifying people 
subject to or at risk of violence, protecting them in those locations, and if they are 
unsafe, shifting them as quickly as possible to safe places.    Rescue is the first duty of 
the state after violence breaks out.  Successful rescue averts or limits the toll of 
communal violence.  Not surprisingly, we found that the district  administrations in 
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Morigaon in 1983, Delhi in 1984, Bhagalpur in 1989 and Gujarat in 2002 failed to 
organize safe passage to relief camps for people under threat.   
 
2. Displacement  
 
Neither the four State Governments we contacted, nor the Central Government, 
admitted to having estimates of people displaced as a result of mass communal 
violence.  We are certain these estimates exist.  The Gujarat government has detailed 
information on relief camps run by NGOs and how many people were housed 
within them, so it follows that it has at least estimates, if not precise numbers, on 
people displaced by violence.  Soon after mass violence in 2002, the Gujarat 
government said publicly that about 98,000 had been displaced656.  Similarly, a report 
by the Special ADM, Law & Order in Bhagalpur soon after the 1989 mass violence 
had an estimate of families displaced.   It is possible that governmental refusal to 
disclose figures of people displaced as a result of these particular episodes of mass 
violence flows from a more general reluctance to acknowledge international 




In three out of the four episodes of mass violence we looked at, the district 
administration and State Government set up relief camps.  The Tewary Commission 
makes reference to relief activity after the Nellie massacre.  In Bhagalpur in 1989, 
there was a Special ADM charged with relief and rehabilitation.  In 1984, the Delhi 
government set up several relief camps.  These State Governments could not or did 
not give us details of services provided in the camps, numbers of people in the 
camps, when camps were closed and why.   Some of these records had been 
destroyed over time.   However, responses to RTI applications also suggested that 
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governments simply had not tracked certain types of information, particularly 
whether and how many people in relief camps returned to their original homes or 
went elsewhere.  This, in turn, suggests a very attenuated engagement with people 
displaced by communal violence, and the fact that victims may need practical 
support and security even after they leave the camps. 
 
In general, providing relief to people displaced by communal violence, albeit bare-
bones relief with very few basic services, is well-established administrative practice.  
 
The Gujarat government in 2002 was the dishonourable exception to this norm.  As 
discussed in chapter 5, it did not set up relief camps, and tried to force closure of 
NGO camps even while the situation was far from secure for displaced Muslims.  
Camp organisers challenged the government’s actions in court, but got no relief.     
The Gujarat experience makes clear that setting up relief camps needs to be more 
than established practice – it should be legally required so that governments can be 
held accountable by victims of violence if they fail to provide those at risk with a safe 
harbour.    
 
The actual standards in relief camps for basic services such as food, water and 
sanitation seem highly variable, reminding us that the Indian government has not 
adopted international norms on relief for displaced people, and has not developed 
national norms.  Similarly, it is clear that there are no established or expected 
standards on providing security, providing displaced people with identity 
documents, uniting families that have been separated, or ensuring that children can 
access school as soon as possible.   The governments of Assam, Bihar and Delhi did 
not disclose information on when and why relief camps were closed.  As with basic 
services and security, there is a need for norms on closure that allow local discretion, 
but constrain the administration to meet a minimum standard, and prevent victims 




State Governments declared monetary compensation packages after each of the 
episodes of mass violence that we studied.  All the packages included compensation 
for at least three categories of harm – death, serious injury, and damage of domestic 
property.  Beyond that, however, there was considerable variation between 
compensation given to victims under different packages.  The Assam government 
gave families of people killed in the Nellie massacre, and in the election related 
violence in Assam more generally, Rs. 5000 in 1983.  In 1984, the Central Government 
announced Rs. 10,000 compensation for those killed in the anti-Sikh riots.  The Bihar 
Government announced far more generous compensation of Rs. 1 lakh to the 
families of the dead in the Bhagalpur riots in 1989, not that long after 1984.  In the 
interim, the Centre had raised compensation for those killed in the 1984 riots to Rs. 
20,000.  Although these episodes of mass violence were relatively close in time, 
compensation for families of the dead varied considerably, and as discussed below, 
the differences between compensation packages widened over time as awards for the 
Bhagalpur and Delhi violence were increased.  In 2002, the Gujarat government 
announced compensation of 1 lakh for families of the dead – a strikingly low figure 
when compared to Rs. 1 lakh announced in Bhagalpur 13 years previously.   
 
In Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat, the compensation packages announced in the 
immediate aftermath of violence were revised and increased several times over the 
years.  Chapter 6 discussed, for example, how the Gujarat government was forced to 
increase quite meagre compensation for death and injury in the face of national and 
international censure. Families of those killed in the 1984 riots initially got Rs. 10,000 
as compensation.  As discussed in chapter 4, the Central Government increased this 
amount to 3.5 lakhs in 2006.   Similarly, in Bhagalpur, the amount given to families of 
the dead increased from Rs. 1 lakh in 1989 to Rs. 3.5 lakhs in 2009, after the Bihar 
government, under the Janata Dal (United), petitioned the Centre for compensation 
on par with those killed in the 1984 riots.   Compensation for victims in these cases 
emerged out of political negotiation between the Centre, the State, victim groups, 
religious leaders and civil society organizations.   Of course, when compensation is 
subject to imperatives of the political process, victims who have fewer resources, or 
less forceful representation will get less compensation.  Families of those killed in the 
Nellie massacre, and more generally in election violence across Assam at the time, 
have not received enhanced compensation over the years.    
 
This variation in compensation amounts is patently unfair, and arguably 
unconstitutional, because it places, in effect, differential values on different lives.  
Variations in compensation for death quite literally place different values on human 
life.  Likewise, variations in compensation for injuries place different values on 
similar types of human suffering.   
 
Within the parameters of a single compensation package, rather than across different 
packages, the only overt discrimination we have seen was in Gujarat in 2002.  The 
Gujarat government initially announced compensation of Rs. 2 lakh for the families 
of those killed in the Godhra incident, and compensation of Rs. 1 lakh for those killed 
in the violence that followed.  Public criticism forced the State Government to 
equalise these amounts.  It lowered the compensation to the largely Hindu families 
of those killed at Godhra, but refused to acknowledge its previous unfairness, citing 
instead the willingness of “kar sevaks”658 to accept lower compensation.   
 
Unlike compensation for death or injury, rates of compensation for damage to 
property should vary, depending upon the type of property and prevailing property 
markets.  So the variation across time and locations was not remarkable, but the rates 
of compensation for property damage were, because they were low, and clearly well 
below prevailing market rates.  In Bhagalpur, for example, the State Government 
gave Rs. 2000 to handloom owners whose looms were destroyed in the violence.  
This was meagre for a productive economic asset, even in 1989.  As we discussed in 
Chapter 1, mass violence bespeaks State failure – at a minimum, the State’s failure to 
protect citizens from unlawful killing, injury and financial loss.  If the State were to 
accept responsibility for this failure, it would have to compensate victims of property 
damage so as to put them back in the position they were in before the damage.  
Instead, the Indian State has made ex gratia payments to victims of mass communal 
violence – it does not accept the legal obligation to compensate victims, defining 
these payments as a discretionary favour.  This is, of course, convenient for the State, 
in that it does not have to bear anywhere near the full cost of the financial losses 
resulting from a failure to control violence.   It is at odds with international human 
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rights instruments that are binding upon India.  It is also at odds with developing 
domestic jurisprudence, that we discuss in more detail below.     
 
Our research focused more on declared packages than on how governments 
implemented these packages, which would be less apparent merely from examining 
official records.  However, it is clear that when compensation is a long-drawn out 
process with multiple iterations, claiming their due becomes vastly more difficult for 
victims.   
 
 
C. Domestic standards and guidelines 
 
1. Administrative standards 
 
India does not have a national law regulating reparations after mass violence, nor 
does it have a national law or policy that deals with displacement as a result of 
violence or armed conflict.   However, providing immediate relief and then 
disbursing compensation for physical harm and property damage is well-established 
administrative practice.   There is also guidance, albeit very general, by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs in its Guidelines on Communal Harmony (‘the Guidelines’).  The 
Guidelines, formulated in 1997, emphasise the need for ‘expeditious disbursement of 
relief’ without any discrimination on any grounds.  They state that the district 
administration should ensure supplies of basic necessities, including security and 
medical assistance in relief camps.  The Guidelines also suggest setting up systems 
for insurance claims related to residential and commercial property.  Finally, they 
mention that the district administration should properly implement a Central 
scheme for assistance of Rs. 3 lakh to “affected families” who are victims of ‘terrorist 
or communal violence’659.  Compensation under the Central scheme has not actually 
been implemented, but this guidance confirms that compensation for material harm 
is established, and expected, practice.  The Guidelines suggest a shift by the Central 
Government towards acknowledging the right to compensation for mass violence, 
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and a shift away from treating compensation as discretionary.  However, the 
Guidelines seem largely ignored in practice.     
 
Moving away from the government’s response specifically to mass violence, state 
governments have issued from time to time detailed administrative instructions, in 
the form of relief manuals, which lay out measures for short term relief and longer-
term rehabilitation.  Relief manuals are geared primarily towards responding to 
natural disasters.  However, they are also applied often to human-made disasters – 
in Assam in 1983, for instance, the relief manual applied to situations of civil unrest.  
The district administration implements relief measures – whether the standard laid 
down in the relief manual or ad hoc measures in response to a local situation.  Some 
state governments have departments specifically responsible for relief, typically 
called the office of the relief commissioner.  Alternatively, the department of revenue 
in the state government is responsible for relief and rehabilitation. More recently, 
some governments have established departments of disaster management.  
 
In addition to administrative guidelines and precedent, governments in India are 
also bound by jurisprudence on State liability for human rights violations.  Below, 
we discuss principles on compensation developed through cases by victims of 
communal violence.  We look also at decisions on compensation for other serious 
violations, which could reasonably apply to compensation for mass violence. 
 
2. Judicial standards 
 
Indian courts have affirmed that victims of communal violence suffer not merely 
from the individual crimes to which they were subject, but also from the failure of 
the State to uphold their fundamental rights under the Constitution, most 
importantly the fundamental right to life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution.  For instance, in Bhajan Kaur vs. Delhi660 the Delhi High Court 
stated that such riots ‘more often than not take place due to weakness, laxity and 
indifference of the administration in enforcing law and order.  If the authorities act in 
time and act effectively and efficiently, riots can surely be prevented’.  Likewise in 
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Manjit Singh Sawhney v. Union of India661 the High Court of Delhi  observed that riots 
occur ‘on account of laxity and indifference of the administration in enforcing law 
and order’ and that these constitute a serious violation of the citizen’s fundamental 
rights to life and equality before the law.  Individuals who suffer human rights 
violations at the hands of the State can initiate a public law action and claim 
compensation from the government body responsible.  Over a number of decisions 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court upheld the principle of strict liability for 
State failure to respect Constitutional rights, and awarded compensation to victims.    
The Supreme Court developed this principle in cases concerning the State’s 
responsibility for deaths in custody. 
 
Nilabati Behera v. Orissa662 was a case where the petitioner’s son was taken into police 
custody, and found injured and dead on a railway track the next day. The son was 22 
years old and his monthly income was between Rs. 1,200 and 1,500 in 1987. The 
Supreme Court, while directing the State of Orissa to pay a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 as 
compensation to the Petitioner and Rs. 10,000 as costs to the Supreme Court Legal 
Aid Committee, observed: 
 
‘12. ... award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this court 
or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy 
available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of 
fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not 
apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an 
action based on tort. [emphasis added]’ 
 
In his concurring opinion Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, (as he then was) observed: 
 
‘37. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties 
of the citizen, have…an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction 
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the 
victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India 
are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to 
repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, 
notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or 
criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by 
and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in 
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accordance with law - through appropriate proceedings. Of course, relief in 
exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only once it is 
established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of 
the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by the court in the facts 
and circumstances of the case, is possible.’ 
 
The Supreme Court’s articulation of compensation for human rights violations in 
decisions such as Nilabati Behara and DK Basu makes clear that if a petitioner 
establishes a violation of Article 21, courts have ‘not only the power and jurisdiction 
but also an obligation to grant relief’663.  The Supreme Court clarifies that this is a 
public law remedy, that exists alongside and independent of criminal prosecution 
and civil, private law, remedies.  In theory, the victim of a violation is free to pursue 
damages in tort after receiving public law compensation, though there is some 
suggestion that private law damages should be adjusted to reflect the public law 
award. 
 
In Nilabati Behara, the Supreme Court suggests that the victim must establish a 
flagrant infringement of his Article 21 right to life.  Later formulations by High 
Courts have seemed to move away from this threshold requirement.  However, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this threshold requirement in Sube Singh, stating that for a 
victim to be eligible for compensation, the violation of Article 21 has to be ‘patent 
and incontrovertible’ and ‘of a magnitude to shock the conscience of the Court’664. 
 
In 1996, Bhajan Kaur, the widow of a man killed in the 1984 riots approached the 
Delhi High court, challenging the Rs. 20,000 compensation the Delhi Government 
gave for the death of a family member as being too low.   The main question before 
the court was whether this amount of compensation breached her Article 21 right to 
life.  However, the High Court made clear that just as the State’s failure to respect the 
right to life – as in the case of custodial killing by agents of the State –  entitled 
victims to compensation from the State, so did the State’s failure to protect the right 
to life, by failing to prevent widespread violence against minorities by private actors.  
Various High Courts have affirmed that the State’s failure to prevent death as a result 
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of violence by non-State actors, including terrorist attacks and communal violence, 
entitles victims to damages under public law665.      
 
Thus, the principles for compensation for victims of communal violence are fairly 
clear666.  Victims are entitled to compensation from the State for violation of their 
Article 21 right to life; governments are obliged to compensate them, the courts are 
obliged to enforce this right to compensation, and this public law remedy does not 
debar them from pursuing private damages.   
 
There is wide judicial consensus that a failure by State authorities to respect the right 
to life warrants compensation.  There is also High Court precedent that failure to 
protect citizens from serious violations of the right to life is also grounds for 
compensation.  However, the actual awards under public law are arbitrary, and few, 
if any, cases articulate reasoning for quantum or develop frameworks that can be 
applied more generally.   The courts have not, in general, adopted tort principles and 
looked at the financial impact of unlawful killing on the bereaved family, but arrived 
at figures they think just in the circumstances, which vary widely.  In Bhajan Kaur, for 
instance, the petitioner contrasted the compensation she got with compensation 
given in other instances by State and Central governments to victims of terrorism 
and victims of the Bhopal gas disaster.  In response, the Delhi High Court surveyed 
compensation under public law for unlawful killing in a series of cases (not related to 
riots), found that awards ranged from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 7.5 lakhs, and declared that 
the petitioner should get Rs. 3.5 lakhs for her loss.  Other High Courts then adopted 
this figure for victims of the 1984 violence. 
 
More recently, the Delhi High Court has tried to articulate a more systematic 
approach to calculating compensation for Article 21 violations, in decisions such as 
Kamla Devi v. Delhi667 and Tasleema v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors668, akin to damages 
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under tort.  In these cases, the court divided the award into two parts.  The first part 
was a standard award for non-pecuniary loss, set at Rs. 1.5 lakhs at 1996 prices, to be 
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index.  The second part was for 
pecuniary loss, or future loss of earnings of the deceased.       
    
While the Delhi High Court has recently moved towards more principled public law 
damages, a survey of jurisprudence reveals wide variation in compensation.  
However, Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed a 
crucial principle – victims of mass communal violence are entitled to compensation 
from the State for its failure to protect them from violence.  The Central and State 
Governments, by contrast, have rarely acknowledged their obligation to compensate 
victims, generally describing compensation as ex gratia, i.e. explicitly rejecting a legal 
obligation to make such compensation. 
 
While courts have undermined the executive’s position that compensation is 
discretionary rather than obligatory, they have failed to go beyond monetary 
compensation and engage with a fuller, more generous notion of reparations.  Below, 
we discuss international standards on reparation, and what they imply for designing 
reparations that are substantively and procedurally just. 
 
D. International standards on reparation 
 
Reparation standards and obligations for States under human rights and 
humanitarian law are collected in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (‘Reparation Principles’)669.  These principles 
ostensibly do not create new legal obligations, ‘but identify mechanisms, modalities, 
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under 
international human rights and humanitarian law’.  Some States have argued that the 
principles go further than the legal instruments they draw upon.  However, the 
principles are non-binding, and perhaps best viewed as consolidating relevant treaty 
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law.  Whether any individual State is bound by a principle depends upon whether it 
is party to the original international treaty from which the principle derives.   
The Reparation principles provide that a State should provide reparation for acts or 
omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of 
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law670.  Like the Indian courts, the Reparation principles thus demand State liability 
for failure to protect individuals from serious human rights abuses.  However, the 
principles go beyond monetary compensation.   According to the principles. 
reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm 
suffered, and include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition.671   
Restitution, under the principles, means measures that whenever possible, restore 
the victim to the original situation before the serious violations of international 
human rights law or humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as 
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life 
and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and 
return of property672.  Thus, the principles incorporate the basic tenet of 
compensation in common law negligence claims.   Contrast this with monetary 
compensation as administered by the Central and State governments, and 
adjudicated by Indian courts.  While jurisprudence and administrative practice 
uphold some financial aid or grant to victims of mass violence, there is no attempt to 
ensure that this aid restores the victim to her or his financial situation before being a 
target of violence. In fact, current State practice in India does not adequately 
compensate victims even for financial loss.  As noted earlier, governments have 
grappled with the more fraught questions of how to restore liberty, family life and 
security to victims of mass violence in an ad hoc way, if at all.    
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The Reparation principles include the right to compensation673 for any economically 
assessable damage, which includes, inter alia: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;  
 (c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning 
potential; 
(d) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical 
services, and psychological and social services. 
As discussed earlier, compensation after the four episodes of mass violence we 
examined included a flat amount for different types of harm.  The governments 
giving these compensation awards have not articulated this as such, but we can 
assume that the amounts given are supposed to compensate victims not just for 
physical harm, but also for mental harm, lost opportunities, and loss of future 
earnings.  Victims have not been compensated for legal and medical fees. 
The Reparation principles incorporate the right to longer term help, or rehabilitation, 
which describes access to medical and psychological care as well as legal and social 
services674.  Across the four compensation packages we examined, governments paid 
only glancing attention to rehabilitation beyond monetary compensation.  The 
standards declared specifically in response to mass violence, as well as general 
standards that were applicable, do not provide in any detail for re-establishing 
livelihoods or resuming education.  There are some measures – low interest loans, 
enhanced food rations – that governments adopted in three of the four cases.  
However, none of these packages or schemes incorporated comprehensive 
rehabilitative measures.   
   
Under the rubric of satisfaction for victims, the Reparation principles include official 
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acknowledgment, and measures to restore civic trust, such as:675 
(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations; 
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the 
extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety 
and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who 
have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further 
violations; 
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the 
children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the 
recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the 
expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the 
families and communities; 
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the 
reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with 
the victim; 
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of 
responsibility; 
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the 
violations; 
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims; 
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in 
educational material and administrative training at all levels. 
It is worth querying whether law or policy should mandate measures such public 
apologies or commemorations, or whether these can only authentically emerge 
through social reconciliation or political accommodation negotiated over time.   
However, the first three measures under the principle of just satisfaction for victims – 
official measures to control violence, recovering the disappeared and the dead and 
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restoring them to families, and building an accurate public record of what happened 
– should surely be the State’s obligations after mass violence. 
The principles also include longer-term institutional reform as a State obligation, 
identifying measures such as police and judicial reform as necessary for preventing 
mass violence.   
The Reparation principles compile existing legal obligations, but like most soft law 
instruments, are also aspirational – a wish list of steps a State should take after gross 
human right violations.  Abstracting from this list of steps, a few themes emerge as 
relevant for reparations programmes.   
 
Scale:  The scale of a program – the number of beneficiaries it covers – obviously 
varies depending upon the number of victims of gross violations.  Many countries 
have administered large-scale reparations programs after mass atrocities, 
particularly after fundamental political transitions.  In Latin America, several 
countries transitioned from dictatorship to democracy across the continent in the 
1990s.  Chile, Argentina and Brazil all developed large reparations programmes, as 
did South Africa after the transition from apartheid.  This type of national 
programme is likely to involve trade-offs in what types of loss it covers and amount 
of compensation.  At the other end of the spectrum, when there are isolated cases of 
serious human rights violations, a reasonably functioning court system should be 
able to accommodate and address the resulting claims against the State.  
 
The mass violence we looked at in India, and the many more episodes that have 
occurred since 1947, fall at neither end of the spectrum.  The four episodes we 
studied resulted in at least a thousand people dead, many more injured, hundreds, 
often thousands, displaced from their homes, and many families financially 
damaged.  However, these episodes of mass violence unspooled within a stable 
political system and under the aegis of a sprawling, albeit inefficient, government 
machine.  The administration in the areas where attacks occur may be under strain, 
but such episodes have not endangered regional and national governments, as they 
might at times of wholesale political transition.  This basic stability means that 
governments in India can arguably sanction and implement deeper, more 
comprehensive reparations programmes without the painful tradeoffs that 
characterize reparations in more tenuous polities.   In light of this, the failure of State 
and Central governments to do so is particularly dishonourable. 
 
Completeness: De Greiff describes ‘completeness’ as a programme’s ability to cover 
‘the whole universe of potential beneficiaries’676.  He argues that completeness is 
affected by (1) evidentiary standards imposed on beneficiaries and (2) structural 
design that encourages or impedes access by victims and efforts by the State to reach 
out to potential beneficiaries.   
 
If victims of serious human rights violations have to fulfil onerous evidentiary 
requirements, they are less likely to qualify for benefits even where they should get 
them.  Some requirements may be very difficult for particular victims to meet, such 
as proof of residence where homes and possessions have been burnt, or birth 
certificates where rates of registration are low.  In Gujarat, for example, we learned 
that survivors who did not claim compensation after the State Government issued 
the first compensation package in 2002 found it difficult to claim compensation 
under subsequent packages.  Requirements that disadvantage those who were 
unable to claim compensation early very likely punish the most vulnerable, since 
they are likely to have the least information in the immediate aftermath of violence.   
 
Similarly, access for people who should benefit is limited by structural barriers, such 
as narrow application deadlines, having to apply in person for benefits, lack of 
public information about the program and its requirements. Experience in India and 
in other countries shows that governments need to spread the word and assist 
potential beneficiaries to make reparations effective.  Fear after identity-based attacks 
stops people from coming forward to claim their dues.  This is even more the case 
where the victim group has traditionally been poor or persecuted.     
 
Governments distributing compensation also need to consider how dues are 
disbursed, particularly where the recipients are vulnerable within their own families 
or communities.  Should, for example, compensation awards take the form of 
government bonds, fixed deposits, or other low-risk investments?  Where a family is 
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receiving compensation when their home was burnt, should the authorities give the 
award to the formal home-owner, or to one of the women in the family?  In the case 
of Naraini Bai v. State of Haryana, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana stepped in to 
protect the married daughter of a couple killed in 1984 from the sexism of the 
Haryana government, which argued that married daughters were not entitled to 
compensation677.  In Bhagalpur after mass violence in 1989, the State Government 
provided for compensation for death to be divided equally amongst the immediate 
family of the deceased, presumably to prevent disputes and ensure that survivors 
share the award equally.  Large sums of cash compensation to women or children 
who have lost many family members sometimes places them under great social risk. 
In the Indian context, the State needs to disburse compensation in ways that protect 
those who are vulnerable within the family unit, particularly women and girls.  
Children orphaned by violence also need particular protection, not only to secure 
monetary compensation, but to guard their access to education, health and access to 
food.   
 
Depth: By the ‘depth’ of a reparations effort we mean the types of harm it covers or 
the types of violations it compensates.  What types of material harm does it cover?  
How is the State’s liability for each type of harm determined?  Does it cover both 
material and non-material harm?   Does it include individual as well as collective 
reparations?   
 
Monetary compensation to individuals for material harm should take precedence 
over collective or symbolic reparations.  However, designing the right framework for 
monetary compensation is challenging.  Most large-scale programmes, like the four 
compensation schemes we looked at, are administrative.  They create categories of 
damage, and assign standardized rates or amounts of compensation to each 
category.  The underlying principle of administrative compensation schemes is, 
arguably, always strict liability, whether the government administering them 
acknowledges this explicitly or not.  While in theory such a programme might be 
guided by the restitutio in integrum standard – restoring the victim to her position 
before she suffered harm – in practice, it is likely to mean a quantum different from 
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what an award applying the principle under the law of torts would yield.  Many 
beneficiaries might be under-compensated for current and future loss as a result, 
while some may be over-compensated.  In addition, administrative compensation 
does not accommodate the demands of individual cases that might warrant 
exemplary damages because of particularly egregious failures on the part of the 
State.  Some commentators have asked whether victims should be allowed to choose 
whether to opt into administrative compensation programmes, or opt out and 
pursue judicial compensation, which is likely to be higher.  However, this sort of 
option might create an easy alibi for a recalcitrant government that is not committed 
to reparations, where the State can blame the victim for not seeking compensation.  
As we mentioned earlier, the Gujarat government’s procedures for claiming 
compensation disadvantage victims who did not claim compensation after the first 
set of rates was announced in 2002.  Another alternative is administrative 
compensation for material harm, which does not extinguish the beneficiary’s right to 
bring an individual claim in court if he feels circumstances warrant this678.  The 
Indian courts have explicitly protected a victim’s right to pursue private damages 
from the perpetrator in addition to compensation from the State.  However, given 
that tort law in India is not very developed, this has not been tested in practice. 
 
The compensation schemes we looked at include compensation for physical 
violations, or putting it another way, violations of certain core civil and political 
rights, including the rights to life, dignity and freedom from torture679.  However, 
they do not include compensation for mental harm, in the sense of mental illness 
triggered by an attack.  They also do not cover compensation for mental harm, in the 
sense of anguish and suffering, or what, in a private negligence claim would be 
termed ‘pain, suffering, loss and injury’.   Finally, these schemes do not include, in 
any comprehensive way, compensation for violations of socio-economic rights and 
their resulting economic costs.  For example, compensation does not cover disruption 
in a child’s schooling; for a child from a poor family, such disruption can be a 
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catalyst for dropping out of education.  It may not include compensation for ‘future 
loss’, continuing harm to livelihood as a result, for instance, a drivers taxi or a 
weaver’s loom being burnt.  
 
The particular compensation packages we examined, but also reparations efforts 
more generally, struggle to accommodate certain types of hidden harm.  Reparations 
efforts should include compensation for different types of sexual violence (which 
they often do not).  However, victims of sexual violence – women as well as men – 
are unlikely to identify themselves.  Compensation for torture can also be difficult to 
include adequately, particularly after episodes of mass violence where torture is not 
inflicted in controlled, ‘official’ environments and proving torture can be genuinely 
difficult.  
 
Symbolic reparations: The Reparations principles reiterate the State’s obligation 
under international law to take symbolic measures of acknowledgement and apology 
under the rubric of ‘just satisfaction’.  Non-monetary reparations, which might 
include public commemoration of victims, memorials, public markers, official 
apology, go beyond particular harm to particular individuals, and aim instead to 
repair the insecurity, public humiliation and trauma that politically organized 
violence engenders.   
 
Examples of symbolic reparations for the four episodes of mass violence we looked 
at are scant.  The Prime Minister apologised in Parliament in August 2005 on behalf 
of Government of India for the 1984 violence.  He addressed his apology "not only to 
the Sikh community but the whole Indian nation" with the assertion that "what took 
place in 1984 was the negation of the concept of nationhood... enshrined in our 
Constitution"680.  However, Central and State governments have not made similar 
gestures for mass violence in Nellie, Bhagalpur or Gujarat.     
 
Hamber makes the point that reparations are a ‘social barometer’ – they 
communicate to victims their place in society, and symbolic measures by the State 
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can communicate social acceptance of their violation, social space for their anger and 
grief.681  Restoring cultural markers that were destroyed during mass violence and 
memorializing the victims’ loss and suffering is an important part of healing.    
 
Some symbolic reparations could, arguably, be ineffective or counterproductive.  For 
example, an official apology would mean little unless it was backed or preceded by 
material reparations, prosecution and an honest account of what happened.  The 
Prime Minister’s apology for the 1984 mass violence, for example, did not translate 
into effective prosecution of criminal cases or pursuit of administrative discipline.   
 
That said, there are some basic non-material measures that the State should 
implement as soon after mass violence as possible, regardless of whether this is 
sincere or politically expedient, and regardless of whether this is controversial 
locally.  This includes exhuming mass graves, financing and providing security for 
last rites by family members, and rebuilding religious sites that have been destroyed 
during violence.  
 
E. Summing up 
 
A survey of the Indian State’s response on relief and rehabilitation reveals that it is 
highly variable and ad hoc.  While there is established administrative precedent on 
providing relief, the lack of a legal obligation to provide relief and rescue those 
targeted by violence allow the government in charge to be completely derelict, as in 
Gujarat in 2002.  Similarly, the lack of national standards on monetary compensation 
means victims are subject to the vagaries of the political formation in power and 
their own ability to lobby the State in securing compensation.  State governments 
appear to make no effort to make compensation easily accessible to victims.  While 
compensation packages across different episodes of mass violence vary, they share 
one constant.  The Centre and State governments subscribe to a very attenuated 
notion of what constitutes recompense for their failure to prevent large-scale identity 
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based violence.   The Indian State delivers poorly on monetary compensation, and is 





After the many episodes of mass violence in India, it has not been uncommon to hear 
victims being encouraged to “move on”, or hear assumptions that victims have, in 
fact, “moved on”.  Pressing for accountability many years after mass violence, on this 
view, disturbs the peace.  We began this work on the premise that authentic peace is 
not possible unless it is built upon a substantial measure of truth and justice.   
 
What the State did or did not do in response to mass violence, is important 
information, that citizens should be able to examine.   Very little of this information 
is publicly accessible.  This study was a modest attempt to use the legal right to 
information to try to secure the survivors’ right to truth. 
 
Therefore, we sought official information on steps the State took towards holding 
individuals and institutions accountable for mass violence, and looked in particular 
at (1) access to criminal justice for victims of violence, (2) whether public officials 
implicated in violence were held accountable, and (3) access to compensation and 
rehabilitation for survivors of violence.     
 
Our experience of using the RTI Act to extract information on mass violence was 
mixed.  A vast amount of information had been destroyed, particularly information 
about the older episodes of mass violence.  Most public authorities initially ignored 
our applications, and responded only when we nudged them with first appeals.  
Many public information officers betrayed a poor understanding of the provisions of 
the RTI Act.  That said, while we were refused a lot of information, we also received 
a significant number of official records.  So, while accessing information was 
difficult, we believe the RTI Act is a valuable resource that should be used 
aggressively to seek such records.   As we said earlier, we felt that the State’s failure 
to make its own performance public shared a pedigree with its multiple failures to 
make reparations.  Denial and impunity become harder to sustain in the face of 
information about the State’s actions.    
 
It is, obviously, very important to use the RTI Act in securing justice for victims of 
recent episodes of mass violence.  It is equally important to extract the information 
that survives on older episodes of mass violence, as a matter of historical record, as 
testimony to the experience of victims, and as a way to understand the State’s 
failures.   
Victims of mass violence were let down severely by the criminal justice system 
across all four episodes of mass violence.  The system failed them from their first 
point of contact with it – when registering FIRs.  Flawed FIRs gave way to poor 
investigation, which in turn led to high rates of summary closure.  We found 
summary closure rates 10 times higher than the closest national rate for each episode 
of mass violence, except for Nellie, where the summary closure rate was 8 times 
higher than the closest national rate.   The number of people arrested in the 
aftermath of violence was small, relative to the scale of violence.  Gross negligence by 
the police was followed by poor prosecution.  Bail and remand application 
information from Gujarat revealed that the prosecution made a remand 
application for only 20% of suspects who were arrested, and opposed less that 
6% of bail applications.  Rates of acquittal were so high as to suggest that the 
judiciary at the trial court level has been passive to the point of being complicit in 
subverting fair, credible trials.  The scale of these failures, the fact that they are 
repeated across different episodes, demonstrates that they are systematic rather than 
occasional aberrations.  Poor investigation and protracted trials seem to be facilitated 
by senior functionaries in government and politics.  Recent results in re-opened cases 
in Bhagalpur and SIT cases in Gujarat show that when mass violence cases are 
prosecuted seriously, the rate of conviction is much higher.  These exceptions are 
telling – usually in the aftermath of mass violence, the police, prosecution and 
judiciary have worked to further the goals of politically powerful actors.     
 
Those in senior government positions or high political office have rarely even been 
put on trial.  Governments have used the muted, euphemistic findings of 
commissions of inquiry as a shield, instead of using the hard information that 
emerges from inquiries to hold officials accountable.  As the aftermath of the 1984 
and 2002 mass violence show, governments have ignored several investigations and 
inquiries, and jettisoned complicit individuals only when criticism by the media, civil 
society and the opposition in the legislature reaches a tipping point.  Substantive 
gaps in the law and procedural barriers to prosecution also make it easier for 
complicit ministers and government officials to escape prosecution.  The Central 
Government needs to amend the law to incorporate command responsibility 
principles into criminal law, and amend how permission to prosecute government 
officials is granted, so that Section 197 of the CrPC does not stymie legitimate 
prosecutions.   
Any episode of mass violence testifies to a failure by the State to prevent and control 
identity based violence.  Clearly, the State has a duty to restitute victims of mass 
violence, restoring them to their former circumstances.   Various High Courts have 
affirmed that the State’s failure to prevent death as a result of violence by non-State 
actors, including terrorist attacks and communal violence, entitles victims to 
damages under public law.   
 
Central and State governments have given compensation to victims of mass violence 
far more readily than they have pursued criminal prosecution of perpetrators.  
However, the details of compensation given after the four massacres we examined 
are not widely available and we discovered that many official records had been 
destroyed over time.  Compensation packages after each episode of mass violence, 
across different states, cover similar types of loss.  The amount of compensation 
offered does not seek to restore victims of violence to their former circumstances. 
Rates of compensation for damage to property, for example, have amounted to token 
payments rather than the value of what was actually lost.  Compensation for similar 
types of loss varies across episodes, even factoring in the passage of time.  This 
variation in compensation amounts results in some lives and some injuries being 
valued lower than others.   The Central Government should lay down binding 
national norms on compensation that set a minimum standard below which State 
Governments cannot fall.  National norms should make compensation compulsory.  
While courts have said the State is obliged to compensate victims of mass violence, 
Central and state governments maintain the position that the compensation they 
offer is discretionary.  Given that governments have resisted acknowledging their 
basic legal obligation to compensate victims, it is no surprise they have failed entirely 
to rehabilitate victims more fully by taking steps to restore physical, economic and 
cultural security in targeted communities.  
 
The Indian State owes survivors of mass violence access to truth, access to justice, 
and access to material and non-material restitution.  It has failed on all these counts, 
a failure confirmed by its own records.  Central and state governments should 
pursue criminal prosecutions, especially of those with greatest responsibility.  They 
should undertake comprehensive reparations programmes.  They should disclose all 
the information they can while respecting the privacy of survivors.  They should 
initiate pressing institutional reform of the police and prosecution systems to prevent 
mass violence in the future, and to break decisively from India’s shameful tradition 
of impunity for such violence.   
 
